James A. Baker III, Memorandum for the President, “My meeting with Shevardnadze.”

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PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT SIT: FILE SIT

IMMEDIATE SECRET 050830Z MAY 90

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN GERMANY

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4917 RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SECTO 06013 NODIS FOR S, D AND S/S - EYES ONLY E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A III) SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT BONN, MAY 4, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III SUBJECT: MY MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE

1. I HAVE JUST COMPLETED A NEARLY FOUR-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH SHEVARDNADZE. HE PROVIDED ME A COPY OF THE LETTER GORBACHEV HAS SENT TO YOU. IN ADDITION, HE GAVE ME ONE RAISA GORBACHEV IS SENDING TO BARBARA. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO DISCUSS LITHUANIA, GERMAN UNIFICATION AND THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR PROCESS AND ARMS CONTROL. WHILE THESE WERE OUR MAIN THEMES, I ALSO RAISED TWO OTHER ISSUES BRIEFLY. FIRST, I PROPOSED A JOINT U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO HELP FEED THE STARVING IN ETHIOPIA -- USING OUR FOOD AND THEIR PLANES. DAVE BOREN IS PUSHING THIS AND SHEVARDNADZE SEEMED VERY RECEPTIVE. WE'LL TALK ABOUT THE DETAILS MORE TOMORROW. SECOND, I RAISED OUR CONCERNS ABOUT RUMORS WE'VE HEARD OF A PAMYAT-LED POGROM AGAINST JEWS THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET UNION TOMORROW. INTERESTINGLY, HE BASICALLY ACKNOWLEDGED

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THESE ARE NOT SIMPLY RUMORS, SAYING THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS TAKEN ALL THE STEPS THEY CAN TO PREVENT THIS. HE SAID THEY COULDN'T EXCLUDE INDIVIDUAL INCIDENTS BUT HE SAID THE MVD AND OTHER SECURITY ELEMENTS WERE ON HIGH ALERT AND HAD CALLED IN AND WARNED THE PAMYAT RING-LEADERS OF THE CONSEQUENCE OF VIOLENCE AND ATTACKS AGAINST JEWS. LET ME TURN TO LITHUANIA. LITHUANIA

2. I GOT THE IMPRESSION FROM OUR DISCUSSION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE MORE RELAXED AND CONFIDENT THAT THEIR STRATEGY IS WORKING. SHEVARDNADZE IMPLIED NO SENSE OF URGENCY. INDEED, WHEN I EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOVIETS NOT SIMPLY TALKING ABOUT THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE, BUT ACTUALLY TAKING STEPS TO PRODUCE ONE, HE SAID HE THOUGHT ONE WOULD BE POSSIBLE IN TIME. HE REFERRED TO THE GROWING DEBATE AMONG THE LITHUANIAN LEADERSHIP OVER THE NEED FOR COMPROMISE, AND IMPLIED THEY WOULD COME AROUND. HE REPEATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING TO START A DIALOGUE IF THE LITHUANIAN LEADERS ANNOUNCED THEY WERE FREEZING THE DECLARATION AND THE LAWS THAT FOLLOWED IT AND WERE WILLING TO COME TO MOSCOW TO BEGIN TALKS. BUT HE SAID THE INITIATIVE, THE FIRST STEP, MUST COME FROM THEM. I ASKED IF LANDSBERGIS ET AL. CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD FROM THE SOVIETS WHAT THEY NEEDED TO DO AND WHAT THE RESULT WOULD BE (NAMELY, BEGINNING OF A DIALOGUE AND LIFTING OF THE SANCTIONS). HE SAID HE WAS CONFIDENT THEY DID. HE SAID THE MAIN PROBLEM AT THIS POINT WAS THE LITHUANIAN WILLINGNESS ONLY TO TALK OF POSSIBLE STEPS AND THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO ACTIVELY TAKE THEM. HERE AGAIN HE NOTED THE SOVIETS WOULD BE PATIENT AND "WAIT A LITTLE LONGER" AS THE LITHUANIANS DEBATE THE ISSUE.

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3. AS FOR POSSIBLE U.S. SANCTIONS, HE SAID THEY WOULD BE NO TRAGEDY, THOUGH THEY WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE -- AS THEY WOULD BE AN INDICATION OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING TO THE RELATIONSHIP. BT *6013 BT SECRET SECTION 02 OF 03 SECTO 06013 NODIS FOR S, D AND S/S - EYES ONLY GERMANY

4. I MADE A FAIRLY LENGTHY PRESENTATION TO HIM, EMPHASIZING THE PRINCIPLES THAT GUIDE US ON (1) THE UNIFICATION PROCESS (NO SINGULARITY AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST GERMANY, THE NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF OTHERS); AND (2) THE ROLE OF THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR AS A "STEERING GROUP" ABLE TO DECIDE A LIMITED NUMBER OF ISSUES (E.G., FOUR-POWER RIGHTS, BORDERS,) AND SHAPED TO DISCUSS OTHERS AND DIRECT THEM TO THEIR PROPER FORA FOR DECISION (NUCLEAR FORCES: SNF NEGOTIATIONS; BUNDESWEHR LIMITS: CFE).
5. I ALSO USED YOUR SPEECH AND OUR RECOGNITION OF THE NEED TO ADAPT NATO, POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY, AND TO DEVELOP CSCE TO REASSURE SHEVARDNADZE THAT THE PROCESS WOULD NOT YIELD WINNERS AND LOSERS. INSTEAD, IT WOULD PRODUCE A NEW LEGITIMATE EUROPEAN STRUCTURE -- ONE THAT WOULD BE INCLUSIVE, NOT EXCLUSIVE.
6. SHEVARDNADZE RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT THE SOVIETS WELCOMED YOUR SPEECH AND MY COMMENTS AT NATO: INDEED, THAT OUR DISCUSSION OF THE NEW EUROPEAN ARCHITECTURE WAS COMPATIBLE WITH MUCH OF THEIR THINKING, THOUGH THEIR THINKING WAS STILL BEING DEVELOPED. HE SAID THEY AGREED THERE SHOULD BE NO DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE TWO GERMANIES OR, IN TIME,

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THE ONE GERMANY. THAT WAS THE MEANING OF THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR, WHERE AFTER ALL THE TWO GERMANIES WERE SITTING AS FULL AND EQUAL PARTNERS. 7. IN ANSWER TO MY CHARACTERIZATION OF THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR AS A STEERING GROUP DISCUSSING AND DIRECTING ISSUES TO OTHER FORA, SHEVARDNADZE SAID HE NEEDED TO THINK MORE ABOUT THIS. HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS REALLY THOUGHT OF THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR AS A DECISION-MAKING BODY, NOT MERELY AS AN ADVISORY GROUP. MOREOVER, HE ALSO FELT THAT IT SHOULD NOT RUSH TO MAKE DECISIONS AND COMPLETE ITS WORK. THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR NEEDED TO ADDRESS MANY COMPLEX ISSUES AND NEEDED TIME TO DO THAT. THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT ENCOURAGE DELAY, BUT FELT THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR SHOULD BE WORKING IN PARALLEL WITH CSCE AND WITH CFE. AS HE PUT IT, THE THREE SHOULD BE SEEN AS A KIND OF SINGLE COMPLEX. 8. HE DID NOT USE THE TERM "SYNCHRONIZATION," BUT HE CLEARLY WAS TRYING TO DEVELOP A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR AND THE OTHER POLITICAL, MILITARY, ECONOMIC PROCESSES IN EUROPE. 9. WE'LL HAVE TO SEE IF WE CAN CHANNEL THAT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. WHILE THEY'RE NOT ON THE SAME WAVE LENGTH, I THINK OUR CONCEPT OF TWO-PLUS-FOUR AS A STEERING GROUP MIGHT YET HAVE SOME APPEAL TO THEM. 10. MOVING THEM ON GERMANY IN NATO WILL PROBABLY PROVE MORE DIFFICULT. HE EMPHASIZED AGAIN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFICULTY THEY HAVE -- ESPECIALLY THE SOVIET PUBLIC HAS -- OF ACCEPTING A UNIFIED GERMANY IN NATO. HE DID THIS WHILE IMPLICITLY ACCEPTING THE LOGIC OF OUR POSITION -- AGREEING THAT NEUTRALITY WAS NOT THE ANSWER FOR LONG-TERM STABILITY AND STATING CLEARLY THAT THE SOVIETS WANT US MILITARY (NOT JUST POLTICAL AND ECONOMIC) PRESENCE IN EUROPE. (INDEED, HE SAID THE US MILITARY PRESENCE MUST REMAIN IN

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EUROPE FOR AT LEAST SEVEN TO TEN YEARS, PROBABLY LONGER.) 11. WHAT COMES THROUGH IS THAT THE SOVIETS DON'T KNOW HOW TO SQUARE THE CIRCLE. THEY'RE WRESTLING WITH IT. I SUSPECT THAT GORBACHEV DOESN'T WANT TO TAKE ON THIS KIND OF AN EMOTIONALLY CHARGED POLITICAL ISSUE NOW, AND ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT BEFORE THE PARTY CONGRESS. BT *6013 BT S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 SECTO 06013 NODIS FOR S, D AND S/S - EYES ONLY 12. I PRESENTED OUR PACKAGE ON ALCMS AND SLCMS, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT IT HAD BEEN DIFFICULT FOR US TO MOVE IN THIS FASHION AND SAYING WE COULDN'T GO FURTHER. I ALSO SAID I DIDN'T WANT TO GO TO MOSCOW IN ELEVEN DAYS WITH THESE ISSUES UNRESOLVED. SHEVARDNADZE CALLED THE PACKAGE A MAJOR STEP ON OUR PART. HE WANTED TO STUDY IT BEFORE FORMALLY RESPONDING, BUT PROMISED AN ANSWER BY EARLY NEXT WEEK. HE CAUTIONED ONLY THAT OUR INABILITY TO ACCEPT AN ALCM CARRYING HEAVY BOMBER SUB-CEILING MIGHT BE A PROBLEM SINCE THIS LEFT OPEN A CHANNEL THAT NEEDED TO BE CONTROLLED. BUT HE SAID THIS WAS ONLY A PRELIMINARY RESPONSE AND HE AGAIN NOTED THAT WE HAD CLEARLY MOVED. BAKER BT *6013

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