Paul Wolfowitz Memoranda of Conversation with Vaclav Havel and Lubos Dobrovsky in Prague.

CONFIDENTIAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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7 JUN 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: USDP Wolfowitz's Report on Trip to Prague

Attached for information are copies of:

-- A report of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz's trip to Prague April 24-26, 1991, to participate in a conference on "The Future of European Security" and to meet with President Havel and MoD Dobrovsky.

-- Memoranda of conversations between USDP Wolfowitz and President Havel and MOD Dobrovsky.

John A. Dubia Executive Secretary

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X56397 91/44185 UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S) DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

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USDP PAUL WOLFOWITZ'S TRIP TO PRAGUE, APRIL 24-26, 1991

MAJOR POINTS

A. CONFERENCE ON "THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY"

The conference was jointly sponsored by NATO SYG Woerner and Czechoslovak FonMin Dienstbier. Several speakers commented that such a conference would have been inconceivable two years ago.

President Havel presented welcoming remarks to Woerner, most of the NATO Pemreps, the Foreign Ministers of four East European states, Poland's Deputy MoD, the Italian FonMin, and civilian and military officials and academics from NATO and Eastern-Central European states. DepFonMin Kvitsinskiy and G. Arbatov represented the USSR.

Conference speakers focused on Eastern Europe.

-- The East Europeans evinced pride in developments in their home countries. The Czechoslovak DepFon Min hoped that the political elements of the Warsaw Pact would be terminated this summer.

-- Many East Europeans voiced concern over being isolated or perceived as a buffer zone between NATO and the USSR. Several said NATO and the presence of U.S. troops in Europe contributed to security and stability on the Continent.

-- Western speakers emphasized that they were not indifferent to the security of East Europeans. While it was premature to give security assurances or membership in NATO, they suggested principles to guide security relationships in Europe.

-- Some Westerners mentioned negative assurances, but it was not clear what exactly they had in mind. Such assurances could mean unwelcome restrictions on the East Europeans.

-- Arbatov, who noted the importance of Soviet conservative views, spoke of an imbalance resulting from the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the continued existence of NATO. Woerner and others eloquently defended the continued need for NATO, while also emphasizing the need to include the USSR in European security arrangements. In reply to Arbatov's later remark that it seemed many viewed Europe as standing on a single NATO leg, which made for lack of balance, the UK NATO PermRep said the Europe he had heard described at the conference had many legs like a centipede.

-- A Western speaker pointed out that Kvitsinskiy's remarks never once mentioned NATO or democracy.

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**USDP Wolfowitz's Speech:**

- Dealt with U.S. policy and the East European security concerns outlined by Havel at NATO in March.

- Emphasized the U.S. commitment to democracy, independence, and sovereignty in the new democracies of East-Central Europe, the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the continued existence of NATO and a U.S. troop presence, although at lower levels, in Europe, and the end of spheres of influence and buffer zones in the region.

- In light of Soviet efforts to conclude new treaties with the East Europeans that would restrict their sovereignty by precluding entrance into treaties or alliances directed against the other party, he pointed out that the CSCE agreements emphasize the right of countries to enter or not enter into treaties or alliances of their own choosing.

- Polish officials at the conference sought out USDP's staff to make the point that they were glad to receive support for their refusal to follow in the footsteps of Romania, which has accepted Soviet restrictions and signed a new treaty.

- Hungarian MFA State Secretary Tomas Katona also expressed appreciation for USDP's reference to CSCE principles and said Hungary would continue to resist such limitations and work in harness with the Poles and Czechoslovaks. (Earlier, the Czechoslovaks and Poles had described Hungary as "wobbly" on the security restrictions.)

**B. USDP WOLFOWITZ'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HAVEL**

- Havel was fully briefed on USDP's remarks at the conference, and was grateful for his comments concerning bilateral treaties. He said the Soviets had pressed the CSFR in on-going negotiations on a bilateral treaty to include a provision not to enter alliances directed against the other party, and specifically referred to the possibility in 10 years of Czechoslovakia joining NATO and the EC. Havel said he was resisting this Soviet proposal in order to protect Czechoslovakia's sovereignty, because he envisioned joining the EC by the year 2000, and wanted to build a network of bilateral treaties with Germany, East European countries, and the USSR. Havel subsequently made this point in public.

- Havel said Kvitsinskiy, who was both attending the conference and negotiating the bilateral treaty with the Czechoslovaks, had accused him of sounding like Dientsbier, Wolfowitz, and Woerner on this subject.

- USDP thanked Havel for the CSFR's contribution during the Gulf crisis. Havel said it had been important for Czechoslovakia's self-confidence, and he was glad Czechoslovak troops were on the right side again.

- Havel expressed appreciation for IMET and President Bush's recent offer of assistance on defense conversion. USDP said the U.S. was prepared to help on conversion and that

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DepSecDef might be able to visit Czechoslovakia this summer. He warned, however, that there was no magic answer beyond relying on market forces.

• Havel said he hoped Secretary Cheney would visit Czechoslovakia.

C. USDP WOLFOWITZ'S MEETING WITH MOD DOBROVSKY

• Dobrovsky said he had just returned from Africa. [It was subsequently learned that he had been negotiating deals on military trainer aircraft, and ammunition production capabilities in exchange for oil.]

• Dobrovsky emphasized the importance of stability in the CSFR for European security, and the need for contacts at the federal level to help quiet separatist agitation.

• Contrary to popular belief, the dissolution of the military structures of the Warsaw Pact had not created a vacuum in the region. According to Dobrovsky, more certainty existed now, and the three Northern Tier countries were no longer buffers between two worlds. This would become clear when the citizens of these countries were ready to defend the principles and values of parliamentary democracy with arms.

• Dobrovsky said the CSFR was prepared to accept IMET. He foresaw a possible problem with some of the IMET implementing language, which might be construed as impinging upon CSFR sovereignty. It was agreed to allow the experts to resolve any problem.

• Dobrovsky mentioned the Czechoslovak government's retreat from its initial position of calling for the dissolution of NATO as well as the Warsaw Pact. He also said Prague was attracted to NATO because it ensured the presence of U.S. troops in Europe.

• Dobrovsky was happy to accept an invitation from SecDef to visit the U.S. [now scheduled for June 11-18].

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

MEETING OF USD P PAUL WOLFOWITZ WITH PRESIDENT VACLAV HAVEL

PRAGUE, APRIL 27, 1991, 1430-1500

Participants:

U.S. USD P Wolfowitz Amb. Shirley Temple Black

Principal Deputy Under Secretary Libby Asst. Deputy Under Secretary Edelman Director SEE James Morison Maria Copson, OUSD/P/SEE Col. Edwin Motyka, DAT LTC Joseph Collins LTC Stephen Freeman

Czechoslovak President Havel Karl Schwarzenberg, Director, Presidential Chancellory Sasha Vondra, Pres. Foreign Policy Advisor LTG Tomecek, Chief, Pres. Mil. Office LTG Andrejcak, Dep. MoD, Strategic Plans

President Havel welcomed USD P Wolfowitz to the Castle, thanked him for his statement at the Prague conference on "The Future of European Security," and said he was particularly gratified by some of USD P's comments on East-Central Europe.

USD P Wolfowitz replied that he thought it important to come to the conference because of Czechoslovakia's importance to the security of the West. He thanked Havel for his statements concerning the importance of NATO and U.S. troops in Europe, and for the CSFR's contributions to the Persian Gulf, including its quick response to the U.S. request for heavy equipment transport vehicles (HETS).

President Havel said Czechoslovakia's contribution was important both politically and for its own internal self confidence. After a long time, Czechoslovak troops were on the right side again.

He had received Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kvitsinskiy that morning and talked about the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty being prepared. The treaty included one item upon which the two countries differ. The Soviets did not want the CSFR to enter any alliance hostile to the USSR and vice versa. The Czechoslovaks are not willing to agree to such a provision. Who, for example, would judge whether or not an alliance was hostile to the other party? Such a provision would limit our independence and sovereignty. The CSFR wants total sovereignty to make its own security decisions in the future. It does not want to act against the Soviet Union or enter an alliance directed against the USSR. But nor does it want any restrictions on its sovereignty.

This boils down to two possibilities in the next 10 years: NATO and the EC. The

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CONFIDENTIAL [DECLASSIFIED] -2- Czechoslovaks are deciding where they belong in the world. The possibility exists of concluding an associate agreement with the EC. This would have security overtones because of efforts to give the European Community a security dimension and political unity. The CSFR hopes for full EC membership by the end of the century. If it were to sign the treaty proposed by the Soviets, Czechoslovakia would be prevented from joining the EC and becoming a member of Europe.

President Havel noted that USDP had mentioned new bilateral agreements in his statement at the conference that morning. A new bilateral network must be created, and while the CSFR realizes that future security arrangements would be unthinkable without the United States, the Soviet Union and its Republics must not be excluded. Such arrangements, however, can only be based on equality of rights and sovereignty of decisions.

USDP Wolfowitz said he agreed. While it is not our business to give the Czechoslovaks advice, he had quoted the Helsinki Final Act in his speech to make that point and to remind the Soviets of their solemn commitments to that Act.

President Havel replied that this was the CSFR's principal argument in the negotiations with the Soviets. Kvitsinskiy had told him today that his people sounded like Woerner and Wolfowitz.

USDP Wolfowitz noted that somebody had commented that Kvitsinskiy had not mentioned NATO or democracy once during his remarks at the conference, although nobody was rude enough to point that out in public. The United States sees the CSCE serving many important functions. Its approach is not to do things now that would freeze a situation that still needs to develop, and to avoid doing anything that might be perceived by the Soviets as a provocation or threat to their security. He expressed surprise that the Soviets were pushing so hard to tie Czechoslovakia's hands in the future.

President Havel said one of the reasons the Soviets persist in the old stereotype of NATO and other European institutions is because they still subconsciously see a potential adversary in these structures.

He expressed his thanks for U.S. military cooperation in the training of officers, which is very important. He then turned to his recent conversation with President Bush, during which he had mentioned the CSFR's need for support in converting arms industries to civilian production. Czechoslovakia has a big arms industry, largely concentrated in Slovakia, with skilled workers who could manufacture engines, etc. In the past Czechoslovak arms were supplied to most of the Warsaw Pact and various "suspicious regimes in the world."

Markets, however, are changing and without foreign assistance or participation, it would be very difficult for the CSFR to make the necessary changes in production. President Havel said he was raising this problem because it concerns political stability in the CSFR and elsewhere. The arms industry was located in Slovakia for strategic reasons, and is now giving rise to a specific political problem. He would be grateful if this subject could be kept in mind.

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USDP Wolfowitz assured the President that this subject was very much in mind because instructions had been received from President Bush after Havel's telephone call. Foreign Minister Dienstbier had already met with Deputy Secretary of Defense Atwood, and DoD was working on a number of things that might be done to help.

USDP warned, however, that there should be no illusions. There will be no magic answer or silver bullet, and the process inevitably will be painful. Thanks to successes in East-Central Europe, the United States was going through the same process. It was reducing forces and closing bases, etc., and U.S. politicians were very unhappy. As difficult as it is for the U.S., however, the process does not involve the kind of political problems the CSFR has in Slovakia.

President Havel noted that only 3 tanks had been sold in the past year, and unlike the U.S., Czechoslovakia does not have a stable, balanced market economy. He had visited a tank factory and had seen at first hand that all the machinery was single-purpose and would have to be torn out if they were to try and manufacture something else. The area suffers greatly from fear of unemployment and social insecurity. The Czechoslovaks do not expect the U.S. to help. They know they have to help themselves and come up with their own initiative. Work is being done on this.

USDP Wolfowitz said the U.S. wanted to share its knowledge and experience, and was trying to identify some U.S. companies which might be able to give advice on the use of resources. He acknowledged, however, that President Havel had put his finger on the heart of the problem, and that the Czechoslovaks might, indeed, have to begin from scratch. Machines that made tanks will not make other things. The CSFR will need to reshape its resources. The U.S. has found that markets do this well. That is where part of the answer lies. DoD would like to arrange for Mr. Atwood to go to Czechoslovakia, perhaps in the summer. He is number two at the Pentagon and has worked in private industry - with General Motors.

Amb. Shirley Temple Black said GM had not had much success in Czechoslovakia.

President Havel returned to USDP's remark that the market is the best stimulator, and noted that Czechoslovakia did not have a full market yet and could not achieve one overnight. In short, the pressure of the market was not yet operational in Czechoslovakia.

USDP Wolfowitz acknowledged that this was true, and that it would be harder for the CSFR than for the U.S. IMET is one of America's most successful programs, and it should concentrate first on management of defense resources.

President Havel ended the meeting by sending his best regards to Secretary Cheney, and expressing the hope of seeing him in Czechoslovakia sooner or later. He added that despite all the problems confronting the country, he was optimistic for the long run.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

MEETING OF USDP PAUL WOLFOWITZ WITH DEFENSE MINISTER LUBOS DOBROVSKY

PRAGUE, APRIL 27, 1991, 1300-1400

Participants:

U.S.

USDP Wolfowitz Amb. Shirley Temple Black Principal Deputy Under Secretary Libby Asst. Deputy Under Secretary Edelman Director SEE, James Morrison Maria Copson, OUSD/P/SEE Col. Edwin Motyka, DAT LTC Joseph Collins, OUSD/P LTC Stephen Freeman, OUSD/P/SEE

Czechoslovak

MoD Dobrovsky Asst. Vice MoD Jaroslav Janda LTG Anton Slimak, Chief, Gen. Staff MG Jindra, Chief of International Rels Interpreter

In his welcoming remarks, MoD Dobrovsky said such meetings were rare, and asked for clarification of the U.S. International Military Education Training (IMET) program.

USDP Wolfowitz said he hoped such meetings would increase in number. Secretary Cheney wanted to deepen the dialogue and invited MoD Dobrovsky to the U.S.

MoD Dobrovsky noted that he and the Secretary had wanted to meet for some time but obstacles always stood in the way. The Gulf war had only been over for a few weeks, and the consequences were still being felt. He was not afraid of flying and was ready to leave at any time.

USDP Wolfowitz explained that Secretary Cheney's calendar was only just beginning to return to normal for the first time since August 2, and promised to provide specific dates and a proposed agenda for the visit shortly.

Turning to complicated political developments in the CSFR, MoD Dobrovsky made the following points:

• The Havel Administration was looking for all possible ways to quiet separatist agitation and make a reasonable federation possible. Emotions played a part in this equation and made rational argument difficult.
• Any contacts on the federal level were very important for the stabilization of the country.
• A weakening of stability in the CSFR would have broad consequences for Central Europe and the whole continent. The more this part of Europe fragments, the more quarrels will erupt and the greater the possibility of even a return to totalitarian systems.

USDP Wolfowitz said the U.S. admired and was grateful for the remarkable changes that have taken place. Czechoslovak achievements have made the whole world more secure.

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He stressed that the U.S. was by no means indifferent to the security of the CSFR. USDP noted that some of Dobrovsky's Polish colleagues had that morning at the conference on "The Future of European Security," referred to those in the West nostalgic for the stability of the Cold War. That stability, they correctly said, was the stability of the cemetery. A return to those times would produce instability, and this made cooperation between our two countries very important.

MoD Dobrovsky said he had recently given a speech to a Euro Group conference in Bonn, at which similar thoughts had been expressed, including the notion that the dismantlement of the Warsaw Pact military structures had created some kind of vacuum. But, in fact, proponents of the vacuum theory were wrong. There was more certainty now. The CSFR, Poland and Hungary were not buffers between two worlds. This would be clear, and the security of Europe would be strengthened once the citizens of these three countries were ready to defend the principles and values of parliamentary democracy with arms. It was necessary to continue uniting the forces of democracy, and give the decisive support without which economic stability is impossible.

Agreeing with these thoughts, USDP Wolfowitz said the world learned a lesson from Czechoslovakia, especially in 1938. Indeed, this experience was very much at the forefront of President Bush's mind throughout the recent Gulf crisis. Like Dobrovsky, USDP also rejected the notion of a vacuum and pointed to the extraordinary growth of democracy. Building an economic base to sustain and strengthen the new democracy was the most important task ahead.

Turning to security issues, USDP Wolfowitz said:

-- There has been anxiety in nearly every direction about relations with NATO. But it was clear from the conference on "The Future of European Security" that the issue now is not membership of NATO. He hoped it was also clear that while NATO would not extend membership now, it was concerned with Czechoslovak security.

-- NATO's existence benefits not only its members but the whole of Europe, and especially the new democracies.

-- The very existence of NATO was in doubt a year ago. Under the leadership of President Bush, and with the strong support of the NATO allies and a united Germany, it was concluded that while the opportunity had arisen to reshape and reduce forces, NATO remained very important for security and stability in Europe. Not only will the Soviet Union remain a large military power as it pulled back behind its own borders, but NATO also anchored Germany to the West and the U.S. to Europe.

-- One of the major achievements of the past year was the consensus reached on the importance of maintaining NATO. East European statements on this subject -- such as President's Havel's at the NAC in March -- were valuable to the U.S. and its allies in Europe, and helped maintain Alliance cohesion.

MoD Dobrovsky said the CSFR had been developing relations with NATO since the first weeks of the revolution, but had revised its views radically. At the beginning, President Havel had urged the dissolution of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO. While Prague still stood

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by its original assessment of the importance of the Helsinki Process, it realized in time that NATO needed to be maintained. Off the record, the CSFR was attracted to NATO because it ensured the U.S. presence in Europe.

USDP Wolfowitz then turned to the IMET program. Education was the best investment, and IMET was the most effective of all U.S. military programs. An interagency U.S. IMET team had just been to Prague to explain that the program would initially focus on defense resource management, and possibly help in developing some language skills to enable more CSFR officers and civilians to participate.

In reply, MoD Dobrovsky said the language barrier was very high. Prague wanted its officers to have a good knowledge of English, but this would take time. Officers would be selected by competition and only those who could benefit from IMET would be chosen. After the first courses there should be some form of evaluation so that corrections could be made if needed. The IMET implementing language might pose a problem; it showed a certain distrust of the CSFR. It was possible that Prague would not accept anything that touched on the sovereignty of the CSFR. It might be necessary to find words to satisfy both U.S. security concerns that no information be passed to a third country, and the specific conditions of Czechoslovakia. This could be dealt with by experts from both sides. Perhaps the U.S. would be satisfied with a CSFR Government guarantee that there would be no leak of secret information and, in the event of such a leak, would inform Washington immediately and try to find a solution.

USDP Wolfowitz agreed the details could be discussed by experts, and said that although he was not familiar with the IMET language, to the best of his knowledge it was standard wording and did not single out the CSFR or reflect any suspicion of that country. He added that other countries with known sensitivities concerning their sovereignty, such as China, had had no difficulty in accepting the standard language.

MoD Dobrovsky then thanked the USG for sending Col. Motyka to Prague as the U.S. DATT. He had done much for the CSFR, including helping get the Czechoslovak chemical weapons unit to Saudi Arabia. The MoD also thanked the USG for transporting the unit to the Gulf, and expressed the hope that future Czechoslovak-U.S. cooperation would prevent wars.

The purpose of military preparations, USDP Wolfowitz replied, was to prevent war. Europe has enjoyed the longest period of peace in its history. The USG thanked the CSFR for its important contributions to the Gulf crisis. He added his thanks to those of MoD Dobrovsky for the work of Col. Motyka, and quipped that he wanted to make the DATT even busier in the future. As far as the language barrier was concerned, the U.S. could assist in language training. It might be able to send people, who could help train CSFR teachers.

MoD Dobrovsky closed by noting that travel abroad changed one's perspective on one's own national problems. He expressed the hope that Czechoslovakia's first IMET graduates would be able to view the country's problems from a wider point of view.

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