[Central Intelligence Agency, Board of National Estimates], Memorandum for [sic] Conversation, 1 February 1966, Top Secret
National Security Archive
Meeting with members of the Board of National Estimates, DCI McCone asked them to consider the implications of the widening of the war in Vietnam through a Chinese intervention and then an initial U.S. use of tactical nuclear weapons against Chinese forces. McCone asked the Board to consider what wo
Source: [Central Intelligence Agency, Board of National Estimates], Memorandum for [sic] Conversation, 1 February 1966, Top Secret Date: Feb 1, 1966 Archive: RG 263, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Records Relating to the CIA History Staff History Source Collection, 1946-1978, box 11, HS/HC Vietnam - ODD Documents -1965-1966 777A 1 Jun 65- 30 Sep 67 Collection: U.S. Presidents and the Nuclear Taboo Nov 30, 2017
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DECLASSIFIED NND 947021 Authority By NARA Date 9-7-6
Mr. Kent SECRET TS # 185925 Copy # 1 of 16
1 February 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR CONVERSATION
This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency. Date 5 DEC 90 HRP 89-2
The Director wants us to think ahead to the possibility that the US will use nuclear weapons in the context of the war in Vietnam.
Assume a situation like this: the Chinese elect to broaden the conflict. Chinese combat units come into the DRV. They may also appear in Laos and Thailand. There is a massing of Chinese and PAVN forces in the southern reaches of MR-4. The DMZ is violated. American forces find themselves unevenly matched north and south of the DMZ. Large numbers of Chinese are on the way to re-enforce the Communist side in this fighting. Things look bad for our side. We use nuclear weapons. It may be that the first ones are low-yield tactical weapons employed in the above combat area. Going on from there, the US might use tactical nuclear weapons on airfields in the DRV and south China. Then with no sign of Chinese retreat, the US drops larger-yield weapons on targets deep in China. These might be the nuclear installations as a starter.
What has happened as the US goes up this road? Obviously the reactions of the USSR are the most important to speculate about.
Document No. TS 185925 No Change in Class. [ ] [X] Declassified Class, Channed To: TS (S) C Next Review Date: ---------- Auth: HR 70-3 Date: 20 Dec 90 By: 624896
SECRET CCC002
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
[DECLASSIFIED NND 947021 Authority By JG NARA Date 9-7-6]
Distribution List Memo for Conversation (re VW) 1 Feb 66 TS # 185923 - 16 copies total
1 - S. Kent
2 - A. Smith
3 - J. Cooley
4 - L. Montague
5 - J. Graham
6 - H. Cunningham
7 - Pvt. Matthews
8 - W. Jackson
9 - Sen. Barnes
10 - E. Proctor
11 - K. Clark
12 - Sen. Collins
13 - Adm. Nelson
14 - M. Whitman
15 - L. Sardine
16 - W. Hyland
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