Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Carter, "Possible Conversation with Giscard," 15 July 1977, Top Secret

MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

June 15, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 22.

SUBJECT: Possible Conversation with Giscard

In response to Giscard's cable, you may wish to telephone him on Friday,
June 17, in addition to a cabled response. The rationale for the date is
that you will be leaving for Camp David later that day, and Brezhnev is
arriving in Paris on Sunday, the 20th.

In that conversation, you may wish to mention to Giscard that you are
anxious to continue on a personal basis with Brezhnev your strong
determination to reduce the dependence of both the U.S. and the Soviet
Union on nuclear weaponry, thereby taking a step towards the eventual
elimination of such weaponry.

You might stress to Giscard that it is premature at this stage to make
formal proposals but that you would be grateful to him for making the
following points to Brezhnev, in addition to your cabled response --
which you hope Giscard will convey orally (attached):

(1) That you would like to explore with Brezhnev the possibility
of a joint US-Soviet statement to the effect that neither power would ever
use nuclear weapons first unless its territory or its forces or its allies
were attacked. This would highlight the notion that nuclear weapons are
designed only for defensive purposes and it would throw the burden of
nuclear responsibility on the party initiating military hostilities. Joint
agreement would furnish a commendable example of US-Soviet willingness
to move, on a step-by-step basis, towards increased restraint on
nuclear weaponry.

(2) That you might consider also a bilateral commitment of no-
first-use against non-nuclear states, preferably in conjunction with the
above. You might wish to be most careful on this one because at this
stage it could make South Korea feel more vulnerable to a North Korean
attack (and at this stage the North Koreans do not have the certainty --
even if they do have the probability -- that we would not use nuclear

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TOP SECRET 2 weapons). A slightly modified variant could involve a declaration that neither power would use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states unless such states were militarily supported in conflict by a nuclear power. For example, if North Korea were to launch an attack, under this formula it would be liable to a U.S. nuclear response only if it were aided in such an attack either by the Soviet Union or by China.

(3) That your concern for nuclear reductions and the freeze is not tactical in nature, nor is it designed to gain a short-term advantage over the Soviet Union, but that it is related to your general desire to decrease global dependence on nuclear weaponry, of which the above two propositions are an indication. Brezhnev should understand that you are anxious to set in motion a process of gradually decreasing both U.S. and Soviet dependence on nuclear weaponry.

(4) That irrespective of progress in current SALT negotiations, you would be glad to discuss these thoughts with Brezhnev on a personal basis in the U.S., perhaps along the lines of the Vladivostok meeting.

The above is sensitive and could be misinterpreted. Hence you might want to use notes in speaking to Giscard so that he does not misinterpret your message to Brezhnev.

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