Teimuraz Stepanov-Mamaladze notes from Conference on Open Skies, Ottawa, Canada.

Excerpts from Stepanov-Mamaladze Notebooks

12 February

Opening of the conference on the Open Skies regime

Malrouney, Genscher, Fischer, Baker, Eimens (?), Dimitrov, Orgonnes (?) Dumas, Horn.

“New ethics of cooperation.”

J. Baker

Recently looked into the hole in the Berlin Wall.

Walls are falling everywhere. The march of freedom has begun.

Stability and predictability.

Disagreements on air forces.

Excludes a possibility of unexpected attack.

Stalin’s concept: security of the Soviet Union means insecurity for others.

Genscher and Fischer next to each other.

Fast evolution on the old continent.

There was no security without super-armaments

There will be no security without trust.

Skubiszewski.

Poland was one of the sources of the change.

The word “Solidarity” assumed an all-European

Atlantic meaning

van den Broek (Netherlands)

At the Geneva conference in 1955. Khrushchev. Thunder strike. Short circuit and total darkness.

Expresses confidence that united Germany changes the appearance. A zero in the cause of building a new European peace order.

Dimitrov

Speaks English.

Meeting.

Hurd.

You have a very informal style. Especially about space, not only to grow spinach here. We listen to you and enjoy.

H[urd] Pace of events.

Baker.

I would like to talk about two things.

a) [We] would like to keep personnel at the current level, i.e. 195 thousand in the central zone, and 225 in the rest. We already discussed with you, even if you leave Eastern Europe (crossed out) Germany, you still remain the greatest power. We, however, will withdraw across the ocean.

2. About German unification.

Formula 2+4, about which we talked in Moscow. It is the best approach for the interests of all main players in this game.

We should agree as soon as possible without putting each other in an uncomfortable situation.

2+4 form[ula] responds to the question about the future presence of Soviet troops in Germany.

Baker's proposal—the result of my morning conversations with him.

I think it includes your expectations, about which you talked in Moscow.

E.A. There are elements on which I would not focus attention, which cause irritation.

All my colleagues say:

United Germany will be in NATO

Will German unification happen?

When they speak about it as an accomplished fact, they don’t take into account how the Soviet people would react to it.

If I mentioned it yesterday, I would open a discussion.

You should be more flexible not only in actions but in statements as well.

About the 2+4 formula

Baker consulted about coordinating a statement. I have nothing against it. I should consult with Moscow.

You have some problems with the unification? We are talking about unification. “Rapprochement” is unrealistic.

Development[s] in the GDR don’t make us happy. A statement would have a stabilizing effect there.

The word “rapprochement” would generate mistrust among the people in the FRG, where the outflow from the GDR is growing.

-This is your problem.

-GDR’s problem. Here we have a TASS statement that mentions “unification.”

-It mentions “unity” and these are different things.

-Let it be “for establishment of German unity.”

-And why should we rush with this statement after all, and why should we link anything with the elections in the GDR? Why not mention elections in the FRG as well?

-1) Statement is a factor of stability. -2) Let us use the formula of German unity.

-We still have to tell Fischer. That it would be bad for the GDR is an argument for me, but it is Modrow’s business.

-In Moscow we agreed about stabilization, orderly process, otherwise events but we did not succeed. Can it be done at the level of ambassadors?

The second option is acceptable, although I am not sure that it is the best.

But, maybe, there is no other solution (way out).

I will [consult?] the day after tomorrow, maybe tomorrow will be able to respond. As far as your presence in Europe is concerned, we are not worried about it.

At Malta M.S.

B[aker] And we also ...

E [duard Shevardnadze] It is a different issue what Germany will say.

B[aker] Thank you. But I do not think that this will be a process of simple ratification.

And if U[nited] G[ermany] stays in NATO, we should take care about non-expansion of its jurisdiction to the East.

And also obligate UG about nuc[lear], chem[ical], bacter[iological] weapons.

E.A. This is very complicated. Now two Germanies are agreeing, and then one will emerge—will it want to include these obligations? Who knows who will be the leader of Germany?

I wished Genscher to become Chancellor of the UG, he said he was not sure.

B[aker] Danger of revanchism is not likely.

E[duard] So far not.

German leading parties are getting scored from the theme of unification. But when it becomes fact.

[New Potsdam]

Government Conference Hall—railroad terminal built in 1910

Chateau Loros

13 February 1990 Tuesday

Secret matinee.

Moscow's agreement, Genscher:

Hungary was the first one to open the borders.

People demand their rights cautiously, but with response statement by M.S. that the Germans can decide issues of their future themselves.

We appreciate the importance of our unification.

Thomas Mann "We pursued the task of creating a European Germany, not German Europe." It is very hard to imagine a unified

Europe with divided Germany, as very difficult to imagine divided Europe with unified Germany.

Negotiations of the two—not behind the backs of the four.

1990—the year of disarmament.

Some unify, others ...

The New York Times, 1945 "Civilization will survive only because of revolution in thinking." This revolution has occurred.

E.A. I am in a stupid situation – we are discussing the Open Skies, but my colleagues are talking about unification of Germany as if it was a fact.

G(enscher) Could you agree to the text if we remove March 18?

E. This is a very important question. I need to consult with Moscow.

G.: it is hard for me to argue with you. Use your authority (influence) as you did in conversation with me.

Instability in the Soviet Union is a failure for Europe and the world. And the German issue is added to it.

[Source: Hoover Institution Archives, Stepanov-Mamaladze Collection. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya]

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