State Department Paper, Implication of Berlin Talks and Perry Report, ca. October 1999 (Confidential)
National Security Archive
This paper lays out the state of play in U.S.-DPRK talks regarding North Korea's missile program, and the larger context of that country's development of weapons of mass destruction. Overall, the paper indicates cautious optimism, based on recent North Korean actions. For example, Pyongyang publicly
Source: State Department Paper, Implication of Berlin Talks and Perry Report, ca. October 1999 (Confidential) Date: Oct 1, 1999 Collection: Engaging North Korea II: Evidence from the Clinton Administration Dec 8, 2017
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2016-03104 Doc No. C05992084 Date: 03/28/2017
[RELEASE IN PART B1,25X6]
[CONFIDENTIAL]
[DOC 2 TP's for Austin undated]
IMPLICATION OF BERLIN TALKS AND PERRY REPORT REVIEW AUTHORITY: Charles Lahiguera, Senior Reviewer
- The public North Korean announcement on September 24 that it would suspend missile launches during the course of our diplomatic efforts reinforces the sense that the North understands the significant price it would have to pay for a launch.
- One of the key factors in securing DPRK commitments not to launch a missile at present was the prospect of punitive measures against it, not just by the US, but also by the ROK and Japan. This collective intent to punish North Korea raised the prospect of significant political damage for the DPRK at a time when its dependence on the outside world is growing.
- Therefore, we will remain in a strong position to deter the North from launching a missile as long as the US, ROK, and Japan, in league with our other allies and friends in the region, remain unified in the determination to impose a stiff political and economic penalty on the North for this potential provocation.
- In terms of diplomatic next steps, the US is preparing for a high-level DPRK visit, although we do not yet know who will come or when it will occur. Ambassador Kartman and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-Gwan will hold meetings before any high-level discussions for planning purposes.
- The high-level visit will be an opportunity to spell out more clearly for the North the progress on security issues that we must see in order to move toward better bilateral relations. Specifically,
Classification Extended on : 03/28/2017 ~ Class: CONFIDENTIAL ~ Authority: DSCG 11-1 ~ Declassify on: 10/28/2039
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2016-03104 Doc No. C05992084 Date: 03/28/2017
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2016-02194 Doc No. C05992084 Date: 03/28/2017 [CONFIDENTIAL] we will make very clear to the North that it will have to deal with our comprehensive security concerns in the arena of weapons of mass destruction, which extend far beyond the missile launch issue.
B1 25X6
- Recognizing the nature of the North Korean regime, it will not be easy to improve even our bilateral relations, let alone DPRK relations with its neighbors, and there are likely to be setbacks along the way.
- But we are committed to trying a positive path with the North as long as we believe we can do so while protecting our core security interests in the region.
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2016-02194 Doc No. C05992084 Date: 03/28/2017
NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
National Security Archive, Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University, 2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037, Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu