Department of Defense

The Militarily Critical Technologies List

Part II: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGIES

February 1998

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology Washington, D.C.

THIS DOCUMENT WAS PREPARED BY THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY The Department of Defense welcomes comments on this publication. Refer comments to the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (International and Commercial Programs) FAX: (703) 931-7792 E-Mail: mctl@ida.org MCTL Internet Home Page: http://www.dtic.mil/mctl TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL COPIES OF THIS DOCUMENT:

(The order number for this document at DTIC and NTIS is: ADA 330102)

PREFACE

A. THE MCTL

The Military Critical Technologies List (MCTL) is a detailed and structured compendium of the technologies DoD assesses as critical to maintaining superior U.S. military capabilities. DoD develops the MCTL with participation of other agencies of the United States Government, U.S. industry, and academia and updates it on an ongoing basis. In the past, the MCTL was published in one document. The MCTL is being published in three documents. Three parts of the MCTL will cover weapons system technologies, technologies associated with weapons of mass destruction, and developing technologies. These three documents provide the opportunity to highlight different technologies and technology levels.

B. USES OF THE MCTL

The action plan accompanying the 23 January 1995 Deputy Secretary of Defense Tasking Memorandum stated that the MCTL is used as a:

• Technical foundation for U.S. proposals for export control in the New Forum,* Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Groups, Australia Group, and other nonproliferation regimes.
• Technical reference for licensing and export control by Customs Officials, DoD, DOS, DOC, and DOE.
• Technical reference for contracts and scientific papers by government, industry, and academia.
• Technical reference and guide for intelligence collection.

In addition, the MCTL:

• Provides background and support for international cooperative activities.
• Supports development of technology transfer policy, technology release guidelines, and specific proposals or controls to be implemented by multinational organizations.

The MCTL is not an export control list.

• There may be items in the MCTL that are not on an export control list.
• There may be items on an export control list that are not in the MCTL.

The MCTL is to be used as a reference for evaluating potential technology transfers and technical reports and scientific papers for public release. The information must be applied using technical judgment. It should be used to determine if the proposed transaction would result in transfer that would permit potential adversaries access to technologies, not whether a transfer should or should not be approved.

C. ORGANIZATION OF THE MCTL

The three parts of the MCTL are the following:

Part I, “Weapons Systems Technologies,” (published in June 1996) details those critical technologies with performance parameters that are at or above the minimum level necessary to ensure continuing superior performance of U.S military systems.

Part II, “Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies,” (this document) addresses those technologies required for development, integration, or employment of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. This document is not oriented to U.S. capabilities. Rather, it addresses technologies that proliferators might use to develop WMD. It provides technical information to assist various entities of the DoD to develop, support, and execute counterproliferation initiatives.

Part III, “Developing Critical Technologies,” (to be published in 1998) will contain a list of technologies which, when fully developed and incorporated in a military system, will produce increasingly superior performance or maintain a superior capability more affordably.

The format of Parts II and III, insofar as possible, is consistent with the MCTL, Part I.

• Note: The Wassenaar Arrangement (initially called the New Forum) is the successor organization to COCOM, and is named for the city in The Netherlands where the arrangement was formalized.

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D. THE MCTL PROCESS

The MCTL process is a continuous analytical and information-gathering process which updates the MCTL by adding information and refining existing documents to provide thorough and complete technical information. In addition, the Technology Working Groups (TWGs), which are part of the MCTL process, provide a reservoir of technical experts in many disciplines that can be called upon to assist in time-sensitive and quick-response tasks.

The TWGs comprise about 500 technical experts from both government and the private sector. In general, TWG members are drawn from the military services, DoD and other federal agencies, industry, and academia. A balance is maintained between public officials and private sector representatives. TWGs maintain a core of intellectual knowledge and reference information on an array of technologies. The data is used as a resource for many projects and other assignments, and TWG members are available to the national security community as technical experts. Working within an informal structure, TWG members strive to produce precise and objective analyses across dissimilar and often disparate areas. Currently the TWGs are organized to address 20 basic technology areas:

Aeronautics Systems Armament and Energetic Materials Biological Systems Chemical Systems Directed and Kinetic Energy Systems Electronics Ground Systems Information Systems Information Warfare Manufacturing and Fabrication Marine Systems Materials Medical Systems Navigation Systems Nuclear Systems Power Systems Sensors and Lasers Signature Control Space Systems Weapons Effects and Countermeasures

E. MCTL PART II METHODOLOGY

For each part of the MCTL, sets of task-organized experts are supplemented with other experts when required. Their efforts are focused on technology areas according to the particular task assignments. For Part II, "Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies," there were six task-organized TWGs corresponding to the six sections of the document: Means of Delivery, Information Systems, Biological Weapons, Chemical Weapons, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Weapons Effects.

The TWGs applied the following guidance in selecting technologies for inclusion in this document—identify and assess technologies required for the development, integration, or employment of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The technologies detailed in Part II are those selected by the TWGs after technical analyses and application of professional judgment. Fundamentally, Part II views technologies from the perspective of a foreign proliferator. It describes technologies that may provide alternative means to achieve a military capability. Emphasis is placed on technologies that a proliferant country might use. It is recognized that a proliferator might obtain key items surreptitiously or through illegal acquisition. The TWGs recognize that small numbers of WMD can be obtained by theft or be provided by another country. The TWG did not focus on these possibilities because they involve transfer of weapons, and not transfer of technologies to build weapons.

F. LEGAL BASIS FOR THE MCTL

The Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 assigned responsibilities for export controls to protect technologies and weapons systems. It established the requirement for an MCTL. The EAA and its provisions, as amended, were extended by Executive Order 12924 (19 August 1994), which was continued on 15 August 1995, 14 August 1996, and 13 August 1997.

The legislation and execution directive are amplified and implemented by DoD Directives 2040.2 and 5105.51 and by the Deputy Secretary of Defense letter dated 23 January 1995.

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CONTENTS

Figures ............................................................................................ II-vii Tables ............................................................................................. II-ix INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ II-1 SECTION 1—MEANS OF DELIVERY TECHNOLOGY ............................ II-1-1 1.1—Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) ............................................ II-1-6 1.2—Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) ............................... II-1-21 1.3—Cruise Missiles ........................................................................ II-1-34 1.4—Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft .................................................... II-1-46 1.5—Artillery ................................................................................. II-1-58 SECTION 2—INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY ....................... II-2-1 2.1—Information Communications .................................................. II-2-5 2.2—Information Exchange ............................................................ II-2-10 2.3—Information Processing .......................................................... II-2-15 2.4—Information Security .............................................................. II-2-21 2.5—Information System Management and Control .......................... II-2-25 2.6—Information Systems Facilities ................................................ II-2-31 SECTION 3—BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY ........................ II-3-1 3.1—Biological Material Production ................................................ II-3-9 3.2—Stabilization, Dissemination, and Dispersion ............................ II-3-15 3.3—Detection, Warning, and Identification .................................... II-3-19 3.4—Biological Defense Systems .................................................... II-3-23 SECTION 4—CHEMICAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY ........................... II-4-1 4.1—Chemical Material Production ................................................. II-4-8 4.2—Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing ..................... II-4-22 4.3—Detection, Warning, and Identification .................................... II-4-27 4.4—Chemical Defense Systems ..................................................... II-4-34 SECTION 5—NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY ............................ II-5-1 5.1—Enrichment Feedstocks Production ......................................... II-5-10 5.2—Uranium Enrichment Processes .............................................. II-5-13 5.3—Nuclear Fission Reactors ........................................................ II-5-42 5.4—Plutonium Extraction (Reprocessing) ....................................... II-5-48 5.5—Lithium Production .................................................................. II-5-54 5.6—Nuclear Weapons Design and Development ............................. II-5-58 5.7—Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing .......................................... II-5-67 5.8—Radiological Weapons ........................................................... II-5-75 5.9—Manufacturing of Nuclear Components .................................... II-5-79 5.10—Nuclear Weapons Development Testing ................................. II-5-91 5.11—Nuclear Weapons Custody, Transport, and Control ................. II-5-109 5.12—Heavy Water Production ....................................................... II-5-112 5.13—Tritium Production ................................................................ II-5-117 SECTION 6—NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS TECHNOLOGY ............ II-6-1 6.1—Underground Nuclear Weapons Effects Testing ........................ II-6-5 6.2—Blast and Shock Effects from Nuclear Detonations ................... II-6-11 6.3—Nuclear Thermal Radiation Effects .......................................... II-6-16 6.4—Transient Radiation Effects in Electronics (TREE) and Systems-Generated Electromagnetic Pulse (SGEMP) Effects ................. II-6-22 6.5—Nuclear Effects on Electromagnetic Signal Propagation ............ II-6-26 6.6—High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Effects ................. II-6-28 6.7—Source Region Electromagnetic Pulse (SREMP) Effects ............ II-6-31 6.8—Pulsed-Power Nuclear Weapons Effects Simulation ................. II-6-33 APPENDIX A—DoD MCTL MASTER LOCATOR .............................. II-A-1 APPENDIX B—EXPLANATION OF TABLE ELEMENTS ..................... II-B-1 APPENDIX C—GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ... II-C-1 APPENDIX D—DEFINITIONS ........................................................ II-D-1 APPENDIX E—INTERNATIONAL REGIMES ..................................... II-E-1 APPENDIX F-1—INDEX ................................................................. II-F-1-1 APPENDIX F-2—CONTROL LIST REFERENCES ................................ II-F-2-1

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FIGURES

1.0-1. Means of Delivery Foreign Technology Assessment Summary ... II-1-5 1.1-1. Theater Ballistic Missiles Foreign Technology Assessment Summary ... II-1-10 1.2-1. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Foreign Technology Assessment Summary ... II-1-26 1.3-1. Cruise Missiles Foreign Technology Assessment Summary ... II-1-38 1.4-1. Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Foreign Technology Assessment Summary ... II-1-50 1.5-1. Artillery Foreign Technology Assessment Summary ... II-1-62 2.0-1. Information Systems ... II-2-2 2.0-2. Information Systems Foreign Technology Assessment Summary ... II-2-4 2.2-1. Routing and Switching Systems ... II-2-10 2.5-1. Information Systems Management and Control ... II-2-27 3.0-1. Progress in Applicable Biotechnologies ... II-3-4 3.0-2. Australia Group Biological Agents ... II-3-5 3.0-3. Biological Weapons Foreign Technology Assessment Summary ... II-3-8 4.0-1. Relative Development of Chemical Weapons Technologies ... II-4-6 4.0-2. Chemical Weapons Foreign Technology Assessment Summary ... II-4-7 4.1-1. Chemical Weapons Convention Schedules of Chemicals ... II-4-12 4.1-2. Australia Group Chemicals ... II-4-14 4.2-1. MC-1 Gas Bomb ... II-4-22 4.3-1. Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) ... II-4-27 4.3-2. RSCAAL ... II-4-28 4.4-1. Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) ... II-4-35 5.0-1. Nuclear History ... II-5-5 5.0-2. Nuclear Weapons Foreign Technology Assessment Summary ... II-5-9 6.0-1. Nuclear Weapons Effects Foreign Technology Assessment Summary ... II-6-4 6.8-1. Simulation of Nuclear Effects Using Pulsed-Power Radiation Sources ... II-6-33

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TABLES

1.1-1. Theater Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters ........................ II-1-11 1.1-2 Theater Ballistic Missiles Reference Data .................................... II-1-17 1.2-1. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters ........ II-1-27 1.2-2. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Reference Data ...................... II-1-31 1.3.1. Cruise Missile Technology Parameters ........................................ II-1-39 1.3.2. Cruise Missiles Reference Data .................................................... II-1-43 1.4.1. Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Technology Parameters ............... II-1-51 1.4.2. Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Reference Data ............................ II-1-55 1.5.1. Artillery Technology Parameters .................................................. II-1-63 1.5.2. Artillery Reference Data ............................................................... II-1-64 2.1-1. Information Communications Technology Parameters ............. II-2-8 2.1-2. Information Communications Reference Data ........................... II-2-9 2.2-1. Information Exchange Technology Parameters .......................... II-2-13 2.2-2. Information Exchange Reference Data ........................................ II-2-14 2.3-1. Information Processing Technology Parameters ........................ II-2-17 2.3-2. Information Processing Reference Data ...................................... II-2-20 2.4-1. Information Security Technology Parameters ............................ II-2-23 2.4-2. Information Security Reference Data .......................................... II-2-24 2.5-1. Information Systems Management and Control Technology Parameters ............................................................................................ II-2-28 2.5-2. Information Systems Management and Control Reference Data ....... II-2-30 2.6-1. Information Systems Facilities Technology Parameters ............. II-2-33 2.6-2. Information Systems Facilities Reference Data .......................... II-2-34 3.1-1. Biological Material Production Technology Parameters ............ II-3-11 3.1-2. Biological Material Production Reference Data .......................... II-3-13 3.2-1. Stabilization, Dissemination, and Dispersion Technology Parameters ............................................................................................ II-3-17 3.2-2. Stabilization, Dissemination, and Dispersion Reference Data .......... II-3-18 3.3-1. Detection, Warning, and Identification Technology Parameters ...... II-3-20 3.3-2. Detection, Warning, and Identification Reference Data ............ II-3-22 3.4-1. Biological Defense Systems Technology Parameters ................. II-3-25 3.4-2. Biological Defense Systems Reference Data .............................. II-3-26 4.1-1. Chemical Material Production Technology Parameters .............. II-4-15 4.1-2. Chemical Material Production Reference Data ........................... II-4-19 4.2-1. Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing Technology Parameters ............................................................................................ II-4-24 4.2-2. Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing Reference Data .... II-4-26 4.3-1. Detection, Warning, and Identification Technology Parameters ...... II-4-29 4.3-2. Detection, Warning, and Identification Reference Data ............ II-4-32 4.4-1. Chemical Defense Systems Technology Parameters .................. II-4-36 4.4-2. Chemical Defense Systems Reference Data ................................ II-4-37 5.1-1. Enrichment Feedstocks Production Technology Parameters ..... II-5-11 5.1-2. Enrichment Feedstocks Production Reference Data .................. II-5-12 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters .......... II-5-20 5.2-2. Uranium Enrichment Processes Reference Data ........................ II-5-35 5.3-1. Nuclear Fission Reactors Technology Parameters ..................... II-5-45 5.3-2. Nuclear Fission Reactors Reference Data ................................... II-5-47 5.4-1. Plutonium Extraction (Reprocessing) Technology Parameters .. II-5-51 5.4-2. Plutonium Extraction (Reprocessing) Reference Data ............... II-5-53 5.5-1. Lithium Production Technology Parameters ............................... II-5-56 5.5-2. Lithium Production Reference Data ............................................. II-5-57 5.6-1. Nuclear Weapons Design and Development Technology Parameters ............................................................................................ II-5-62 5.6-2. Nuclear Weapons Design and Development Reference Data ........... II-5-65 5.7-1. Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Technology Parameters ...... II-5-70 5.7-2. Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing Reference Data ................... II-5-73 5.8-1. Radiological Weapons Technology Parameters .......................... II-5-77 5.8-2. Radiological Weapons Reference Data ........................................ II-5-78 5.9-1. Manufacturing of Nuclear Components Technology Parameters .. II-5-82 5.9-2. Manufacturing of Nuclear Components Reference Data ............ II-5-87 5.10-1. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Technology Parameters .. II-5-95 5.10-2. Nuclear Weapons Development Testing Reference Data ........ II-5-103 5.11-1. Nuclear Weapons Custody, Transport, and Control Technology Parameters ............................................................................................ II-5-110

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5.11-2. Nuclear Weapons Custody, Transport, and Control Technology Reference Data ............................................................................................ II-5-111 5.12-1. Heavy Water Production Technology Parameters ............................ II-5-114 5.12-2. Heavy Water Production Reference Data ........................................ II-5-116 5.13-1. Tritium Production Technology Parameters .................................... II-5-118 5.13-2. Tritium Production Reference Data ................................................ II-5-118 6.1-1. Underground Nuclear Weapons Effects Testing Technology Parameters .................................................................................................. II-6-7 6.1-2. Underground Nuclear Weapons Effects Testing Reference Data ....... II-6-9 6.2-1. Blast and Shock Effects from Nuclear Detonations Technology Parameters ................................................................................................ II-6-13 6.2-2. Blast and Shock Effects from Nuclear Detonations Reference Data ... II-6-15 6.3-1. Nuclear Thermal Radiation Effects Technology Parameters ............. II-6-18 6.3-2. Nuclear Thermal Radiation Effects Reference Data .......................... II-6-20 6.4-1. Transient Radiation Effects in Electronics (TREE) and Systems- Generated Electromagnetic Pulse (SGEMP) Effects Technology Parameters ................................................................................................ II-6-24 6.4-2. Transient Radiation Effects in Electronics (TREE) and Systems- Generated Electromagnetic Pulse (SGEMP) Effects Reference Data .......................................................................................................... II-6-25 6.5-1. Nuclear Effects on Electromagnetic Signal Propagation Technology Parameters ............................................................................ II-6-27 6.5-2. Nuclear Effects on Electromagnetic Signal Propagation Reference Data .......................................................................................... II-6-27 6.6-1. High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Effects Technology Parameters ............................................................................ II-6-30 6.6-2. High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) Effects Reference Data .......................................................................................... II-6-30 6.7-1. Source Region Electromagnetic Pulse (SREMP) Technology Parameters ................................................................................................ II-6-32 6.7-2. Source Region Electromagnetic Pulse (SREMP) Reference Data ...... II-6-32 6.8-1. Pulsed-Power Nuclear Weapons Effects Simulation Technology Parameters ................................................................................................ II-6-35 6.8-2. Pulsed-Power Nuclear Weapons Effects Simulation Reference Data .......................................................................................................... II-6-36

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INTRODUCTION TO MCTL PART II

INTRODUCTION TO MCTL PART II

A. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

Before the demise of the Soviet Union, the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons was considered in the context of superpower relations. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the subsequent events have had many consequences. Regional conflicts, once constrained, are now increasingly likely to result in the use of weapons of mass destruction. Opportunities to acquire key technologies and components have expanded through the dual stimuli of underutilized technical expertise and difficult economic circumstances. Simultaneously, development and availability of applicable technologies have expanded.

Responsible states have endeavored to stem proliferation of WMD through international agreements and export controls. Such tools, while imperfect, remain the basis for increasingly comprehensive steps to address the broad WMD threat. United Nations' inspectors in Iraq discovered that Saddam Hussein, in spite of international treaties, had efforts underway to develop nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the means to deliver them. North Korea developed the infrastructure to produce nuclear weapons even though it was a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. South Africa produced six nuclear devices while under the constraints of an international trade embargo. The Aum Shinrikyo cult killed and injured people in Japan by placing containers of the nerve agent sarin in crowded Tokyo subway trains. The same group had a very capable laboratory including fermentors, dryers, and sizing equipment and had produced the biological pathogen anthrax.

Concern about the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery has reached exceptional levels. On November 14, 1994, the President of the United States found that "...the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons ('weapons of mass destruction') and of the means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States...." He declared a national emergency to deal with the threat. This executive order (12938) was extended on November 8, 1995; November 12, 1996; and again on November 12, 1997.

B. OBJECTIVE

This document identifies technologies and technology levels required for the development, integration, or employment of nuclear (including radiological), biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. Technologies describing the effects of the employment of these weapons and technologies for information systems required for many employment options for WMD are also included. Emphasis is placed on a proliferant country's ability to threaten the United States and its allies; however, subnational activities are also considered. Of greatest interest are technological capabilities "sufficient" to produce WMD of a given type and the ability to deliver them. Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies can be used in many cases to obtain capability without extensive, development programs. Other technologies of concern are those that are built on the grid of existing technologies such as commercial networking of communications.

The above criteria differ from those used in MCTL, Part I, "Weapons Systems Technologies," where the performance levels of interest were those that ensure the superiority of U.S. military systems. In Part II WMD, operational technology capabilities are stressed without making any assumptions regarding an adversary's strategy or tactics, intentions, objectives, methods of employment, or target selection.

Items of proliferation concern that are on export control lists as well as those that do not appear on export control lists are included to provide indicators of possible capabilities for WMD development and to inform U.S. export control decision makers. Foreign Technology Assessments are provided to assist in understanding the capabilities of selected foreign countries in WMD-related technologies.

While every effort was made to prepare a comprehensive listing of technologies of proliferation concern, the absence of a technology should not be construed to mean that the technology could not make a contribution to proliferation.

C. OVERVIEW

This document identifies and discusses the technologies required for the development, integration, or employment of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery. Since the United States has forsworn the use of biological and chemical weapons, the underlying technologies include those usable by another country to develop an offensive capability and those needed to defend against their use. The parameters listed indicate those levels agreed to in the MCTL Technology Working Group process. They provide a description of technologies which are appropriate for possible actions by those assigned responsibility to constrain proliferation.

The technologies treated in this volume differ greatly. The development of nuclear weapons generally requires significant infrastructure, including a large capital investment required for the production of special nuclear material. By contrast, pathogenic biological agents can be made in small commercial facilities which are difficult to

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distinguish from legitimate pharmaceutical or related production activities. Technologies required to produce toxic chemicals are widely available, and much of the equipment is embedded in legitimate chemical industry. The infrastructure complexity and expense associated with different means of delivery vary widely. Proliferant states which have been prominent in world affairs have opted for extended investment in means of delivery, command and control, and their associated infrastructures. While not all proliferants follow such a path, there are very real reasons for doing so when the world is viewed through the eyes of the individual proliferants.

Nuclear technologies receive wide publicity. Technical information is available in the public sector at an increasingly fine level of detail. Technologies for the production and operation of means of delivery are also well known. Examples of items include the widely distributed cruise missile systems and use of the U.S.-deployed Global Positioning System, which offers users precise time and location worldwide. Biotechnologies which can be applied to biological weaponry are predominantly dual use, growing rapidly and requiring relatively small amounts of capital investment.

Heightened interest in the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery has been accompanied by a significant amount of misinformation. Factual and carefully considered technical information is needed to address constraints effectively through nonproliferation and counterproliferation initiatives. This report provides technical data on WMD. In addition, it distills, from a technological viewpoint, reality from the myths of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. It is helpful to retain an ongoing awareness that the problem is complex and the challenge is often driven by unique cultural considerations.

WMD warfare involves a myriad of factors: types of weapons; delivery systems; conflict arena size and WMD launch-to-target distance; attack size, timing, tactics, frequency, and duration; military or political, counterforce or countervalue attack objectives; weapon stockpile sizes; and custody and release policies and procedures.

In summary, development, integration, and employment of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery is grounded in a huge number of choices which will be driven overwhelmingly by the political aims, culture, and resources of the proliferator. Other drivers include economics, a trained workforce, and available technical knowledge.

1. Means of Delivery

The Means of Delivery (MOD) treated here are exceptionally diverse. Included are manned and unmanned aerial vehicles of various levels of cost and sophistication. Artillery systems and multiple launch rocket systems make up the ground-based elements of MOD. These last two are traditional weapons of war, widely available and relatively inexpensive. By contrast, intercontinental ballistic missiles are complex, difficult to develop, and very expensive to maintain in operational status. Of particular interest in this section is the compatibility of the MOD with the actual payload. Physical parameters of speed, heat, shock, and delivery angle tend to drive the survivability, dispersion, and efficiency of chemical or biological payloads. In each MOD system, application of all of the technologies known to or used by the United States is not required. A proliferator has the latitude to select among often disparate, but equally satisfactory choices of means of delivery. MOD usually requires some information systems, however simple, to control assets and complete missions.

2. Information Systems

Each proliferator will use information systems to some degree throughout processes appropriate to acquire and employ WMD. Technologies treated here are commonly found within the commercial information technologies available throughout the world. Selection of information systems suites is driven by the particular combination of weapons selected, cost of information systems, and culture of the individual proliferator. The impact in various kinds of employment is addressed in detail.

3. Biological Weapons

Biological organisms are easier and less expensive to produce than special nuclear material or many chemical warfare agents. The required technology is widely available, with dual-use applications in the commercial fermentation and biotechnology industries. Because data on producing biological organisms is so widely available in open literature, it is difficult for industrialized nations to withhold relevant information from potential proliferants. Most equipment needed for large-scale production of biological warfare agents is also dual use and widely available in world markets.

Biological agents must retain their potency during storage, delivery, and dissemination. When weaponized for missile, bomb, or cluster bomblet delivery, agents are weakened by the environmental stresses of heat, oxidation, and desiccation. While it is relatively difficult to develop munitions with predictable effects, it is less difficult to spread biological agents indiscriminately to cause large numbers of casualties. Standard biological agents for covert sabotage or attacks against broad-area targets are easy to produce and easy to disseminate using commercially available agricultural sprayers.

Because biological agents reproduce, a small amount can multiply into a significant threat. When disseminated, they are slow acting; microbial pathogens require incubation periods of days to weeks between infection and the appearance of symptoms.

Toxin agents are poisonous substances made from living systems or produced from synthetic analogs of naturally occurring poisons. They are covered under biological weapons technologies in this document even though they act as chemical agents.

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4. Chemical Weapons Technologies to produce chemical weapons are difficult to distinguish unambiguously from those used to manufacture commercial chemical compounds. Many technologies that benefit chemical weapon production are dual use and widely available. Legitimate commercial chemical facilities can produce chemical warfare agents. Multiple-purpose chemical plants which manufacture organo-phosphorous pesticides or flame retardants could be converted to produce nerve agents. Open literature and standard principles of chemical engineering enable proliferants to learn how to produce chemical weapons. Although some chemical agents, such as mustard gas, are simple to produce, others are produced by more complex processes involving corrosive or reactive material.

More than 100 countries have the capability to produce simple chemical weapons such as phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, and sulfur mustard. Somewhat fewer countries are able to produce nerve agents such as sarin, soman, tabun, and VX. Commercial equipment that could be used to produce chemical warfare agents is generally available.

An operational capability to use chemical weapons involves design and development of effective munitions, filling them before use, and integrating them with a delivery system. Dispersion of chemical agents is hindered by atmospheric turbulence, which increases vertical dilution and thereby reduces casualties. Dispersion is also affected by air temperature and temperature gradient.

5. Nuclear Weapons The basic concepts of nuclear weapons are widely known. Nuclear bomb-related physics is available in unclassified publications, and experienced foreign nuclear designers could be hired to expedite a proliferant country's nuclear weapon program, which requires a large, specialized, and costly scientific-industrial base. For most countries, the biggest obstacle to developing nuclear weapons is procuring plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Because production of these nuclear materials is the most difficult and costly part of a nuclear weapon program, leakage of weapon-grade material from nuclear-capable countries is a very serious concern.

Despite wide availability of the basic design concepts, a proliferant country must have technical expertise to produce a single nuclear weapon. First-generation nuclear weapons developed by most proliferant countries would likely be designed for delivery by short-range ballistic missile (like a SCUD) or tactical aircraft. High-performance computers would not be needed to design first-generation fission weapons.

Nuclear weapons are so destructive that delivery accuracy would seldom be a problem. Nuclear weapon effects are blast, thermal, and radiation. Against human beings, blast and thermal effects are immediate; nuclear radiation effects can be immediate or delayed.

6. Nuclear Weapons Effects Nuclear weapons effects simulation and hardening technologies have been widely employed in the United States. Other nuclear states have employed these technologies to a lesser degree. Employment of simulation technology by a proliferator is an effective means of ensuring that the desired results will be achieved while avoiding the adverse public reaction to an actual nuclear test. Although these technologies are less widely understood than the technologies for WMD, they are included to provide key elements of insight into nuclear weapons phenomena. They are presented independently because they are a highly specialized set of technologies which have been the subject of significant research and development.

D. ORGANIZATION OF PART II Weapons of Mass Destruction include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; means of delivery; information systems that enable a proliferant to command, control, and manage resources required for a WMD program; and certain nuclear weapons effects technologies that provide insight into nuclear weapons, their applications, and constructing defenses appropriate to these effects.

Each of the six sections contains the following parts:

• Scope identifies the technology groups covered in the section; each group is covered by a separate subsection.
• Background provides historical perspective and/or complementary information about the section's technologies.
• Overview discusses the technology groups identified under "Scope."
• Rationale indicates why the technology groups are important.
• Foreign Technology Assessment (FTA), with accompanying figure, provides summary estimates of foreign capabilities; these estimates are expert judgment by the TWGs and are discussed in Section E below.

There is a subsection for each technology group identified under scope. Each subsection contains these parts:

• Overview identifies and discusses technologies listed in tables that follow.
• Rationale indicates why listed technologies are important to proliferators.
• Foreign Technology Assessment (FTA) provides comments on a more detailed technology level than in the section FTA above.
• Tables, which are the heart of the MCTL, present data elements related to the development, production, or employment of WMD. The principal data element is "Sufficient Technology Level," which is the level of technology required for a proliferant to produce entry-level WMD, delivery systems, or other hardware, and software that are useful in WMD development,

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integration, or use. The “Export Control Reference” column provides general reference to assist in identifying potential national and international control guidelines. This column is provided for general reference and should not be construed as a definitive determination of U.S. export control policy for these technologies. Jurisdictional determination of a specific technology and/or commodity must be made in accordance with the procedures in the ITAR and EAR. (Note: For a brief description, see Appendix F, “International Regimes.”) The following references are used:

• USML: United States Munitions List
• CCL*: Commerce Control List
• NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
• WA: Wassenaar Arrangement
  • Cat: category designation—CCL and WA Dual Use list
  • ML: Munitions List
• NTL: Nuclear Trigger List (Nuclear Suppliers Group)
• NDUL: Nuclear Dual Use List (Nuclear Suppliers Group)
• MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime
• AG List: Australia Group List
• BWC: Biological Weapons Convention
• CWC: Chemical Weapons Convention Other data are defined in Appendix B, “Explanation of Table Elements.”

E. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

The MCTL includes estimates, called Foreign Technology Assessments (FTA), of foreign capabilities in each of the MCTL technology areas. These FTA estimates are the scientific and technological consensus of the TWG members from industry, government, and academia. Collaboration with the Intelligence Community is an essential part of the FTA determination, and selected members of the Intelligence Community are TWG members who participate regularly in the MCTL process. These MCTL FTAs are foreign capability assessments and do not constitute findings of foreign availability, which are the responsibility of the Department of Commerce under the Export Administration Act.

Tables containing summaries of general foreign capabilities appear in each of the six MCTL Part II sections. The technological capability level is represented by diamond icons. ♦♦♦♦ indicates capability in the technology area that exceeds the sufficient level. It does not mean that the country has capability in all of the technologies associated with that technology area. It implies a range of technologies, e.g., ♦♦♦♦ for ICBM indicates that the technological capability of a country exceeds the sufficient level of technology to develop an ICBM; it does not necessarily mean that the country has the technological sophistication of the United States in ICBMs. In a corresponding manner, ♦♦♦ indicates sufficient technology capability; ♦♦ shows some technological sophistication but less than a sufficient level; and ♦ means limited capability. (Note: This is NOT the same as MCTL Part I, where the number of blocks was related to technologies listed in the accompanying tables “at or above the minimum level necessary to ensure continuing superior performance of U.S. military systems.”) If two or more countries have the same number of diamonds, it does not necessarily mean that their capabilities are the same. An absence of diamonds in countries of concern may indicate an absence of information, not of capability.

The diamonds indicate indigenous capability to produce or the ability to legally acquire and use those technologies. A country could obtain key items surreptitiously or through illegal acquisition, catapulting the possessed WMD capability past the lower levels of expected evolutionary development.

* CCL EAR 99: Items that are subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) that are not elsewhere specified in any CCL category are designated by EAR 99.

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SECTION I

MEANS OF DELIVERY TECHNOLOGY

SECTION 1—MEANS OF DELIVERY TECHNOLOGY

Highlights

• Several means are available to deliver WMD: ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft, and artillery.
• The delivery means a nation uses depends on the availability of the vehicle, the survivability of the delivery system, the nature of the target, and the objective.
• Optimum effectiveness might not be the driving factor when selecting a means of delivery.
• Aircraft generally carry more payload weight than ballistic or cruise missiles.
• Ballistic missiles which are mobile are less vulnerable than fixed sites to U.S. offensive operations.
• Modern cruise missiles are generally more accurate and less expensive than ballistic missiles.

BACKGROUND

The means that a nation uses to deliver a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) depends in part on the availability of a vehicle, the survivability of the delivery system, the characteristics of its intended target, and the nation's military objective (even if the target is civilian in nature). These factors are not mutually exclusive considerations. Many proliferants have demonstrated clever methods to adapt one delivery vehicle, which it can easily acquire, to other applications much different from the original purpose of the vehicle. Similarly, some nations have launched effective attacks against targets that U.S. analysts might initially overlook because of a different perception of the importance of these targets.

When a proliferant has invested both the expense and talent to develop a WMD arsenal and the means to deliver it, it does so to be capable of launching a sufficiently effective attack. Consequently, the means of WMD delivery a proliferant selects usually reflects some planning and coordination of its objectives. No strategist can completely rule out an irrational or desperate WMD attack from a proliferant. However, such attacks, because of their very irrationality, will generally not inflict the damage necessary to change the course of a conflict. Nor is the threat of an ineffective and irrational attack likely to serve the goal of deterrence or further the change that a proliferant might pursue.

With these restrictions in mind, a nation will select a means of delivery that furthers its goals. This does not mean that the proliferant must seek ways to optimize the effectiveness of a WMD attack, as nations with modernized militaries do. Proliferants might conduct an attack merely to demonstrate an intention or a capability. Certain characteristics of delivery systems and the types of WMD they carry are naturally associated with these goals.

Delivery Systems Considerations for Chemical or Biological Payloads

To be truly effective, chemical or biological agents must be spread in a diffuse cloud over a large area. Certainly, any chemical or biological cloud may find some victims, but highly concentrated clouds spread over very small areas or pools of agent puddled on the ground have limited effectiveness because they come into contact with only a small portion of the targeted population or equipment.

Meteorological conditions affect the size and concentration of a windborne agent cloud and its durability. Hence, the interaction of the delivery vehicle and the local meteorology is an important consideration when a proliferant contemplates a chemical or biological attack. Some of these conditions even affect the probability that the cloud will reach its target after it has been released from a delivery vehicle. The United States' experience in testing windborne agents has shown that a cloud must be released below an atmospheric shear layer or it will disperse before reaching the ground. Most shear layers occur at around 500 feet above ground level (AGL).

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Shifting wind conditions, local topography and micro-meteorology, and the presence of manmade structures also affect the distribution of the agent within the cloud and its dissemination from a delivery vehicle. Biological agents, in particular, decay rapidly in the presence of strong sunlight and quickly become ineffective. Some chemical agents also suffer from degradation in sunlight and from interaction with water vapor and other constituents of the atmosphere. Winds channeled by tall buildings and geographic features may deposit some of the cloud in unexpected locations. Delivery vehicles themselves create a disturbance in the wind field because of the aerodynamic and propulsive effects generated by the vehicle. Since some of these conditions change over the course of hours, an attack that is launched at a particularly propitious time under the local meteorological conditions at the target may not be effective by the time the WMD arrives. With sufficient warning of a chemical and biological weapon attack, a population can take protective measures that may be quite effective.

To be effective, a delivery vehicle employed to spread chemical or biological agents must distribute the material in a fine cloud below a certain altitude and above the surface. It should be capable of all-weather operations and should not betray its presence to air defense assets. These traits are considerations that will determine the overall effectiveness of a chemical or biological attack. Proliferants with limited military budgets must also consider the cost of acquiring and maintaining a WMD delivery system arsenal as well as the warheads. This may limit a proliferant to developing or purchasing only one or two types of delivery systems rather than simultaneously pursuing multiple systems.

Delivery systems vary in their flight profile, speed of delivery, mission flexibility, autonomy, and detectability. Each of these considerations is important when planning a chemical or biological attack.

Ballistic missiles have a prescribed course that cannot be altered after the missile has burned its fuel, unless a warhead maneuvers independently of the missile or some form of terminal guidance is provided. A pure ballistic trajectory limits the effectiveness of a chemical or biological attack because, generally, the reentry speed is so high that it is difficult to distribute the agent in a diffuse cloud or with sufficient precision to ensure a release under the shear layer of the atmosphere. In addition, thermal heating upon reentry, or during release, may degrade the quality of the chemical or biological agent. U.S. experience has shown that often less than 5 percent of a chemical or biological agent remains potent after flight and release from a ballistic missile without appropriate heat shielding.

A ballistic missile also closely follows a pre-established azimuth from launch point to target. The high speed of the ballistic missile makes it difficult to deviate too far from this azimuth, even when submunitions or other dispensed bomblets are ejected from the missile during reentry. Consequently, if the target footprint axis is not roughly aligned with the flight azimuth, only a small portion of the target is effectively covered.

A ballistic missile has a relatively short flight time, and defenses against a ballistic missile attack are still less than completely effective, as proved in the Allied experience during the Gulf War. However, with sufficient warning, civil defense measures can be implemented in time to protect civil populations against chemical or biological attack. People in Tel Aviv and Riyadh received enough warning of SCUD missile attacks to don gas masks and seek shelter indoors before the missiles arrived. Even with these limitations on ballistic missile delivery of airborne agents, Iraq had built chemical warheads for its SCUDs, according to United Nations' inspection reports.

Cruise missiles, in contrast, can be guided and follow almost any course over the ground that a mission requires. The speed of a cruise missile is compatible with an effective dissemination of both chemical and biological agents, although designers generally must plan to release these agents outside of the aerodynamically disturbed flow field around the vehicle. If the cruise missile is outfitted with a sensor platform, it may determine the local meteorological conditions and alter its flight profile appropriately before it releases the agent. Unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) are naturally more difficult to detect because of their small size and ability to fly below radar horizons. On the other hand, their slow speed increases their vulnerability to defenses.

Most nations that manufacture chemical and biological agents produce these agents in large quantities. The delivery system costs can become the ultimate limiting factor. Since cruise missiles are much less expensive than either manned aircraft or ballistic missiles, a proliferant can overcome the liabilities of delivery cost efficiency by selecting suitable cruise missile systems.

Manned tactical aircraft and bombers have several of the advantages of cruise missiles, but some additional liabilities. Manned aircraft are expensive to maintain. They also require routine flight operations for crew training, expensive upkeep programs, hangars for housing, and large air bases for basing. If an airplane is lost or shot down, the loss of the pilot complicates subsequent attack planning. Unless a nation has acquired highly capable aircraft or retrofitted its existing aircraft with advanced technology, there may be limitations to all-weather or night operations. Since biological attacks are most effective at night when there is no sunlight to decay the agent and the atmosphere is settling towards the ground as it cools, a limitation on night operations characteristically limits the effectiveness of some biological attacks. The flexibility of flight planning and attack strategy, however, weighs in favor of manned aircraft. A pilot is able to change targets if the battle situation dictates.

Delivery System Considerations for Nuclear Payloads

Nuclear weapons differ markedly from chemical, biological, or conventional warheads. The principal difference is the size, shape, and inertial properties of the warhead. Generally, nuclear weapons have a lower limit on their weight and diameter, which determines characteristics of the delivery system, such as its fuselage girth. Though these limits may be small, geometric considerations often influence the

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selection of a delivery system. Chemical and biological weapons, which are usually fluids or dry powders, can be packed into almost any available volume. Nuclear weapons cannot be retrofitted to fit the available space; however, they can be designed to fit into a variety of munitions (e.g., artillery shells).

Nuclear weapons also have a different distribution of weight within the volume they occupy. Fissile material, the core of a nuclear weapon, weighs more per unit of volume than most other materials. This high specific gravity tends to concentrate weight at certain points in the flight vehicle. Since virtually all WMD delivery systems must fly through the atmosphere during a portion of their trip to a target, a designer has to consider the aerodynamic balance of the vehicle and the required size of control system to maintain a stable flight profile while carrying these concentrations of weight. Chemical, biological, and conventional weapons all have specific gravities near 1.0 gram/cc, so these materials may be placed further from the center of gravity of the vehicle without providing large compensating control forces and moments. In some special applications, such as ballistic missile reentry vehicles and artillery shells, the designer needs to include ballasting material—essentially useless weight—to balance the inertial forces and moments of the nuclear payload.

Because nuclear weapons have a large kill radius against soft and unhardened targets, accuracy is a minor consideration in the delivery system selection as long as the targeting strategy calls for countervalue attacks. Nuclear weapons destroy people and the infrastructure they occupy. They only require that the delivery system places the warhead with an accuracy of approximately 3 kilometers of a target if the weapon has a yield of 20 kilotons and to an even larger radius as the yield grows. Most unmanned delivery systems with a range of less than 500 kilometers easily meet these criteria. Often, as is the case with ballistic missiles, the quality of the control system beyond a certain performance does not materially change the accuracy of a nuclear warhead, because a large fraction of the error arises after the powered phase of the flight as the vehicle reenters the atmosphere. While this is true of chemical and biological warheads as well, with a nuclear warhead, there is less need to compensate for this error with such technologies as terminal guidance or homing reentry vehicles.

A proliferant most likely would not manufacture or obtain nuclear weapons in the same quantities as chemical, biological, or conventional weapons. This may cause a proliferant to place more emphasis on the reliability of the vehicle and the targeting methods it selects to deliver nuclear weapons. Reliability may refer to the delivery system or its ability to penetrate defenses to deliver a weapons load.

Many factors contribute to the ability to penetrate defenses, including the proximity of approach before detection, the velocity of the delivery system, and the time to target after detection. Cruise missiles approach much closer to a target before being detected, but their slow speed also means that the defense has time and capabilities to intercept them in a realistic manner once they are detected. Ballistic missiles can be detected upon launch, but their high reentry speed still makes them difficult targets to acquire and intercept before they reach the target. A proliferant nation must weigh these considerations along with the availability of technologies for building certain delivery systems when it develops a targeting strategy for its nuclear weapons. If a defending country can alert its population of an impending attack, a ballistic missile launch detection system provides about 8 minutes of warning for a missile with a 500-km range. Alternatively, the population has 5 seconds of warning for every mile from the target that a transonic cruise missile can be detected. If the defending nation can detect the cruise missile 100 miles from the intended target, it has about 8 minutes to intercept the missile.

From the standpoint of defense, stealthy cruise missiles pose the greatest threat as a delivery system, regardless of the WMD type. Manned aircraft, while a serious threat, have other limitations, such as their unrefueled range, their capability or lack of capability to operate in all weather conditions and at day or night, their visibility to defense detectors, and their high acquisition, maintenance, and training costs.

OVERVIEW

Proliferants that are acquiring WMD have an array of vehicles available to deliver their payloads. The “Means of Delivery” section covers the primary military methods of delivering WMD. The section focuses on unique aspects of these delivery systems and simple modifications to them that enhance the ability of a proliferant to conduct a WMD attack. Excluded from this topic are adaptations of civilian vehicles, such as automobiles or small boats, which usually accompany terrorist acts. Furthermore, the discussion generally considers only the primary delivery means to carry a weapon to its final target. Except for aircraft carrying WMD bombs or glide devices that steer or fly toward a target after being dropped, the discussion does not treat secondary vehicles that move WMD closer to a target before launch. These vehicles, which include submarines and surface ships carrying ballistic or cruise missiles on board, have such broad military applications that their acquisition cannot be uniquely associated with WMD.

This section will first list the conditions for effective delivery of a payload and then its associated influences on the choice of a delivery system. Each of the subsections that follow emphasizes and elaborates upon certain technologies that a proliferant might use to make its delivery system more effective.

RATIONALE

The ability to produce any of the three types of WMD does not give a proliferant operational capability in that type of weapon. The weapon must be integrated with a delivery system to get the weapon to the intended target. Military systems have been included in this section because they are of most concern. Civilian vehicles (e.g., boats, aircraft, trucks) are not covered because they are so common throughout the world. Yet, they could also be used to deliver a WMD or other significant weapons to

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a particular location, as was demonstrated in the Saudi Arabia bombing in which a commercial truck was used. Some ballistic missiles have been purchased (and possibly modified for longer range), and others have been developed indigenously. Although intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are not widespread, proliferants might obtain the technology to produce them. Cruise missiles provide WMD delivery capability with relatively low technology and ease of acquisition. Most militaries have combat aircraft or the means to purchase them. As long as a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon can be developed to be carried on an aircraft and successfully released, it is a threat that needs to be considered. Artillery is common in the world's armies and can also be used to deliver a WMD. There are many kinds of artillery with varying capability. Nuclear, chemical, and biological munitions that are usable by many existing artillery systems have been produced. The technology has been available for many years and is quite well understood. Also included in the Artillery subsection is the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 1.0-1) Over two-thirds of the countries that cause concern have programs to acquire ballistic missiles. Even though short-range anti-ship cruise missiles are widely available, only a few countries possess long-range land-attack cruise missiles. With the success of long-range cruise missiles in Desert Storm and its aftermath, indigenous development programs can be expected among proliferants. Combat aircraft are already available in every country that has or is suspected of acquiring WMD, and many are being modernized. All armies have artillery that could be adapted to deliver WMD.

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| Country | Sec 1.1 Theater Ballistic Missiles | Sec 1.2 ICBMs | Sec 1.3 Cruise Missiles | Sec 1.4 Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft | Sec 1.5 Artillery |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Argentina | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Brazil | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Canada | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Chile | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| China | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Egypt | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| France | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Germany | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| India | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Iran | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Iraq | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Israel | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Italy | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Japan | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Libya | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| North Korea | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Pakistan | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Russia | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| South Africa | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| South Korea | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Sweden | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Syria | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Taiwan | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Ukraine | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| United Kingdom | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| United States | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |

Legend: Sufficient Technologies Capabilities: ♦♦♦♦ exceeds sufficient level ♦♦♦ sufficient level ♦♦ some ♦ limited
Because two or more countries have the same number of diamonds does not mean that their capabilities are the same. An absence of diamonds in countries of concern may indicate an absence of information, not of capability. The absence of a country from this list may indicate an absence of information, not capability.

**Notes:** Each delivery system column reflects the technologies listed in greater detail in the section describing that delivery system. The technology columns listed in the Foreign Technology Sections on the individual delivery systems refer to technologies that one or more of the listed countries may need. Lack of capability in one technology does not indicate a country has limited capability. It may indicate the country is pursuing a different technology solution.

Figure 1.0-1. Means of Delivery Foreign Technology Assessment Summary

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SECTION 1.1—THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILES (TBMs)

OVERVIEW

The Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) subsection describes the technologies that a nation can employ to build a TBM and the associated means by which they can use it. The U.S. Government defines a TBM as a ballistic missile with a range of less than 3,500 km. Except where noted, this document will use that definition. This subsection emphasizes those technologies that improve accuracy, reduce intercept at boost, increase lethality, and assist a country in extending the range of its missiles, transporting and launching the missiles clandestinely, and building them in sufficient numbers to achieve its objectives. The tables tabulate technologies or their adaptation to entire missiles and their subsystems. They are ordered as follows: airframe; propulsion; guidance, control, and navigation; and weapons integration.

When a proliferant seeks a range extension from an existing airframe, it may need to strengthen the airframe if the original missile had a low factor of safety. This is necessary so the missile can withstand higher aerodynamic loads; change the propulsion subsystem by altering either the burning rate or the duration of propellant flow or by selecting a high-energy propellant; adapt the guidance system to accommodate the new acceleration loads and the higher cutoff velocities; and weaponize the warhead by including thermal protection on the nosetip or modifying the reentry strategy of the missile to withstand the higher aerodynamic heating on reentry.

Proliferants can modify or manufacture longer range ballistic missile airframes in several ways. Iraq extended its missile range by reducing the payload and lengthening existing airframes to hold more fuel and oxidizer. Iraq also introduced the concept of “strap-ons” to extend a missile’s range when it launched the “al Abid” in December 1990. To manufacture the “al Abid” missile, Iraq strapped five SCUDs together to form a single large missile, theoretically capable of a 2,200-km range.

Proliferants can also stage missiles in parallel or serial. The United States used a concept known as “parallel staging” to extend the range of its Atlas missile. Parallel staging fires several component engines simultaneously at launch. Then, as the missile accelerates, it drops these extra engines. When a nation possesses the technical capability to support extra range, the most efficient way to achieve it is through conventional “serial” staging, in which a missile’s stages fire one at a time in sequence. Some Chinese TBMs, such as the M-11, which may have originally been designed as a multiple-stage missile (and, therefore, has sufficient thrust-to-weight ratio), can be converted to two-stage missiles with minor modifications and modest assistance from technical experts if they are aware of certain design limitations.

Highlights

• Chemical and biological weapons are difficult to dispense efficiently from TBMs.
• Proliferants with just a few nuclear weapons may consider TBM reliability before using this means of delivery.
• Separating warheads increase the probability of defense penetration.
• Attitude control modules and post-boost vehicles increase TBM warhead accuracy.

But some constraints, such as avoiding maximum dynamic pressure at staging and timing the staging event precisely enough to maintain control over the missile, are solved when multi-stage missiles are built derived from components which originally came from a multi-stage missile.

To extend the range of liquid-fueled and solid-fueled missiles, these missiles require different adaptations to the propulsion subsystem. Liquid-fueled missiles supply fuel to the thrust chamber by turbopumps. To increase the range of an existing liquid-fueled missile, the proliferant must either increase the flow rate of the propellant and oxidizer or allow the missile to burn for a longer period of time. This can be accomplished by adding more propellant, which usually requires a modification to the airframe, and consideration of other factors such as structural integrity, stability, and thermal integrity. If a longer burn time is chosen, many surfaces that are exposed to the combustion process, such as jet vanes in the exhaust flow or components of the thrust chamber, may need to be modified to protect them from the increased thermal exposure. Alternatively, if the missile thrust is to be increased, the combustion chamber must be designed or modified to withstand the increased pressures, or the nozzle must be redesigned with a larger throat area to accommodate the increased mass flow rates. In addition, structural modifications may be required to compensate for the higher aerodynamic loads and torques and for the different flight profile that will be required to place the warhead on the proper ballistic phase trajectory. Usually a country will design a completely new missile if new turbopumps are available. A proliferant that wishes to increase its liquid-fueled missile’s range may need to consider upgrading all the valving and associated fluidic lines to support higher flow rates. The

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proliferant will seek lightweight valves and gauges that operate with sub-millisecond time cycles and have a reliable and reproducible operation time. These valves must also accept electrical signals from standard computer interfaces and require little if any ancillary electrical equipment. A country may use higher energy propellant combinations in existing missile designs with relatively minor structural, material, and turbopump modifications. Technology requirements would focus on thermal protection for the thrust chamber and improved injector design.

A solid-propellant missile differs in overall operation because it simply burns propellant from an integral motor chamber. A proliferant seeking to make longer range solid missiles generally has to stage the missile (either in parallel or serial); strap on additional whole motors or motor segments; improve the stage fraction; or improve the propellant. When a nation chooses to stage an existing missile, it may be able to procure the first stage of a serially staged design, which is larger and more difficult to manufacture, and simply add an indigenous smaller upper stage of its own. A key determinant of a missile's utility as a first stage is the performance specification of thrust-to-weight ratio. Whole missile systems used as a first stage must produce a thrust-to-weight ratio greater than one for the entire assembled multi-stage missile. Missiles that may fall below the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines are still of interest because they might be used by proliferants as upper stages of serial staged missiles or as strap-ons.

Once a country can indigenously produce a solid rocket motor, few, if any, components do not automatically scale from more basic designs. If a proliferant desires a more advanced solid rocket fleet, it may choose to build the missile case from carbon graphite or more advanced organic matrix materials. To support this, it will need to import either filament winding machines, an equivalent manufacturing process, or the finished motor cases. A proliferant might import the finished filament wound cases without propellant if it chooses to use a manufacturing technique pioneered in the former Soviet Union known as "cartridge loading." Cartridge loading allows the propellant to be inserted into the case after it is manufactured. The competing manufacturing procedure, known as "case bonding," usually requires the case, propellant, and insulating liner to be assembled in close proximity at the same site, though it is still possible to import empty cases for case bonding. Designs employing propellants with higher burning temperatures require many supporting components, including better insulating material to line the inside of the rocket case and stronger or larger thrust vector control actuators to direct the increased thrust.

The three separate flight functions performed by the guidance, control, and navigation subsystem generally require separate technical considerations. Guidance refers to the process of determining a course to a target and maintaining that course by measuring position and attitude as the missile flies (while, at the same time, steering the missile along the course). Control generally encompasses the hardware and software used during the missile's burn phase to change the missile's attitude and course in response to guidance inputs and to maintain the missile in a stable attitude. Navigation concerns locating a target and launch point and the path that connects them in three-dimensional space. An effective design requires that all three functions operate in concert before and during flight for the missile to reach its target. Some of the hardware and software in each feature overlaps functions.

The aerodynamic and inertial properties of the missile and the nature of the atmospheric conditions through which it flies determine the speed with which guidance commands need to be sent to the control system. First generation TBMs, such as the SCUD and the Redstone, have fins to damp out in-flight perturbations. The rudimentary guidance systems used in these missiles do not support rapid calculations of position changes. When a missile's thrust vector control system becomes responsive enough to overcome these perturbations without aerodynamic control surfaces, these fins are usually removed from the design because their added weight and aerodynamic drag diminish the missile's range.

Most TBM designs have a resonance around 10 Hz (cycle time of 100 milliseconds). Calculations to correct disturbances must occur within this cycle time. Guidance and control engineers generally add a factor of safety of two to their cycle time or, in other words, half the cycle time. When thrust vectoring is the exclusive control standard of a missile, the system must respond or have a major cycle time of 50 milliseconds or less. When fins are used, the control cycle time for a missile may be much longer than a second.

As the guidance and control subsystems work together to keep a missile stable and flying on its trajectory, all the components of these subsystems must operate within the major cycle time. Guidance computers, for instance, have to accept acceleration, angular position, and position rate measurements; determine if these positions are proper for the missile's course; and correct any deviations that have occurred in the flight profile. Computers of the i8086 class, and later, are capable of making these calculations in the times required. In addition to the calculation procedures, all the control hardware must reliably and repeatedly accept the control signals generated by the flight computer and effect the commands within the cycle time. Since some of these operations must occur in a specific sequence, the sum of all operational times in the sequence must be much shorter than the major cycle time. Therefore, valves, electric motors, and other actuators must produce steering forces within 50 milliseconds to support an unfinned ballistic missile control system. When the missile has fins, the allowable response times increase, permitting the hardware operational specifications to be greatly reduced.

In addition to the cycle time, the control subsystem must also hold the missile within acceptable physical deviations from specified attitude and velocity during its short burning period. Missiles with autonomous control systems generally rely on acceleration measurements rather than position measurements to determine attitude and position rates. However, positional indications can be substituted if the positional

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variables can be determined quickly and accurately enough. Position measurements reduce the control system cycle time by generally reducing the computer integration of accelerations that are required to determine position. Positional measurements also do not suffer the degradation in performance that occurs with time, acceleration force, and vibrations on measurement instrumentation that supports acceleration measurements.

Multi-source radio signals that allow a triangulation of position offer an alternative to acceleration measurements. Advanced missile powers dropped radio guidance in the 1960's and switched to autonomous inertial measuring units, which are carried onboard the missile. The United States considered radio guidance again in the late 1980's for mobile missiles but dropped the idea in favor of a Global Positioning System (GPS). Nonetheless, if a proliferant chose to build a radio guidance system, it could transmit signals from the launch site, or it may build an accurate transmitter array near the launch site to create the signals. Guidance engineers often refer to this latter technique as using pseudolites. However, radio command and control schemes, because of the immediate presence of a radio signal when the system is turned on, alert defenses that a missile launch is about to occur. However, performance for these systems degrades because of the rocket plume and radio noise. Also, these systems are very much subject to the effects of jamming or false signals.

On the other hand, GPS and the Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) are unlikely ever to be used in the control function of a ballistic missile. The best military grade GPS receivers produce positions with an uncertainty of tens of centimeters. If a missile has two of these receivers in its airframe spaced 10 meters apart, the best angular resolution is roughly in the centi-radian range. TBMs require milliradian range angular accuracy to maintain control. However, GPS has significant application for an TBM outfitted with a post-boost vehicle (bus) or attitude control module that navigates a reentry vehicle to a more accurate trajectory.

Older, less-sophisticated guidance systems perform less navigation than modern TBMs. In the older TBMs, a launch crew sets the azimuth to the target at a mobile site and the control computer determines when the missile is traveling at the proper velocity and velocity attitude angle to achieve the desired range. These three properties, in addition to random winds at the target and errors that accrue in the guidance instruments, uniquely determine where the missiles land. Any technologies that allow a proliferant to position and target its missiles in the field quickly reduces the time defending forces have to target and destroy the missile. GPS allows a mobile launch crew to operate more quickly in the field when not launching the missile from a pre-surveyed launch site.

When no in-flight update of position is given, a crew must set a reasonably accurate azimuth before the missile is launched. To be consistent with the overall accuracy of an older missile, such as the SCUD, which has a non-separating warhead, the crew must strike an azimuth line within 1 milliradian of the actual azimuth to maintain a satisfactory cross range accuracy. With military grade GPS receivers of 1–3 meter accuracy, the launch crew must survey no further than 1 km from the actual launch point to support a 1-milliradian azimuth. Pseudolites or differential GPS will either reduce survey distance required or increase accuracy—whether using military or civilian GPS signals.

Any technologies that allow for the separation of a reentry vehicle after the boost phase assist the proliferator in two ways. First, a separating warhead is often more accurate than a warhead that reenters while still attached to the main missile body. Secondly, the separated warhead produces a much smaller radar cross section (RCS), thus making the warhead harder to locate.

Technologies that assist a country in separating its warheads and producing a clean aerodynamic shape for reentry include computer aerodynamic prediction routines, nosetip materials that can withstand higher aerodynamic heating, and space-qualified small missile motors that can steer out accumulated error. Hardware that assists in separating a warhead from a booster includes timing circuits, squibs, and other cutting charges, and if accuracy is an issue, an alignment mechanism. This mechanism might be as simple as aerodynamic fins that unfold upon reentry.

RATIONALE

TBMs can carry a conflict outside of the immediate theater of fighting and can usually penetrate to their targets. Iraq's limited capability missiles made an impact by tying up allied air assets on seek-and-destroy missions against mobile launchers and in the other steps taken to calm Israeli and Saudi populations. Extant whole missile systems, such as the SCUD and SS-21, can satisfy the targeting needs for many proliferators.

A proliferator's potential ability to upgrade existing, outmoded missiles (e.g., short-range SCUDs) is quite real. Much of the hardware and technology to support many of the modifications described in the Overview are readily available or can be produced indigenously. However, some of the hardware and technology (those requiring more advanced technology, special materials, and/or precise manufacturing) are not readily available and may require special design and production efforts by more advanced countries. A proliferator can achieve an understanding of the most efficient and cost-effective methods to extend the range of a missile by using finite element structural and fluid dynamic computer routines and automated codes to predict missile performance and aerodynamic properties. A proliferator can also test and validate the computer routines in wind tunnels and structural laboratories. Since these computer routines reduce the number of engineers needed to modify missiles, they are particularly key to reducing both the unit and system costs. Automated engineering computer routines are ranked at the same level of importance in the technology tables as hardware items.

The type of propulsion system selected also affects launch strategy, the second important proliferant capability. Liquid-propellant missiles generally create less of a

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military threat than solid-propellant missiles. Solid-propellant missiles are stable and storable and do not require fueling before launch, a time when the missile is particularly vulnerable because of its exposure. In addition, solid-fueled missiles have a shorter launch support train than liquid-fueled missiles. Fewer vehicles and less activity associated with the vehicles limits exploitation of acoustic, seismic, and other signatures. The enormous progress made in guidance and navigation with the GPS, particularly in automated design with computer routines such as finite element codes and in materials science with the introduction of composite materials, has further reduced the design burden on proliferants seeking TBMs. Transferred to proliferant nations, these advances streamline the manufacturing processes, which accelerate and expand the potential for a missile arsenal. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 1.1-1) Several countries purchased SCUDs up to the end of the Cold War, and many of these countries still have arsenals of varying size and threat. These countries include Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. The Soviets also sold Syria, Yemen, and possibly Libya, the shorter range SS-21 missile. Egypt, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea all display the manufacturing base and technical prowess to make range extension modifications similar to those that Iraq accomplished before the Gulf War. In addition to these countries, several nations have built or attempted to build their own TBMs. An inherent capability to produce unique and totally indigenous missiles exists in these countries: Argentina, Brazil, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, and Taiwan, and nearing production in Syria. Iran and Iraq must import the guidance and control systems of these missiles; however, beyond those constraints imposed on Iraq by UN sanctions, it has no limitations on its ability to produce 600-km range TBMs. Systems Both China and North Korea continue to sell missile technology and missile systems. Also, North Korea continues to sell missiles abroad. North Korea has offered the 1,000-km-range No Dong missile, and the Chinese sold between 30 and 50 CSS-2's, a 2,200-km-range missile, to Saudi Arabia in the late 1980's. Apparently, the Israeli government acted as an intermediary for shipping Lance missiles to the Taiwanese. Lances are a short-range nuclear delivery system that the United States based in Europe. They can be reverse engineered to serve as strap-ons for existing missiles. Each TBM may cost as little as $1.5 million dollars, so a proliferator with even modest resources can afford to build a sizable missile force. If a country seeks autonomy from the world market and wishes to build its missile indigenously, it can purchase a manufacturing plant from the North Koreans or Chinese for about $200 million and purchase critical parts, such as guidance systems, elsewhere. To develop complete autonomy requires a capital investment of about $1 billion dollars. Technical Assistance Besides whole systems, many corporations and nations have offered technical assistance during the last 10 years to some emerging missile powers. German firms reportedly assisted the missile programs of Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iraq, and Libya. Italians have offered assistance to Argentina, Egypt, and India, and the French have participated in missile programs in Iraq and Pakistan. Most European countries can lend technical assistance to emerging missile powers. The French have a long history of developing missiles not only to support the Ariane space launch capability but to launch the force de frappe nuclear arsenal. The Italians have participated in the European Union space program that helped design and prototype the Hermes missile. While the British relied on American missile programs to supply their TBM needs in the 1960's, a technical exchange program between Britain and the United States has trained and educated a sizable pool of missile talent from the British Isles. Many Western European nations and Russia are in the process of downsizing their defense industries. As many as 2 million physicists and engineers may become available over the course of the next decade. As of 1997, the U.S. Government lists at least 11 countries outside of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and China with programs for producing an indigenous missile. Most of these programs are technologically sophisticated enough to produce a militarily threatening system in a relatively short time. Guidance systems are the principal impediment to most countries in developing their own missile, followed by propellant manufacturing and warhead mating to prevent failure caused by the heat of reentry and vibration during boost.

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| Country | Airframe Extension to Liquid-Fueled Missiles | Post-Boost Vehicles | High Energy Solid-Fuel Motors | Storable Liquid Propellant Engines | Strap-on Boosters | Floated Inertial Measurement Units | Digital Navigation and Control | Post-Boost Position Realignment and Spin | Bomblets or Submunitions | TEL Manufacturing | Separating Warheads |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Argentina | ♦♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Brazil | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Canada | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Chile | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| China | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Egypt | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| France | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Germany | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| India | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Iran | ♦♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Iraq | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Israel | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Italy | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Japan | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Libya | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ |
| North Korea | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Pakistan | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Russia | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| South Africa | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| South Korea | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Sweden | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Syria | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦ |
| Taiwan | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Ukraine | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| United Kingdom | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| United States | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |

Legend: Sufficient Technologies Capabilities: ♦♦♦♦ exceeds sufficient level ♦♦♦ sufficient level ♦♦ some ♦ limited
Because two or more countries have the same number of diamonds does not mean that their capabilities are the same. An absence of diamonds in countries of concern may indicate an absence of information, not of capability. The absence of a country from this list may indicate an absence of information, not capability.

Figure 1.1-1. Theater Ballistic Missiles Foreign Technology Assessment Summary

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Table 1.1-1. Theater Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters

(cont'd)

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Table 1.1-1. Theater Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters (cont'd)

(cont'd)

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Table 1.1-1. Theater Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters (cont'd)

(cont'd)

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Table 1.1-1. Theater Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters (cont'd)

(cont'd)

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Table 1.1-1. Theater Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters (cont'd)

(cont'd)

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Table 1.1-1. Theater Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters (cont'd)

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Table 1.1-2. Theater Ballistic Missiles Reference Data

(cont'd)

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Table 1.1-2. Theater Ballistic Missiles Reference Data (cont'd)

(cont'd)

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Table 1.1-2. Theater Ballistic Missiles Reference Data (cont'd)

(cont'd)

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Table 1.1-2. Theater Ballistic Missiles Reference Data (cont'd)

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SECTION 1.2—INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBMs)

OVERVIEW

The Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) subsection continues the description of missile technology that was begun in the TBM section and extends it to the additional technologies that a nation needs to increase the range of its missiles to intercontinental distances (>5,500 km). ICBMs are particularly troubling to the world community because they have few, if any, distinguishing characteristics from space launch vehicles. Many nations can build an ICBM capability while claiming to be building a space launch fleet. Few would question, for instance, India’s assertion about the benefits of a communication satellite to link remote regions in its country or a meteorological satellite to predict the path of monsoons. If a country chooses to further assert that national sovereignty compels it to build its own launch vehicle, the world community has few legitimate reasons to argue.

In the last 20 years, several countries have built, or sought to build, missiles with an intercontinental reach, usually under the auspices of a space launch capability. France led the way with the introduction of the S-2 launch vehicle in the late 1960’s. Derivatives and motor technology from their S-2 missile assisted France in developing its Ariane space launch vehicle, which competes directly with the American Delta class space vehicles. Israel demonstrated the technical capacity to put a satellite in orbit in 1991, indicating to the world that it could deliver WMD to any spot on the globe.

Space launch programs came out of South Africa and India in the late 1980’s. The South Africans constructed an especially credible prototype for a three-stage launch vehicle that had immediate use as an ICBM. Finally, Iraq showed that a long-range missile did not necessarily have to be built from the ground up. With the help of foreign consultants, Iraq test fired the al Abid Space Launch Vehicle in December 1990. The al Abid consisted of five SCUD missiles strapped together to form a lower stage, which was designed to boost two upper stages, together with a payload, into orbit. The al Abid did not work as predicted, and, if it had, it would have put only a few kilograms of useful payload into orbit. As an ICBM, though, it established the possibility of building a long-range rocket from dated technology. The various technologies will be addressed as complete systems and as subsystems.

Systems

Iraq built its al Abid capability with the direct assistance of foreign scientists and engineers and by attempting to purchase technology, such as carbon-carbon materials, for rocket nozzle throats and nosetips directly from foreign companies. The multiple uses for aerospace materials and the development of aerospace consortiums have

Highlights

• Strap-on boosters are an attractive method to develop ICBMs quickly.
• Serially staged missiles deliver the most payload per unit weight, but are more difficult to make.
• ICBMs cost a proliferant 20 to 60 times as much as a TBM for the same payload.
• Proliferants will need to manufacture Transporter-Erector Launchers (TELs) if they seek a mobile missile capability, or build hardened shelters if they wish to protect ICBM.
• Chemical and biological agents are difficult to dispense effectively from an ICBM.
• A proliferant may solve the ICBM re-entry heating problem by building a less accurate, low ballistic coefficient re-entry vehicle.
• A post-boost vehicle provides a means of delivering WMD accurately from an ICBM.

multiplied the number of sources of research talent and manufacturing industries that a potential proliferant nation can tap for assistance in building an ICBM.

These foreign outlets have also exposed the proliferant world to the high expense associated with building an ICBM. In the late 1980’s, Iraq could afford to trade some of its oil wealth for the cost of buying the entire corporate talent of one research and development (R&D) firm. Most economies that can sustain such a high level of funding are either already building space launch vehicles (France and China), are in a multilateral arrangement to build one (Germany, Great Britain, Italy), or have recently abandoned building one because of market forces (South Africa).

ICBM attacks must also be effective because a launching nation will get few opportunities to continue the attack. The simple cost of an ICBM limits the total size of a missile inventory. This decreases the potential for sustained firing of ICBMs, a tactic used to disrupt a society by the threat of repeated chemical weapons attacks by long-range missiles.

If a country seeks to launch an ICBM, it must either launch the missile from a vulnerable fixed launch site, harden the launch site for better survivability against

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attack, or invest the additional expense in building a mobile transporter-erector launcher (TEL). Use of vulnerable, fixed launch site ICBMs provides opportunity for opposing forces to eliminate most of these sites quickly. Hardened launch sites are difficult to reload quickly and thus damper a sustained firing tactic. Without the use of fixed launch sites, a nation must rely on mobile launchers. Making enough mobile launchers to support a long missile campaign is an expensive endeavor. It also lessens the possibility of a sustained firing. A small ICBM that delivers 500 kg of payload to a distance of 9,000 km will weigh between 15,000 and 22,000 kg, depending on the efficiency of the design and the sophistication of the technology involved. The FSU and the United States have built TELs to handle missiles of this mass.

Chemical or biological agents are not spread efficiently by the flight path that an ICBM follows. The high velocity along the flight azimuth makes it almost impossible to distribute airborne agents in an even and effective cloud. Submunitions make the problem somewhat more tractable, but the submunitions still require a very capable propulsion system if they are to cancel the azimuthal velocity and impart a cross range velocity to circularize the distribution of an agent cloud. Other problems abound: U.S. experience with fuzes for ballistic missiles showed that much less than 10 percent of chemical and biological agents survived the launch and delivery sequence. Iraq used fuzing for its chemical warheads on its TBMs that would have allowed less than 1 percent of the agent to survive.

The most sensible warhead for an ICBM to carry is a nuclear weapon, and the weaponization section concerns itself primarily with the weaponization of ICBMs to carry nuclear warheads.

Subsystems

Some of the same technologies for extending a TBM's range provide extra capability to build an ICBM. An ICBM may include strap-ons, a clustered combination of single-stage missiles, "parallel" staging, and serial staging. Iraq increased the range of its missile fleet by reducing the weight of the warhead in one case (the al Hussein missile) and extending the propellant and oxidizer tanks and increasing the burn time in another (the "al Abbas" missile). The particular path that Iraq followed in making the "al Abbas" out of SCUD parts is not technically practical for building an ICBM. An airframe must have a thrust-to-weight ratio of greater than one to lift off, and a SCUD airframe cannot be extended sufficiently to reach intercontinental ranges and still lift off with the current turbopump, given its low stage fraction (the ratio of burnout weight to takeoff weight—a strong measure of missile performance). Building a new turbopump that provides the needed take-off thrust and also fits within the airframe is a more difficult task than simply building a new and much more capable missile from scratch.

Both strap-ons and parallel staging provide ways for a proliferant to reach an ICBM capability. Many countries have built small, solid rocket motors that can be tailored to fit within the MTCR guidelines. A number of these motors strapped on to a reasonably capable main stage, such as the S-2, would resemble the Ariane launch vehicle. The country that pursues this path requires a firing sequencer that can ignite all the motors simultaneously. Strap-ons generally operate for a short fraction (roughly one-third) of the total missile burn time of an ICBM. If they are dropped off, the guidance and control requirement can be met by using the main engine thrust vector control to steer the whole assemblage. Aerodynamically, the strap-ons behave much as fins in the lower atmosphere, increasing the amount of total cycle time available for the guidance computer to operate.

Parallel staging offers many of the same advantages for liquid rockets that strap-ons do for solid rockets. The United States built the Atlas missile as a parallel staged rocket because, in the 1950's, it was the quickest path to developing an ICBM to meet the Soviet challenge. A liquid-fueled, parallel-staged rocket draws propellant and oxidizer from existing tanks but feeds it to several engines at once to sustain the proper thrust level. When these engines are no longer needed, they are dropped. The tanks, however, remain with the missile so a parallel-staged missile is not as efficient as a serially staged missile.

As many designers already know, and most textbooks prove mathematically, a serially staged missile is the best design to deliver a payload to long distances. Examples of an optimal, serially staged ICBM include the U.S. Peacekeeper missile and the Soviet Union's SS-24. Each of these missiles can reach 11,000-km range and carry up to 10 nuclear warheads. In an optimum serially staged configuration, each stage contributes about twice as much velocity as the stage that preceded it, though many effective ICBMs can be built without following any particular design guideline.

To be capable of an 11,000-km range, the ideal ICBM would be composed of four stages. The United States and the Soviet Union both ignored this consideration, though, because of concerns about the overall reliability of the missile. The ignition of each stage in sequence at the staging interval is difficult to time properly, and, inevitably, some period occurs during this staging event when the control authority over the missile is at its worst. To reduce these events and improve the overall reliably of the missiles, the superpowers chose to trade performance for fewer stages.

A proliferant that does not buy a fully equipped ICBM must solve this same staging sequence problem. The technologies to build event sequencers and the short duration, reproducibly timed squibs, exploding bridge-wires, or other stage separation shaped charges to support these sequencers are among the most sensitive material to be controlled in trying to prevent the proliferation of ICBMs.

If a proliferant clusters existing single-stage missiles together, it must consider the guidance and control implications of the design. Several ordinary single-stage missiles grouped together make a very stout planform with a high lateral moment of inertia. To control this missile, the thrust vector control system has to produce much greater torque on the airframe than it would for an equivalent mass that is long and thin, as are most missiles. The high moment of inertia, in turn, requires either higher

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actuation strokes in a thrust vector control system, which reduces the thrust available for range, or a much larger liquid injection system, which reduces the weight available for propellant and again reduces the range. On the other hand, simple thrust vector control strategies, such as vernier nozzles and fluid injection, can satisfactorily control the missile. A proliferator only needs to build the fluidics to support these schemes: fast acting valves and the actuators to control these valves. The same types of valve and piping concerns that are covered in the tables for TBMs apply to the fluid system of an ICBM.

A serially staged missile forces a designer to carefully consider the control of a more dynamically complex vehicle. The stages and interstage breaks make the structure of a serially staged missile behave under some loading conditions as a series of smaller integral segments attached at points with flexible joints. This construction has natural frequencies that are different than a single, integral body, such as a one-stage missile. If flight conditions excite any of these many and complex resonant modes in the missile stack, the guidance and control system must supply the correct damping motion, in frequency or duration, to prevent the missile from losing control. Some of the corrections affect the guidance of the missile, and the flight computer must determine the proper steering to return the missile to its predicted trajectory. A proliferator may use many existing finite element routines and modal analysis hardware to find or predict these frequencies.

In addition to the hardware, a requirement exists to test and validate the computer routines in wind tunnels and structural laboratories. Since these computer routines reduce the number of engineers needed to modify missiles, they are particularly key to reducing the cost of individual missiles. For this reason, automated engineering computer routines are ranked at the same level of threat in the technology tables as hardware items.

The guidance and navigation systems of an ICBM closely mirror those that are used in a TBM, and anyone who has passed through the phase of building a TBM can possibly scale up a version of the guidance system suitable from the earlier missiles. The mathematical logic for determining range is different for ICBMs than for TBMs if a digital guidance computer is used rather than a pendulous integrating gyro accelerometer, which is the standard for most TBMs. However, many text books derive the equations of motion for digital guidance computers. Errors created by the guidance system feedback instrumentation during the boost-phase can be corrected later in the flight with post-boost vehicles (to be discussed in the weaponization section). Navigation technologies, beyond the issues already discussed for TBMs, can be applied in this same post-boost vehicle.

The propulsion system of ICBMs can be either liquid or solid fueled (or in some cases a hybrid of the two). A proliferator that understands the principles of solid fuel burning and how to shape the configuration of the internal grain to achieve the desired thrust/time trace can build any of its stages for an ICBM indigenously. Larger motors, of course, are more difficult to manufacture. The outer case of a solid missile can be made from any conventional material, such as steel, but better propellants with higher burning temperatures often require the substitution of materials with higher strength-to-weight ratios, such as Kevlar and carbon or glass epoxy. Steel cases can be used with cross-linked, double-based solid fuels, but the need for additional liners and insulation to protect the case against the higher burning temperatures of these newer propellants compromises some of the range that can be achieved by using the better propellant in the first place. Most steel cases must be produced from a material having a thickness that closely or exactly matches the final thickness of the motor case to prevent excessive milling of the material.

Filament winding technology may lay the filaments in solid motor cases in longitudinal and circumferential plies, in bias plies, and in the most structurally efficient way of all—in helically wound orientations. Any European, former Soviet, or U.S. multi-axis filament-winding machine of sufficient size can be used to wind a solid rocket motor case. The ply's winding orientation determines the structural, or stage, efficiency of the solid rocket motor.

In a liquid-fueled missile, the supply pressure to feed fuel and oxidizer to the thrust chamber may come either from creating an ullage pressure or pumping the liquids to the thrust chamber with turbopumps. Large volume flow rate pumps, particularly those designed for caustic fuels, have unique applications to ICBM construction. A proliferator may avoid the need for pumps by building tanks within the ICBM to contain an ullage pressure, which forces the liquids into the thrust chambers when the tanks are exposed to this high pressure. In most cases, ullage pressure is structurally less efficient than modern turbopumps because the missile frame must cover the ullage tanks, which are maintained at very high pressure and thus are quite heavy. However, this decrement in range performance is small. Since the technology is simpler to obtain, it may serve the needs of a proliferator. In either case, a liquid missile generally requires valves and gauges that are lightweight, operate with sub-millisecond time cycles, and have a reliable and reproducible operation time. These valves must also accept electrical signals from standard computer interfaces and require little, if any, ancillary electrical equipment.

The choice of liquid propellant may also influence other technology choices. Some liquid propellants are storable, and others must be cryogenically cooled to temperatures approaching absolute zero. The cryogenic coolers make the missile less mobile and more difficult to prepare to fire. The superpowers long ago abandoned nonstorable liquid-propellant missiles for these reasons, but a country that can support the technology to manufacture and store liquid oxygen and hydrogen may find this to be one possible path to making an ICBM.

The ICBM trajectory creates the most stressing problem for weapons integration, mainly because of the enormous heat load that velocity imparts to the reentry vehicle (RV). A TBM reenters the atmosphere at about 2 km/sec, and an ICBM reenters at about 6 km/sec. This increase in velocity creates more than an order of magnitude increase in associated heating.

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Traditionally, ICBMs have overcome the heat load with two reentry strategies: one using a very high ballistic coefficient and one using a very low ballistic coefficient. The choice has important and mutually exclusive implications for other aspects of the design. If a low ballistic coefficient is selected for RVs, it may only require that the heat shield be built from very simple and easy to obtain material, such as cork and phenolic. These materials provide sufficient thermal protection because the velocity of the RV is dissipated high in the atmosphere and the surplus thermal energy is transferred to the shock wave that the RV creates and the turbulence of the flow in its wake. Since the RV has slowed almost to terminal velocity, the unpredictable conditions of the winds aloft reduce accuracy. A low ballistic coefficient RV may have a circular error probability (CEP) as great as 20 km from the reentry phase of its flight alone. It has, however, slowed to the point where the dissemination of chemical and biological agents is more feasible.

On the other hand, if a high ballistic coefficient is selected, the nosetip of the RV must endure temperatures in excess of 2,000 °C. Temperatures in this range call for the best thermal insulating materials possible, such as 3-d or 4-d carbon/carbon. In addition to protecting the RV from extreme heating, the nosetip must also experience very little erosion of its contour as it travels through the atmosphere. Materials that provide both of these properties are rare and generally limited to manufacture in technologically advanced countries.

Either of these reentry strategies benefits from the aid of a post-boost vehicle (PBV). The use of a PBV makes a high ballistic coefficient RV especially accurate. The PBV operates in space after the missile has burned completely. It steers out the guidance errors that have accumulated during the boost phase of the firing and puts the RV on a more accurate ballistic path. It can also be used just before the RV reenters the atmosphere to correct any errors in the flight path that have occurred because of assumptions about the Earth's gravitational field between the launch point and the target. In a sophisticated PBV, the vehicle may realign the RV so it reenters the atmosphere with little aerodynamic oscillation. It may also spin the RV to even out contour changes in the nosetip and, thereby, reduce unpredictable flow fields around the body. The spinning gives the RV a gyroscopic inertia that damps out small perturbations in the attitude of the RV.

With a PBV, a proliferator can achieve a targeting accuracy of 500 m over an intercontinental range. In general, the PBV costs about half of the total throw weight of a missile. For these reasons, its use is traded off with chemical and biological agents payload.

The tables include technologies for extending range by simple modifications to boosters, separating a warhead so it can re-enter, making a thrust vector control system that is consistent with the higher aerodynamic and thrust loads on an ICBM, and increasing the responsiveness of thrust vector control. The tables list first the most useful technologies for range extension and for building complete motors for an ICBM. Then, they list in descending order those technologies that advance capability to (1) build a large arsenal very quickly; (2) allow a warhead to reenter the atmosphere without burning up; (3) develop more accurate warheads from the post-boost phase through the reentry phase; and (4) support an ICBM arsenal with other military equipment, such as silos or other protected launch sites. As in other subsections, each of the tabulated technologies, or adaptations of technologies, applies to a specific subsystem of the missile: airframe, propulsion, guidance control and navigation, and weapons integration. The "Foreign Technology Assessment" paragraphs explore these programs in greater depth and evaluate the technical depth of various nations that are trying to build space launch vehicles and ICBMs.

RATIONALE

ICBMs create a true proliferation problem because they enable the proliferator to break out of a regional context and move toward potential global impact. Regardless of the origin of a conflict, a proliferator may involve the entire world simply by threatening to spread the war with an ICBM. In 1991, Iraq demonstrated this principle even with the limited-range "al Abbas" missile.

Whatever unspoken protocols existed during the Cold War, they will almost certainly cease to exist when an ICBM-armed proliferator makes threats against a target. Therefore, the ICBM subsection emphasizes technologies that pose the most immediate threat against the United States and its allies, assuming that no ballistic missile defenses are readily available.

FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 1.2-1)

Systems

Seven nations—the United States, Russia, China, France, Japan, India, and Israel—have launched space vehicles, demonstrating generalized capability to build an ICBM. Israel has demonstrated the clearest link between a space launch program and a missile delivery system with the Shavit, the first Israeli satellite, and a substantial copy and scaled-up version of the Jericho II missile. Although Ukraine has not "launched" any space vehicles, it has produced large space launch systems as well as the world's only heavy ICBM, the SS-18. Brazil is developing a sounding rocket that has applications to an ICBM program, and Pakistan has made first-generation rockets that indicate an underlying objective of developing an ICBM. No country has yet sold ICBMs abroad.

Under United States pressure, Taiwan all but abandoned its space launch program in 1993. However, a residual infrastructure of knowledge and manufacturing capability remains in Taiwan. South Korea and Indonesia, once ICBM aspirants, have also dropped their development programs in recent years because of U.S. pressure and economic forces.

No one purchaser names a possible price for the purchase of an ICBM, since none have been sold as unregulated commodities in the way that SCUDs have. However,

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other sales provide some indication of the rough costs. The Brazilians reportedly expected to receive in excess of $10 million each for their Condor II, whose range of 1,000 km is much less than intercontinental, and the Chinese apparently received about $20 million for each of the 2,500-km range CSS-2s they sold to Saudi Arabia. Many studies within the United States indicate that the Peacekeeper, a highly capable and advanced missile, costs the military about $65 million per copy.

At $50 million per missile, a country would need to invest about $2 billion to purchase or build 40 missiles. When this is compared to the roughly $200 million the Iraqis paid to build their Saad 16 missile manufacturing facility, it becomes clear that the economies of many countries cannot support a nuclear weapons production capability and an ICBM launch capability.

Existing ICBMs and their countries of origin include: China, the CSS-4; France, the M5 and M4; the FSU, the SS-11, -13, -17, -18, -19, -24, -25, and the SSN-20 and -23; and the United States, the MM III, Peacekeeper, and Trident.

Subsystems

A determined proliferant can make an ICBM by substituting many technologies for the ones that have been listed so far as being militarily sufficient. The proliferants that have not been named as already capable of building an ICBM—Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya—need to seek out certain technologies on overseas markets. The nature of an acquisition program need not reveal its intention, if substitutions for certain materials are done properly.

Hardware

Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya can manufacture or import steel of an equivalent grade to the material found in the early Minuteman II ICBM. If these countries seek to build a composite motor case instead, they must purchase the filament-winding machine from the United States, the FSU, France, Germany, the UK, or South Africa. The Chinese may be able to supply a reverse engineered filament winding machine based on Soviet technology.

Other than the traditional solid-propellant manufacturing centers in France, Sweden, Norway, Germany, and the United States, many other European countries with arms manufacturing centers, such as the Czech Republic, have some solid-propellant capability. In addition, Pakistan can manufacture small, solid-propellant motors that can be used as strap-on boosters. South Africa also has an indigenous solid-propellant production capability, which, if it so desired, can export small solid-propellant motors.

Proliferators that may wish to follow the liquid-fueled path to ICBMs without using strap-ons are likely to purchase turbopumps primarily from Germany, Sweden, the United States, France, or Russia.

The guidance and control package that a country needs to support an ICBM depends upon the desired accuracy it expects to achieve with its missile. Without a PBV, this accuracy is going to be poor, and more rudimentary technology can be used. Any industrial/advanced nation manufactures equipment and parts that, when properly constructed, can be used to build an inertial measuring unit. In addition to the United States, a proliferant can turn to Belgium, Germany, France, Holland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia, Italy, China, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, Egypt, or India. In general, though, a guidance and control unit, using a digital guidance computer and consistent with a staged missile, cannot be built from cannibalized parts of older, analog guidance systems.

A PBV requires a small liquid rocket motor, cold gas thrusters, or many small total impulse solid rocket motors. These motors must be supported by a small guidance, control, and navigation unit that flies with the RVs until they are dropped. GPS units have wide application for this particular phase of the ICBM trajectory. Because of existing export controls, a proliferant would have to modify an over-the-counter GPS receiver to operate at high altitude and at ICBM velocities. The knowledge of how to build a GPS receiver is now widespread, however, and many individual hobbyists have built receivers that evade these restrictions. A modified GPS receiver or a GLONASS receiver is completely consistent with the needs of a PBV.

Technical Assistance

Besides supplying whole systems, many corporations and nations have offered technical assistance in the last 10 years to some emerging missile powers. German firms reportedly assisted the missile programs of Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iraq, and Libya. The Italians have offered assistance to Argentina, Egypt, and India. The French have participated in missile programs in Iraq and Pakistan. Israel has been accused by international arms regulators of participating in technology programs that lend a country the capability to build or modify a ballistic missile. The South Africans reportedly have received significant aid from the Israelis.

Most European countries can lend technical assistance to emerging missiles powers. The French have a long history of developing missiles, not only to support the Ariane space launch capability but to launch the force de frappe nuclear arsenal. The Italians have participated in the European Union space program that helped design the Hermes missile. While the British relied on American missile programs in the 1960's to supply their TBM needs, a technical exchange program between Britain and the United States trained and educated a sizable pool of missile talent from the British Isles.

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Legend: Sufficient Technologies Capabilities: ♦♦♦♦ exceeds sufficient level ♦♦♦ sufficient level ♦♦ some ♦ limited Because two or more countries have the same number of diamonds does not mean that their capabilities are the same. An absence of diamonds in countries of concern may indicate an absence of information, not of capability. The absence of a country from this list may indicate an absence of information, not capability.

Figure 1.2-1. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Foreign Technology Assessment Summary

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Table 1.2-1. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters

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Table 1.2-1. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters (cont'd)

(cont'd)

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Table 1.2-1. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters (cont'd)

(cont'd)

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Table 1.2-1. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Technology Parameters (cont'd)

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Table 1.2-2. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Reference Data

(cont'd)

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Table 1.2-2. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Reference Data (cont'd)

(cont'd)

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Table 1.2-2. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Reference Data (cont'd)

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SECTION 1.3—CRUISE MISSILES

OVERVIEW The Cruise Missiles subsection reviews the many ways a proliferant can construct a cruise missile to deliver a WMD. The term cruise missile covers several vehicles and their capabilities, from the Chinese Silkworm (HY-2), which has a range of less than 105 km, to the U.S. Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM), which can fly to ranges of up to 3,000 km. These vehicles vary greatly in their speed and ability to penetrate defenses. All, however, meet the definition of a cruise missile: “an unmanned self-propelled guided vehicle that sustains flight through aerodynamic lift for most of its flight path and whose primary mission is to place an ordnance or special payload on a target.” This definition, when applied to the delivery of WMD, can include unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned control-guided helicopters or aircraft. Proliferants can achieve a cruise missile capability by simply buying existing cruise missiles from supplier states and modifying them to meet a particular need, or they can make a complete system from readily available parts.

European aerospace firms, the FSU, and the Chinese have all sold many cruise missiles of one description or another to customers in proliferant and industrialized countries. In most cases, the performance of missiles is range limited and, in some cases, even payload limited, and their use as a carrier of WMD is probably confined to tactical applications. With the introduction of new guidance technologies, particularly the GPS, future cruise missiles will be more accurate and attractive to proliferants.

The United States introduced cruise missiles into its inventory when a combination of technologies reached a critical point in their development. Taken together, these same technologies can easily form the underpinnings for a capable unmanned aerial system. Except for Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM), the 1990’s have seen these technologies, or the knowledge of how to reproduce them, become widespread among industrialized and newly industrializing nations. The introduction of GPS and GLONASS eliminates the need for a country to rely on TERCOM navigation. A proliferator is not forced to seek out any other technologies to build a cruise missile, though many, such as rocket-assisted take-off units, may give a combatant more flexibility in using a cruise missile for a variety of combat operations.

Many proliferants have the scientific and research base to design airframes and build them to meet the needs of a cruise missile program. Arms control officials in the U.S. State Department and many of its overseas counterparts are attempting to reduce high volume serial production of cruise missiles, particularly ones that support a chemical or biological weapons infrastructure. Consequently, the tables identify technologies that assist the mass production of cruise missiles. Once a country has an assured supply of engines and guidance components, the path to a capable cruise missile fleet becomes easier.

Highlights

• Existing over-the-counter technology allows a proliferant to assemble a threatening cruise missile.
• Cruise missiles are ideally suited for the delivery of biological agents.
• Subsonic cruise missiles can survey a target for meteorological conditions before spreading agent.
• Supersonic cruise missiles may increase the probability of penetrating defenses.
• A supersonic/subsonic hybrid cruise missile is difficult for a proliferant to build.
• Wind tunnels, computer design routines, and spray flow field modeling all assist a proliferant to build a more capable cruise missile.

Of the four major subsystems that compose a cruise missile—airframe, propulsion, guidance, control, and navigation, and weapons integration—none is expensive in and of itself, and a steady supply of each is available. In the late 1960’s, the United States first introduced turbine propulsion systems that weighed less than 100 lb and produced many hundreds of pounds of thrust. These turbine engines, or their lineal descendants, powered most of the early U.S. cruise missile designs and were one of the least costly items. Depending upon the range a proliferant desires for its cruise missile, the powerplant may even be as prosaic as a reciprocating engine with a propeller. The latter, of course, has little hope of disguising its signature from defenses, but the mission profile may allow it to disguise itself as another platform. Even if no signature modification is considered, this type of missile has applications in regional wars where the technology of the defense is not as important as it is to an attacking proliferant.

Currently, GPS receivers provide more capability and accuracy than any targeting strategy requires of the guidance, control, and navigation subsystem. Cruise missiles,

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being aerodynamic vehicles, do not need the rapid response cycle time that ballistic missiles must have to keep the vehicle under control and on an appropriate track. Avionics systems available for first-generation commercial aircraft are both light enough and accurate enough to keep a cruise missile under control for long periods of time. For navigation, civilian code GPS is priced for the civilian hobbyist market, so purchasing an off-the-shelf navigation unit capable of obtaining 20 m of CEP is within the range of the common pocketbook. This level of accuracy is better than that of the early TERCOM systems installed on U.S. cruise missiles, which made them practical for the first time in the late 1970's.

For long cruise missile flight paths, a country without access to GPS systems must develop a mapping guidance logic for its cruise missile or accept highly degraded performance from an inertial measurement unit (IMU). A proliferant using one or two cruise missiles in an isolated attack from a standoff platform can achieve all of its targeting aims with an IMU, but long flight paths allow errors in the IMU to become so great that the missile may stray far from its target. Also, without an updated mapping system, the cruise missile must fly at an altitude high enough to avoid all manmade obstacles, thereby exposing itself to detection.

Even with GPS, the autonomous cruise missile carrying an on-board map must be supplied with the latest terrain and physical feature changes that have occurred along its course if it flies near the ground. Updated autonomous map guidance systems require large computer storage memories aboard the aircraft with units that can withstand the flight vibrations and possible thermal extremes of the missile over a long-duration flight. These units must be supplied with the latest maps that the delivering nation can obtain. Few nations have the space flight vehicles or high-altitude aircraft to build radar maps from overflights alone. Consequently, these maps will have to be purchased, or the proliferant will have to accept the attrition from missiles lost because of outdated information. The United States and Russia understand the key position that radar maps play in cruise missile guidance and are unlikely to allow the information stored in these maps to be released on the world market. Even if these maps are sold through some clandestine channel, they will quickly become outdated since cultural features change rather rapidly. As an alternative, a country may try to develop another guidance scheme, but the costs for developing a new infrastructure to support a map-based guidance system probably rivals that of the original TERCOM or a GPS constellation itself.

In the absence of GPS, the reliability of the cruise missile targeting philosophy becomes increasingly more problematic. As an alternative, a country may attempt to fly its cruise missile with radio guidance or other commands. Usually radio guidance uses frequencies high enough to operate only on line-of-sight reception. If the country expects to operate in hostile territory or attack at very long ranges, it must control the intervening repeater station to contact these missiles by real-time transmission of flight controls signals and position information.

Since cruise missiles fly relatively slowly and with only gentle accelerations, at the entry level, the airframes of these delivery systems can be built out of inexpensive aluminum of a grade as simple as 2024 - T1. Most proliferants with a basic metal production facility and an access to textbooks on metallurgy have a ready supply of this grade of aluminum. As proliferants design and build more sophisticated cruise missiles, they will undoubtedly substitute composite materials and other more elaborate structural elements in the airframe, but, for the most part, these materials are not needed.

A cruise missile airframe does not undergo particularly severe stress on its flight to a target, it does not pull any high "g" maneuvers, and it does not experience propulsion accelerations associated with gun or ballistic missile launches. Virtually any airframe that is structurally sound enough to be used in an ordinary airplane is adequate for a cruise missile. A designer can use factors of safety of 1.5 or 2 in the design to ensure structural integrity under all dynamic conditions without recourse to structural finite element computer codes, which generally only assist a designer to shave four or five percent from the weight of a design. Still, these technologies are included in the tables because their use does allow a proliferant to build a more capable cruise missile.

Technologies that advance the large serial production of inexpensive cruise missiles threaten current defenses built against missile attacks. These technologies include sheet metal processing machines that could form complex shapes, such as those found on the airframe or leading edge of cruise missiles; hydraulic presses or stamping mills that shape the nose cones or turbine inlets; and numerically controlled machines for parts production.

If a country wants to increase the penetrability of its cruise missiles, it must identify technologies that aid in signature reduction, signature masking, or other means to confuse detection systems. Some of these technologies include radar jamming and spoofing technologies; infrared suppression of engine exhaust; paints and coatings that disguise the thermal signature of leading edges; computer routines that predict the flow field around aerodynamic surfaces and the methods to change those surfaces to reduce heat transfer and turbulent flow fields; wind tunnel technology that supports the computer prediction; and computer routines that predict the RCS from a given geometry and predict redesign methods to achieve certain design specifications.

The cruise missile is suited for the delivery of chemical or biological agents if it does not fly at supersonic or transonic speeds. Most cruise missiles designed to fly at high speeds are not similarly able to fly at slow speeds without dramatic changes in the wing planform in flight. These changes in wing planform are generally not consistent with cruise missile geometries or packing volumes in the same way they might be in manned aircraft, such as the FB-111. Supersonic missiles generally cannot dispense chemical and biological agents from sprayers since the airstream itself will destroy the agent by heating or shock, but they do deliver nuclear weapons with great efficiency. None of these considerations are exclusive impediments to a proliferant's cruise

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missile development program. It is only a general guideline that high-speed cruise missiles make sense as a means to deliver nuclear weapons and low-speed cruise missiles are better suited for chemical and biological weapons.

Bomblets can also be included on transonic or supersonic missiles. These bomblets can be released over a target to ameliorate the airstream problem. After release, the bomblets decelerate, float to the target, and spray their agent into the air. Bomblets reduce the packing fraction of agent within the cruise missile airframe and, therefore, reduce the overall payload of a cruise missile. A subsonic cruise missile equipped with a sprayer dispensing agent from a single tank onboard the missile may simply release the agent into the airstream. In most cases, a large fraction of this agent will be destroyed before it reaches its target. To be more effective, the sprayer must dispense the agent so that it avoids the vortex from the tips of the wings and the disturbed airflow from the fuselage. Technologies that are required to develop bomblets, predict their flight path, or enhance the capabilities of sprayers as a means for a proliferant to deliver WMD from a cruise missile are highlighted.

Three key concerns of the cruise missile threat are (1) range extension to ranges greater than 500 km, (2) the ability to penetrate defenses, and (3) any technologies that reduce the cost of manufacture and therefore increase the size of a cruise missile inventory. In order of priority, the tables first list technologies that assist a country in building long-range cruise missiles. The tables then cover technologies that reduce the signature of a cruise missile and list those technologies that decrease the per unit cost or increase the total serial production of cruise missiles for a fixed price. Finally, the tables include support technologies that may make cruise missiles easier to use, package, or launch. As with each of the other delivery systems subsections, the tables are organized by specific subsystem of the aircraft: airframe, propulsion, guidance, control, and navigation, and weapons integration.

Cruise missiles differ from ballistic missiles as a potential threat because they share so many common technologies with existing vehicles that have been designed for other purposes. As a consequence, a proliferant can obtain much of the hardware to construct a cruise missile by cannibalizing existing commercial aircraft or by purchasing parts and components for the missile from legitimate suppliers. The technology tables serve only as a guideline to alert and inform export control regulators of general categories of technologies as opposed to specific performance specifications.

RATIONALE

Cruise missiles pose perhaps the gravest delivery system proliferation threat to U.S. worldwide interests. They are inexpensive to build and can, therefore, overwhelm current defenses by sheer numbers. They can be designed to be small with low-thrust engines and can penetrate radar and infrared-detection networks. The technology to build them is simple and available to any country that builds even rudimentary aircraft. Finally, since cruise missiles are unmanned, they require no flight crew training, expensive upkeep programs, special hangars for housing, or large air bases for basing. These factors make it especially difficult to collect intelligence on the development of indigenous cruise missiles and to anticipate the developing threat.

FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 1.3-1)

Systems

At least 12 exporting countries—Great Britain, the United States, China, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and Taiwan—have developed cruise missiles with some capability in the hands of proliferants to threaten U.S. worldwide interests.

Generally, these cruise missiles are small and have a limited range. While it is possible that they can be converted to deliver WMD, their short range limits their possible targets of interest. They may deliver biological or chemical agents against ports and airfields in regions of concern such as the Persian Gulf, but are not able to attack longer range targets. In addition, cruise missiles, such as the Chinese Silkworm, have many other limitations besides short range that restrict their utility as a WMD delivery system. The missiles leave a turbulent airflow in their wake, which makes it difficult to deliver a sprayed pathogen or chemical agent cloud. They fly along a predictable path towards the target rather than one that can realign itself to match the geometry of the target.

The following cruise missiles are a sample of missiles that are available legitimately on the world market and pose less threat as possible candidates for conversion to WMD delivery: the British Sea Eagle, the Chinese Seersucker and Silkworm, the French Exocet, the German Kormoran, the Israeli Gabriel, the Italian Otomat, the Japanese SSM-1, the Norwegian Penguin, the Soviet SSN-2C and its derivatives, the Swedish RBS-15, the Taiwanese Hsiung Feng 2, and the U.S. Harpoon. Older missiles, such as the Silkworm, have cumbersome and slow-moving control surfaces that do not readily adapt to the improvement in position calculation that GPS provides. Moreover, their guidance systems are intended mostly for the missiles in which they are placed and have little transference to a new airframe if they should be cannibalized. In most cases, the ease with which a cruise missile can be built leads a proliferant to build a new missile from scratch rather than attempting to adapt these older missiles for WMD delivery.

Even if the missiles do not pose a significant threat against U.S. worldwide interests, some aspects of their manufacturing base may migrate to more capable missiles and require close scrutiny. Missiles that contain small turbojet engines can be cannibalized, and the engines can be used in more threatening applications. A proliferant can also glean the knowledge to build these turbojets by reverse engineering the engines or setting up indigenous co-production facilities. Examples of exported missiles with small turbojet engines include the British Sea Eagle and the Chinese HY-4. Israel is offering an upgraded Gabriel, which features the latest in propulsion technology, to overseas customers. Other missiles in this class include the U.S. Harpoon, the

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Swedish RBS-15, the Soviet SS-N-3, the Soviet SS-N-21, and the Otomat Mark-II. Cruise missiles that have immediate application to nuclear, chemical, and biological delivery include the U.S. Tomahawk and ACM, the Russian SSN-21, the AS-15, and the French Apache.

Harpoons have been exported to 19 countries, including Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia. India has received Sea Eagles, while Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea have Silkworms and Seersuckers, a version of which North Korea now manufactures. Italy has Kormorans, and Taiwan, South Africa, Chile, Ecuador, Kenya, Singapore, and Thailand have Gabriel Mark-IIs. Italy has exported turbojet powered Otomats to Egypt, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Nigeria, Peru, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, while the Swedes exported the RBS-15 to Yugoslavia and Finland. In addition, the Soviets sold the long-range (500 km, 850 kg) turbojet powered “Shaddock” to Syria and Yugoslavia. At the next notch down in technological capability, the Soviets have flooded the world market with 1960’s-generation liquid-fueled “Styx” (SS-N-2C) missiles. Algeria, Angola, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Vietnam, Yemen, and the former Yugoslavia have the Styx missile in their inventories.

As the list of customers for the Styx demonstrates, the cost of a cruise missile is within the financial resources of even the most basic defense budgets. Even highly capable cruise missiles such as the Tomahawk only cost around $1.5 million per copy. This cost reflects the most advanced avionics systems and TERCOM guidance. At least one congressional study has shown that with the substitution of GPS, a proliferant could build a cruise missile with a range and payload capability roughly equivalent to the Tomahawk, for about $250,000. Unlike production of the heavy bomber, many countries have the economic resources and technical base to produce this kind of delivery system indigenously.

Subsystems

Though the sale of complete systems on the world market is a concern, that threat is much smaller than the possibility that a country could indigenously design and build a capable cruise missile by cannibalizing other systems for parts it cannot build on its own. Of particular concern are components and parts that reduce the cost of the missile in serial production, reduce the cost of position mapping navigation systems, and increase the range of these missiles.

Navigation and guidance continues to be the pacing item in threatening cruise missile development. The Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM) is a derivative of the Harpoon and contains in its nose a video camera that acts as a terminal guidance system. If a proliferant adopts this technology and can position a transmitter and receiver within line-of-sight to the missile from anywhere in the theater, it can dispense with the need for any other kind of guidance system. Israel has developed a capable guidance system that can be used in this application.

The next major subsystem component that enhances the capability of a cruise missile is the powerplant. The United States pursued the cruise missile long before the development of the first lightweight engine technology, so this is not a critical path item towards developing a cruise missile. Still, more capable engines increase the threat of a cruise missile. First, they reduce the RCS of the missile. Next, they increase the range by reducing the drag and power required for control surface actuation. Finally, they reduce other flight signatures, such as infrared cross-section and acoustic emission, that might be exploited in a defense network.

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Legend: Sufficient Technologies Capabilities: ♦♦♦♦ exceeds sufficient level ♦♦♦ sufficient level ♦♦ some ♦ limited Because two or more countries have the same number of diamonds does not mean that their capabilities are the same. An absence of diamonds in countries of concern may indicate an absence of information, not of capability. The absence of a country from this list may indicate an absence of information, not capability.

Figure 1.3-1. Cruise Missiles Foreign Technology Assessment Summary

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Table 1.3-1. Cruise Missiles Technology Parameters

(cont'd)

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Table 1.3-1. Cruise Missiles Technology Parameters (cont'd)

(cont'd)

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Table 1.3-1. Cruise Missiles Technology Parameters (cont'd)

(cont'd)

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Table 1.3-1. Cruise Missiles Technology Parameters (cont'd)

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Table 1.3-2. Cruise Missiles Reference Data

(cont'd)

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Table 1.3-2. Cruise Missiles Reference Data (cont'd)

(cont'd)

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Table 1.3-2. Cruise Missiles Reference Data (cont'd)

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SECTION 1.4—COMBAT FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT

OVERVIEW

The Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft subsection addresses the technologies that a nation needs to deliver a WMD by an aircraft. Unlike the cruise and ballistic missile subsections, which describe the additional burden a country may face to build the delivery system, this discussion assumes that most proliferants already possess aircraft or can purchase them legitimately on world markets.

Three key attributes of an aircraft pose the greatest threat: (1) reliable delivery of WMD, (2) ability to penetrate defenses, and (3) all-weather, day and night capability. The aircraft subsection describes and lists those technologies that allow a proliferant to carry out a targeting objective. The tables first list technologies that assist a country in weaponizing its aircraft fleet to accept WMD. Then they cover technologies that enable all-weather, day and night aircraft operations. Finally, the tables address the hardware and technical expertise that are needed to assist in penetrating defenses. Each of the tables is organized to categorize technologies, or adaptation of technologies, under the specific subsystem of the aircraft: airframe, propulsion, guidance, control, and navigation, and weapons integration.

Proliferants can pursue at least four technological advances to manned aircraft: (1) methods to increase range, (2) methods to weaponize WMD for reliability, (3) methods to mask or otherwise disguise flight signatures to detection networks, and (4) methods to launch an aircraft attack around the clock and in all-weather conditions.

Methods to Extend Range

All the identified proliferants maintain some manned aircraft systems. As total delivery systems, any of these aircraft can carry and drop almost any nuclear, chemical, or biological payload that the proliferant is capable of making or purchasing. Proliferants that possess limited-range aircraft have already begun to upgrade the severity of threat these aircraft pose by investigating the world market for in-flight refueling capability. In 1987, Libya purchased in-flight refueling tankers that are capable of extending the range sufficiently to strike European targets. Libya’s only impediment to expanding its aircraft range is the availability of interim staging bases from which the tanker aircraft can fly.

Because of the physical isolation and political posture of many proliferants, few, if any, countries will act as host for proliferants to stage refueling tanker aircraft that could aid any WMD strike against U.S. worldwide interests. To do so would invite retaliation from the United States and the probable loss of the asset to U.S. counterforce operations. Given this geographical constraint, a proliferator may undertake to make modifications to an existing aircraft to extend range without in-flight refueling.

To accomplish any range extension to its aircraft fleet, the country must add additional fuel tanks, reduce the aerodynamic drag, or change the propulsion system to consume less fuel. Modifications to the airframe or propulsion subsystem of an aircraft may augment its range at the margins, but none of the realistic modifications a proliferant might make add to the range in the same dramatic way that an in-flight refueling capability does. Thus, if sales of in-flight refueling aircraft are limited and the use of foreign airfields for tanker traffic are monitored, the WMD aircraft threat can be limited to a regional theater of operation. The technology tables have been organized to highlight these considerations.

Methods to Increase Targeting Reliability

With a manned crew, targeting reliability is expected to be high. In the event of any problems en route to the target, the crew may be able to take action to change its target. Similarly, most manned aircraft crews usually visually confirm the position of

Highlights

• The widespread sale of manned aircraft throughout the world reduces the need for a proliferant to build its own aircraft to deliver WMD.
• Existing aircraft can be modified to increase their range. In-flight refueling offers the best method to greatly extend aircraft range.
• All-weather, round-the-clock WMD delivery with manned aircraft is a significant threat.
• Technologies that assist a proliferant to acquire glide, terminally homed, and aerodynamically steered bombs can threaten U.S. worldwide interests.
• Existing and readily available avionics, autopilots, and navigation units are compatible with WMD delivery from manned aircraft.

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a target (except when dropping stand-off weapons, such as cruise missiles). Guidance and navigation subsystems are important to aid in navigation to the target. Significant errors in targeting occur from unpredictable winds, incorrect fuzing information, or poor aerodynamic design. The proper weapons integration of WMD warheads can eliminate most of these problems.

An aircraft can often be tracked and shot down by existing defense batteries. At some point, a proliferant aircraft will likely display itself to any tracking sensor as it approaches a target. A proliferant aircraft may, however, delay this detection to radar tracking networks by following contours in the terrain and by employing electronic countermeasures. Neither of these two changes requires modifications to the aircraft's propulsion or airframe and, therefore, they take less effort.

Aircraft can be flown to the target using only visual cues if meteorological conditions permit. A technology that allows an aircraft to operate in any weather condition or during any time of the night or day greatly enhances the threat this delivery system poses. In addition, if a technology allows an airplane to fly outside of its normal operating environment, while following the contours of the terrain, the aircraft then complicates defense strategies. Some technologies that can be fitted onto aircraft to accomplish these objectives are (1) an avionics unit that senses position and position rate; (2) small onboard computers capable of automated flight planning, targeting, en route navigation, and ensured terrain avoidance; and (3) addition of stealth.

Many flight-qualified control systems produce sufficient force (sometimes known as command authority) and response time (or phase margin) to steer any existing aircraft autonomously. These actuators must be coupled to a flight computer, which detects position and position rates and compares them to an on-board stored radar or topographical map of the terrain. In a fully autonomous system, the flight computer must predict the course far enough in advance to give the aircraft time to maneuver and avoid any obstacles within performance constraints, such as climb rate and roll rate. Complete guidance and control subsystems and the components that comprise them are sufficient technology to constitute a proliferation threat.

Methods to Increase Attack Flexibility

Navigation systems traditionally compare either analog or digital representations of the Earth's surface to the radar or topographical scene through which the airplane flies. In recent years, these computers have relied almost exclusively upon digital representations. While reversion to an analogue scene comparison is not ruled out, digital maps are by far the most militarily threatening. They have better resolution, are more accurate, and are updated frequently by contractors, which removes from the proliferant the burden of generating the databases for these maps. Computers that support digital navigation and scene generation require highly sophisticated storage devices and rapid random access to the stored information.

Methods to Increase Penetration

Once an aircraft is within range of defense radars, it may use electronic counter-measures in several ways to spoof defense assets. Sophisticated countermeasures may alter the signal returned to the defense radar to make the aircraft appear to be some other type of aircraft. This technique is especially effective against radars that present thematic rather than actual RCSs to defense personnel evaluating the surroundings. Simpler electronic countermeasures may make an aircraft appear to be much larger or spread out over a greater region of the sky. Consequently, hit-to-kill interceptors may miss the actual aircraft as they fly to intercept the large region within the predicted target area. A proliferant's electronic countermeasures may not prevent the aircraft from being ultimately targeted and eliminated, but they delay the interception to allow the aircraft to release its weapon on the actual target or an adjacent target of near equivalent value. As a result, electronic countermeasures are listed as an important technology to be denied to proliferants.

As a last resort, a proliferant may attempt simply to overwhelm the defense by saturating a target with too many aircraft to intercept. This is a less attractive alternative with aircraft than it is with cruise missiles because of the high cost of purchasing the aircraft, maintaining them, and training a capable crew. Moreover, since a proliferant cannot predict which aircraft will penetrate and which will be intercepted, it must equip all of them with WMD. For chemical and biological agents, this may not be too difficult, but few proliferants can currently manufacture nuclear weapons in sufficient quantities to threaten a saturation attack.

All aircraft require weapons integration, whether they arrive at the point of sale in their weaponized state or not. Indigenously produced WMD will probably differ from their foreign counterparts. A proliferant must discover, on its own, the idiosyncrasies of the interaction of a weapon and the aircraft that carries it to plan for these modifications. For example, bomb bay doors opening at certain velocities sometimes cause severe aircraft vibration. Similarly, once the bomb bay doors are open the airflow around the weapon may cause it to vibrate uncontrollably. Again, modern computational fluid dynamics (CFD) codes and their aerodynamic equivalents streamline the redesign process to achieve clean stores separation under all circumstances. Wind tunnels assist a proliferant in estimating the extent of any needed modifications.

The weapons, on the other hand, may need to undergo significant refinements, depending on the ultimate intentions of the country. Some simple standoff weapons, such as glide bombs, may provide a proliferant a unique penetration capability. As an example, a country can target its neighbor without violating its airspace by using a glide bomb that has a lift-to-drag ratio of 5 and dropping it from an aircraft operating at a ceiling of 50,000 ft. The girth of the weapon or its aerodynamic surfaces may create a release problem that forces the proliferant to consider designing folded aerodynamic

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surfaces. However, a glide bomb is both more accurate than an ordinary gravity bomb and has a greatly reduced RCS compared to the aircraft which drops it, thus solving many of the problems of penetration.

To hit in the vicinity of the target, even a large area target such as a city, the post drop vehicle may need an autonomous guidance and control unit. This unit does not need to meet the specifications of a missile-grade IMU, but it must be good enough to provide simple feedback control to the aerodynamic control surfaces. Systems for aircraft using GPSs are being made available on the world market. Many European and U.S. manufacturers make avionics equipment that can control a split flap or simple aileron.

The tables include technology items directly tied to accurate aerodynamic bombs, control surfaces for a bomb, and steerable aerodynamic devices suitable for releasing airborne agents.

RATIONALE

Fixed-wing aircraft used for the delivery of WMD are of significant concern. Most potential proliferants have reasonable numbers of tactical aircraft and have trained pilots to fly them. The aircraft available usually have a short strike range, suitable for their limited geographical area. Longer range capability, while possible with modifications to existing aircraft and the development of in-flight refueling capabilities, involve introduction of new technologies and systems.

With the advent of the GPS, proliferants now have a technique to improve the navigational capability of their aircraft significantly. Also, even though state-of-the art signature reduction is not readily available, more conventional countermeasures would still be of considerable value, particularly in regional conflicts.

FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 1.4-1)

Systems

Since the end of the Cold War, widespread sales have been made of aircraft capable of delivering WMD. China owns SU-27 Flankers, and North Korea has SU-25 Frogfoots. Syria and Libya possess SU-24s, and Iraq, at one time, had the Mirage F1-C. India has 15 Jaguars. The SU-24 has a combat radius of 1,000 km, giving it the most threatening range capability in a regional conflict. However, since they can trade payload, speed, fuel, and range, any of these aircraft can execute a WMD delivery.

Effective use of aircraft in a combat role requires ongoing training, maintenance, and functioning of a substantial infrastructure. Key needs include trained people, availability of spare parts, and realistic exercises. The case in which Iran lost U.S. support is instructive in the limits to keeping aircraft viable as a means of delivery.

China, India, Pakistan, and Israel can maintain and support a tactical aircraft infrastructure, train and recruit pilots, and sustain their aircraft in a threatening posture. North Korea has great difficulty in training pilots and maintaining its aircraft but could mount a single attack against South Korea with its SU-25 Frogfoots. As the Gulf War showed, when the coalition achieved air supremacy, Iraq did not mount even a single sortie against a coalition target, and in all likelihood Iran is in similar straits. Syria has the ability to maintain its aircraft with foreign assistance from either the former Soviet Union or elements of the former Soviet Bloc. The United States has no way of limiting this assistance as it did in post-Revolutionary Iran because it does not control the market for parts and personnel relevant to the air fleet.

All members of the G-7, Sweden, and Poland can supply technical expertise and maintenance personnel to proliferants. South Africa or its agents can funnel spare parts for aircraft to proliferants facing severe shortages. Former Cold War enemy production entities have created licensed co-production facilities for aircraft in China, Israel, South Africa

and Slovenia. India has similar facilities and a tradition of education that can adapt the facilities to unconventional design concepts. The Baltic Republics can perform R&D into flight dynamics and have computer facilities available that can host 1980’s vintage U.S. software for advanced structural designs. The industrialized nations of South America (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) are capable of either building comparable facilities indigenously and performing experiments and analyses for a third party or exporting the technical talent to build such facilities elsewhere. These same entities can design and build a variety of warhead systems, consistent with tactical aircraft delivery, including aerial bombs, spray systems, glide bombs, terminally steered or guided bombs, and cruise missiles. These devices have the common requirement of aerodynamic flight through a defined mission profile. For chemical and biological weapons, the designer must also provide some mechanism for air braking the warhead, such as fins, or other glide devices that allow the warhead to disseminate agent over a broad area, and a method to keep biological agents in an active condition through the delivery cycle. Failing this, the proliferator must accept the greatly reduced efficiency from dissemination initiated by a burster charge. At the most rudimentary level, a proliferator must produce an aerodynamic warhead configuration that has a repeatable and predictable flight profile, does not induce severe vibration from air stream buffeting, and can detonate at a predetermined altitude or upon ground contact. Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Indonesia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic Republics, Pakistan, Mexico, and Cuba can design and build these weapons. Those capabilities that support or further weapon system design are included as “sufficient” technologies.

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| Country | Airframe | | Propulsion | | Guidance and Control | | | Weapons Integration | | |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| | Modifications to Comercial Aircraft | Low-Observable Modifications to Existing Aircraft | Propulsion System | Advanced High-Energy Fuels | All-Weather Guidance and Flight Modifications | Digitally Driven Acutators for Existing Autopilots | Military-Grade GPS Receivers | Bomb Sights | Simple Steered or Homed Bombs | Bomb Flight Mechanics R&D |
| Argentina | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Brazil | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Canada | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Chile | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| China | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Egypt | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| France | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Germany | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| India | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Iran | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Iraq | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Israel | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Japan | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Libya | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| North Korea | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Pakistan | ♦♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Russia | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| South Africa | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| South Korea | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Sweden | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Syria | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Taiwan | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Ukraine | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| United Kingdom | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| United States | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |

Legend: Sufficient Technologies Capabilities: ♦♦♦♦ exceeds sufficient level ♦♦♦ sufficient level ♦♦ some ♦ limited
Because two or more countries have the same number of diamonds does not mean that their capabilities are the same. An absence of diamonds in countries of concern may indicate an absence of information, not of capability. The absence of a country from this list may indicate an absence of information, not capability.

Figure 1.4-1. Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Foreign Technology Assessment Summary

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Table 1.4-1. Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Technology Parameters

| Technology | Sufficient Technology Level | Export Control Reference | Critical Materials | Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment | Unique Software and Parameters |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| AIRFRAME | | | | | |
| Finite element structural computer routines | PC-based routines capable of making 1,000 node calculations and containing automatic mesh generators | USML VIII | None identified | High-speed computing facilities or parallel processor operating systems | Operating systems for high-speed computers that reduce repeated instruction set calls to the CPU |
| Fluid mechanics finite element routines | PC-based routines with mesh generators and Lagrangian logic | MTCR 16; USML VIII | None identified | Flow tables and hydrodynamic test facilities that exploit the hydrodynamic similitude approximations to compressible flow; high-speed computing facilities or parallel processor operating systems | Operating systems for high-speed computers that reduce repeated instruction set calls to the CPU |
| Vibration shakers and other environmental test equipment | Vibration power spectral density output of 10 g rms. between 20 and 20,000 Hz, with forces >=50 kN (11,250 lb) | MTCR 15; CCL Cat. 9B | None identified | Piezoelectric force transducers and sample and hold data acquisition boards for computers; high-speed computers | Fourier transform, chirp, and other advanced signal processing software and modal analysis software |
| Aerothermal wind tunnels | Input heat flux levels >100 BTU/ft²-sec | MTCR 15; CCL Cat. 9B; WA Cat. 9B | None identified | Hot wire anemometers or wind vector and stability devices with directional response <1 deg and time response <0.1 msec. | Finite element and hydrodynamic software |
| Conventional wind tunnels | Wind tunnels producing Reynolds Numbers in excess of 2.5 million per foot | MTCR 15; CCL Cat. 9B; WA Cat. 9B | None identified | None identified | None |
| Structural modifications for thrusted munitions release or glide vehicles with stored aerodynamic surfaces | Glide vehicles with L/D>5 or thrust missile with >0.1 km/sec velocity change | WA ML 4, 5; USML IV, XII | None identified | None identified | None identified |
| Propulsion/airframe/flight control system integration | Techniques that provide tradeoffs on range, maneuverability, and safety with complexity and weight | MTCR 2, 9; USML VIII | None identified | Six degrees of freedom computer models | Source code for CAD/CAE |

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(cont'd)

Table 1.4-1. Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Technology Parameters (cont'd)

(cont'd)

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Table 1.4-1. Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Technology Parameters (cont'd)

(cont'd)

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Table 1.4-1. Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Technology Parameters (cont'd)

| Technology | Sufficient Technology Level | Export Control Reference | Critical Materials | Unique Test, Production, and Inspection Equipment | Unique Software and Parameters |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **WEAPONS INTEGRATION** | | | | | |
| Weapons separation design and prediction | Aerodynamic and trajectory prediction codes validated to within 1% of measured properties | USML VIII | None identified | High-speed computing facilities or parallel processor operating systems | None identified |
| Advanced state vector calculation routines | Codes with validated results that predict submunition bomb case and aero glide vehicle variables within 1% of measured variable | WA ML 21; USML XXI | None identified | High-speed computing facilities or parallel processor operating systems | None identified |
| Submunitions separation or dispensing mechanisms | Submunitions with packing densities exceeding 75% | WA ML 4; USML IV | None identified | None identified | None identified |

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Table 1.4-2. Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Reference Data

(cont'd)

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Table 1.4-2. Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Reference Data (cont'd)

| Technology | Technical Issues | Military Applications | Alternative Technologies |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **PROPULSION** | | | |
| Turbofan engines | Decrease in net thrust at low altitudes makes low level cruise fuel inefficient | Improved range and ceiling | Any propulsion unit consistent with range and payload needs, e.g., internal combustion engines |
| Turbojet engines | Thrust is dependent on the maximum stress and temperature levels the engine can sustain for long flights | Improved range and ceiling | Any propulsion unit consistent with range and payload needs, e.g., internal combustion engines |
| Technology for high temperature and erosion protection coatings for engine parts | Thrust is dependent on the maximum stress and temperature levels the engine can sustain for long flights | Increased reliability and improved range | Ceramics and carbon carbon inserts |
| Inlets for transonic and low supersonic flight speeds | Forming aerodynamically sound designs that do not choke | Increased range and better defense penetration | Increased drag and reduced range |
| Propulsion integration for subsonic, transonic, and low supersonic flight speeds | Upgrading existing airframes with more modern engines that may have higher thrust levels or improved fuel consumption | All air vehicles | None identified |
| Chemical Vapor Deposition (CVD) equipment | Manufacturing equipment maintenance to ensure reproducibility | Improved reliability | None identified |
| Thermal spray forming equipment | Maintaining thermal control and flow consistency | Improved reliability | None identified |
| **GUIDANCE, CONTROL, AND NAVIGATION** | | | |
| Digital radar maps | Reducing radar images to digital representations that can be stored and retrieved efficiently | Delivery of a munitions within a lethal radius | GPS topographical maps |
| Global Navigation System | Time required to calculate position and corrections to position to obtain desired flight path | Delivery of a munitions within a lethal radius | IMUs; radio controlled or preprogrammed flight profiles |
| Map Guidance Technology | Resolution of the surface of the Earth particularly in height in order to ensure all obstacles are cleared by the flight vehicle | Increased operations envelope to include night and all weather flight | More restrictive operational conditions |
| GPS receivers | Correcting civil code to protected code | Navigation | GLONASS receivers |
| Full authority flight control system | Maintenance of adequate gain and phase margins; adequate response time over flight envelope; redundancy vs. safety | Increased reliability and accuracy | Pilot integration of parameters |
| Vibration test equipment using digital control techniques | Properly shock isolating the test equipment so that test results are meaningful | Reliable weapons delivery | Flight testing under highly stressed conditions |

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(cont'd)

Table 1.4-2. Combat Fixed-Wing Aircraft Reference Data (cont'd)

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SECTION 1.5—ARTILLERY

OVERVIEW

In the Artillery subsection, two military strategies for using artillery to deliver WMD are discussed. Traditionally, artillery has been a battlefield weapon rather than a long-range attack weapon, although the United States, Russia, France, and Britain have demonstrated that conventional artillery tubes can deliver nuclear, chemical and biological agents. Each of these countries had a specific battlefield application for WMD of the 30-km range. Few of the strategic, technical, economic, and political forces that led the superpowers to develop this highly specific capability apply to conditions within proliferants. However, artillery may be attractive to proliferants for other reasons, including the availability of designers and parts and the possibility that a WMD shell from one of the superpower's arsenals could suddenly become available.

As an indigenous product, artillery can be applied as a strategic WMD delivery system. Iraq demonstrated imaginative use of artillery in the large investment it made in the Supergun project. In this case, a proliferant chose to develop a strategic delivery system that happened to be a scaled-up version of a well-known artillery delivery system. These vastly different applications of the same basic technology show that a proliferant that pursues artillery as a means of delivery must choose either to use existing artillery pieces and solve the technical problems of designing a shell to accommodate these weapons or design a new weapon for the shell they intend to deliver. The United States, as an example of the former approach, built nuclear and chemical rounds compatible with their existing 155-mm guns. These shells had flight properties that exactly matched the flight properties of conventional ammunition. Iraq, as an example of the latter approach, built the Supergun specifically to fire a single, special nuclear round.

Highlights

• Artillery pieces for possible delivery of WMD exist in virtually every military organization in the world.
• A proliferant must harden WMD shells against high spin rates and accelerations to use an artillery piece to deliver WMD.
• Existing artillery pieces have insufficient range to allow a proliferant to use artillery as a strategic WMD delivery system except in special circumstances.
• Nuclear warheads are difficult to fit into existing conventional artillery tubes.
• Several proliferants have the technical capability to custom-build long-range guns, similar to the Iraqi Supergun, to deliver WMD.
• Superguns are expensive and have limited sustained firing potential.
• Use of Multiple Launch Rocket Systems overcomes some artillery limitations.

Using Existing Artillery Pieces

When a country can manufacture a WMD shell to exactly match a conventional round, it solves all of the technical problems of gun manufacture because many suppliers on the world market provide artillery pieces in standard 155-mm, 203-mm, and 406-mm caliber gun tubes. Still, the proliferator must solve unique technical problems associated with the WMD warhead.

Nuclear

To use existing artillery pieces, a proliferant must be sufficiently advanced in its nuclear design to make a warhead with a diameter small enough to fit a standard caliber tube. Consequently, to be used in a conventional tube, a nuclear round must match the inertial and aerodynamic properties of conventional shells and be able to withstand the acceleration produced by the firing charge and the high spin rates (up to 250 Hz) of modern artillery shells. If it does not closely meet these characteristics, the shell will suffer from poor range and accuracy.

Since nuclear shells have components made of high atomic-number materials and these materials are traditionally configured in a spherical shape, aeroballisticians must frequently add supplemental materials to match the mass of nuclear artillery shells and the ratios of the moments of inertia. Countries that have solved this problem have used highly dense materials, such as depleted uranium, as a ballast.

As an alternative, a country can ignore the question of range loss and high dispersion and accept reduced performance. Often, this means that their military can only fire the shell to its maximum range, and an extensive testing program is required to determine the limits of the dispersion. Since the surrogate shells used in this test program must inertially match the real nuclear rounds and a statistically meaningful

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test program requires many firings, the proliferator must have a ready source of high atomic-number (non-nuclear) material to use in its test rounds.

A nuclear-capable proliferant must also be able to build a nuclear round that can withstand the high acceleration produced by the firing charge. For example, in most full-range 155-mm rounds, the initial acceleration on the shell may exceed 10,000 g's. The proliferant that builds its nuclear shell indigenously must be able to form insensitive high explosives in complex shapes that resist cracking and spalling under these accelerations. They must also be able to build a special nuclear fuze, which differs from the fuze in a conventional round, and the fuze electronics that can withstand the acceleration and still perform normally at the end of the trajectory.

Since the aerodynamic shape of the shell must also match a conventional round, few, if any, changes can be made to overall shell design. If the artillery shells are made indigenously, the proliferant has the means to make any type of casing for a nuclear shell. For a nuclear shell, a proliferant can make one concession to the warhead when the shell must be stored for a long period of time. The designers may have to substitute a new outer casing material that is less sensitive to embrittlement from a low-level nuclear radiation environment.

Chemical

Since the specific gravity of most chemical agents is near to that of conventional high explosives, a chemical round for an existing artillery piece requires even fewer design concessions than a nuclear round. With only minimal ballasting, designers can match the inertial properties of chemical and conventional shells quite easily.

Because the materials involved have mid-range atomic numbers, ballasting can be made from many materials. In flight, though, chemical WMD, being a fluid, has a tendency to change its inertial properties because of the centrifugal force created by the spinning shell. Binary chemical agents take advantage of this spinning to mix the compounds. But the spinning momentum forces the fluid to migrate to the outer casing wall of the shell and alter the inertial properties in a way that conventional high explosives—most often being solid—do not. As the shell flies, this fluid migration has a tendency to cause large coning angles and increase the drag on the body.

Liquid migration is a function of many properties of the WMD, but the most important is the viscosity of the liquid. Proliferants may solve the variable inertial problem by modifying the viscosity of the liquid with liquid additives or by including internal baffles that dampen the motion of the liquid when the shell is fired.

The liquid material is fairly insensitive to the shock of firing and virtually no accommodation needs to be made for WMD rounds beyond that already made in conventional rounds. The fuzing and firing circuits of chemical rounds do not require the high energy and precise timing of nuclear rounds; thus, one can manufacture a high explosive detonator for an artillery shell and use this same detonator on a chemical round with little modification. Both chemical and biological rounds do require efficient dissemination mechanisms since the agents must be spread over a large area. Submunitions and the technologies that remove them from an artillery shell in flight and decelerate them or alter their flight path support the more efficient dispersion of agent. Radar fuzes or timers that can open a shell and release submunitions must have a firing precision of better than 50 ms to be effective.

Biological

Biological agents have properties similar to chemical agents and the design considerations for artillery shell delivery follow similar reasoning. Biological toxins generally withstand the shock of firing from an artillery tube with little degradation in performance. Live biological agents, on the other hand, degrade significantly when placed in this high acceleration environment. Virtually any proliferant that can manufacture an artillery shell for special purposes, such as incendiaries or flares, has all of the technological sophistication at its disposal to deliver biological toxins in this manner. On the other hand, the high acceleration experienced by all artillery shells means live biological agents are unlikely candidates for this means of delivery unless microencapsulation or other buffers are used to alter the susceptibility of the agent to shock. Spores of certain pathogens, such as anthrax, resemble toxins in their ability to withstand shock.

Most deliverable biological agents, however, have lower specific gravities than existing conventional rounds. The light weight of the biological material, which may include fillers, release agents, protective coatings, and agglutinating matter to accrete a respirable particle, requires a country to consider carefully means to ballast the shell to match the inertial properties of conventional rounds.

Ancillary Technologies Common to All Types of WMD

The two technical hurdles that must be overcome to use WMD in artillery shells—protection against acceleration and matched inertial properties—can be replicated in a laboratory setting or simulated on a computer. Flight trajectory prediction programs with 6-degree-of-freedom modeling will reveal to an analyst the degree of uncertainty in a shell's flight path when inertial properties are mismatched with conventional shells. Less computer-intensive point mass models predict with a high degree of accuracy this same information. Since any user of conventional artillery shells knows in advance the aerodynamic properties of the shell, little, if any, need exists for wind tunnels or finite element fluid modeling. Devices that measure the moments of inertia for many applications other than military purposes are easily adapted for use in measuring artillery shells. Any entity that does not already possess this equipment can purchase it legitimately on the open market.

Reproducing the high accelerations of a gun launch in a laboratory setting is difficult, so experimentalists often resort to subscale tests using small bore cannon or other energy producing devices such as rail guns. A proliferator that wishes to test the response of a new pathogen to high acceleration can use these techniques and then

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assume that incremental increases in full-scale models follow an extrapolation of the results they have measured.

A proliferator with a slightly more advanced design capability can extend the range of the 155-mm shell to approximately 50 km, either by using base bleed supplemental blowing to shape the aerodynamics over the boat tail or by lengthening the barrel. A lengthened barrel increases the spin rate proportionately and exaggerates all of the problems formerly identified with spinning shells. For use beyond 50 km, the proliferant must manufacture both the gun and the shell. Fifty kilometers is sufficient range for a proliferator to threaten coastal cities or an adversary's territory adjacent to a common border.

The "Foreign Technology Assessment" paragraphs will discuss which countries can develop WMD to fit existing artillery pieces. It also discusses which countries have the technical wherewithal to continue to pursue research into a Supergun.

The tables that follow this text list, in order of priority, technologies that a proliferant needs to produce WMD artillery shells that fit into existing guns and then cover the more stressing task of building a new artillery piece on the scale of the Supergun.

Multiple Launch Rocket System as a Means of Delivery

In many cases, the flight dynamics limitations imposed on the use of WMD with artillery shells can be mitigated by employing a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). MLRS batteries launch a salvo of missiles against a target from a collection of launch tubes mounted on, or towed by, a highly mobile vehicle. Generally, the delivery systems constituting a MLRS have a range of less than 50 km, but the exact range can be extended depending on the circumstances. Since the MLRS uses a rocket as its basis, the accelerations that a warhead endures at launch are much less than those for an equivalent range artillery shell. Similarly, the rocket uses aerodynamic stability with fins or airframe shape so the warhead is not subjected to the high spin rates that an equivalent range artillery shell needs to maintain gyroscopic stability. Also, the rocket does not travel as fast as an artillery shell, so fuzing and firing operations can be less precise than with an equivalent artillery shell. This long flight time also gives submunitions an opportunity to be dispensed properly.

In the field, the MLRS offers many logistical and tactical advantages for delivering chemical and biological agents. Since the attacker uses the MLRS in a salvo mode, the individual missiles can be launched to cover a large area when they arrive at a target. This could lay down an effective cloud of chemical or biological material, which may deny large areas of a battlefield to a defender. However, care must be taken to ensure that the close proximity of salvo round detonations does not have a negative effect on agent vitality or dispersion. Consequently, this tactic makes MLRS an unlikely choice for nuclear munitions.

Since MLRS systems have widespread applications for anti-personnel, anti-tank, and anti-armor operations, knowledge of their design, manufacture, and use is widely available to many U.S. allies and trading partners. Many derivative versions of the system have been built to accomplish special targeting objectives that have application to the use of WMD. For instance, the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) used with the MLRS uses a special, long-range missile while the anti-tank version deploys a submunition in mid-flight, similar to the deployment that would be required to deliver chemical or biological agents efficiently.

In the U.S. version of the MLRS, which has been widely studied overseas, the rocket can accept a warhead weight of up to 156 kg on a system with a total weight of 306 kg. This is about twice the payload that a 155-mm shell delivers and at a price of about three times the system weight. Hence, the warhead structural efficiency factor is less than that for artillery shells, but the simplicity of the operation more than compensates for the loss of efficiency. An MLRS rocket, as built by the United States, has a diameter of 227 mm and a length of 3.937 m, making it easy to ship, stockpile, and deploy.

The United States has sold MLRS systems that theoretically can be retrofitted for chemical or biological use to many trading partners abroad. A Memorandum of Understanding among the United States, Germany, France, the UK, and Italy allows for joint development, production, and deployment of the United States design. Currently, the United States and others have sold and deployed the MLRS in Bahrain, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the UK, and the United States. Russia and the FSU have several variants of an MLRS in production and service. In fact, in the latter half of the decade, a clear competition has emerged between the United States and the Russians to sell MLRS systems as part of their arms packages. The Russian systems are made by the SPLAV consortium and are called the SMERCH: a 300-mm rocket, the Uragan, a 220-mm system, and the Prima, which is 122 mm in diameter. The Russians also wish to market two other systems, which are both 140 mm in diameter. The Russians have sold the 300-mm Smerch to Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Uragan system has been sold to Syria and Afghanistan. Many other variants still exist in the former Eastern Bloc states.

RATIONALE

Artillery shells present the exception to the rule that a proliferant must pursue some technological capability to deliver WMD. Artillery pieces are ubiquitous in any military; thus, armies are fully trained in their use. The United States and the Soviets built a large arsenal of nuclear and chemical shells to fit these existing artillery pieces and designed them so that all of the preparations and firing procedures associated with them closely mirror conventional rounds. The United States is in the process of destroying its chemical shells, but some do exist and many nuclear artillery shells are still in Russia. Consequently, the possibility that a proliferator could find a way to acquire a fully weaponized WMD shell and use it in existing military hardware cannot be ruled out.

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FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 1.5-1)

Since virtually every country in the world with a military has artillery pieces and the training to accompany their use and theory of operation, a proliferant must only manufacture the WMD shells for these guns if it intends to deliver the munitions at ranges less than 50 km. As an alternative, proliferants may clandestinely acquire shells to use in their artillery pieces. The United States, Russia, and, by common belief, Israel have made nuclear shells. The United States, Russia, reportedly France, and possibly Israel have made chemical and biological shells. The United States builds its shells in standard 155- and 203-mm caliber. Most European countries use the same bore. In the Russian tradition, the Soviet Union built its shells in 152- and 202-mm caliber. A shell from these stocks fits and can be fired from the larger bore U.S. and European guns, but the reverse is not true. When the smaller Russian shells are fired from U.S. and European guns, there is a small additional blow by and consequent loss of acceleration to the shell. Even then, care must be taken to ensure that the close proximity of salvo round detonations does not have a negative effect on agent destruction or dispersment; therefore, this configuration produces a slight range loss and additional wobble upon exit from the gun.

The United States, Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Austria, Norway, Belgium, France, Germany, the Czech Republic, all the Baltic Republics, Ukraine, Belarus, Italy, Spain, Greece, elements of the former Yugoslavia, China, North Korea, South Africa, Israel, Egypt, Cuba, Vietnam, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan have all built artillery pieces or have the infrastructure to build them according to either the U.S. and European standard or the former Soviet one. Most of these countries' military officers have been trained on the weapons and are capable of advising a proliferant on methods to either build the guns or obtain them legitimately from a supplier nation. If a proliferant found itself in possession of a standard WMD artillery shell, any of these countries could supply the gun to fire it for less than $250,000, without even needing to understand the nature of the shell.

A proliferator may decide to manufacture its own gun, particularly if it designs a WMD device employing a gun-assembled, as opposed to an implosion, nuclear weapon. An entry-level, gun-assembled, nuclear weapon requires a gun barrel diameter of approximately 650 mm rather than 155 mm. There are some 16-inch (406-mm) guns in many nations' arsenals, and an innovative gun-assembled nuclear weapon may have a diameter this small. But the 16-inch guns are not as readily available as the 155-mm guns, and a proliferant would generate the attention of export control authorities if it tried to purchase one.

Several proliferants have the technical capacity to build a gun approaching the Supergun if they can find a supplier of specialty steels for the barrel and large action hydraulic cylinders for the recoil mechanisms. The specialty steel tubes must have interior surfaces with deviation in diameter of less than 50 µm per 20 mm of tube diameter and deviation from a true longitudinal axis of less than 1 mm per meter of length. Oil-producing nations that produce their own pipelines, as a rule, have no reason to make tubes that meet the standards of gun barrel manufacture. Pipelines generally carry oil under a pressures of several atmospheres, rather than the several hundred atmospheres that are required for a gun barrel. Moreover, there are no stringent requirements on pipelines for interior surface finish, diametrically, and straightness.

Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, South Korea, and India either have the capability or could quickly obtain the ability to build large bore gun barrels. Many South American nations, in particular Argentina and Brazil, also have the industrial and metallurgical industry to support large bore gun manufacturing.

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Legend: Sufficient Technologies Capabilities: ♦♦♦♦ exceeds sufficient level ♦♦♦ sufficient level ♦♦ some ♦ limited Because two or more countries have the same number of diamonds does not mean that their capabilities are the same. An absence of diamonds in countries of concern may indicate an absence of information, not of capability. The absence of a country from this list may indicate an absence of information, not capability.

Figure 1.5-1. Artillery Foreign Technology Assessment Summary

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Table 1.5-1. Artillery Technology Parameters

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Table 1.5-2. Artillery Reference Data

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SECTION II

INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY

SECTION 2—INFORMATION SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY

Highlights

• Information Systems capabilities, built on the grid of existing military and commercial technologies, enable most WMD operations
• Large damage envelopes of WMD minimize precision weapon guidance, delivery, and information systems dependencies.
• Information Systems (in some form) can be anticipated to be used by most proliferators.

BACKGROUND

There are many different definitions for Information Systems (IS). The following definition is used for Part II:

People, technologies, and machines used to capture or generate, collect, record, store, retrieve, process, display and transfer or communicate information to multiple users at appropriate levels of an organization to accomplish a specified set of functions.

This definition suggests the wide range of technologies incorporated in different Information Systems.

Since Information Systems are likely to be used in most WMD weapons systems, this separate IS section promotes a more consistent, thorough, and effective assessment. These assessments emphasize countries, other than the United States, which might be adversaries. Consideration is also given to coalition arrangements for both adversaries and allies. Enabling IS capabilities relevant to subnational activities are treated insofar as those activities might target nations or nation-states.

Subsets of Information Systems are commonly referred to as Functional Areas. A large information system may have as many as seven functional areas. IS requirements are normally allocated to functional areas (or system segments). For instance, functional area specifications allow system architects to select the best hardware or software implementation solutions available at the time of fabrication and production. Specifications written in terms of bandwidth, signal quality, reliability, availability, and other generic performance parameters leave designers free to make optimum selections. In the media area, for example, metallic or fiber-optic cable or satellite or terrestrial radio can be selected depending on the speeds and accuracies specified as requirements.

Assessing technologies in terms of IS functional area capabilities, as opposed to specific hardware/software composition, minimizes the requirement for revised MCTL assessments as new products or devices are introduced or older ones withdrawn. For example, a new WMD weapon delivery or damage assessment requirement might be discovered for real-time video observation of battlefield or target areas at a remote command center. If no prior real-time video requirement existed in a proliferant's information systems, then in all likelihood channel bandwidth or bit-rate revisions to the Information Communications functional area capability parameters would be necessary. A real-time observation capability would mean that there is possession of or access to guided or unguided (terrestrial or satellite, radio or optical transmission through the atmosphere or outer space) media technology, with the ability to support video traffic.

Figure 2.0-1 illustrates the extensive scope of what qualifies as an information system and shows the seven traditional functional areas: (1) Information Processing, (2) Information Security, (3) Information Exchange, (4) Information Communications, (5) Information Management and Control, (6) Information Systems Facilities, and (7) Information Systems Sensors. The information system examples in Figure 2.0-1 include large, complex entities such as enterprise management information systems (MIS), telecommunications systems, and even the worldwide Internet. The list could be extended to include numerous smaller systems such as those based on personal computers.

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INFORMATION SYSTEMS COMMAND, CONTROL, AND INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS EXAMPLE INFORMATION SYSTEMS INTERNET TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS FUNCTIONAL AREAS MIS SYSTEMS INFORMATION SYSTEMS FUNCTIONAL AREAS MARKET APPLICATIONS INFORMATION PROCESSING INFORMATION SECURITY INFORMATION EXCHANGE INFORMATION COMMUNICATIONS INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEMS FACILITIES INFORMATION SYSTEMS SENSORS MILITARY NON-MILITARY GOVERNMENT COMMERCIAL BASIC TECHNOLOGIES, TECHNIQUES, DEVICES, AND MATERIALS

Figure 2.0-1. Information Systems

OVERVIEW This section identifies IS technologies that have potential utility in implementing and enabling critical WMD operations. Of special interest in this section are Information Systems built on the grid of existing technologies, including those of World War II vintage, as opposed to those depending on development that requires an extensive industrial base. In particular, this section focuses on the minimum set of technologies required for the development, integration, or employment of WMD and their means of delivery. This is in contrast with Part I of the MCTL, in which performance levels ensuring superiority of U.S. military systems were provided.

In Part II, the innovative use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology, perhaps in combination with advanced and older military IS technologies, dominates the assessments. In this COTS category are systems that are procured for civilian purposes, which are rapidly re-programmable for military operations. Modern, fiber-optic-based, software-defined telecommunications networks are a prime example. Properly designed, they provide multimedia voice and data service to the general population and can also constitute a highly survivable backbone for equipment that is optimized for military operations.

IS functional areas for WMD capabilities often overlap those cited in MCTL Part I, Section 8. They differ principally in that performance levels ensuring superiority of U.S. systems are not imposed. However, MCTL Part I provides complementary technical assessment information.

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RATIONALE

Recent experience demonstrates the value of both military and commercial IS techniques. Unlike the past when DoD, NASA, and other USG agencies dominated and sponsored frontier developments, the vast majority of technologies supporting today’s information systems are driven by civil requirements. Increasingly, the government is specifying “off-the-shelf” mainstream commercial “open-systems, standards-based technologies” as the method of choice for avoiding obsolescence in a fast-changing technology environment.

Overall, strategic and tactical military use of information systems encompasses a range of applications from wide-area switched networks serving an entire theater of operations (often countrywide with global interties), to local processing and communications systems including transportable and personal hand-held devices, to IS systems embedded in smart weapons and sensors. Proliferator possession of critical technologies supporting such a diversity of applications can have decisive significance. In areas of direct combat support, information systems sustain the performance advantages of management, command and control, surveillance, and guidance and control systems for weapons of mass destruction.

It should be noted that most of the technology capabilities cited are those that could be of interest to proliferant countries with large numbers of weapons and relatively capable delivery systems. Countries with fewer resources may employ their weapons with minimal IS support. In fact, one reason why WMD are appealing to even subnational groups is that their large damage envelopes and lethal radii reduce the need for precision weapon delivery and other IS dependencies.

In many cases, U.S. military countermeasure capabilities and techniques may be ineffective when used against commercial IS systems. For example, it may be extremely difficult or impractical to successfully electronically jam large metropolitan area cellular communications systems or all commercial satellite systems that an adversary may have at its disposal.

The tables in this section that identify technologies should be interpreted in the following manner. Proliferants with only a small number of WMD and no intention or capability of sustaining a long-term WMD attack may not be strongly dependent upon the availability of any supporting IS technology. When IS technology is required or helps facilitate WMD, under the column titled “Sufficient Technology Level,” the statement depicts technology items that meet most requirements identified during analysis of the wide range of WMD scenarios considered in this document. For COTS technology items, the statements generally indicate that commercial-application performance requirements for capacity, service, quality, availability, etc., generally exceed those encountered in WMD application scenarios.

FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 2.0-2)

The United States currently leads in system engineering and integration of complex information systems, closely followed by the UK, France, Germany, Canada, and Japan. Underlying technologies for Information Systems and wide-area integration of such systems are driven largely by commercial requirements. A significant number of countries have developed capabilities equivalent to those of the United States in network switching and transmission. The United States has sustained its lead in computer hardware because it enjoys superior microprocessor design and fabrication capabilities (see Sections 5 and 10 in MCTL Part I).

While the United States continues to be the only country with critical capabilities in all IS technology Functional Areas (FAs), equivalent capabilities are found in one or more other countries in every FA. The growing multi-nationalization of information systems developments has increased the worldwide availability of advanced IS technologies. U.S. technology leadership in communications and computer systems has declined in recent years relative to Europe and Japan.

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| Country | Sec 2.1 Information Communications | Sec 2.2 Information Exchange | Sec 2.3 Information Processing | Sec 2.4 Information Security | Sec 2.5 Information Systems Management and Control | Sec 2.6 Information Systems Facilities |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Australia | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Canada | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| China | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Cuba | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Czech Republic | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Denmark | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Egypt | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Finland | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| France | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Germany | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Hungary | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ |
| India | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ |
| Iran | ♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦ | ♦ |
| Iraq | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦ |
| Israel | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Italy | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Japan | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Libya | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ |
| North Korea | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦ | ♦ |
| Norway | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Pakistan | ♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Poland | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦ |
| Russia | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| South Africa | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ |
| South Korea | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Sweden | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Switzerland | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Syria | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Taiwan | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| United Kingdom | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| United States | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Vietnam | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ |
| Subnationals | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ |

Legend: Sufficient Technologies Capabilities: ♦♦♦♦ exceeds sufficient level ♦♦♦ sufficient level ♦♦ some ♦ limited
Because two or more countries have the same number of diamonds does not mean that their capabilities are the same. An absence of diamonds in countries of concern may indicate an absence of information, not of capability. The absence of a country from this list may indicate an absence of information, not capability.

Figure 2.0-2. Information Systems Foreign Technology Assessment Summary

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SECTION 2.1—INFORMATION COMMUNICATIONS

OVERVIEW

The Information Communications Functional Area (FA) as generally defined includes transmission facilities, that is, the medium (free space, the atmosphere, copper or fiber-optic cable) and electronic equipment located at nodes along the medium.

In this context, equipment amplifies (analog systems) or regenerates (digital systems) signals and provides termination functions at points where transmission facilities connect to switching or multiplexing systems. Multiplexers combine many separate sources of traffic into a single signal to enhance transmission efficiency. In modern designs, transmission termination, switching, multiplexing, and other functions may be integrated in a single piece of equipment and, in combination, play a major role in defining network capacity and latency, communication services, grade of service, maintenance, reliability, availability, and survivability.

This section addresses a wide range of equipment used in local and long-distance communications. Included in the nonintegrated types are simple repeater/amplifiers, channel service units (CSUs), and data service units (DSUs). CSU/DSUs are termination equipment required to connect customer premises equipment (CPE) to telecommunications networks and typically provide transmit and control logic, synchronization, and timing recovery across data circuits.

Other examples include satellite, terrestrial microwave, and cable transmit and receive terminals (transceivers), which, in most instances, include multichannel capabilities. Modern, fourth-generation and beyond switches and digital cross-connect systems (DCS) incorporate switching, multiplexing and line-termination functions.

In the case of public cellular or specialized mobile radio (SMR) equipment, Information Communications FA capabilities are combined with traditional application-level functions such as call set-up and take-down dialing, signaling, etc.; advanced features like caller identification; and acoustic and other human interface capabilities.

Thus, it is apparent that basic requirements for communicating information between two nodes can be accomplished through the use of a wide variety of COTS products, each with greater or lesser abilities to support WMD operations. Moreover, whether implemented in modern integrated or prior-generation products, Information Communications Functional Area capabilities are critical for WMD missions of any significant complexity or duration.

RATIONALE

Information Communications Functional Area capabilities, including beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) and secure communications, can be important to WMD operational missions and objectives.

Highlights

• Long-distance, beyond-line-of-sight communications are essential for:
  • Remote reconnaissance and damage assessment,
  • Aerial strikes launched from one country on targets in an adversary country, and
  • Battlefield command and control within large tactical arenas.
• In mixed WMD and conventional conflicts survivable communications are critical to sustaining chemical or biological offensives.

Requirements for BLOS communications arise in both strategic and tactical battlefield WMD warfare. For missile and manned or unmanned aircraft attacks, where the distance between launch points and target designated ground zeros (DGZs) exceeds point-to-point line of sight, there is a need for some form of long-distance communications. Operational situations in which this occurs include aerial strikes launched from one country to targets in another country. Typical targets might be civilian shipping and transportation ports, industrial centers, military command centers, supply depots, and actual battlefield areas. For example, during an ongoing conflict, an aggressor might attempt to create a “plague port” to inhibit an adversary’s ability to receive supplies or disembark allied or peacekeeping forces.

BLOS communications are needed to relay information generated by sensors or individuals in the vicinity of the DGZ back to the strike-force headquarters. Such information may include force status reports; micro-meteorological, indications, and other intelligence data; situation reports; and, damage assessment reports. In the near term, voice or low-rate data communications capabilities from ground-based individuals or manned or unmanned airborne reconnaissance platforms may suffice. In the future, a sophisticated adversary may have a requirement for BLOS communications to relay data from disposable, possibly air-dropped, wide-area, array sensors systems.

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Long-distance communications are implemented using terrestrial or satellite relays, long-wave (below 3 MHz) radio transmission, or a combination of these media. Military long-distance systems can be based on either dedicated facilities or shared facilities obtained from public or other common-user networks. Increasingly, modern facilities of either dedicated or shared design, are able to provide integrated voice, data, facsimile, imagery, and video.

At the low-cost end, single-channel long-distance connections can be made today with standard cellular telephones, interconnected to local and long-distance switched networks. In the near future, mobile service from one or more of the following satellite systems—Iridium, Teledesic, Global Star, Odyssey, and Inmarsat—will become available. Tables 2.1-1 and 2.1-2 illustrate pertinent long-distance communications transmission capabilities.

As an example, in the Gulf War, Iraq was unable to sustain its air defense capability after the United States destroyed its air defense communications network. This resulted from direct attacks on communications facilities with conventional, albeit "smart" weapons. WMD conflicts that escalate to nuclear levels impose the possibility of additional "nuclear effects" communications degradation and destruction.

One advantage of chemical or biological warfare is that it does not necessarily threaten physical facilities and infrastructure plants. When employed in combination with conventional or nuclear warfare, many realistic scenarios arise in which the ability to sustain any offensive depends critically on survivable communications, which often come under physical attack in mixed conflicts. Under these conditions, home-country communications among various command centers and depots are required to direct long-term WMD assembly and transport to battlefield and/or launch points.

In-country telecommunications systems with extraordinary availability and survivability can be implemented using emerging commercial fiber and Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH)-based telecommunications technologies. In the United States and elsewhere, these systems are built to Synchronous Optical Network (SONET) standards, equal, though not identical, to International Telecommunications Union (ITU) standards.

As noted above, these systems are expected to be procured for civil use. But, with appropriate Information Exchange switching, multiplexing and digital cross-connect facilities (see Section 2.2), and Information System Management and Control capabilities (see Section 2.5), they can (1) be easily used for military applications and (2) achieve acceptable survivability and robustness in the face of physical attack.

The reason for the extraordinary programmability and survivability of modern commercial telecommunications is twofold. First, the flagship and most profitable telephone carrier offerings today are their Software Defined Network (SDN) offerings. SDN allows carriers to offer large customers, who in the past may have opted for private, dedicated facilities-based networks, the option of equivalent "virtual private networks" using shared public network facilities.

These networks not only offer large industry or military customers service indistinguishable from dedicated facilities-based private networks, but deliver those services at lower cost. Moreover, SDNs greatly augment capabilities to modify, optimize, and customize carrier services, in accordance with changing requirements.

Modern commercial telecommunications networks exhibit unparalleled survivability because the market demands it. One of the major U.S. carriers supports the equivalent of 300,000 Washington-to-New York voice circuits. Loss of that connection translates into revenue losses of $30,000 or more per minute. The advent of high-capacity fiber transmission makes it possible to carry an enormous number of voice conversations over a single fiber. Yet that funnel factor means that to ensure profitability and network availability, one must not concentrate that much traffic without extensive back-up or redundant connections. Fortunately, SDH/SONET standards addressed this problem from the outset.

With automated Management and Control and appropriate switching and multiplexing facilities, SDH/SONET networks can be designed to tolerate massive switch and cable-cut failures. In many instances, service restoration can be virtually automatic—accomplished in 15 milliseconds—a time span short enough to prevent disconnect of existing calls.

For example, dual homing and two or four fiber-based bi-directional line-switched ring (BLSR) diversity among switching/multiplexing hubs, along with designed-in capabilities (like embedded SDH/SONET protection routing and automated performance monitoring and diagnostic management functions), yield survivability features that older dedicated military systems with precedence, priority, preemption, and even dynamic non-hierarchical routing (DNHR) cannot approach.

The explanation for this is that these older techniques basically preserved or restored service on a call-by-call basis. On the other hand, one company has announced its U.S. network plan for 38 interlocking rings, with 16 nodes per ring, that will enable hundreds of thousands of equivalent voice circuits to be restored, almost instantaneously.

Since SDH/SONET systems can accommodate the world's largest common-user network traffic loads, bandwidth or channel capacity requirements encountered in WMD or conventional warfare scenarios can be met without resorting to state-of-the-art switching speeds or ultra-broadband transmission systems.

Satellite-based services offer commercial communications exhibiting significant availability and survivability. One class of service that provides virtually undeniable service is mobile communications via hundreds of satellites through Iridium, Teledesic, and the other systems mentioned earlier. Another class of satellite service supports very small aperture terminals (VSATs) which employ small suitcase-packaged antennas 1.5 to 6 feet in diameter. Finally, high-capacity, multichannel trunk satellite service can be supported with larger but still transportable earth terminals.

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Not only is it difficult to electronically jam or physically disable the large numbers of satellites providing such services, but to do so may interrupt service to thousands of worldwide users, whether or not they are involved in a conflict. For practical purposes, satellite-based communications exhibit dual, BLOS and equivalent high-survivability capabilities.

FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

The first column of Figure 2.0-2 contains a comparative representation of foreign technology assessments for the Information Communications Functional Area by country and for subnational groups. All of the developed Western nations in the G8 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United States, and the UK), except recently joined Russia, plus the Scandinavian countries, Israel, and Taiwan, have capabilities in all elements of the Information Communications Functional Area, including transmission facilities and required electronic equipment located at nodes along the medium, in their installed base. Of the G8, only Russia has considerable development ahead before she becomes comparable to the other members. However, like China, this comparatively late development may be an advantage to Russia because she is not burdened with a large installed base of outmoded analog equipment and bandwidth-limited non-fiber-optic transmission. Therefore, Russia, China, and other lesser developed countries can more readily expand their capabilities with modern equipment, avoiding performance penalties involved with hybrid facilities. The China assessment may be low since one indicator of China's Information Communications Functional Area capabilities is that the United States alone takes up 40 percent of China's exports. Part of this 40 percent, in which China's trade surplus with the United States is greatest, is telecommunications equipment, and China manufactures its own fiber-optic cable.

Most of the other countries with lesser developed telecommunications (Cuba, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Vietnam) have lower Information Communications Functional Area capabilities, which tend to be concentrated around the larger population centers; however, these deficiencies could be corrected in a comparatively short period of time with supplemental satellite systems. For example, Iran's telecommunications installed base is limited to Tehran and its surrounding area. An exception to this generality is Iraq. Iraq's baseline telecommunications capabilities are much less concentrated on the population centers and are more country-wide. See subsection 8.11 in Part I of the 1996 MCTL.

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Table 2.1-1. Information Communications Technology Parameters

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Table 2.1-2. Information Communications Reference Data

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SECTION 2.2—INFORMATION EXCHANGE

OVERVIEW Information Exchange (IX) is an IS functional area to which switching and multiplexing are usually assigned. As illustrated in Figure 2.2-1, all forms of circuit, packet, and SDH/SONET transport network-based line and path routing and switching are implied. In circuit switching, the IX functional area encompasses call-by-call [e.g., central office (CO) telephone exchange] as well as channel switching. In the past, channel switching was implemented manually at technical control centers. In the United States, by the late 1980’s, digital cross-connect systems (DCS) began to be installed in 24-channel (“T1,” or more properly, DS-1) group-based Asynchronous Digital Transmission Systems (ADTS). Some DCS equipment provides not only channel switching at DS-1 rates (1.544 Mbps), but also (1) “add and drop” multiplexing without “breaking out” each 64 Kbps DS-0 channel, and (2) supergroup (DS-“n”) channel switching. Moreover, it achieves these functions in compact, programmable equipment. Much of this vintage equipment is still in operation.

Highlights

• Circuit switching, packet switching, and multiplexing are Information Exchange Functional Area capabilities generally available and installed worldwide, and require constituent elements in all but stand-alone, desktop information systems.
• Stored program control central office and digital cross connect switching are key to Software Defined Networks that can be used for survivable communications capabilities supporting WMD operations.
• Transportable and dual (Central Office and tandem) function switches further enhance network survivability.
• Fast packet, Asynchronous Transfer Mode-based switching and multiplexing support voice, data, graphics, imagery, and video requirements.

SWITCHING PACKET

• Port Sharing
• Variable bandwidth CONVENTIONAL
• e.g., X.25 FAST PACKET FRAME RELAY
• Variable length frames CELL RELAY
• Fixed-size cells CIRCUIT
• Dedicated circuits
• Fixed bandwidth CALL-BY-CALL
• CO switches
• Tandem switches
• Dual function switches
• PBXs
• Key/Hybrid CHANNEL
• Networking T1 multiplexers
• Digital cross-connects (DCS) SDH/SONET TRANSPORT
• Line Switching
• Path Switching

Figure 2.2-1. Routing and Switching Systems

Today, ADTS DCS equipment is being replaced by SDH, International Telecommunications Union (ITU) G-Series or SONET-compliant synchronous byte interleave multiplexer equipment. SDH/SONET-based DCS equipment exhibit all basic asynchronous DCS features. Beyond basic features, SDH/SONET DCSs capitalize on all of the considerable advantages of synchronous transmission and multiplexing. Among these advantages is the ability to support synchronous payload envelopes (SPEs) that extend “add and drop” capabilities across all SDH multiplexing hierarchy levels. In addition, to enhance survivability and availability, SDH/SONET-based bi-directional line-switched rings (BLSRs) provide reusable bandwidth for more efficient inter-node transport in evenly meshed networks. A meshed network means traffic is more or less evenly distributed among all nodes rather than being funneled through a few hubbing locations. Half the available bandwidth in a BLSR is allocated as a working rate evenly distributed among all nodes rather than being funneled through a few hubbing locations, and the other half is reserved for protection routing. Thus, in an optical

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carrier, OC-48,¹ application, working traffic is placed in the first 24 STS²-1 time-slots, with time-slots 25 through 48 serving as the protection facility. In conjunction with ITU Telecommunications Management Network (TMN)-based management functions, this can result in unparalleled recovery from transmission failures, whether failures occur naturally or from intended or collateral enemy attack damage.

Network designs using early versions of these techniques have dramatically improved restoration from man-made or natural outages. For example, in 1991 it typically took 120 minutes after a failure to restore 35 DS3 circuits (about 24,000 equivalent DSO (or voice circuits). On July 30, 1996, more than 200,000 circuits were taken out of service when a water department crew bored into a fiber-optic cable in North Carolina. In this case, 92.8 percent of the service was restored in three minutes, nearly 10 times the number of circuits in 3 percent of the time. See Section 2.5 for a discussion of automated Information Systems Management and Control Functional Area technologies that can lead to this kind of performance in networks used to support WMD missions.

What makes performance improvements of this magnitude possible is not just programmable switching, multiplexing, and computer-based network control technologies, but the fact that with broadband fiber optic cable and capacity-extending wavelength division multiplexing, for availability and survivability purposes, designers can virtually assume that spare or reserve capacity is “free.” That is, in large commercial or public networks, the 50-percent BLSR “call fill-rate” has no appreciable negative cost or revenue impact.

Another technology category included in the Information Exchange Functional Area is the wide variety of equipment generally described under the rubric of packet switching. As Figure 2.2-1 shows, packet switching encompasses conventional and fast packet realizations in both frame and cell relay appearances. Although it is generally appreciated that modern telecommunications systems are increasingly able to integrate voice, data, video, and other services, as noted earlier an even more systemic form of integration is occurring: that is, the integration of switching and multiplexing within single equipment envelopes.

This development trend is a logical one: early digital circuit switches employed time-division multiplexing techniques (augmented in larger switches with space division multiplexing) to accomplish switching functions.

The most recent, and perhaps the most promising manifestation of the integration of switching and multiplexing functions in common equipment, is the Asynchronous Transfer Mode³ (ATM) digital facility. However, more common so-called local area networks (LANs) and satellite access schemes also provide means for sharing common circuits among multiple traffic channels (multiplexing), and provide either connection-oriented or connection-less switching and call establishment functions.

In addition to the switching and integrated switching-multiplexing equipment described above, equipment assigned to the Information Exchange Functional Area also includes older non-switching “channel bank” and flexible digital time division multiplexers, as well as all forms of analog electronic and photonic multiplexers (e.g., modern, wavelength-division multiplexers).

RATIONALE

The reason that IX Functional Area capabilities are so important to WMD operations is the same reason that they have commercial significance. Quite simply, IX capabilities are required constituent interconnection elements for any information system that extends beyond a “stand-alone” desktop installation.

Stored program control central office and digital cross-connect switching is key to Software Defined Networks (SDNs). One of the principal advantages of SDNs is that they permit near-real-time network reconfiguration to optimize performance for a wide variety of traffic types and loading or in response to network damage or outages. These same programmability features allow peacetime civilian networks to be rapidly converted to highly survivable communications assets supporting crucial WMD operations.

Equally valuable for WMD operations is the increased accessibility that end-user organizations have to telephone-company-based SDN management and control facilities that allow them to create and optimize individual subnetworks in accordance with unique customer (in this case, WMD force elements) service and configuration profiles.

In fact, with the exception of long-wave radio, all BLOS and wide-area communications network survivability capabilities described in the Section 2.1, depend critically upon IX capabilities. You don’t build terrestrial or satellite, fixed, cellular, or specialized mobile telecommunications systems without switching and multiplexing. A recent urban warfare study revealed that the Russians in Chechnya, the Israelis in Lebanon, and the British in Northern Ireland all resorted to commercial cellular services for mobile troop communications when military-issue portable radio performance proved unsatisfactory within cities.

¹ OC “n,” the “nth” level in an optical carrier multiplexing hierarchy. ² Synchronous Transport Signal Level 1, basic SONET building block, electrical equivalent of OC-1. ³ ATM, a cell relay-based form of fast packet switching, uses fixed, 53-byte packets, suitable for voice, data, and other services, in either fixed or variable bit-rate formats.

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When operational, Iridium, Teledesic, or other satellite-based capabilities will be even more relevant in satisfying military urban mobile communications requirements since the service will involve reduced reliance, or none at all, on indigenous telecommunications facilities. Clearly, all these systems depend critically on highly sophisticated Information Communications, Information Exchange, and Information Systems Management and Control functional area technologies.

Satellite-based mobile telecommunications of the type just described is one example of commercial technology for which there appears to be no practical military alternative. This statement is true unless one wants to defend the position that there exists in the world a country willing and able to deploy an Iridium or Teledesic-like satellite constellation for dedicated military use only.

COTS dual-function switches that combine central office and tandem switching capabilities are also available. This means that in combination with SDH/SONET transmission systems discussed above, the physical location of switching within a network no longer needs to be fixed or pre-assigned. This results in enormous survivability and service restoration benefits. In the same vein, dual-function switches also enable cost-effective means of time-phased upgrading of obsolete telephone systems in urban areas such as Moscow or in many third world metropolitan areas.

Transportable central offices used for disaster recovery by telephone companies represent another commercial technology with significant WMD operations survivability potential. Tables 2.2-1 and 2.2-2 list specific Information Exchange technology capabilities.

FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

The second column of Figure 2.0-2 contains a comparative representation of foreign technology assessments for the IX functional area by country and for subnational groups. The IX functional area capability profiles of most countries are similar to their Information Communications capabilities. There are, however, some exceptions in the cases of smaller or less-developed countries. Iraq's IX functional area is assessed as greater than its Information Communications capabilities, as is Germany's, Japan's, North Korea's, Russia's, and South Africa's, whereas Israel, Poland, and Taiwan are assessed as having fewer IX functional area capabilities than their Information Communications Functional Area capabilities. These lesser IX functional area capabilities can significantly affect the overall performance of their information systems.

The switching and multiplexing capabilities associated with the IX functional area are common to both military and civil systems and have become readily available through joint developments or through foreign sales. The ranking of IX functional area capabilities largely reflects the effects of international standardization. Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK have overall IX functional area capabilities equal to those of the United States, although U.S. capabilities may surpass them in some niche technologies such as optical systems. All of these countries, plus Italy, sell switching equipment worldwide. In most cases, their export equipment is technologically advanced; however, their equipment may incorporate somewhat limited capabilities. For example, their multi-level switching and preemption equipment may contain only two levels rather than three to five levels.

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Table 2.2-1. Information Exchange Technology Parameters

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Table 2.2-2. Information Exchange Reference Data

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SECTION 2.3—INFORMATION PROCESSING

OVERVIEW
Information Processing (IP) is an IS functional area to which computers, peripherals, servers, end-user or terminal equipment such as displays, keyboards, and other devices are normally assigned. Operating system, application and utility software are also considered elements of the IP functional area. This section discusses many of these technologies, consisting mainly of computer software and hardware.

The following are among an extensive list of IP-based commercial capabilities with WMD application:
*   Computer-aided design (CAD) software, hardware suite, and complex system engineering and integration tools;
*   A rich variety of IS design, performance and environmental modeling, simulation, test, and evaluation products;
*   On-line Analytical Processing (OLAP);
*   Streamlined object-oriented programming (reusable programs, classes and objects), fourth-generation languages, and intelligent database management system development/modification products;
*   Conventional and advanced multimedia (acoustic, voice, graphics imagery, video, tactile and haptic), user-friendly, human interfaces;
*   High-performance virtual reality and other home entertainment products;
*   Mature hardware and software products supporting client/server, distributed processing, and database system architectures; and
*   Data Warehousing.

In examining the role of commercial technology in WMD applications, it is necessary to understand DoD's overall acquisition policy. Section 2501 of Title 42 of the Defense Appropriations Act for 1993 declares:

> *It is the policy of the Congress that the United States attain its national technology and industrial base objectives through acquisition policy reforms that have the following objectives:*

*   *Relying, to the maximum extent practical, upon commercial national technology and industrial base that is required to meet the national security needs of the United States;*

> **Highlights**
>
> *   In view of the rapid pace of commercial technology development, the performance of COTS information processing technology is generally far superior to military standard counterparts.
> *   COTS information-processing design, development, test, and evaluation tools facilitate adaptation and upgrade of older military and commercial information systems, delivery systems, and other WMD elements.
> *   Extraordinary performance growth in ever smaller, lighter, lower power packaging makes the introduction of powerful IP products possible, and greatly augments survivable transportable command centers.

*   *Reducing the reliance of the Department of Defense on technology and industrial base sectors that are economically dependent on Department of Defense business; and*
*   *Reducing Federal Government barriers to the use of commercial products, processes, and standards.*

The implication is that through such policy initiatives, the proliferator seeking to acquire IS can become aware of a wider array of choices.

Just as there is a need to plan for failure or destruction of switching centers in the Information Exchange IS functional area, availability of WMD IP functions ideally must not depend on the survivability of a small number of high-value information-processing centers. Insurance, airline reservation, and other industry segments have developed a wide variety of fail-safe redundancy and back-up technologies, including disaster recovery techniques and plans, that can easily be adopted with great advantage for WMD missions.

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RATIONALE

Although COTS capabilities are intrinsically capable of supporting WMD missions, constructing automated strike planing, damage assessment, battle management, sensor and intelligence data fusion, modeling and simulation, weapon inventory and control, and numerous other IP functional capabilities requires significant customization.

However, there is no question that COTS design, development, test, and evaluation technologies outlined above, which are available on the open market, facilitate the adaptation and technology infusion or upgrade of older military and commercial IS, delivery system, and other WMD elements.

Inasmuch as COTS technology transfer to the WMD Information System baseline capabilities does not involve composite material, fuel processing, propulsion system, weapon payload integration, and similar structural and mechanical dependencies, much can be accomplished at reasonable levels of effort and within aggressive schedules by rogue countries such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and others.

COTS products such as Internet and Intranet capabilities, distributed computing environments (DCE), client-server structures, on-line analytical processing (OLAP), on-line transaction processing (OLTP), an ever-growing family of enterprise software developments, and other commercial developments offer tremendous potential in streamlining and enhancing WMD and conventional warfare operations.

Multimedia personal power-computers are of particular significance for conflict situations in which transportability and information-supported weapons (e.g., remotely piloted vehicles) are crucial to mission success. High-performance laptop PCs can be conveniently taken to temporary maintenance and repair depots, flight decks, launch vehicles, and battlefields. Slightly larger suitcase-size packaging, augmented with survivable communications and GPS capabilities, extends information-based, war-fighting potential even further.

At desktop/workstation capability levels, it is possible today to achieve in single-van, transportable command centers what 10 years ago demanded a convoy of vans and support vehicles. This advancement reflects increased IP performance and reliability, all accomplished with greatly reduced computer processor and peripheral size, weight, volume, power consumption and, consequently, scaled-down prime power and environmental control support facilities. Tables 2.3-1 and 2.3-2 list specific IP capabilities with WMD relevance.

FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

The third column of Figure 2.0-2 contains a comparative representation of foreign technology assessments for the IP Functional Area by country and for subnational groups. The IP capability profiles of most countries are similar to their Information Communications and Information Exchange capabilities. There are, however, some significant exceptions. India and Iran are assessed as having IP capabilities greater than those in both their Information Communications and Exchange functional areas. Iraq's IP capabilities exceed their Information Systems Management and Control and Information Systems Facilities. Japan, North Korea, and Pakistan have IP capabilities that exceed their Information Communications and Exchange functional areas. Only Australia, South Africa, and Switzerland are assessed as having IP capabilities that are less than their Information Communications and Exchange functional areas.

Some of the country capability assessments that appear in Figure 2.0-2 may be conservative because the IP capabilities in almost all countries are growing so rapidly due, in large part, to the rapid expansion of the Internet. IP technology status statistics by country are difficult to locate; however, some indication of various country's capabilities were revealed by a recent world survey of the Internet host and PC populations. This survey reported that Finland, with a population of 4 million, has the world's largest Internet host density, with ~535 per 1,000 population. The United States still leads the world in PC density with ~ 390 PCs per 1,000 population; however, Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland are close behind the United States in PC densities, with more PCs per 1,000 than Japan, Germany, the UK, and Canada. Software is changing the economic and military balances in the world. There is an accelerating intellectual capital transfer of software development know-how now in progress through the Internet, Intellectual capital transfer takes place through aggressive computer hardware and software marketing, conferences, trade journals, and technical literature on software development, and through the graduates of colleges and universities, which teach IP skills and abilities, in the United States and other countries. IP know-how transfer also takes place in personnel transfers overseas and training conducted by U.S. multinational companies. However, the United States still currently leads, and is forecast to continue to lead, the world in software innovation, the development of large complex systems, and in system engineering and integration through at least the year 2005 or 2010. The United States has sustained its lead in computer hardware because it enjoys superior microprocessor design and fabrication capabilities. See Sections 5 and 10 in Part I of the 1996 MCTL.

The United States is having a great deal of software developed by foreign nationals, either within their own country or as part of a team in the United States. For example, communications software is being developed in India by a subsidiary of a U.S. communications company. In another case, a critical DoD system being developed under contract in the United States has Russian nationals on the development team. Software developed today is so complex that any programmer(s) could put in viruses, Trojan horses, back doors, and time bombs that could go undetected all the way through installation, particularly if there is a cooperative group effort.

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Table 2.3-1. Information Processing Technology Parameters

(cont'd)

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Table 2.3-1. Information Processing Technology Parameters (cont'd)

(cont'd)

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Table 2.3-1. Information Processing Technology Parameters (cont'd)

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Table 2.3-2. Information Processing Reference Data

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SECTION 2.4—INFORMATION SECURITY

OVERVIEW

Technologies in the Information Security (INFOSEC) Functional Area are those designed to safeguard information privacy or secrecy and to ensure information integrity. Encryption, scrambling, protected wire, and steganographic techniques are used to protect the privacy and secrecy of data at or en route among information processing or storage nodes. Hash functions protect information integrity by alerting owners to data manipulation or tampering.

This section deals principally with information in electromagnetic format contained within electronic or photonic devices or en route over suitable media. Physical access control capabilities are included to the extent that they provide protection against attacks intended to illegally acquire information and not merely to physically destroy the facilities in which it resides.

Protecting information while it resides in processing, storage, server, and interface terminal nodes—yet making it readily available to authorized users—is accomplished with access control, authentication, non-repudiation, and electronic signature techniques. All of what has come to be known as “trusted system” INFOSEC capabilities can be used by proliferators.

The cost of trusted systems and other associated COTS INFOSEC products is comparatively small and within the reach of most proliferators. Associated COTS INFOSEC systems that might be used by proliferators for their trusted systems are standard physical and electronic access limiting techniques. Unique badges or cards, which include name, picture, individual personal identification numbers (PINs), other identification numbers, and passwords are in this category. Of Operations Security (OPSEC) interest are advanced local and remote identification and authentication mechanisms. In this latter category are thermogram, hand or eye scanning, voice printing, keyboard rhythm, fingerprint, signature dynamics, and other biometric technologies.

Today there are quality COTS INFOSEC products of such strength that effective communications and signal intelligence countermeasure operations against them are practicable only for government agencies or other large, well-funded organizations. Readily available COTS secure communication products include line and trunk encryption devices, secure voice and data end-instruments, encrypted common channel and per-channel signaling systems, and a rich variety of encryption software.

The availability of powerful and effective INFOSEC products and techniques does not guarantee that any country’s computer-dependent enterprise infrastructures are invulnerable. In fact, many of today’s computer-dependent utilities such as

Highlights

• Commercial INFOSEC products are available on world markets with capabilities deemed adequate for WMD operations.
• Significant progress is being made toward open, market-based INFOSEC development of public-private key architectures, related standards, and the functional specification of certification authority structures.

telecommunications systems and electrical power systems, as well as financial services systems and other civilian and military systems, are known to have been penetrated by competent hackers. Well-funded adversarial government or industrial espionage activities pose an even greater threat to these systems.

Many infrastructure systems are vulnerable, not because they cannot be protected using available COTS products and techniques, but because risk-benefit analyses are not persuasive. Due to their perception of the threat, decision-makers accept the risk rather than bear the attendant investment costs, operating efficiency losses, and time-consuming access restrictions associated with protecting their systems. A knowledgeable proliferator intent on achieving surprise or concealing its identity may be expected to be willing to pay the price of strong INFOSEC.

New and more capable INFOSEC capabilities and techniques continue to appear in both commercial and military environments. And certainly, potential proliferants have ready access to commercial technologies to implement whatever level of security they deem necessary to protect their WMD warfare operations. Commercial technology developments that promise to augment today’s capabilities and allow WMD proliferators to implement even higher levels of information security are outlined below.

The use of fiber-optic cable, even in the absence of encryption, greatly complicates the old-fashioned wire-tapping procedure. Intrusion-resistant fiber cable makes undetected eavesdropping almost impossible. Similarly, common-channel signaling

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defeats automated, in-channel, “search-on-number” intercept techniques, since signaling and subscriber traffic take different signal paths. Proliferants able to use commercial fiber-optic systems would realize these benefits. Perhaps the most significant open, market-based INFOSEC development is the progress made towards the adoption of public key cryptography and protocols, related standards, and the establishment of certification authority structures. As improved standards and overall architectures emerge, there appears to be more than an adequate supply of scientific and professional competence available for assistance in the development and integration of systems of whatever strength proliferators require, from algorithm and protocol development to encryption and key management. The financial services industry’s interest and the intense interest of business in electronic commerce on the Internet have accelerated development of commercial tools and technologies with broad WMD application. Among them are means to protect (while selling) intellectual property rights, safeguard databases, restrict access, prevent false repudiation, safely transfer funds, and execute binding contracts electronically, as well as numerous other secure capabilities. RATIONALE Because all businessmen and government decision-makers have not implemented measures to correct vulnerabilities in many of today’s nonmilitary systems, the opinion is often advanced that commercial capabilities are unsuited for military applications and their importance to WMD warfighting is minimized. It is unlikely that these arguments will persuade astute WMD proliferators who are free to convert commercial INFOSEC products normally used to protect civilian dual-use information systems to WMD use. Virtually all commercial INFOSEC capabilities have direct WMD application for weapon storage, custody and release as well as other military command and control operations. In conducting successful nonattributable WMD attacks, covertness is mandatory. In such situations, even the appearance of encrypted traffic may compromise missions by tagging information. A proliferator may avoid encryption altogether using one-time codes and steganographically concealed messages buried in innocuous text or bitmapped images to prevent adversaries from intercepting intelligible data. This ancient coding method is ideal in high-volume traffic voice and Internet-type data networks. Steganography is within the reach of all proliferators. Even prisoners with no equipment but their minds have developed essentially undetectable means of transmitting embedded decoding templates with the concealed messages. A complementary approach for maintaining secrecy and covertness involves the use of secure, intrusion-resistant, low probability of detection and interception communications technologies. Of course, if a WMD or conventional attack strategy critically depends on the element of surprise, overt encryption using any of the commercial technologies remains an option. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT Complete INFOSEC and OPSEC technical data appears in open source U.S. and foreign trade journals and technical literature and also can be obtained from vendors. Cryptographic systems are widely available. A Russian vendor will deliver a complete package with a 2-year service provision to anyone, and Sun is fielding a whole suite of strong cryptographic products supplied by a Russian manufacturer for their customers anywhere in the world. National and international export regulations can be circumvented in those countries that prohibit the export of robust information security systems, including strong cryptography. In addition, there are now many countries that have at least a limited capability to produce, or at least use, robust information security products. The Information Security Functional Area column of Figure 2.0-2 contains a foreign technology assessment by country and for subnational groups. One-third of the countries assessed have capabilities in all INFOSEC Functional Area technologies. Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the UK, and the United States are the world INFOSEC technology leaders. Denmark, Finland, India, Israel, Japan, Norway, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and Taiwan are close behind the leaders. Iran and North Korea are believed to have all essential INFOSEC functional area capabilities. Most countries and subnational groups, have at least a limited INFOSEC technology capability. A limited capability includes the ability to use INFOSEC products obtained on the world market with little or no direct technical support from the manufacturers. Note that Libya, Vietnam, and the subnationals are among those credited with a limited INFOSEC technology capability and all of them should be able to purchase robust INFOSEC systems, which are comparatively inexpensive. See Section 2.3 (page II-2-16) for a description of COTS software vulnerability.

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Table 2.4-1. Information Security Technology Parameters

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Table 2.4-2. Information Security Reference Data

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SECTION 2.5—INFORMATION SYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL

OVERVIEW

Information System Management and Control (IM&C) is the IS Functional Area capability for planning, organizing, designing, optimizing, engineering, implementing, provisioning, monitoring, directing, controlling, and accounting for IS activities and resources. Here, "controlling" is understood to subsume operations, maintenance, configuration and change management, and security. Within the military, IS IM&C is but one element of mission-level Command, Control, and Intelligence functional capabilities. With inadequate IM&C capabilities, a WMD proliferator would have difficulty in rapidly converting civilian telecommunications complex Information Systems to military use or in taking advantage of the survivability Information Systems are able to furnish.

This section addresses IS technologies necessary to control normal operations and service provision while achieving reliability, availability, fault isolation, service restoration, and survivability objectives.

As an example of an advanced IM&C capability, consider today's software defined or virtual private telecommunications networks (SDN/VPNs), in which traffic is routed through networks under the control of computers residing in network control points or operations centers (NCP/NOCs). These computers are connected to remote stored program-controlled switching and multiplexing equipment using common-channel signaling (CCS) networks. The computers, and associated databases containing a subscriber's unique VPN information, screen every call and apply call-processing control in accordance with customer-defined requirements.

The IM&C capabilities implemented in an NCP/NOC not only control normal call-processing and routing, but they monitor and manage virtually every aspect of a network. Of particular interest to WMD operations, NOCs are the management and control means by which the extraordinary survivability features of SDH/SONET bidirectional line-switched rings (BLSRs) are realized.

Highly survivable operations, if needed for some WMD missions, can be realized through the combination of fiber-optic and other media Information Communications functional area capabilities; flexible and programmable switching and multiplexing Information Exchange functional area capabilities; and importantly, computer, database, and software IM&C functional area capabilities. Thus, commercial hardware and software product technologies implementing IM&C capabilities can be central to any proliferant's successful adaptation of commercial public telephone networks for WMD military purposes.

Highlights

• With inadequate Information System Management and Control capabilities, no WMD proliferator can rapidly convert civil telecommunications or other complex IS systems to military use.
• Information Systems Management and Control functional area capabilities are of seminal importance to both normal day-to-day and stressed-mode, complex system operations.
• As information systems grow, add more components, more functions, and more users, IS Management and Control itself becomes more difficult and complex, yet increasingly crucial.

The increasing importance of IM&C to telecommunications and other complex Information Systems is due to many worldwide trends. In the past, data processing was usually accomplished within mainframes in a relatively small number of large, centralized processing sites. In the telecommunications arena, networks supported limited sets of services derived from a relatively small set of basic technologies, using equipment from only a few vendors. Today, divestiture, deregulation, privatization (overseas), and rapid technological expansion and competition has resulted in significant growth in the number of private and public telecommunications networks. These networks support numerous services and are derived from a wide variety of network elements (NEs) with equipment supplied by hundreds of manufacturers.

To cope with added functional complexity and reduce manpower requirements, network operators are placing more processors in voice communications networks (VCNs). Analogously, advances in microprocessors technology and the corresponding trend away from centralized-mainframe designs has spawned a large number of data communications networks (DCNs) now connecting distributed processors in client/server configurations. In both cases, the result is that networks are more complex and more software driven than ever.

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Not surprisingly, as information systems proliferate, add more components, more functions and more users, IS management itself becomes more difficult and complex, yet increasingly crucial. The fast growing cellular telephone industry adds new dimensions to telecommunications management, particularly for roaming applications where one carriers' subscribers must be recognized and served by other carrier's networks.

In the United States, divestiture has meant that many end-to-end connections require services and/or facilities from two different local exchange carriers (LECs), one or more interexchange carriers (IXCs) or backbone networks, and often two local area networks comprising customer premises equipment (CPE) from a variety of manufacturers.

Overseas, similar situations exist among interconnected pan-European national networks and within countries where privatization has given rise to a variety of alternative service providers. Effective, integrated IM&C in this environment is difficult to achieve, but may be far simpler in third-world countries, where rebuilding homogeneous nationwide networks from the ground up may be feasible.

Since the IS product environment worldwide is heterogeneous, practical, long-term, and end-to-end (e.g., systems including customer-owned and carrier or other service provider-based, common-user information systems), effective IM&C approaches must be based on standards and a common, evolving agent process/manager process paradigm. Relevant standards include the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Telecommunications System Sector (TSS) M30X0 Telecommunications Management Network series; the International Standards Organization (ISO) Common Management Information Protocol (CMIP) and several subsidiary standards; the Internet Activities Board, Simple Management Network Protocol (SMNP); and the Institute of Electronics Engineers (IEEE) local and metropolitan area network standard entitled LAN/MAN Management.

To achieve the rapid fault isolation and service restoration leading to ultra-high availability and militarily acceptable levels of survivability, standards must be implemented in appropriate network elements and arranged in architectures with designed-in performance monitoring; fault isolation; and excess traffic, processing, storage capacity, and disaster recovery back-up resources that can be quickly reallocated to compensate for intentional, man-made, or naturally occurring damage or failure.

In public networks, this means stored program central office, tandem and digital cross-connect switching, multiplexing, router and server equipment; telecommunication management networks (TMNs, i.e., data communication networks designed to exchange management information but logically separate from "managed networks"); broadband fiber-optic Synchronous Digital Hierarchy/SONET (SDH/SONET)-based backbone transmission; and alternate multimedia communications (e.g., broadband satellite and satellite or terrestrial based mobile communications). An advanced signaling system such as the ITU-TSS Signaling System # 7 (SS # 7—AT&T and Bellcore versions are commonly referred to as CCS 7 and SS 7, respectively) plays an important role in normal and degraded-mode military operations of advanced telecommunications system. For example, during the Cold War era, COCOM permitted the export of SS # 7-capable switching hardware, but restricted export of SS # 7 itself.

Figure 2.5-1 summarizes IM&C dimensions, i.e., the functions, managed entities, and domains implied in the above discussion. In the figure, IM&C functions are divided into "technical" and "business/government/military" categories, with only key subfunctions illustrated. Managed entities are grouped under "IS Services," "IS Networks," and "IS Elements" categories, again with only partial subcategory illustrations. Finally, the dedicated-facilities and common user management domains are shown.

RATIONALE

Figure 2.5-1 graphically demonstrates the challenges involved in creating either end-to-end integrated management and control systems or achieving the goal of "open IM&C systems." However, as noted, in third-world countries where upgrading essentially allows designers to start with a "clean slate," military information systems can be built upon homogeneous or even single-vendor common-user commercial systems. These systems can easily be more survivable than dedicated, special purpose alternatives built from equipment made to military specifications.

The reason is twofold. First, civil information systems generate revenue only when operational. As a consequence, the profit motivation for high availability, minimum downtime, and immunity to failures and accidental cable cuts is paramount.

Second, although it is possible to design excess capacity into military systems to account for losses in warfare, capacity requirements sufficient to handle peacetime civilian requirements are generally orders of magnitude larger than any justifiable military overbuild design requirements.

To illustrate these advantages, consider the Autovon military network. It was once regarded as the preeminent, survivable voice network with 55 U.S. switch centers. Today civil requirements have resulted in switch numbers and capacities dwarfing old Autovon military requirements. As a consequence, the most survivable military IS designs are those based on the ability to make optimal use of civil systems by placing them at the disposal of military users. This is especially true of commercial technologies embodying the most effective IM&C mechanisms to circumvent outages caused by natural disasters and irreducible component failures. Tables 2.5-1 and 2.5-2 illustrate specific technology capabilities with WMD significance.

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FUNCTIONS

BUSINESS/ GOVERNMENT/ MILITARY

• Financial
• Service-Level Arrangements

TECHNICAL

• Reliability/Availability/Survivability
• Capacity/Traffic Management
• Engineering and Integration

CMIP Functions

• Fault Management
• Performance Management
• Configuration Management
• Security Management
• Accounting Management

Dedicated Systems

• Local
• Metropolitan
• Wide-Area

Common-User Systems

• Local
• Metropolitan
• Wide-Area

MANAGEMENT DOMAIN

IS SERVICES Voice, Data, Video, Distributed Processing, Directory, Security, ...

IS NETWORKS Circuit-Switched Packet-Switched Transmission ATM-SONET-SDH Based

IS ELEMENTS Switches, Multiplexers, Modems, Mainframes, Servers, PCs, Workstations, Computer Program Components, Databases, Communications Protocols, Human Interfaces, etc.

MANAGED ENTITIES (OBJECTS)

Figure 2.5-1. Information Systems Management and Control

FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

The Information Systems Management and Control (IM&C) column in Figure 2.0-2 shows the comparative IM&C capabilities of 32 countries and a representative assessment for subnational groups. Only one-third of those listed have all IM&C Functional Area capabilities because this is a large, complex, functional area consisting of 11 elements that include the capability for planning, organizing, designing, optimizing, engineering, implementing, provisioning, monitoring, directing, controlling (operations, maintenance, configuration and change management), and accounting for IM&C activities and resources. Countries with strong capabilities in all IM&C technologies are the world Information Systems leaders (or host divisions of multinational companies), which have installed much of the world's information systems telecommunications base. The world's IM&C leaders are Canada, France, the UK, and the United States. In contrast, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and the subnationals are among those countries that have only limited, if any, IM&C capabilities. An ambitious WMD proliferator would need strong capabilities in all IM&C technologies to rapidly convert civilian telecommunications and the other complex information systems functional area technologies to military use and take advantage of the extraordinary survivability modern systems could provide for WMD operations. A minimal proliferator that does not intend to conduct sustained or sophisticated WMD operations might not benefit from the possession of IM&C technologies.

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Table 2.5-1. Information Systems Management and Control Technology Parameters

(cont'd)

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Table 2.5-1. Information Systems Management and Control Technology Parameters (cont'd)

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Table 2.5-2. Information Systems Management and Control Reference Data

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SECTION 2.6—INFORMATION SYSTEMS FACILITIES

OVERVIEW Information Systems Facilities is the Functional Area encompassing any or all of the following capabilities: exterior physical shelter and interior room; equipment and other IS support structures; prime power generation and/or co-generation; power conditioning; environmental heating, ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC); chemical and biological filtration and protection; electromagnetic pulse protection; tempest shielding; radiation protection; and human habitation and life-support accommodations.

Clearly, not all of these capabilities are required for every instance of military operations. Physical shelters may be fixed, or transportable in ground mobile, airborne or shipborne configurations. They may support manned command, control and intelligence centers, manned information processing or communications centers, or unattended IS resources.

Civil IS shelters typically may not involve sleeping quarters or other overnight accommodations, but instead merely provide facilities housing IS equipment and personnel in common office work environments.

Where nuclear weapons are involved, the Cold War era taught that under determined attack, there is no such thing as a survivable, fixed command center or IS operations building. Not even so-called deep underground command centers, regardless of cost, could be certified as survivable. As a consequence, in military WMD scenarios in which long-term survivability is mandatory, mobile facilities are the only viable option. From a U.S. perspective, preparation for global nuclear warfare, beginning with the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) program in the 1970's, led to the investment of billions of dollars in military, mobile command, surveillance, and IS center technology. The airborne command center, the Airborne Warning and Command System (AWACs), and the Ground Mobile Command Center (GMCC) are illustrative developments. For tactical scenarios, the Tri-Tac program developed a wide variety of mobile/transportable voice and data switching, communications satellite and terrestrial terminals, and various IS processing center products to support moving battlefield theater locations. In Europe, the Deutsche-Bundespost placed cable hocks within civilian telecommunications networks, permitting mobile switching and multiplexing gear to be connected with surviving transmission media to restore service interrupted by intentional or collateral wartime damage.

By the late 1980's, enormous advances in microprocessor-based computer power, coupled with dramatic reductions in space, weight, and prime power consumption, made possible installation in a single rack those IS capabilities which previously required an 18-wheel tractor-trailer.

Highlights

• Older military or commercial high technology, highly survivable transportable/mobile information systems facility capabilities are readily available to proliferants.
• Advances in processing power, coupled with dramatic reductions in space, weight, and power consumption, allow information systems capabilities to be packaged in much smaller volumes.
• In many cases, the total cost per transportable information systems facility may be an order of magnitude less than the cost of a single precision-guided conventional weapon.

Due to these advances, the trend towards transportable IS facilities accelerated in the 1990's. Today, satellite terminals able to operate in military or civilian bands are encased in suitcases. COTS "office in suitcase" products incorporate multimedia telecommunications, position location, and rich varieties of distributed computing environment data processing functions.

Worldwide, many commercial telecommunications carriers inventory central office, tandem, and dual-function switches; cellular/PCS base-station; digital loop carrier (DLC); and other capabilities in transportable/mobile configurations. Alternatively, with broadband, fiber-optic transmission, traffic can be affordability back-hauled great distances to remotely restore damaged or otherwise failed switching, multiplexing, DLC, or other functions.

Because so many commercial enterprises now literally depend upon continuous telecommunications and data processing operations, and because downtimes of even 15 minutes can have catastrophic revenue and profit consequences, many businesses have elaborate internal or third-party, contract-based, disaster recovery IS capabilities.

All of the above IS technology capabilities are known to potential WMD proliferants and available on world markets. Thus, the possibility that WMD proliferants will be able to use transportable or mobile IS facilities to mount highly survivable offensives must be fully accounted for in planning by U.S. or allied forces.

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RATIONALE

The relevance of older military or commercial, high-technology, highly survivable IS facility capabilities in WMD warfare is evident from the above discussion.

Should a WMD proliferator possess only fixed IS and support facilities, U.S. and allied precision-guided and other conventional weapons can be effective. In future WMD and other conflicts, we may find that adversaries have deployed, or can deploy, transportable or mobile IS facilities. Ominously, in many cases the total cost per transportable IS facility may be an order of magnitude less than the costs of a single precision-guided conventional weapon needed to target and destroy such a facility.

Clearly, the wartime utility of high-technology, high-survivability IS Facility capabilities by WMD users must be fully understood by U.S. strategists and planners if effective countermeasures and counter-strike alternatives are to be available.

See Tables 2.6-1 and 2.6-2 for specific examples of pertinent IS Facility capabilities. Sections 3 (Biological Weapons Technology), 4 (Chemical Weapons Technology), and 5 (Nuclear Weapons Technology) present specific technologies that provide personal and shelter-based protection from chemical, biological and nuclear weapons effects, respectively. Note that survivable IS facilities are not required by proliferators with minimal WMD weapon inventories and capabilities, or those that perhaps would launch isolated WMD attacks.

FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

The last column in Figure 2.0-2 contains a foreign technology assessment by country and for subnational groups in the IS Facilities Functional Area. Countries with advanced Information Systems, and especially those defending against or planning large-scale, sustained WMD operations, need all of the IS Facilities Functional Area capabilities. Only nine of the 32 countries listed have capabilities in all of the technologies in this functional area.

Like the IM&C technologies, the IS Facilities Functional Area technologies are found among the world leaders in Information Systems: Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the United States. Denmark, Norway, Russia, and Sweden also have all IS Facilities Functional Area technologies. Several countries have limited IS Facilities Functional Area technologies: Iran, North Korea, and Poland. Iraq, Libya, Vietnam, and the subnationals also have limited capabilities in these technologies.

Proliferants committed to conducting large-scale and sustained WMD warfare need substantial IS Facilities Functional Area capabilities, particularly for operations requiring highly survivable transportable and mobile IS capabilities.

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Table 2.6-1. Information Systems Facilities Technology Parameters

• The dose rates are expressed in Système Internationale d'Unités (SI) metric units of radiation. The gray (Gy) is a unit of absorbed dose of ionizing radiation; one Gy is an absorbed dose of ionizing radiation equal to one joule per kilogram of absorber. The gray replaces the rad. One rad = 0.01 Gy.

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Table 2.6-2. Information Systems Facilities Reference Data

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SECTION III

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY

SECTION 3—BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY

Scope 3.1 Biological Material Production ........................................ II-3-9 3.2 Stabilization, Dissemination, and Dispersion ................... II-3-15 3.3 Detection, Warning, and Identification ........................... II-3-19 3.4 Biological Defense Systems ........................................... II-3-23

BACKGROUND

Biological agents are naturally occurring microorganisms (bacteria, viruses, fungi) or toxins that can cause disease and death in a target population. They can also attack the food supply and/or materiel of a nation. Biological weapons (BW) which project, disperse, or disseminate biological agents have two characteristics that enhance their effectiveness as weapons: (1) biological agents, other than toxins, reproduce and, therefore, a small amount of infectious agent can cause disease; (2) biological agents, other than toxins, usually require an incubation period of hours to days to manifest signs of exposure so the affected soldier is not certain whether a biological agent attack has occurred until illness sets in. The uncertainty can compromise unit cohesion and weaken U.S. force superiority.

The United States has forsworn the use of biological weapons and has developed a strategy of offensive strike power by other means, coupled with biological defense capability, as a suitable deterrent to potential adversaries. A nation, subnational group, or organization, or even an individual, determined to construct a biological weapon and release the agent can, with minimal financial resources and infrastructure, produce an effective weapon. Small amounts of biological material are sufficient because of the reproductive nature of microorganisms. The availability of small amounts of biological organisms, including those listed by the Australia Group (AG), in culture collections provides a major resource for such determined entities. All of these stocks are also available from natural sources, such as soil samples and infected rodents. In addition to naturally occurring organisms, genetically modified organisms may be used as biological agents. Some organisms exist primarily in repositories and may be used as biological agents (Variola Virus). It is estimated that between 10 and 10,000 virulent organisms of the AG agents are sufficient to cause illness in one individual. The number of organisms required is a function of the specific agent and the means of delivery. The delivery of a limited amount of a biological agent might be militarily significant if the agent is released in a contained environment (e.g., a closed building, submarine, or surface vessel).

Highlights

• Biological weapons are unique because they are made up of pathogenic organisms that can reproduce and cause infection (and death) in a large number of hosts.
• It takes hours to days for symptoms of exposure to appear.
• Biological weapons are relatively inexpensive to produce.
• All of the equipment used to produce biological agents is dual use, with applications in the pharmaceutical, food, cosmetic, and pesticide industries.
• Dissemination and dispersion are key to the effective employment of biological weapons.
• Many toxic organisms are subject to destruction by external forces (e.g., sunlight, explosives).

There are aspects that make biological weapons agents unique and different from all other weapon systems. Whereas a subnational group would be required to have a significant infrastructure to develop nuclear devices, it would be less complicated to make biological agents. Moreover, the biological agent could be a strategic and disorganizing threat because of its ability to reproduce and the delayed manifestation of symptoms. Those delivering BW could be protected by active or passive immunization or by well-designed protective masks to protect the respiratory system from aerosols, the primary delivery mechanism.

An additional concern is the relative low cost required for the production and the ease of deployment of biological agents by subnational groups and organizations for biomedical, pharmaceutical, and food production. All of the equipment used to produce biological agents is dual use.

Because biological agents reproduce, only small amounts of a starter organism are needed. The use of appropriate growth media or nutrients in a cell culture system of 100 liters, or of four passes through a 25-liter system, can generate sufficient agent to infect numerous targets in a contained area (e.g., subway, contained office building). Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) require the purchase of large amounts of precursor or of fissile material to achieve threat capability. The self-generation of the biological agent is a unique element of this WMD.

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Biologically derived toxins also present a threat. The recent apprehension in the United States of an individual citizen who produced large quantities of the toxin ricin is an example of the danger related to the production of toxin WMDs by small groups. As with other chemical agents, the toxins do not reproduce and, therefore, represent a threat that differs quantitatively from biological agents.

1. History of Biological Weapons

Crude forms of biological warfare have been employed since 300 B.C., when the decaying corpses of animals and humans were placed near water and food supplies of adversaries. Over the years, different diseases, including plague and smallpox, were used as the agent. Catapults were one vehicle for introduction of the infected tissue. Other vehicles, including blankets, have been employed to transmit smallpox to a target population.

World War I saw the development of biological warfare strategies. Cholera and plague were thought to be used in Italy and Russia while anthrax was presumably used to infect animals in Romania. A consequence of such events was the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare—known as the Geneva Protocol. This protocol banned the use of biological agents in warfare but not research, development, production, or stockpiling of such agents.

With the advent of World War II, rapid developments occurred in biological warfare capability in the United States and other nations. In February 1942, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences established a Biological Warfare Committee, chaired by Edwin B. Fred of the University of Wisconsin. The administration of the biological warfare effort was placed under civilian supervision: Dr. George Merck directed the advisory group, and Ira Baldwin of the University of Wisconsin became the scientific director. In 1943, Fort Detrick, Maryland, became the site of these activities, as Camp Detrick. In Canada, Sir Fredrick Banting, Dr. J.R. Collys, and Dr. Charles Best led the biological warfare capability effort.

The technologies examined at Fort Detrick included pathogen identification, modes of transmission, infection, detection, public health measures, containment, rapid drying of organisms, and packing for delivery. In 1969, President Nixon stated that the U.S. unilaterally renounced biological warfare. Biological weapon stockpiles and their associated munitions were destroyed following the preparation of an environmental impact statement and review by both federal and state authorities and the public. Low targeting capability, the potential for catastrophic outcome on civilian populations, and public antipathy to biological weaponry were factors in the renunciation of biological warfare. In 1972, there was international agreement to the Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction [Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)]. Concern over USSR compliance with the Convention arose with the sudden outbreak of anthrax cases in Sverdlovsk (now Ekaterinenberg) in 1979.

The early 1980's saw renewed discussion of the utility of biological weapons as strategic weapons. For example, information became publicly available concerning studies of biological agents in Japan and the studies on the effects of infectious agents on human subjects in Harbin, Manchuria, during World War II. The number of infectious agents used on human populations was about 25 (e.g., plague, typhus, smallpox, tularemia, gas gangrene, tetanus, cholera, anthrax, tick encephalitis). In 1941, the Japanese deployed plague-infected fleas in Hunan Province, resulting in the death of several hundred persons. The difficulty encountered by the Japanese was the development of an effective delivery system.

In recent years, newly emerging infectious diseases have complicated the picture. They include AIDS, prion disorders, and several hemorrhagic fevers such as Ebola. These diseases and the possible reduction in immunocompetence have fostered an increased role of the United States and international agencies in monitoring disease outbreaks. Several federal agencies in the United States are responsible for the health and protection of the population, including military personnel, from infectious diseases. The civilian agencies include the National Institutes entities that address health care issues of primary importance to the defense community: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), and the Naval Medical Research Units.

2. Recent Developments Affecting Biological Warfare Capability

The introduction of modern biotechnology during the past 25 years has markedly changed the qualitative and quantitative impact that biological warfare, or the threat of such warfare, can have on military forces and urban communities. This new technology provides the potential capability of (1) developing biological agents that have increased virulence and stability after deployment; (2) targeting the delivery of organisms to populations; (3) protecting personnel against biological agents; (4) producing, by genetic modification, pathogenic organisms from non-pathogenic strains to complicate detection of a biological agent; (5) modifying the immune response system of the target population to increase or decrease susceptibility to pathogens; and (6) producing sensors based on the detection of unique signature molecules on the surface of biological agents or on the interaction of the genetic materials in such organisms with gene probes. The specific technologies used in realizing these capabilities include (1) cell culture or fermentation; (2) organism selection; (3) encapsulation and coating with straight or crosslinked biopolymers; (4) genetic engineering; (5) active or passive immunization or treatment with biological response modifiers; (6) monoclonal antibody production; (7) genome data bases, polymerase chain reaction equipment, DNA sequencers, and the rapid production of gene probes; and (8) the capability of linking gene probes and monoclonal antibodies on addressable sites in a reproducible manner.

New technologies related to biological warfare are emerging rapidly. The technology of monoclonal antibody production has existed only since 1975, while the technology of genetic engineering has existed since the 1980's. Technology for

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sequencing the genomes of organisms has changed so dramatically that the rate of sequencing has increased by several orders of magnitude since 1994. All of these reflect the enormous change in information databases and in technology including biotechnology, computer equipment, processes, and networking of research teams. Information that will emerge from the human genome effort is likely to increase our understanding of the susceptibilities of different populations to disease and stresses of various sources. Such information may increase the proliferation of BW agents, particularly in areas with active ethnic rivalries, and lead to a new variant of ethnic cleansing.

The rapid rate of development reflects to some degree the national and international investment in this technology. The level of federal spending in the United States in the entire biotechnology area during 1994 approximated 4 billion dollars. The private sector invested approximately 7 billion dollars during the same year. This investment and the rate of information accrual indicates that biological technology that can be used for peaceful and military purposes is increasing in capability at a rate exceeding most other technologies. The pharmaceutical industry is relying on biotechnology for new therapeutic products to improve prophylaxis and therapy for many different diseases and is concerned that these new technologies not fall into the hands of potential adversaries.

Figure 3.0-1 portrays graphically the explosive growth of applicable biotechnologies. The illustration was prepared from a broad field of knowledge and applications, which, in aggregate, are doubling every 18 months. Examples of sustained geometric growth include monoclonal antibodies, combinatorial chemistry, and gene probes, which are explained below.

• Monoclonal Antibodies - In the early 1970's, Kohler and Milstein developed a procedure to produce antibodies for a single antigenic epitope. An epitope is the region of a molecule that initiates the production of a single antibody species. The dimensions of an epitope approximate a surface area 50 x 50 Angstroms. These antibodies are called monoclonal antibodies. With quality control, these antibodies can be produced in gram quantities in a highly reproducible manner, and therefore, they are suited for industrial uses. The industries currently using monoclonal antibodies include medical diagnostics, food, environmental protection, and cosmetics.

• Combinatorial Chemistry - This is a technique for rapidly synthesizing large numbers of peptides, polynucleotides, or other low molecular weight materials. These materials are synthesized on a solid-state matrix and in an addressable form so that materials of known sequence can be accessed readily. The materials can function as receptors, pharmaceuticals, or sensor elements. The technique, developed by Merrifield in the 1970's, has been essential for the growth of combinatorial chemistry.

• Gene Probes - These are polynucleotides that are 20–30 units bend, under stringent conditions, complementary nucleic acid fragments characteristic of biological agents. These units provide the basis of rapid detection and identification.

OVERVIEW

This section of the MCTL is concerned with technologies related to the development, integration and deployment of biological weapons . The infectious organisms discussed are those identified by the AG (see Figure 3.0-2). The AG list does not include every known organism that could be used in a biological weapon. Toxins will be considered in the biological weapons section consistent with the AG and the BWC of 1972. Several aspects of biological warfare will be covered: (1) the identity of the biological organism or toxins; (2) equipment and materials necessary for the production, containment, purification, quality control, and stabilization of these agents; (3) the technologies for the dissemination and dispersion of biological agents; (4) equipment for detection, warning, and identification of biological agents; and (5) individual and collective biological defense systems.

RATIONALE

Biological weapons are unique because the effects from pathogenic organisms, except toxins, are not seen for hours to days after dissemination. If adequate detection devices are not available, the first indication of a biological weapon attack could be symptoms in target personnel. At this point, treatment propylaxis and therapy is often ineffective. In addition, incapacitated troops require tremendous logistical support (four or five medical corpsmen and associated personnel for each ill person); thus, incapacitants may be preferable to lethal agents. Also, besides deaths caused by infectious agents, the psychophysical damage suffered by troops who believe they have been exposed to a biological attack could markedly impair combat functions. The perception is almost as significant as the reality. The affected soldier is not certain whether a biological attack has occurred and could be psychologically, if not physically, impaired.

The biological technology industry is information intensive rather than capital intensive. Data on technologies involved in biological production are widely available in the published literature. These technologies are dual use, with applications in the pharmaceutical, food, cosmetic, and pesticide industries. New technologies, such as genetic engineering, are more likely to affect fabrication, weaponization, or difficulty of detection than to produce a “supergerm” of significantly increased pathogenicity.

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(Height of line indicates rate of development—time to double) 5 yr 1 yr 6 Months (Arrows show enabling technologies) 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Uses Solid State Peptide and Nucleic Acid Synthesis 1970 Pathogen Masking Detection Vaccines Nucleic Acid Probes Sensors Personal Protection Vaccines Pathogen Masking Monoclonal Antibodies 1972 Chimeric Monoclonal Antibodies Sensors 1984 Multiarray Biopathogen Detector DNA Engineering 1982 Sensors, Human Genome, Pathogen, Soldier Selection, Active Protection Pathogen Efficacy 1992 Robust Toxicant or Pathogen Human Genome Project 1989 Disease susceptibility Stress Susceptibility Toxicant Resistance Encapsulation and Stabilization Personal Protection Therapeutics Antibiotics Treatment Bioactive Peptides Enhance Human Perform- ance and Protection Cell Growth Chambers/Fermenters Pathogen Masking Detection 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Figure 3.0-1. Progress in Applicable Biotechnologies II-3-4

**Viruses**
V1. Chikungunya virus
V2. Congo-Crimean haemorrhagic fever virus
V3. Dengue fever virus
V4. Eastern equine encephalitis virus
V5. Ebola virus
V6. Hantaan virus
V7. Junin virus
V8. Lassa fever virus
V9. Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus
V10. Machupo virus
V11. Marburg virus
V12. Monkey pox virus
V13. Rift Valley fever virus
V14. Tick-borne encephalitis virus
(Russian spring-summer encephalitis virus)
V15. Variola virus
V16. Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus
V17. Western equine encephalitis virus
V18. White pox
V19. Yellow fever virus
V20. Japanese encephalitis virus

**Bacteria**
B1. Bacillus anthracis
B2. Brucella abortus
B3. Brucella melitensis
B4. Brucella suis
B5. Chlamydia psittaci
B6. Clostridium botulinum
B7. Francisella tularensis
B8. Burkholderia mallei (pseudomonas mallei)
B9. Burkholderia pseudomallei (pseudomonas
pseudomallei)
B10. Salmonella typhi
B11. Shigella dysenteriae
B11. Vibrio cholerae
B13. Yersinia pestis

**Toxins**
T1. Botulinum toxins
T2. Clostridium perfringens toxins
T3. Conotoxin
T4. Ricin
T5. Saxitoxin
T6. Shiga toxin
T7. Staphylococcus aureus toxins
T8. Tetrodotoxin
T9. Verotoxin
T10. Microcystin (Cyanginosin)
T11. Aflatoxins

**Rickettsiae**
R1. Coxiella burnetti
R2. Bartonella quintana (Rochlimea quintana,
Rickettsia quintana)
R3. Rickettsia prowasecki
R4. Rickettsia rickettsii

**Genetically Modified Microorganisms**
G1. Genetically modified microorganisms or
genetic elements that contain nucleic acid
sequences associated with pathogenicity and
are derived from organisms in the core list.
G2. Genetically modified microorganisms or
genetic elements that contain nucleic acid
sequences coding for any of the toxins in the
core list or their subunits.

**Viruses (Warning List)**
WV1. Kyasanur Forest virus
WV2. Louping ill virus
WV3. Murray Valley encephalitis virus
WV4. Omsk haemorrhagic fever virus
WV5. Oropouche virus
WV6. Powassan virus
WV7. Rocio virus
WV8. St Louis encephalitis virus

**Bacteria (Warning List)**
WB1. Clostridium perfringens
WB2. Clostridium tetani
WB3. Enterohaemorrhagic Escherichia coli,
serotype 0157 and other verotoxin-
producing serotypes
WB4. Legionella pneumophila
WB5. Yersinia pseudotuberculosis

(cont'd)

Figure 3.0-2. Australia Group Biological Agents

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Genetically Modified Microorganisms

WG1. Genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with pathogenicity and are derived from organisms in the warning list. WG2. Genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for any of the toxins in the warning list or their subunits.

Toxins (Warning List)

WT1. Abrin WT2. Cholera toxin WT3. Tetanus toxin WT4. Trichothecene mycotoxins WT5. Modecin WT6. Volkensin WT7. Viscum Album Lectin 1 (Viscumin)

Animal Pathogens

Viruses: AV1. African swine fever virus AV2. Avian influenza virus AV3. Bluetongue virus AV4. Foot and mouth disease virus AV5. Goat pox virus AV6. Herpes virus (Aujeszky's disease) AV7. Hog cholera virus (synonym: Swine fever virus) AV8. Lyssa virus AV9. Newcastle disease virus AV10. Peste des petits ruminants virus

Animal Pathogens (cont'd)

Viruses (cont'd): AV11. Porcine enterovirus type 9 (synonym: Swine vesicular disease virus) AV12. Rinderpest virus AV13. Sheep pox virus AV14. Teschen disease virus AV15. Vesicular stomatitis virus

Bacteria: AB3. Mycoplasma mycoides

Genetically Modified Microorganisms: AG1. Genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with pathogenicity and are derived from animal pathogens on the list.

Plant Pathogens

Bacteria: PB1. Xanthomonas albilineans PB2. Xanthomonas campestris pv. citri

Fungi: PF1. Colletotrichum coffeanum var. virulans (Colletotrichum kanawae) PF2. Cochliobolus miyabeanus (Helminthosporium oryzae) PF3. Microcyclus ulei (syn. Dothidella ulei) PF4. Puccinia graminis (syn. Puccinnia graminis f. sp. tritici)

Plant Pathogens (cont'd)

Fungi (cont'd): PF5. Puccinia striiformis (syn. Pucciniaglumarum) PF6. Pyricularia grisea/Pyricularia oryzae

Genetically Modified Microorganisms: PG1. Genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with pathogenicity derived from the plant pathogens on the list.

Awareness Raising Guidelines

Bacteria: PWB1. Xanthomonas campestris pv. oryzae PWB2. Xylella fastidiosa

Fungi: PWF1. Deuterophoma tracheiphila (syn. Phoma tracheiphila) PWF2. Monilia rorei (syn. Moniliophthora rorei)

Viruses: PWV1. Banana bunchy top virus

Genetically Modified Microorganisms: PWG1. Genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with pathogenicity derived from the plant pathogens identified on the awareness raising list.

Figure 3.0-2. Australia Group Biological Agents (cont'd)

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While laboratory-scale capability for production of biological agents is sufficient for achieving most terrorist purposes, large-scale production for military purposes can be achieved easily in dual-use facilities. All of the equipment needed for large-scale production of offensive biological agents is dual use and available on the international market. Although a typical vaccine plant costs in excess of $50 million, a less elaborate fermentation plant that could produce biological agents could be built for less than $10 million.

If disseminated properly, only a small amount of biological agent is needed to infect numerous people. Proper dissemination, however, is a non-trivial problem because the agent must be dispersed in 1 to 10 micron particles and be inhaled by the target population. Symptoms normally take hours to days to appear. Detection is key to implementation of protective measures. Since biological organisms are living, they have the potential to reproduce. They can continue to affect people for extended periods of time. However, they are subject to being negated by sunlight and the environment, but most can be effectively stabilized against adverse environmental effects. Stress from explosive dissemination and/or missile firing can reduce efficiency to about the 5-percent level, which is why aerosol dissemination by pressurized gases was adopted by munition designers in the old U.S. program. Dissemination efficiencies of up to 70 percent were achieved, with 30 to 50 percent being produced routinely. Vaccines can be produced to defend against biological agent use; however, to produce the vaccine, the organism being employed by an adversary must be known.

Although some of the proliferation concerns for biological weapons are similar to those for other WMD, some concerns are unique. The unique features include containment of the agent during production, stabilization and dispersion of the agents, detection, identification, and warning. All these aspects are important because biological agents are relatively easy to hide. The diffusion of information, technologies, and raw materials associated with biological and pharmaceutical processing are almost always dual use and, therefore, raise non-proliferation issues.

Because of the low financial costs of acquiring equipment for biological agent production, the implications for the proliferation of production and dispersion are clear: developing nations can attack targets effectively with biological agents. Defensive technologies are of interest because changes in vaccine production or other self-protection measures could presage an offensive attack. Stabilization and dispersion are proliferation concerns because these technologies increase the efficacy of biological agents. Detection, identification, and warning technologies can be used to support efforts to mask the presence of biological agents even though these technologies do not pose a direct threat.

FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 3.0-3)

Most industrialized nations manufacture equipment and materials that can be used for the production, containment, purification, quality control, and stabilization of biological agents and for their dissemination and dispersion. Most developed nations manufacture the equipment for identifying these agents, but the means for detection and warning are less readily available. All these technologies are dual use, with applications in the pharmaceutical, food, cosmetic, and pesticide industries. The AG group of biological agents are readily available in the natural environment and from culture collections in the industrialized and in some developing nations. The recent outbreaks of Ebola in Africa and Hanta (Hantaan) virus infections in Asia and North and South America are evidence of occurrence in the natural environment. In addition, these organisms can be obtained from national collections [e.g., American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) and European collection]. The ATCC and European collections do not necessarily share information.

Many collections of organisms recognized as potential biological agents and included in the AG list exist throughout the world and are made available with minimal monitoring of use or transport. This is particularly the case in the open societies of the United States, Europe, and Japan, as was documented in 1995 by a case occurring in Ohio. The nutrients, growth media, and small-size fermenters are readily available.

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| Country | Sec 3.1 Biological Material Production | Sec 3.2 Stabilization, Dispersion and Weapons Testing | Sec 3.3 Detection, Warning, and Identification | Sec 3.4 Biological Defense Systems |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Australia¹ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Austria¹ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Belgium¹ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Brazil | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦ |
| Bulgaria | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Canada¹ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| China | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Cuba | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ |
| Czech Republic¹ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Denmark¹ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ |
| Egypt | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ |
| Finland¹ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| France¹ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Germany¹ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Greece¹ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ |
| Hungary¹ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| India | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Iran | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ |
| Iraq | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ |
| Israel | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Italy¹ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Japan¹ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Korea (North) | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Korea (South)¹ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Libya | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ |
| Netherlands¹ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Norway¹ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Pakistan | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Poland¹ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Romania¹ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Russia | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Slovak Republic¹ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| South Africa | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Spain¹ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦ | ♦ |
| Sweden¹ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Switzerland¹ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Syria | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦ |
| Turkey | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | | |
| Ukraine | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| United Kingdom¹ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| United States¹ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |

¹ Indicates that the nation is a member of the Australia Group (AG).

Legend: Sufficient Technologies Capabilities:
♦♦♦♦ exceeds sufficient level
♦♦♦ sufficient level
♦♦ some
♦ limited

Because two or more countries have the same number of diamonds does not mean that their capabilities are the same. An absence of diamonds in countries of concern may indicate an absence of information, not of capability. The absence of a country from this list may indicate an absence of information, not capability.

Figure 3.0-3. Biological Weapons Foreign Technology Assessment Summary

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SECTION 3.1—BIOLOGICAL MATERIAL PRODUCTION

OVERVIEW

The previous section addressed the various organisms that might be selected for production (The AG Biological Agents). This section addresses the production of the organisms, including procedures such as culture, fermentation, viral reproduction, etc.; the stabilization of the organisms; and specific equipment used in the manufacturing process.

The stages involved in the production of biological agents include selection of the organisms, large-scale production of organisms from small starter cultures, and stabilization of the organisms. The list of biological organisms and toxin products that are of concern as biological agents is derived from the AG consensus.

The design of a production facility provides important information regarding whether the facility is intended to produce pharmaceutical grade products or biological weapon grade materials. Relevant design elements include containment, purification equipment, sterilization equipment, and ventilation and filtration systems.

The design of a biochemical processing plant is an important signal of covert biological agent production. Containment of the biological material during processing is of special interest. There is a clear distinction between processing materials for biological or toxin agent weaponization and processing protective agents to be used for countermeasures or personnel performance enhancement. For the production of biological agents for offensive military activities, the processing containment requirement is to protect the environment from the agent because of its infectious nature. For the production of biomaterials, such as vaccines, biological response modifiers, antibiotics, and anti viral agents, for defensive military activities, the containment requirement is to protect the processed biomaterial from contaminating materials in the environment. Effectiveness of countermeasures is enhanced by achieving high levels of purity and cleanliness in the product before it is administered to friendly personnel. By contrast, an unpurified biological agent that will be used in BW is generally more stable than the purified agent that is needed to produce vaccines and biological response modifiers (BRMs). Consequently, a proliferant does not require a high level of purity if production is for BW use only.

Generation of biological agents requires fermenters or single cell production capabilities with operational conditions identified in the MCTL, including smooth, highly polished stainless steel surfaces, self-containment capability, and negative pressure conditions. The primary difference between the production requirements for biological weapons and non-military commercial purposes lies in containment and contamination. During biological agent production, efforts are generally made to avoid contaminating the environment with the organism. Less concern arises about the

Highlights

• Biological weapon production is similar to commercial production of biological materials.
• With the exception of toxins, biological organisms can multiply.
• Containment of the organisms is critical.
• Design of the plant can indicate covert biological agent production.

contamination of the product. Conversely, the pharmaceutical, brewing, and biotechnology industries are most concerned about protecting the purity and quality of the product. This concern is reflected in the nature of the sealing joints, positive or negative pressure chambers, and containment of venting systems.

Utilities involving clean steam, sterile air, and inert gas supply are most critical for containment in the processing of biologically based materials for human use, which must meet good manufacturing practices (GMP). Clean steam, generated from a purified water supply, must be supplied to all processing equipment having direct contact with the product to ensure sterility and prevent the influx of environmental contaminants. Steam sterilization is accomplished before product processing by direct supply to the equipment. Steam is supplied to the equipment seals (e.g., sample ports, agitator shafts, raw material addition ports) during processing as a primary barrier. Equally important is the removal of collapsed steam or condensate formed on the equipment. This prevents the formation of pockets of standing water, which promote bacterial growth, and maintains the high temperature necessary for sterilization. The collected contaminated condensate can be channeled to an area for final sterilization or inactivation before it is released into the environment. Efficient steam supply and condensate removal requires pressure regulators, pressure relief devices, venting, and the capability for free draining of all lines.

Supplying sterile, inert gases to processing equipment is a method of containment. This can protect oxygen-sensitive biomaterials and prevent aerosol generation of toxic products. Inert gases, such as nitrogen, helium, and argon, are usually supplied directly to processing equipment through sterile, in-line filters, maintaining a pressurized system or providing an inert blanket over the product in processing vessels.

To attain a higher level of containment, many bioprocessing industries have employed greater degrees of automation. Potential contamination of purified product, human exposure to toxic products or constituents, and the risk of human error are

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minimized. Processing facilities make use of state-of-the-art computerized distributed control systems (ABB, Modicon, Allen Bradley Corp.), which allow automatic control, control from remote locations, and automatic data logging and trending. Another component in bioprocessing is the design of ventilation within the primary and secondary barriers of a process area. Ventilation at primary barriers (i.e., barriers separating product from equipment operators and the rest of the processing area) is accomplished with dedicated, in-line air/gas membrane filters. Ventilation across secondary barriers requires more complicated air handling system design to allow for the maintenance of clean areas (rated by the number of particles per volume of air) and maintenance of positive or negative pressure between the processing area and the outside environment or between different processing areas in the same facility. Equipment used in these designs includes high efficiency fans and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. The procedure used for the actual replication of an organism is a function of the organism itself. Tables 3.1-1 and 3.1-2 include several techniques, including cell culture, fermentation, viral replication, recombinant DNA, and powdering and milling. Cell culture is necessary for the reproduction of pathogenic viruses and Rickettsiae since they will not reproduce outside a living cell (e.g., chick embryo or tissue cultures). Single cell growth chambers, including fermentation, are used for the production of bacteria and bacterial toxins, although some bacteria (e.g., plague bacteria) can also be cultivated in living animals. Recombinant DNA techniques are a preferred method to produce rare animal toxins. Because of the complexity of this technique, the capability is not as widespread as the others. Powdering and milling is the technique generally used to produce BW and toxin weapons (TW) agent particles having diameters less than or equal to 10 µm, the size most effective for respiratory delivery. RATIONALE Figure 3.0-2 lists the naturally occurring pathogens and toxins potentially used as BW agents. Whereas the majority of these agents have no current dual-use applications, a small number do have biomedical roles other than those in vaccine production. The highly toxic botulinal toxin A, produced by Clostridium botulinum, shows medicinal promise in blocking involuntary muscle spasms or weakening a muscle for therapeutic purposes. Five medical uses of toxins that might be used in BW have been approved by the Food and Drug Administration. Immune protection against these agents is important because they occur naturally in some regions of the world. Toxins and pathogens that affect animals, such as anthrax, brucella, plague, and tularemia, are widespread. Vaccines are widely produced and administered. The issue of the need for the same toxic agent for either BW/TW production or countermeasure vaccine production emphasizes the dual-use nature of the technologies. Indeed, initial processing of agents and processing of their associated vaccines only differ by a few steps (e.g., the degree of purification and the type of containment used).

The qualitative and quantitative impact of biological warfare, or the threat of such warfare, on military forces and urban communities has changed markedly in the past 20 years. The production techniques described in this section have resulted in more virulent strains of organisms and the genetic modification of non-pathogenic organisms to pathogenic strains with virulent characteristics. The implications of genetic engineering for chemical and biological warfare are far-reaching. Genetic engineering provides the potential for improved virulence by the incorporation of genes (i.e., specific strands of DNA) permitting increased production of a pathogen or toxin. Thus, as much as 100 times more pathogen or toxin could be produced per cell than that which could be produced by naturally occurring strains. Cells that normally do not produce toxins may be altered to produce toxins for biological weapon development. Conversely, known pathogens or toxins may be genetically inactivated for vaccine countermeasure development. Cells can also be modified to produce antibodies directly for passive immunization against specific infectious agents. As with the human immune system, many current biowarfare detection kits depend on antibodies reacting with the antigenic surface coatings of pathogenic bacteria or viruses. Thus, modified non-pathogens can be used to mask the agent from the immune-based detector and, potentially, from the human immune system itself to increase the agent's effectiveness. General robustness or survivability of a pathogen under the environmental stresses of temperature, ultraviolet (UV) radiation, and desiccation (drying) can also be genetically improved to promote stability during dissemination; nutrient additives are used to enhance survival of selected biological agents in aerosols. Controlled persistence of a pathogen to permit survivability under specified environmental conditions may eventually be possible. The potential also exists for the development of so-called "conditional suicide genes," which could program an organism to die off following a predetermined number of replications in the environment. Thus, an affected area may be safely reoccupied after a predetermined period of time. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 3.0-2) Seed stocks of the AG group of biological agents are readily available in the natural environment and from culture collections in the industrialized and in some developing nations. The recent outbreaks of Ebola in Africa and Hanta virus infections in Asia and North and South America are evidence of this. In addition, these organisms may be obtained from national collections (e.g., American Type Culture Collection [ATCC] and European collections). Most industrialized nations manufacture equipment and materials necessary for the production, containment, purification, and quality control of these materials. Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, the Ukraine, the UK, and the United States are the most advanced countries in the techniques of manufacturing large quantities of biological agents and protective vaccines and materials required for prophylaxis and therapy.

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Table 3.1-1. Biological Material Production Technology Parameters

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Table 3.1-1. Biological Material Production Technology Parameters (cont'd)

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Table 3.1-2. Biological Material Production Reference Data

Note: The United States has forsworn the use of biological weapons; however, to perfect defensive procedures, it is necessary to understand the organisms.

(cont'd)

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Table 3.1-2. Biological Material Production Reference Data (cont'd)

Note: The United States has forsworn the use of biological weapons; however, to perfect defensive procedures and intelligence-gathering procedures, it is necessary to understand the manufacturing procedures for these organisms.

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SECTION 3.2—STABILIZATION, DISSEMINATION, AND DISPERSION

OVERVIEW Biological weapons production can be divided into three distinct phases: biological agent production (see Section 3.1), stabilization, and dissemination/dispersion. This section discusses the latter two parts. Stabilization and dissemination/dispersion are important issues because of the susceptibility of the biological agents to environmental degradation, not only in storage but also in application. This is a problem whether the end use is for biological weapons, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, pesticides, or food-related purposes and is related to the susceptibility of the organisms to inactivation of the biochemical compound by the environment. This loss of bioactivity can result from exposure to high physical and chemical stress environments, such as high surface area at air-water interfaces (frothing), extreme temperatures or pressures, high salt concentrations, dilution, or exposure to specific inactivating agents.

This section discusses various techniques of stabilization, such as freeze drying and ultra freezing, and various techniques of dissemination/dispersion, such as spray devices, cluster bombs, etc. Section 1 of this document discusses modes of delivery, such as cruise missiles, airplanes, and artillery shells .

The primary means of stabilization for storage or packaging are initial concentration; direct freeze drying (lyophilization); direct spray drying; formulation into a special stabilizing solid, liquid, or sometimes gaseous solution; and deep freezing. Methods of concentration include vacuum filtration, ultrafiltration, precipitation, and centrifugation. Freeze drying is the preferred method for long-term storage of bacterial cultures because freeze-dried cultures can be easily rehydrated and cultured via conventional means. Many freeze-dried cultures have remained viable for 30 years or more.

Deep or ultra freezing of biological products is another long-term storage technique for species and materials not amenable to freeze drying. The method involves storage of the contained products in liquid nitrogen refrigerators (–196° Celsius) or ultra-low temperature mechanical freezers (–70° Celsius). Mechanical freezing systems should include precautionary back-up freezers and electrical generators. Cryoprotective agents, such as dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO), glycerol, sucrose, lactose, glucose, mannitol, sorbitol, dextran, polyvinylpyrrolidone, and polyglycol, are required to ensure cell viability during storage. A toxin agent is most effective when prepared as a freeze-dried powder and encapsulated. Such encapsulation, however, is not necessary for weaponization. Infectious biological agents are generally stabilized and then spray dried.

Effective delivery of these agents must also consider the environmental effects on the agent (inactivation). Dissemination (delivery) of biological agents in biological

Highlights

• Stabilization is critical to effective dissemination.
• The environment can affect the survival of the organism.
• Explosive delivery means can result in inactivation of the organism.

warfare has been traditionally accomplished by aerosol dispersal using either spray devices or through incorporation of the agents with explosive devices (cluster bombs, missile warheads with submunitions designed for extended biological agent dispersal). The latter, however, must be approached with caution since explosive, heat-generating entities can inactivate the organisms/toxins. The preferred approach is dispersion via the use of a pressurized gas in a submunition. Other preferred platforms from an efficiency standpoint include small rotary-wing vehicles, fixed-wing aircraft fitted with spray tanks, drones, bomblets, cruise missiles, and high-speed missiles with bomblet warheads. Fixed-wing aircraft and ground vehicles with aerosol generators also make excellent delivery systems.

Aerosolization of biological agents using spray devices is the method of choice since the extreme physical conditions associated with explosive dissemination can completely inactivate the biological agent. (Aerosol dispersal allows for control of particle size and density to maximize protection from environmental degradation and uptake of the enclosed biological agents in the lungs of targeted populations.) Aerosol particles with a diameter of 1–15 µm mass median diameter (MMD) are readily absorbed by lung cells following inhalation, the primary mode of infection by most biological agents. Some agents can also act following ingestion of contaminated food or water. However, infectious agents generally do not penetrate intact skin. Equipment used with aerosol dispersal of biological agents includes spray nozzles or aerosol delivery systems capable of dispersing particles or droplets and compressors for initial weaponization by agent integration with compressed gas (air). For subnational or terrorist groups, the biological agents can be dispersed by manual aerosol generators. The availability of vaccines against selected biological agents may render the user immune to the effects of the agent although a sufficient dose of agent may overwhelm the vaccine’s protective effect.

Dissemination efficiency rates of aerosol delivery systems are in the range of 40–60 percent. Cruise missiles, aircraft carrying gravity bombs or spray attachments,

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and fixed-wing or rotor craft with attached sprayers are all vehicles for delivery of biological agents. The delivery of biological agents by explosive devices is much less efficient (~1–5 percent).

In a theater environment, the effective use of BW agents requires analysis of meteorological conditions and the mapping of the target.

RATIONALE

Biological agents have some unique characteristics that make weaponizing them attractive. Most biological weapons consist of living organisms (toxins are the exception) and, thus, can replicate once disseminated. A relatively small group of persons, using single individuals deployed in a military staging area, could bring about the infection of a large percentage of targeted persons. The clinical illness could develop within a day of dispersal and last for as long as 2–3 weeks. The mission and political impact of such a strike on a combat or constabulary force of 10,000 soldiers may compromise operations. In a civil situation, major subway systems in a densely populated urban area could be targeted for biological agent strike, resulting in massive political and social disorganization. Approximately 10 grams of anthrax spores can kill as many persons as a ton of sarin. Under appropriate meteorological conditions and with an aerosol generator delivering 1–10 micron particle-size droplets, a single aircraft can disperse 100 kg of anthrax over a 300 km² area and theoretically cause 3 million deaths in a population density of 10,000 people per km². The mean lethal inhalator dosage is 10 nanograms.

On the other hand, some biological agent characteristics can severely limit the effectiveness of BW, which consist of living organisms. A technique to stabilize (protect) the organisms from adverse environments is essential if the weapons are to maintain their effectiveness over some period of time. This requirement of stabilization also extends to the methods of delivery since the organisms are very susceptible to degradation in the environments associated with delivery systems.

FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 3.0-3)

Any country having pharmaceutical, cosmetic, or advanced food storage industries will have stabilization facilities similar to those that could be used for biological weapons. The ability to disseminate the biological agent over a wide area would be limited to those countries having cruise missiles or advanced aircraft. Even the smallest country or a terrorist group, however, has the capability to deliver small quantities of BW agent to a specific target. Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, the UK, and the United States have the most advanced techniques of manufacturing large quantities of biological agent and are also the most apt to have the capability to disseminate the biological agent over large areas.

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Table 3.2-1. Stabilization, Dissemination, and Dispersion Technology Parameters

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Table 3.2-2. Stabilization, Dissemination, and Dispersion Reference Data

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SECTION 3.3—DETECTION, WARNING, AND IDENTIFICATION

OVERVIEW

Detection, warning, and identification involve sensors and transduction of a detected signal to a transponder. Standoff detectors provide early, wide-area spectroscope and warning of biological agent attack. Stand-off detectors are spectroscope-based monitors of materials containing nucleic acid/protein with absorbance in the 230–285 nanometer range. They can be confounded by biological material or pollen of size similar to that of the biological agent. Point detectors are used at designated locations. Most detection and warning systems are based on physical or chemical properties of biological agents. The point detectors include dipstick kits selective for some but not all AG agents (see Table 3.0-2) or multiarray sensors using antibodies generated against AG agents or gene sequences complementary to AG agents. Identification systems, which are critical to medical response, use immunochemical or gene probe techniques or mass spectral analysis. No single sensor detects all agents of interest. Detectors for biological agents must have a short response time (less than 30 minutes for biological agents) with a low false alarm rate. Detection equipment must be integrated with a command and control system to ensure an alarm is raised. Early warning is essential to avoid contamination. Agent location, intensity, and duration are crucial parameters for command decisions.

Sensor systems based on physical or chemical properties of biological agents include high-performance liquid and gas chromatography, mass spectrometry, scattering Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR), and ion mobility spectrometry (IMS). The basic recognition component of the sensor designed for a specific agent is generally a large molecule that binds selectively to the target agent. The recognition molecules are physically bound to a supporting surface that generates a signal (transduction) when the recognition molecule binds the biological agent. The methods for transduction include (1) changes in absorption of light at specific wavelengths; (2) changes in resonating frequency of a piezoelectrically active surface caused by mass effects; (3) changes in pathways of light movement at an interface of target agent and recognition molecules; and (4) switching of a light-conducting pathway resulting from interaction of recognition molecule with the biological agent. Recognition molecules are antibodies (association constants of 10⁻⁶ to 10⁻⁸), receptors (dissociation constant, KD, KD = <10⁻¹⁴), or DNA sequences complementary to genetic material encoded by the biological agent.

Highlights

• Reliable, quick-response sensor systems are essential for detection and warning.
• Identification is critical to medical response.
• Various physical phenomena are used to convert sensor signals to useful detection and identification information.
• Underlying sensor technology exists in many countries.

Biodetection systems providing limited warning and identification functions currently exist. Systems in the inventory or in the advanced stages of development warn that a biological attack has occurred and collect samples for subsequent laboratory analysis. However, no real-time, on-site detection systems are available today. The rapid growth in biotechnology is assisting in the area of improved biological defense technologies, although many of the same advances can also be used to improve biological agents.

RATIONALE

Early detection and warning is the first line of defense against biological agents. Detection and identification of biological agents allow commanders to take steps to avoid contamination, to determine the appropriate protection for continued operations, and to initiate proper prophylaxis and therapy to minimize casualties and performance degradation.

FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 3.0-3)

Besides the United States, several countries have a significant capability in the sensor technology that underlies detection and identification of biological agents: Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, The Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, and the UK. Several other countries are just a step behind: Austria, China, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Switzerland, and the Ukraine. The worldwide efforts to develop improved biological agent detectors are extensive.

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Table 3.3-1. Detection, Warning, and Identification Technology Parameters

(cont'd)

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Table 3.3-1. Detection, Warning, and Identification Technology Parameters (cont'd)

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Table 3.3-2. Detection, Warning, and Identification Reference Data

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SECTION 3.4—BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS

OVERVIEW

This section covers measures that can be taken to protect forces in a biological weapons environment. The protection and countermeasures issues related to biological warfare and defense concern the individual soldier and the unit.

The individual soldier can be protected by providing prophylactic treatment before deployment into a risk area, by providing full respiratory protection during time periods of potential exposure [Mission-Oriented Protection Posture (MOPP) gear] to the biological agent, or by using pharmacological, physical, or biomedical antidotes to threat agents shortly after exposure. Prophylaxis of the individual is generally accomplished by immunization, using the attenuated or dead biological agent, which serves as an immunogen. More recently, it has become possible to provide protection by immunizing personnel against a fragment of the toxin/biological agent. Initiating the immunization process to achieving protection usually involves a period of weeks. Multivalent vaccines and DNA vaccines are in development to enhance countermeasures against biological agents.

Protection measures for a unit or group primarily rely on weather monitoring, remote probe monitoring for biological agents, and central command data acquisition, transfer, and analysis. Large-scale decontamination measures for barracks, vehicles, and other equipment are also considered unit protection.

Individuals can be protected from exposure to biological weapons agents by active or passive immunization against the agents. Figure 3.0-2 has identified many of the agents of concern. A nation’s capability to use a biological agent should be limited by its ability to provide protection against the agent for its forces and civilian population. A proliferant may not recognize such a limit. In addition, administering biological response modifiers (BRMs) to personnel at the appropriate time can mobilize the immune system in a normal individual. This will reduce the likelihood that exposure to a biological or toxin agent will degrade the individual’s function or result in disease or death. These performance enhancers (BRMs) are discussed in detail below.

BRMs or immunomodulators are biomolecules with the ability to enhance or diminish the immune response of the body. During the last decade, several BRMs (e.g., interferons, interleukins) have been identified. When injected, they enhance the immune response of the human subject to a given antigen (virus or bacterium). Derivatives of these immune enhancing agents can be administered to personnel to improve performance efficiency.

Several naturally occurring proteins, including interferons and interleukins, function as immunostimulating BRMs. In addition to naturally occurring BRMs such as

Highlights

• A proliferant would require some type of BW defensive capability for protection during employment and defense against a counterattack.
• Vaccines are possible but the agent must be known (requires lead time for full protection).
• Detection and identification are key to determine appropriate defensive measures to take after an attack.
• A mask is sufficient to prevent a majority of biological agents from infecting personnel.
• Biotechnology offers potential for enhanced protection in the future.

interferons and interleukins, immuno-enhancing drugs, such as arsphenamine and cefodizime, act to stimulate natural immune response. These drugs are used widely in medicine following chemotherapy and for treatment of various autoimmune diseases. Growth factors for cells of the hematopoetic immune system have been found useful for ameliorating immunosuppression conditions. BRMs can be administered via conventional methods, using encapsulation technology for mass treatment through aerosols or using controlled release systems for long-term internal treatment. Although the immune system enhancers are of potential benefit, they may have undesired side effects, such as fever and malaise, that can degrade combat performance.

Anti-idiotype antibodies can be used to initiate immunization in forces against toxic biological agents. Immunization with the anti-idiotype can induce production of antibodies that recognize and bind the biological agent specifically and selectively. In the most favorable scenario, the human subject would be completely protected immunologically and yet never be exposed to attenuated biological or toxin agent.

Immunosuppressants are one class of BRMs that show promise in offensive biological warfare. These are substances that cause subjects to become “immunocompromised” or more susceptible to infection and, therefore, can be used directly or in concert with other encapsulated chemical or biochemical weapons for diminishing an adversary’s capabilities. These substances include pharmaceuticals, such as

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cyclosporin, rapamycin, and FK506, which are useful in chemotherapy treatments for various cancers and in the prevention of organ, bone marrow, or skin graft rejection. Biological agent protection requires only respiratory and eye protection rather than the complete MOPP gear required for chemical protection. The protective garment requirements include resistance to the penetration of biological weapon or toxin materials, filtration of inflow air to remove particles containing the agents, and cooling of the interior compartment. Current clothing and mask systems used for protection against biological agents act as a barrier between the agent and the respiratory system or mucosal tissues of the target. They do not inactivate the agent. For biological protection, such clothing is sufficient but is not comfortable. Visual field of view is decreased and the head mask results in discomfort because of temperature increase and fogging. RATIONALE Biological defense systems technologies have been included for two reasons. First, an aggressor can be expected to have some standard of protection for the force employing BW. Standards of protection could vary from minimal to sophisticated, but all should be considered, especially those that allow a proliferant to feel secure in offensive operations. Secondly, an attacker would have to be prepared for a counter-attack in kind (depending on the opponent). Self-protection defensive measures would be easiest to take in an offensive attack mode. The attacker would know in advance what biological weapon(s) would be employed and could immunize those that might come in contact with the organism(s). Protective masks could be worn to provide additional protection. When being attacked, a country would encounter problems similar to those faced by the United States: unknown agents being used at an unspecified place for an undetermined duration. Immunization requirements would have to be determined by intelligence reports of enemy capabilities. Some type of detection (see Section 3.3) would be needed to alert forces to take protective measures. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 3.0-3) Vaccines can be produced by any country with a pharmaceutical industry. Equipment can be purchased on the open market since it is all dual use. Protective masks are made in many countries. A simple dust mask could provide significant protection as long as it was worn when being exposed to the biological agent.

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Table 3.4-1. Biological Defense Systems Technology Parameters

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Table 3.4-2. Biological Defense Systems Reference Data

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SECTION IV CHEMICAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY

SECTION 4—CHEMICAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY

Scope 4.1 Chemical Material Production ....................................................II-4-8 4.2 Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing ....................II-4-22 4.3 Detection, Warning, and Identification ....................................II-4-27 4.4 Chemical Defense Systems ......................................................II-4-34

BACKGROUND Chemical weapons are defined as weapons using the toxic properties of chemical substances rather than their explosive properties to produce physical or physiological effects on an enemy. Although instances of what might be styled as chemical weapons date to antiquity, much of the lore of chemical weapons as viewed today has its origins in World War I. During that conflict "gas" (actually an aerosol or vapor) was used effectively on numerous occasions by both sides to alter the outcome of battles. A significant number of battlefield casualties were sustained. The Geneva Protocol, prohibiting use of chemical weapons in warfare, was signed in 1925. Several nations, the United States included, signed with a reservation forswearing only the first use of the weapons and reserved the right to retaliate in kind if chemical weapons were used against them. (Note: the United States did not ratify the Protocol until 1975). Chemical weapons were employed in the intervening period by Italy (in Ethiopia) and Japan (in Manchuria and China). Both nations were signatories to the Geneva Convention. Chemical weapons were never deliberately employed by the Allies or the Axis during World War II, despite the accumulation of enormous stockpiles by both sides. Instances of employment of chemical weapons in the local wars since then are arguable, although they were definitely used in the Iran-Iraq conflict of 1982–87. In January of 1993, a lengthy and detailed Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was signed in Paris by many countries. Unlike the Geneva Convention's single paragraph prohibition, the CWC attempts to define the prohibited substances, including their effects, and to establish enforcement mechanisms. In addition to banning CW use, the CWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical weapons.

The CWC obliges a state party to destroy chemical weapons under its possession, jurisdiction, and control; to destroy all CW it abandoned in the territory of another state party; and to destroy CW production facilities under its jurisdiction or control. On April 29, 1997, the CWC entered into force, thereby putting in place a detailed and intrusive declaration and verification regime. Russia possesses the largest acknowledged stockpile of chemical weapons and may have difficulty adhering to the CWC's destruction requirements because of economic difficulties.

Highlights

• Chemical weapons (CW) are relatively inexpensive to produce.
• CW can affect opposing forces without damaging infrastructure.
• CW can be psychologically devastating.
• Blister agents create casualties requiring attention and inhibiting force efficiency.
• Defensive measures can be taken to negate the effect of CW.
• Donning of protective gear reduces combat efficiency of troops.
• Key to employment is dissemination and dispersion of agents.
• CW are highly susceptible to environmental effects (temperature, winds).
• Offensive use of CW complicates command and control and logistics problems.

Development of chemical weapons in World War I was predominantly the adaptation of a chemical "fill" to a standard munition. The chemicals were commercial chemicals or variants. Their properties were, for the most part, well known. The Germans simply opened canisters of chlorine and let the prevailing winds do the dissemination. Shortly thereafter the French put phosgene in a projectile and this method became the principal means of delivery. In July 1917, the Germans employed mustard shells for the first time and simultaneously attempted to use a solid particulate emetic, diphenyl chloroarsine, as a mask breaker. Mustard, an insidious material, penetrates leather and fabrics and inflicts painful burns on the skin. These two themes, along with significant increases in toxicity, represent a large segment of the research and development of chemical weapons that nations have pursued over the years. There is first the concept of agents that attack the body through the skin, preferably also through clothing, and more preferably through protective clothing. Along with that concept is the idea of penetrating or "breaking" the protective mask so that it no longer offers protection for the respiratory system. Increasing the toxicity of the chemical agent used would theoretically lower the amounts required to produce a battlefield effect. Unless this increase is significant, however, it can be masked by the inefficiencies of disseminating the agent. Consequently, later development has focused on the methods for delivering the agent efficiently to the target.

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The chemicals employed before World War II can be styled as the "classic chemical weapons." They are relatively simple substances, most of which were either common industrial chemicals or their derivatives. An example is phosgene, a choking agent (irritates the eyes and respiratory tract). Phosgene is important in industry as a chlorinating material. A second example is hydrogen cyanide, a so-called blood agent (prevents transfer of oxygen to the tissues), now used worldwide in the manufacture of acrylic polymers. The industrial application of many of the classic chemical agents is recognized by the CWC and they are included on a schedule wherein few restrictions apply. They would be only marginally useful in modern warfare and generally only against an unsophisticated opponent. Moreover, large quantities would be required to produce militarily significant effects, thus complicating logistics.

Blister agents or vesicants are an exception to the limited utility of classic agents. Although these materials have a relatively low lethality, they are effective casualty agents that inflict painful burns and blisters requiring medical attention even at low doses. The classic mustard is the most popular among proliferant nations since it is relatively easy to make. Mustard is generally referred to as the "king" of agents because of its ease of production, low cost, predictable properties, persistence, and ability to cause resource-devouring casualties rather than fatalities. Its insidious nature is both an advantage and a disadvantage. Mustard on the skin causes no immediate sensation and symptoms normally do not appear until several hours after exposure. At incapacitating levels this may be as long as 12 hours. (Contrary to the normal expectation, horrible fatalities occurred in the Iran-Iraq War because Iranian soldiers, feeling no effects, continued to wear mustard soaked clothing and inhale its fumes.)

To produce immediate effects, an arsenical vesicant known as lewisite was developed in the United States. Much of the former Soviet Union vesicant stocks were mixtures of lewisite and sulfur mustard.

Between the world wars the development of chemical weapons included adaptation to aircraft delivery (bombs) and exploitation of lewisite, since the more potent mustard was, from a battlefield perspective, slow in producing casualties. Independent experiments in several countries led them to consider/adopt mixtures of mustard and lewisite as fills for chemical munitions.

Nerve gases, or anticholinesterase agents, were discovered by the Germans in the 1930's and developed during World War II. In 1936 during studies of possible pesticides, the German chemist Gerhard Schrader discovered what he called "tabun" or GA. Two years later Schrader discovered the even more toxic "sarin" or GB. These compounds are orders of magnitude more toxic than those used in World War I and thus represent the significant toxicity increase that changed the concept of employment. Fortunately for the Allies, the Germans never exploited their technological advantage, although they did produce a large number of tabun-filled munitions.

Nerve gases are liquids, not gases, which block an enzyme (acetylcholinesterase) that is necessary for functions of the central nervous system. Similar in action to many pesticides, they are lethal in much lower quantities than classic agents. The nerve gases are effective when inhaled or when absorbed by the skin (percutaneous), or both, although there are differences in effectiveness. In general, the lower the material's volatility (and hence its inhalation threat) the greater its percutaneous toxicity. Nerve agents are generally divided rather arbitrarily into G- and V-agents, although there are numerous structural variants that are potent cholinesterase inhibitors. Nerve agents known to date to have been produced for chemical warfare purposes are all organophosphorus compounds and are liquids at room temperature.

The Italians, Hungarians, Japanese, French, English, Russians, and Americans, as well as the Germans, all perfected mustard, phosgene, and similar agents during World War II. Although never used in the conflict, these nations amassed such huge quantities of chemical munitions that their disposal presented a practical problem, one that would be virtually insurmountable in today's more environmentally conscious world. In those more naive times, however, the munitions simply found their way to the bottoms of almost all the world's oceans in the holds of expendable ships.

After World War II the victors took an interest in exploiting the potential of the remarkably potent "nerve" agents. The British, in particular, had captured small stocks of sarin (GB) and set about investigating its potential. The Soviets removed the Germans' GB production plant to the Soviet Union. GB turned out to be perhaps the best of the respiratory agents, being volatile as well as exceedingly toxic. The United States designed a cluster bomb to exploit the characteristics of GB and followed this with a litany of adaptations of munitions. Artillery rockets were produced as were bombs, projectiles, and spray tanks. Many of these used the basic design of high-explosive weapons and simply changed the fill to GB. In the instance of the spray tank, it was necessary to use a polymeric thickening material so that the liquid would form large droplets and not evaporate before it reached the ground. The French, British, and Canadians all built small-scale facilities to produce the GB for testing. The United States, however, entered into full-scale production of GB, as did the Russians just a little later. The Russians also produced soman (GD), an agent the U.S. developers had decided to forswear because of its properties of being refractory to treatment above a single lethal dose.

In the late 1950's, UK scientists discovered another category of nerve agents, the V-agents. These were particularly interesting in that most of them were very effective percutaneously and represented an effective way to circumvent the ubiquitous gas mask. The United States and the UK pursued a form of V-agent called VX, although they produced it by entirely different processes. The Russians exploited another structural analog that proved more adaptable to their industrial processes.

The 1960's saw continued development in nonlethal agents, or riot control agents, first used in World War I. These materials, most notably CS, are strong irritants of the mucous membranes with very high safety ratios. The letters "CS" are code letters for a solid powder classified as a riot-control agent (O-chlorobenzylmalonitrile). This

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compound is a highly effective irritant of the mucous membranes with an exceedingly high safety ratio (~63,000). The purpose of CS and similar materials is temporary incapacitation without permanent harm. CS was developed and first used by the UK. It was quickly adopted and used extensively by the United States and since has been produced and employed by many nations. CS is a solid at room temperature and presents a problem for effective dissemination in useful particle sizes. Particulate CS, like most solids, tends to develop an electrostatic charge which causes the particles to agglomerate into larger particles. Much development effort during the 1960's was spent on finding effective dissemination techniques.

The work on particulate CS could be extrapolated to another type of chemical agent that was of extreme interest in the 1960's: incapacitating agents. These were initially seen by some as a panacea to make warfare safe and humane. Thousands of potential compounds were screened, obtained from government sources in the United States and from commercial pharmaceutical companies around the world. Although there were several promising materials, primarily mental incapacitants, only BZ was ever standardized.

The problem of incapacitants, or incapacitating agents, is complex. The use of incapacitants in warfare is considered to be prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention even though only a single agent, BZ (3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate), and its immediate precursors are included as listed compounds (Schedule 2) in that Treaty. In retrospect, while BZ was the only incapacitating agent formally accepted (i.e., type classified) by the United States, it was a poor choice and is now obsolete. It remained in U.S. stocks for only a short period of time. The substance is a mental rather than a physical incapacitant with long-onset time and unpredictable symptoms. The victim becomes confused and is likely to be incapable of acting decisively. The confusion, however, may not be readily apparent. The duration of action is long, about 48 hours, making prisoner management difficult. There are, moreover, hundreds of compounds more potent, faster acting, and with shorter duration of effect. Mental incapacitants are predominantly glycolates, whereas some of the more potent candidates for physical incapacitants have come from research on improved anesthetics. Indeed, almost all potential incapacitants are byproducts of the pharmaceutical industry and have legitimate pharmaceutical uses. The defining technologies for such incapacitating weapons, then, are the production of a physiologically effective compound in greater than practical pharmaceutical quantities and incorporation of the material in weapons. It is probable that the physical state of an incapacitant will be a particulate solid and that the practical route for effective use is by inhalation.

Binary chemical weapons use toxic chemicals produced by mixing two compounds immediately before or during use. Binary weapons do not necessarily employ new toxic chemicals. In U.S. parlance, relatively innocuous precursors were stored separately and reacted to form the toxic chemical agent en route to the target. In principle, the binary concept could also be used to produce highly lethal but unstable compounds or mixtures of compounds unsuitable for long-term storage. The U.S. type classified and produced a GB (sarin) binary nerve agent weapon, the M687 projectile (a 155-mm artillery shell), and was in the late stages of development of two other binary weapons when its offensive CW program was terminated. The Russians have been publicly accused by dissidents within their own agencies of developing new binary agents, and the Iraqis are known to have constructed binary bombs and missile warheads, albeit with crude manual mixing of the reactants.

Other possibilities for chemical agents include toxins and allergens which also have been, at times, considered biological agents. Although not living organisms themselves, these materials are usually products of living organisms with complex molecular structures. A wide variety of toxins with an equally broad spectrum of chemical, physical, and physiological properties exists. The CWC attempts to avoid the complexity by listing only two toxins in its list of substances for verification. They are ricin, a byproduct of castor bean extraction, and saxitoxin, a shellfish poison. Given the large number of potential toxins, these would appear to be place holders to permit the inclusion of any toxin if deemed necessary at a future date.

Until the recent attempts at terrorism by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, virtually all uses of chemical weapons have been as tactical weapons by nations. These have ranged from attempts to break the stalemate in World War I to the recent use by Iraq to blunt Iranian human wave attacks in the Iran-Iraq War (1982–87). Chemical weapons were not employed by the major protagonists in World War II. Between World Wars I and II, two signatories of the Geneva Protocol (Italy and Japan) employed chemical weapons. Typically, nations have employed them against unprotected targets and not against an equally well-armed nation; chemical weapons are therefore arguably an example of mutual deterrence. Although there have been charges of chemical weapon use in virtually every conflict in recent decades, most have not been substantiated by clinical or physical evidence.

The growth of chemical agent technology development that spurred production is illustrated in Figure 4.0-1. Chemical agents used initially in World War I were industrial compounds adapted for weapons use. As the war continued, more compounds were screened and specialized agents, particularly sulfur mustard, came to the fore. After the war, research continued at a slow but steady pace, with the major breakthrough being the German discovery of the nerve gases in the mid 1930's. Agent technology accelerated again in the 1950's with the British discovery of the V-agents. The 1960's featured extensive work and discovery in incapacitants and riot control agents as well as the early work on binary agents. If the dissidents of the Russian chemical program are to be believed, major advances are continuing.

In the lethal chemical arena a development effort that spread out over three decades was the concept of binary agent employment. This concept entailed the creation of highly efficient yet simple reaction schemes that could be used to create toxic agents from non-toxic ingredients in the weapon en route to the target. The United States

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developed three different binary munitions, a GB projectile (a 155-mm artillery shell), an aerial bomb producing VX, and a medium-range missile warhead (for the MLRS) containing an intermediate volatility agent. Iraq made a crude attempt to exploit binary systems in the Gulf War, but none were actually deployed.

The Russian Army apparently quashed early attempts to develop binary agents by its technicians, although public revelations in 1995 by scientist Vil Mirzayanov and in 1996 by a former head of the Russian demilitarization program indicate recent Russian development of binary systems for new and novel classes of nerve agents.

An historical perspective of the growth of dissemination technology in comparison to agent technology also can be seen in Figure 4.0-1. Dissemination technology into the 1950's consisted mainly of the use of an explosive burster in adapted shells and iron bombs. During that time the concept of submunitions for better agent dispersal (e.g., missile warheads such as the Sergeant) and spray tanks (e.g., the Aero 14B) evolved and led to more uniform dissemination. These were followed in the mid-1960's and 1970's by concepts of thermal dissemination and aerodynamic breakup, as well as rheological techniques of particle size control in the 1990's.

Despite the importance of detection, the major technological advances for detection, identification, and warning are relatively recent. Initially, detectors were papers impregnated with a dye that underwent a color change when exposed to a chemical agent. By World War II, air-sampling tubes filled with liquids that changed color on exposure were available, as well as rather crude wet chemical point detectors. The advent of the nerve gases after World War II led to the development of sensitive enzyme detection techniques and point detection alarms. The latter were based on wet chemistry and required extensive servicing. The recent advances in microprocessing and fieldable instrumentation techniques have made remote and area sensing of chemical agents feasible.

A major advance in individual physical protection occurred very early with the development of the activated charcoal filtered gas mask. Many incremental improvements to aid in effectiveness against particular agents and to add to communication and creature comforts followed. Impregnated clothing for protection against percutaneous poisoning was another rather early development which continues to be improved incrementally by increasing protection factors and wearability.

OVERVIEW

This section addresses technologies that would enable a country to develop both offensive and defensive chemical weapons capability. The United States has forsworn the offensive use of chemical weapons and is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Therefore, technologies for offensive military operations are not of interest except to maintain an appreciation for others' potential and to continue to develop a robust defense against them. References to offensive operations and technologies are included to ensure that there is an understanding of what is required to develop, integrate, and employ chemical weapons.

There are a number of reasons for a country to pursue the development of chemical weapons. Chemical weapons are relatively inexpensive to produce. Many standard munitions can be modified and filled with toxic chemicals. A chemical attack (or even a credible threat of a chemical offensive) can reduce the efficiency of an opposing force by making it take precautionary steps (donning protective suits, entering shelters, etc.) or diverting its attention to defensive measures. Casualties incurred can burden a country's medical resources. Unlike conventional weapons, chemical munitions, for the most part, injure or kill people while leaving the surrounding infrastructure intact. Moreover, because of their unconventional nature, chemical weapons can be psychologically devastating for a force being attacked.

Military forces that contemplate CW employment have many things to consider. The use of chemical weapons runs counter to the global norm and is apt to engender strong denunciation by third parties and retaliation by the nation attacked. There are significant operational hurdles. Logistics, training, and command and control are complicated by the possible employment of chemical munitions. Care must be taken to prevent one's own force from bearing the brunt of an attack. A properly defended force might be slowed but will not be stopped. Although the "cost" of CW employment could be high in terms of the above factors, the "benefit" of degrading an adversary's performance and the psychological affect might be deemed sufficient to offset the cost.

This section on Chemical Weapons Technologies contains four subsections. Chemical Material Production addresses technologies for producing toxic chemical agents that could be used in chemical weapons. Those that require special expertise are covered in more detail than those available through standard industrial processes. Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing addresses those technologies that a proliferant could use to disperse toxic chemicals and ensure the viability of its dissemination systems. Also addressed are Detection, Warning, and Identification technologies that enable forces to detect and identify toxic agents and provide warning to minimize the threat. The last subsection, Chemical Defense Systems, discusses those systems that provide protection from the effects of chemical weapons.

RATIONALE

A number of technologies are required to develop, integrate, and employ chemical weapons. Although many of these technologies are old and available in the open literature, successful employment entails more than simply producing toxic chemicals. Technologies used for dissemination and dispersion are perhaps the most important. The myriad technologies for offensive use are included in this section to provide the reader an appreciation of the requirements to develop chemical weapons and an understanding of where offensive breakthroughs might occur, even though the United States

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has renounced the capability. Technologies needed to detect the use of toxic chemicals and provide protection are essential to all countries. Even proliferants that employ chemical weapons require some type of detection and protection capability. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 4.0-2) Starting in World War I, a number of countries have employed chemical weapons. After false starts by others, the Germans finally employed chlorine successfully at Ypres, Belgium, in 1915. Other WWI use included phosgene and chloropicrin in 1916 by the British, and mustard in 1917 by Germany. Lewisite was developed in 1918, too late to be used in WWI. Between the world wars, Japan began research on chemical weapons and began production in the late 1920's. The Italians used mustard in Ethiopia in 1935–36. Although Allied and Axis nations produced and stockpiled chemical weapons, they were not used during World War II. Egypt employed mustard and probably G-agent in Yemen in the 1960's. Both sides relied on CW during the Iran-Iraq conflict. The Iraqis used mustard, tabun, and sarin from 1982–87 and were prepared to do so in the Gulf War. Libya dropped chemical agents from a transport aircraft against Chadian Troops in 1987. Many nations have become States Parties to the CWC and can be expected to adhere to their commitments not to develop chemical weapons. Others will not sign or may abrogate their commitments. Any nation with a sophisticated chemical industry has the potential to produce chemical weapons, although nerve agents require a greater amount of expertise than classical agents and vesicants. Having the potential, however, does not indicate intent. Subnational groups, both independent and state-sponsored, could produce or purchase toxic chemicals or possibly chemical warfare agents to threaten a civilian populace. Since civilians are poorly prepared for attacks by toxic materials, consequences of a successful attack could be severe. Governments are increasingly concerned about the use of toxic chemicals in light of the Aum Shinrikyo attack in Tokyo but thus far have been unable to come to grips with the complexity of the problem. The armed forces of many nations have some type of detection equipment and protection gear, although there are wide variations in their quantity and capability.

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Relative Development 9 7 5 3 1 Improved gas mask (protection; fit; comfort) Novichok Series Gas mask w/voicemitter & drinking capability Miniaturization Laser detection Protective ointment (Mustard); collective protection; gas mask w/Whetlerite VX CC-2 impregnated clothing Protection Agent Detection Gas mask; rosin oil impregnated clothing Tabun Sarin Nerve gas alarm Binary munition Lewisite Blister agent detectors; kit; color change paper Aerodynamic Dissemination Chlorine, Chloropicrin, Phosgene, Mustard Smell Missile warheads; spray tanks Projectiles: central bursters Aircraft bombs 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 CW Use WWI It/Fr/Sp/Japan Egypt Iran/Iraq/Libya Chlorine: 1915 Phosgene: 1916 Chloropicrin: 1916 Mustard: 1917 Mustard Mustard Mustard; Tabun Sarin Arms Control The Hague 1899 Geneva Protocol 1925 CWC 1993 Figure 4.0-1. Relative Development of Chemical Weapons Technologies II-4-6

| Country* | Sec 4.1 Chemical Material Production | Sec 4.2 Dissemination, Dispersion and Weapons Testing | Sec 4.3 Detection, Warning and Identification | Sec 4.4 Chemical Defense Systems |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Australia | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Bulgaria | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Canada | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| China | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Czech Republic | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Denmark | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Egypt | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Finland | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| France | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Germany | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Hungary | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| India | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Iran | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Iraq | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Israel | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Italy | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Japan | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Libya | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Netherlands | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| North Korea | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| Norway | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Pakistan | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Poland | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Russia | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Slovak Republic | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| South Africa | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| South Korea | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Spain | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Sweden | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Switzerland | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Syria | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| United Kingdom | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| United States | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Viet Nam | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Subnationals | ♦♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |

Legend: Sufficient Technologies Capabilities: ♦♦♦♦ exceeds sufficient level ♦♦♦ sufficient level ♦♦ some ♦ limited
Because two or more countries have the same number of diamonds does not mean that their capabilities are the same. An absence of diamonds in countries of concern may indicate an absence of information, not of capability. The absence of a country from this list may indicate an absence of information, not capability.

Figure 4.0-2. Chemical Weapons Foreign Technology Assessment Summary

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SECTION 4.1—CHEMICAL MATERIAL PRODUCTION

OVERVIEW This subsection contains information on a number of the toxic chemicals and their most important precursors. Included are nerve agents (e.g., sarin, soman, tabun, VX), vesicants (e.g., sulfur mustards, lewisites, nitrogen mustards), and “classic” chemical agents (phosgene, cyanogen chloride, hydrogen cyanide). Important precursors are also listed. These include DF, DC, and QL, all used in producing nerve agents.

There are thousands of toxic chemicals that could be used in chemical weapons. Those listed have been stockpiled and/or used by a number of countries. The CWC Schedules of Chemicals (Figure 4.1-1) and the Australia Group (AG) list of precursors (Figure 4.1-2) are also provided to ensure recognition of those being considered either for verification provisions of the CWC or for export control. It should be remembered that the CWC schedules and the AG list do not include all of the known chemicals that have been or could be used to produce toxic agents.

Depending on the type of agent to be produced, there can be technical hurdles that must be overcome. “Classic” agents can be manufactured using existing chemical infrastructure, and most have legitimate commercial uses. Likewise, vesicants are not technologically complicated. The production of the nerve agents, however, requires significantly more sophisticated chemical processing. Some production processes require strict temperature control. Containment of toxic substances and gases can pose problems. Depending on the immediacy of use, purity of product can add a difficult dimension to production. In some cases, special equipment or handling is required to prevent corrosion of equipment and/or rapid deterioration of the product.

These hurdles can be overcome. If sufficient purity cannot be attained, an agent can be manufactured and used immediately. This presupposes the capability to manufacture a sufficient quantity in the time allotted. If special, corrosive-resistant equipment cannot be obtained, corroded equipment can be replaced when necessary or only a limited amount can be produced. If nerve agent production is technologically infeasible for a proliferant, a simpler agent (vesicant or classic agent) can be produced. Alternatives can entail increased costs, increased munition requirements, or reduced CW capability.

Some of the simpler classic chemical agents can be manufactured using existing chemical infrastructure. For example, phosgene is manufactured internally within chemical plants throughout the world for use as a chlorinating agent. Chlorination is the most common of chemical intermediate reactions in the chemical process industry. A reasonable size phosgene facility could be purchased with an investment of $10–$14 million. Similarly, hydrogen cyanide is currently manufactured worldwide as an intermediate in the manufacture of acrylic polymers and could be diverted for other uses or separately manufactured with about the same investment. In either instance the technologies are simple, well known, and require no specialized equipment. These CW agents require high munitions expenditures and are easily defeated by a gas mask, so that use would most likely be against unprotected populations and/or poorly equipped combatants.

Highlights

• There are many routes to produce most toxic chemicals.
• Thousands of chemicals exist that could be considered for chemical weapons.
• If corrosive-resistant equipment cannot be procured (for corrosive reactants and products), standard equipment can be used and replaced or discarded.
• Many CW precursors are common industrial chemicals. Some have been used in the past as agents in CW.
• Most technologies associated with CW production are old and available in the open literature.

Almost all proliferant states since World War I have manufactured vesicants, principally sulfur mustard, bis(2-chloroethyl) sulfide. There are several routes to this compound, none of which require sophisticated technology and/or special materials. The earlier producers favored the Levinstein Process, which consists of bubbling dry ethylene through sulfur monochloride, allowing the mixture to settle and (usually) distilling the remaining material. More recent production has involved chlorination of thiodiglycol, a relatively common material with a dual use as an ingredient in some inks. This method does not result in the solid byproducts of the Levinstein Process and can be more easily distilled. Drums of thiodiglycol, produced in the United States and illegally diverted from their intended recipients, were found by international inspectors after the Gulf War at Iraqi CW production sites. The principal problem experienced by initial manufacturers of sulfur mustard has been the insidious nature of this material. Virtually all those producing mustard have experienced a large number of industrial accidents resulting in casualties from mustard burns. Nitrogen mustards have been synthesized only in pilot plant quantities, but did not require any unusual processes or materials. Lewisite was produced by both the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II. The plants were quite small and unsophisticated by

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today's standards. Lewisite is an arsenical and as such would require unusually large amounts of arsenates in its production.

Production of the nerve agents requires significantly more sophisticated chemical processing. In a majority of these materials, there are corrosive chemicals in the process that require specialized corrosion-resistant construction materials. With the exception of GA (tabun), manufactured by the Germans in World War II and the Iraqis during the Iran-Iraq war, G-agent production involves both chlorination and fluorination steps. Both of these steps require special and expensive construction materials. Reactors, degassers, distillation columns, and ancillary equipment made of high nickel alloys or precious metals are needed to contain the corrosive products and by products. Only the last step of the process involves the highly toxic material, so that special air handling equipment would be needed for only a small portion of the facility.

There are many process routes for producing the G- and V-agents; the majority involve the synthesis of methylphosphonic dichloride (DC) at some stage. The United States designed and built plants for four different processes for producing DC. Two were used in the stockpile production of GB (sarin), a third represented an upgrade of the stockpile production process to minimize waste, and the fourth represented a newer method used in producing material for binary weapons. The Soviet Union used a still different process to make DC and Iraq one similar to the last U.S. process. DC is a relatively easy material to store and ship and need not be produced at the same site as the final product. It is very stable and has been stored for over 30 years with little deterioration. The size of the facility required to produce DC in militarily significant quantities ranges from very large down to room sized. A facility to produce DC with ancillary support would cost approximately $25 million not including pollution and environmental controls and waste treatment. Modern waste treatment and pollution abatement to U.S. standards would more than double the cost, although it is doubtful that a proliferant would build to these standards. The various DC production processes require some special corrosion-resistant equipment, generally glass-lined reactors and storage tanks, although not the ultra-expensive equipment required for later stages. DC has limited commercial use.

In the actual production of G-agents, the partially fluorinated DC (now a transient mixture called Di-Di) is reacted with an alcohol or alcohols and the product degassed and usually distilled. As noted previously, this is the toxic step of the reaction which requires air handling and filtering and also part of the highly corrosive portion that requires high nickel alloy (such as Hastelloy C) equipment and piping or precious metals (such as silver). The U.S. stockpile of GB was produced in this fashion and the former Soviet Union stockpiles of GB and GD (soman) by a variation of that process. The Iraqis used a somewhat over-fluorinated DC and mixed alcohols to produce a GB/GF mixture which was inherently unstable. Most of the alcohols involved in producing G-agents have large-scale commercial use. An exception is the alcohol for producing GD, pinacolyl alcohol, which has very limited pharmaceutical use.

Two principal general methods have been employed for V-agent production. The process used in the United States was called the Transester Process. It entails a rather difficult step in which phosphorus trichloride is methylated to produce methyl phosphonous dichloride. The material is reacted in turn with ethanol to form a diester and this material then transesterified to produce the immediate precursor of VX. The product is reacted with sulfur to form V-agent. This process has the advantage of being straightforward and producing high quality product. Conversely, it has the disadvantage of some difficult chemical engineering steps. The V-agent formed exclusively in the United States was VX. The former Soviet Union, the only other known producer of significant quantities of V-agent, did not produce VX per se, but rather a structurally different variant with the same molecular weight. The Soviets designed their process to make maximum use of production capability already available. The DC of the G-agent process was used in an Amiton process conducted in solution. The technique has the advantage of producing a single intermediate (DC). Disadvantages include the need to recover a highly toxic material from solution and to handle large quantities of contaminated solvent. In general, the V-agents are not easily distilled, and it is unlikely that a final purification process can be developed.

Incapacitating agent production is similar in many ways to the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, since these compounds are normally variations or derivatives of compounds used or postulated for use as pharmaceuticals. Since most pharmaceuticals are produced in relatively small quantities, production would entail a scale-up to an unusual process size for the type of reactions entailed. Moreover, virtually all candidate incapacitating agents are solids at room temperature and would require drying and grinding to an inhalable particulate. Given the tendency of many compounds to acquire a static charge and agglomerate, the grinding is a nontrivial manufacturing problem. The problems associated with manufacture (and use) of solid lethal agents (such as carbamates) are analogous to those experienced with incapacitants.

As a consequence of the diversity and complexity involved, it is difficult to provide any generic insights to toxin production. The only toxin to exist naturally in large quantities is ricin. It is a byproduct of castor oil production. Production of ricin is a physical separation. There are weak parallels with plutonium extraction or uranium isotope enrichment in nuclear processing. Toxin separation is much easier, less expensive, and requires smaller equipment. These advantages might make a toxin attractive to a poor, proliferating country. Most other toxins must be laboriously extracted in small quantities from the organism that secretes them. While synthetic toxins are possible, they are complex molecules, the synthesis of which in any significant amount would be difficult. Biotechnology may enhance the ability to produce toxins that were previously difficult to obtain in significant quantity.

Production of chemical agents in the past has anticipated their long-term storage since (in the instance of United States at least) they were viewed as deterrent weapons and by policy would not have been employed except in response to aggressor use.

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This also meant that the agents and/or their weapons of employment might be stored for extensive periods of time. The life span of chemical weapons was first expected to be a decade. The requirement was later increased to 20 years when it became clear that munitions were likely to be stored at least that long. Chemical agents can either be stored in bulk quantities or loaded into munitions. With the nerve agents in particular, the quality of the initial material must be excellent and they must be stored under inert conditions with the absolute exclusion of oxygen and moisture. Generally an overlay of dry helium was employed to leak check munitions. A small amount of stabilizer (2–4 percent) was also used to extend agent life span. The United States stored agent in both bulk containers and in munitions. In the latter instance, the munitions were normally stored in revetted bunkers. This was particularly true when explosives and propellants were uploaded in the munitions. Storage of agents in explosive, uploaded munitions has both advantages and disadvantages. The principal advantage is speed of use when the munition is needed. There is no labor-intensive or time-consuming uploading process, and most munitions can be handled and shipped as if they were conventional munitions. The principal disadvantage is that explosives and propellants become part of the “system,” and their storage and deterioration may complicate the handling of the chemical weapons. An illustrative case is seen in the 115-mm M55 rockets where burster, fuse, and rocket propellant cannot be easily and/or safely separated from the agent warhead before demilitarization. As a consequence, demilitarization is far more complicated and costly than it would be otherwise.

Agents stored in bulk in the United States are now stored entirely in large cylindrical “ton” containers similar to those used to store and ship many commercial chemicals. The procedure for the former Soviet Union’s stockpile appears to have been to upload their stocks of nerve agent into munitions when produced, but to store them without the bursters or fuses. These munitions were then themselves stored in more conventional warehouse-like structures. Conversely, the older stocks of vesicants (i.e., mustard, lewisite and mustard-lewisite mixtures) are stored in bulk, apparently intended to be filled in munitions a short time before use. Bulk storage of the vesicants by the Russians is in large railroad-car-size tanks again located in warehouse-like structures. When the Iraqis produced chemical munitions they appeared to adhere to a “make and use” regimen. Judging by the information Iraq gave the United Nations, later verified by on-site inspections, Iraq had poor product quality for their nerve agents. This low quality was likely due to a lack of purification. They had to get the agent to the front promptly or have it degrade in the munition. This problem would have been less severe in their mustard rounds because of less aggressive impurities. The problem of degradation inhibited their ability to deploy and employ nerve weapons but probably did not have a great effect on their use of mustard. Using their weapons soon after production probably worked well in the Iran-Iraq War, where the skies over Iraq were controlled by the Iraqis. Unfortunately for the Iraqis, loss of air control in the Gulf meant the weapons could never reach the front. The chemical munitions found in Iraq after the Gulf War contained badly deteriorated agents and a significant proportion were visibly leaking.

Binary munitions were once intended by the United States as a means of retaining a retaliatory capability without the necessity of an agent stockpile. The relatively nontoxic intermediates could be stored separately and not placed in proximity to one another until just before use. This requires some human engineering to ensure the munitions designs permit simple, rapid mating of the ingredient containers and production of the lethal agent en route to the target. The binary system was envisioned almost exclusively for application to the standard nerve agents. Although at least three types of binary munitions were planned, only one (155-mm artillery shell) was in production when the United States ended CW production. The Russians claim to have considered binary munitions but not produced any. The Iraqis had a small number of bastardized binary munitions in which some unfortunate individual was to pour one ingredient into the other from a Jerry can prior to use.

Release of agent by enemy action during shipment is a disadvantage of unitary chemical munitions. The sinking of the U.S. cargo ship John Harvey in the harbor at Bari, Italy, during World War II and the subsequent unwitting release of a large quantity of mustard gas is a case in point. Mustard escaped from damaged munitions contaminating those escaping the sinking ship and civilians on shore.

RATIONALE (See Table 4.1-1)

Since there are so many toxic chemicals that could be used in chemical weapons, only those agents of major significance and their precursors have been included. These toxic chemicals have been designated of most concern by the world community. The majority of nerve agents, sulfur mustards, lewisites, and some of the nitrogen mustards are listed in the CWC schedules of chemicals (Figure 4.1-1). Each nerve agent is representative of a family (hundreds to thousands) of chemicals. Those specifically included have been produced and stockpiled by a number of countries. The precursor DC is the fundamental building block for a significant portion of G- and V-agents. The classic chemicals (phosgene, cyanogen chloride, and hydrogen cyanide) have been included since they are so readily available that a proliferant could obtain them easily. Although these chemical agents would require high munitions expenditures and are easily defeated by a gas mask, they could be used effectively against unprotected populations and/or poorly equipped combatants.

Toxins have not been included in this subsection but can be found in Section 3, Biological Weapons Technologies. Although toxins are not living organisms, they are made by living organisms. They are listed in Schedule 1A of the CWC and the biological agent part of the Australia Group list.

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FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 4.0-2)

Any country with a chemical industry has the capability, if not the intent, to produce toxic chemicals. Most of the technologies are old and described in the open literature. The countries listed in Figure 4.0-2 have the capability or have used chemical weapons in the past and therefore are technically capable of producing chemical weapons. The assessment is not an indication of current intent. Many of these countries have signed/ratified the CWC.

There have been numerous press reports of toxic chemicals produced in Russia that are not covered in the CWC schedules. Vil Mirzayanov, a chemist and former high-ranking scientist in the former Soviet Union's chemical weapons program, published an article in Kuranty in 1991 (and co-authored another article in 1992 in the Moscow News) in which he claimed that Russia had developed new kinds of chemical weapons. Substances like Novichok (A-230, A-232, and A-234) are chemical agents that the Russians are said to have developed in spite of agreement to halt production of chemical weapons. These statements were repeated by a former head of the Russian demilitarization program.

There has been press coverage of a large, underground facility being built at Tarhunah in Libya that the United States claims is designed as a chemical production facility. Libya dropped chemical agents obtained from Iran from a transport aircraft against Chadian troops in 1987. Late in 1988, Libya completed a chemical agent facility at Rabta as part of its drive to develop an indigenous CW capability. When the United States brought international attention to the plant, Libya responded by fabricating a fire to make it appear that the facility had been seriously damaged. This plant was closed in 1990, but the Libyans announced its reopening in September 1995 as a pharmaceutical facility. The Rabta facility is still capable of producing chemical agents.

Since the late 1980's, North Korea has expanded its chemical warfare program. Today it can produce large quantities of blister, blood, choking, and possibly nerve agents. It also maintains a number of facilities involved in producing or storing precursors for toxic chemicals, the agents themselves, and weapons. As mentioned previously, Iran delivered limited quantities of blister and blood agents against Iraqi soldiers late in the Iran-Iraq War. Iran has increased its rate of production since 1984 and has produced at least several hundred tons of blister, blood, and choking agents. Some of these agents have been weaponized to support ground combat operations.

Before the Gulf War, Iraq had become nearly self-sufficient in producing many precursors and had developed a variety of chemical weapons on its own. The chief inspector of the UN Special Commission chemical destruction group said that all known chemical munitions, agents, and precursors in Iraq had been eliminated by May 1994. Many think that Iraq can revive its CW capability in a matter of months in the absence of UN monitoring or import controls.

On the Asian subcontinent, India and Pakistan are capable of developing chemical weapons. India has a large chemical industry that produces numerous dual-use chemicals that are potential precursors. In June 1997, India submitted CW declarations to the CWC governing body in The Hague. This was the first time the Indians publicly acknowledged a CW program. Pakistan has procured dual-use precursors from foreign sources and is moving slowly toward the capability of producing precursors.

The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan proved that subnational groups can obtain the expertise and ingredients to threaten society with chemical agents. A Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations study indicated that the cult had produced the nerve agents sarin, soman, tabun, and VX, as well as phosgene and sodium cyanide. Toxic chemicals were used at least twice, including the Tokyo subway attack that left 12 dead and more than 5,000 injured.

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The following Schedules list toxic chemicals and their precursors. For the purposes of implementing this Convention, these Schedules identify chemicals for the application of verification measures according to the provisions of the Verification Annex. Pursuant to Article II, subparagraph 1(a), these Schedules do not constitute a definition of chemical weapons. (Whenever reference is made to groups of dialkylated chemicals, followed by a list of alkyl groups in parentheses, all chemicals possible by all possible combinations of alkyl groups listed in the parentheses are considered as listed in the respective Schedule as long as they are not explicitly exempted. A chemical marked "*" on Schedule 2, part A, is subject to special thresholds for declaration and verification, as specified in Part VII of the Verification Annex.)

(cont'd)

Figure 4.1-1. Chemical Weapons Convention Schedules of Chemicals

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Schedule 2 A. Toxic chemicals: (1) Amiton: O,O-Diethyl S-[2-(diethylamino)ethyl] phosphorothiolate (78-53-5) and corresponding alkylated and protonated salts (2) PFIB: 1,1,3,3,3-Pentafluoro-2-(trifluoromethyl)-1-propene (382-21-8) (3) BZ: 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (*) (6581-06-2)

B. Precursors: (4) Chemicals, except for those listed in Schedule 1, containing a phosphorus atom to which is bonded one methyl, ethyl, or propyl (normal or iso) group but not further carbon atoms, e.g., Methylphosphonyl dichloride (676-97-1) Dimethyl methylphosphonate (756-79-6) Exemption: Fonofos: O-Ethyl S-phenyl ethylphosphonothiolothionate (944-22-9) (5) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidic dihalides (6) Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) N,N-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphoramidates (7) Arsenic trichloride (7784-34-1) (8) 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid (76-93-7) (9) Quinuclidine-3-ol (1619-34-7) (10) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethyl-2-chlorides and corresponding protonated salts (11) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-ols and corresponding protonated salts Exemptions: N,N-Dimethylaminoethanol (108-01-0) and corresponding protonated salts N,N-Diethylaminoethanol (100-37-8) and corresponding protonated salts (12) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-thiols and corresponding protonated salts (13) Thiodiglycol: Bis(2-hydroxyethyl)sulfide (111-48-8) (14) Pinacolyl alcohol: 3,3-Dimethylbutane-2-ol (464-07-3)

Schedule 3 A. Toxic chemicals: (1) Phosgene: carbonyl dichloride (75-44-5) (2) Cyanogen chloride (506-77-4) (3) Hydrogen cyanide (74-90-8) (4) Chloropicrin: Trichloronitromethane (76-06-2)

B. Precursors: (5) Phosphorus oxychloride (10025-87-3) (6) Phosphorus trichloride (7719-12-2) (7) Phosphorus pentachloride (10026-13-8) (8) Trimethyl phosphite (121-45-9) (9) Triethyl phosphite (122-52-1) (10) Dimethyl phosphite (868-85-9) (11) Diethyl phosphite (762-04-9) (12) Sulfur monochloride(10025-67-9) (13) Sulfur dichloride (10545-99-0) (14) Thionyl chloride (7719-09-7) (15) Ethyldiethanolamine (139-87-7) (16) Methyldiethanolamine (105-59-9) (17) Triethanolamine (102-71-6)

Source: The Chemical Weapons Convention, “Annex on Chemicals,” Part B.

Figure 4.1-1. Chemical Weapons Convention Schedules of Chemicals (cont'd)

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| Chemical | C.A.S. # | Chemical | C.A.S. # |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1. Thiodiglycol | 111-48-8 | 30. Triethyl Phosphite | 122-52-1 |
| 2. Phosphorus Oxychloride | 10025-87-3 | 31. Arsenic Trichloride | 7784-34-1 |
| 3. Dimethyl Methylphosphonate | 756-79-6 | 32. Benzilic Acid | 76-93-7 |
| 4. Methyl Phosphonyl Difluoride | 676-99-3 | 33. Diethyl Methylphosphonite | 15715-41-0 |
| 5. Methyl Phosphonyl Dichloride | 676-97-1 | 34. Dimethyl Ethylphosphonate | 6163-75-3 |
| 6. Dimethyl Phosphite | 868-85-9 | 35. Ethyl Phosphinyl Difluoride | 430-78-4 |
| 7. Phosphorus Trichloride | 7719-12-2 | 36. Methyl Phosphinyl Difluoride | 753-59-3 |
| 8. Trimethyl Phosphite | 121-45-9 | 37. 3-Quinuclidone | 3731-38-2 |
| 9. Thionyl Chloride | 7719-09-7 | 38. Phosphorus Pentachloride | 10026-13-8 |
| 10. 3-Hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine | 3554-74-3 | 39. Pinacolone | 75-97-8 |
| 11. N,N-Diisopropyl-ß-Aminoethyl Chloride | 96-79-7 | 40. Potassium Cyanide | 151-50-8 |
| 12. N,N-Diisopropyl-ß-Aminoethane Thiol | 5842-07-9 | 41. Potassium Bifluoride | 7789-29-9 |
| 13. 3-Quinuclidinol | 1619-34-7 | 42. Ammonium Bifluoride | 1341-49-7 |
| 14. Potassium Fluoride | 7789-23-3 | 43. Sodium Bifluoride | 1333-83-1 |
| 15. 2-Chloroethanol | 107-07-3 | 44. Sodium Fluoride | 7681-49-4 |
| 16. Dimethylamine | 124-40-3 | 45. Sodium Cyanide | 143-33-9 |
| 17. Diethyl Ethylphosphonate | 78-38-6 | 46. Tri-ethanolamine | 102-71-6 |
| 18. Diethyl N,N-Dimethylphosphoramidate | 2404-03-7 | 47. Phosphorus Pentasulphide | 1314-80-3 |
| 19. Diethyl Phosphite | 762-04-9 | 48. Di-isopropylamine | 108-18-9 |
| 20. Dimethylamine Hydrochloride | 506-59-2 | 49. Diethylaminoethanol | 100-37-8 |
| 21. Ethyl Phosphinyl Dichloride | 1498-40-4 | 50. Sodium Sulphide | 1313-82-2 |
| 22. Ethyl Phosphonyl Dichloride | 1066-50-8 | 51. Sulphur Monochloride | 10025-67-9 |
| 23. Ethyl Phosphonyl Difluoride | 753-98-0 | 52. Sulphur Dichloride | 10545-99-0 |
| 24. Hydrogen Fluoride | 7664-39-3 | 53. Triethanolamine Hydrochloride | 637-39-8 |
| 25. Methyl Benzilate | 76-89-1 | 54. N,N-Diisopropyl-2-Aminoethyl Chloride Hydrochloride | 4261-68-1 |
| 26. Methyl Phosphinyl Dichloride | 676-83-5 | | |
| 27. N,N-Diisopropyl-ß-Amino-Ethanol | 96-80-0 | | |
| 28. Pinacolyl Alcohol | 464-07-3 | | |
| 29. O-Ethyl 2-Diisopropylaminoethyl Methylphosphonite | 57856-11-8 | | |

Source: ACDA Fact Sheet on Australia Group Export Controls, November 7, 1995 (current as of September 6, 1997).

Figure 4.1-2. Australia Group Chemicals

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Table 4.1-1. Chemical Material Production Technology Parameters

(cont'd)

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Table 4.1-1. Chemical Material Production Technology Parameters (cont'd)

(cont'd)

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Table 4.1-1. Chemical Material Production Technology Parameters (cont'd)

(cont'd)

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Table 4.1-1. Chemical Material Production Technology Parameters (cont'd)

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Table 4.1-2. Chemical Material Production Reference Data

(cont'd)

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Table 4.1-2. Chemical Material Production Reference Data (cont'd)

(cont'd)

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Table 4.1-2. Chemical Material Production Reference Data (cont'd)

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SECTION 4.2—DISSEMINATION, DISPERSION, AND WEAPONS TESTING

OVERVIEW

Perhaps the most important factor in the effectiveness of chemical weapons is the efficiency of dissemination. This section lists a variety of technologies that can be used to weaponize toxic chemical agents. Munitions include bombs, submunitions, projectiles, warheads, and spray tanks. Techniques of filling and storage of munitions are important. The principal method of disseminating chemical agents has been the use of explosives. (Figure 4.2-1 shows an example of a U.S. chemical bomb, the MC-1.) These usually have taken the form of central bursters expelling the agent laterally. Efficiency is not particularly high in that a good deal of the agent is lost by incineration in the initial blast and by being forced onto the ground. Particle size will vary, since explosive dissemination produces a bimodal distribution of liquid droplets of an uncontrollable size but usually having fine and coarse modes. For flammable aerosols, sometimes the cloud is totally or partially ignited (flashing) in the dissemination process. For example, explosively disseminated VX ignited roughly one third of the time it was employed. The phenomenon was never fully understood or controlled despite extensive study. A solution would represent a major technological advance.

Highlights

• Efficiency of dissemination is the most important factor in the effectiveness of chemical weapons.
• Much of the agent is lost in an explosive dissemination by incineration and by being forced onto the ground.
• Flammable aerosols frequently “flash” (ignite) when explosively disseminated.
• The environment (winds and temperature) are important factors in CW dissemination.

Aerodynamic dissemination technology allows nonexplosive delivery from a line source. Although this method provides a theoretical capability of controlling the size of the particle, the altitude of dissemination must be controlled and the wind direction and velocity known. Accurate weather observations can enable the attacker to predict wind direction and velocity in the target area.

An important factor in the effectiveness of chemical weapons is the efficiency of dissemination as it is tailored to the types of agent. The majority of the most potent of chemical agents are not very volatile. Indeed, the most volatile of the G-agents is GB (sarin), which has a volatility near that of water. All are nonvolatile liquids or solids at room temperature. VX is an oily liquid.

An advanced proliferant might attempt to develop on-board sensor systems for initiation and control of agent dissemination/dispersal for ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and artillery. In these cases, the sensor (target-detection device) may employ technologies common to other electronic fuzing applications. The efficacy of explosives and pyrotechnics for dissemination is limited by the flammable nature of some agents.

In some respects, long-range strategic weapons pose a lesser problem than short-range tactical weapons that are fired over, or in the vicinity of, one’s own forces. The agent must be dispersed within the boundary layer (<200–300 ft above the ground) and yet high enough to allow effective dispersal of the agent. This poses design problems because the ground/target detection device must be substantially more sensitive than for conventional munitions. The increased sensitivity also results in increased susceptibility to false firing due to noise, mutual interference, and electronic countermeasures (ECM).

Figure 4.2-1. MC-1 Gas Bomb

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Casualties due to premature initiation of the warhead are unacceptable in tactical weapons. Accordingly, an additional function such as a simple electrical or mechanical timer may be used to arm the height-of-burst sensor.

A more recent attempt to control aerosol particle size on target has been the use of aerodynamic dissemination and sprays as line sources. By modification of the rheological properties of the liquid, its breakup when subjected to aerodynamic stress can theoretically be controlled and an idealized particle distribution achieved. In practice, the task is more difficult, but it represents an area where a technological advance could result in major munition performance improvements. The altitude of dissemination must be controllable and the wind direction and velocity known for a disseminated liquid of a predetermined particle size to predictably reach the ground and reliably hit a target.

Thermal dissemination, wherein pyrotechnics are used to aerosolize the agent has been used particularly to generate fine, inhalable clouds of incapacitants. Most of the more complex agent molecules, however, are sensitive to high temperatures and can deteriorate if exposure is too lengthy. Solids are a notoriously difficult problem for dissemination, since they tend to agglomerate even when pre-ground to desired sizes.

Dispersion considers the relative placement of the chemical agent munition upon or adjacent to a target immediately before dissemination so that the material is most efficiently used. For example, the artillery rockets of the 1950's and early 1960's employed a multitude of submunitions so that a large number of small agent clouds would form directly on the target with minimal dependence on meteorology. Another variation of this is multiple "free" aerial sprays such as those achieved by the BLU 80/B Bigeye weapon and the multiple launch rocket system. While somewhat wind dependent, this technique is considerably more efficient in terms of agent quantities.

Testing requirements for munitions seek to measure the efficacy of dissemination. This has been done historically on instrumented grids with samples of the disseminated material taken at known positions. The positions are assigned area values and these are integrated to determine total dosage and dose isopleths. While the technique was constantly improved, it still was crude by most standards and required numerous tests to provide useful information. Instrumental methods such as versions of light detection and ranging (LIDAR) may well be better suited to more accurate measures but without the signature of the chemical grids.

Modeling dissemination patterns for agent laydown can be an effective way to predict dispersal without physical testing. Little testing would be required given good, verified models. The problem, however, is model verification.

RATIONALE (See Table 4.2-1)

Many dissemination technologies have been included because many are available to a proliferant. In World War I, canisters of chlorine were simply opened to allow the gas to drift across enemy lines. Although this produced limited results, it is indicative of the simplicity of potential means of dispersion. Although central bursters have limitations, countries usually use this method in the early stages of CW development, although it does not have to be the first one. There is sufficient open literature describing the pros and cons of various types of dissemination to dictate the consideration of all of them by a proliferant. Most countries could develop the toxic agents and adapt their standard munitions to carry the agents. It is much more difficult, however, to achieve success in effective dispersion and dissemination. Weather observation and forecasting are essential to increase the probability of effective CW dissemination and reduce the risk of injuring friendly forces.

FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 4.0-2)

As stated previously, most countries have the capability to develop chemical weapons. Those with a well-developed military infrastructure could readily adapt existing munitions for chemical warfare. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq delivered mustard and tabun with artillery shells, aerial bombs, missiles, and rockets. Virtually any country or subnational group with significant resources has sufficient capability to attain the minimum capability that would be needed to meet terrorist aims. Any nation with substantial foreign military sales or indigenous capability in conventional weapons will have (or have ready access to) both the design know-how and components required to implement at least a moderate capability.

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Table 4.2-1. Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing Technology Parameters

(cont'd)

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Table 4.2-1. Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing Technology Parameters (cont'd)

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Table 4.2-2. Dissemination, Dispersion, and Weapons Testing Reference Data

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SECTION 4.3—DETECTION, WARNING, AND IDENTIFICATION

OVERVIEW

Because many toxic chemicals act quickly, rapid detection is needed to prevent lethal or incapacitating results from unwanted exposure. This subsection covers a variety of technologies that can be used to detect CW agents. Sample collection, sample processing, and information processing are vital to enable identification and warning of chemical exposure.

Detection can be accomplished at a designated location (point detection) or at a distance (standoff detection). No single fielded sensor detects all chemical agents of interest. Standoff detection is particularly difficult for low volatility agents (e.g., either U.S. or Russian forms of VX). Sensitivity of a detector is crucial to detecting lethal concentrations. Equipment must be reliable, provide identification quickly with a low false alarm rate and high accuracy, and be integrated into an alarm system so that warning can be distributed and proper action taken. Unknown factors can include location, persistence, and intensity of the agent. These are critical parameters for command decisions. Figure 4.3-1 shows a U.S. Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM). Detection, warning, and identification have an offensive CW component and are also necessary in a defensive context.

Highlights

• Detection requirements for a purely offensive posture are minimal.
• A prudent attacker must be prepared to defend against a counter-attack in kind if the CW threshold is crossed.
• Detection, warning, and identification of the employment of CW are key to implementing defensive measures.
• Detection of CW is a key aspect of CWC compliance.

Figure 4.3-1. Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM)

Some amount of detection and warning capability is needed if a country is to develop and employ chemical weapons. When toxic chemicals are produced, detection and warning are necessary to the extent that the safety of workers is important. If storage sites are established, detection is needed to verify the integrity of the weapons and to ensure that the surrounding area does not become contaminated. These concerns can be mitigated if production occurs just before use. Even though soldiers and airmen employing chemical weapons might wear some type of protective clothing, detection is necessary to prevent inadvertent exposure and to minimize contamination. It should be noted that other countries have not considered safety to be as important as the U.S. did when it was involved in offensive CW preparation. Consequently, they may dispense with procedures that the U.S. deemed essential.

Proliferators of chemical weapons would not need much detection equipment. The agent(s) being produced and used would be known. Point detectors would be sufficient to determine inadvertent leakage. Detection capability is required to know when the environment is safe for normal operations after CW has been employed.

Detection, warning, and identification are critical in a defensive role. Protection against chemical agents is available, but since wearing protective gear degrades military performance, units must not assume a protective posture until it is mandatory. Many prophylactic measures are most effective if implemented before exposure, and many therapeutics must be initiated soon after exposure. The sophistication needed depends on the technological capability of the enemy.

The detection and identification requirements in a defensive posture are much more difficult to meet than those required for offensive operations. Detection, warning, and identification systems are further stressed because the time, place, amount, and type of agent used are determined by the attacker. The defender must be ready for anything at any time and in any amount.

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Historically, detection of ground and surface contamination has depended on a color change on special paper that was exposed to an agent. Another method was a color change that occurred when air was drawn through tubes with special dye chemicals on a substrate. Special analytical kits were used to determine the presence of chemical agents in water. Various technologies are used in automatic detectors. All of them indicate the presence of an agent in one location. A number of detectors are being developed to provide standoff capability. Figure 4.3-2 shows the U.S. Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL), which is designed to detect nerve and vesicant agent clouds at up to 5 km. If an agent can be detected at a sufficient distance, measures can be taken to avoid the contamination and the need to wear protective clothing.

RATIONALE (See Table 4.3-1)

To prevent unnecessary casualties during production, transport, storage, and employment, a proliferant might need only be able to detect those agents that are being developed. A number of technologies could be used for this purpose, although only point detectors would suffice, since the location and identity would already be known. Warning would be quite simple. A prudent attacker, however, must be prepared for a retaliatory attack by an adversary. In this case, the agent to be expected might not be known. Identification and warning would be critical to taking proper defensive measures.

The ability to detect and identify toxic agents and provide warning to forces is essential for operating in a chemical environment. Early detection and warning provide situational awareness to allow military forces to avoid or reduce the threat. If exposure cannot be avoided, troops must don protective clothing. Military forces also must know when contamination has been reduced to a level that permits normal operations. Knowledge of areas of residual contamination is important as well.

FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 4.0-2)

A number of Western countries (Canada, France, Germany, the UK, and the United States) have significant capability in sensor technology. Russia and Israel also are well advanced in this field. At least 18 countries have some type of chemical detector in their armed forces. Countries among the 18 include China, Finland, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Libya, the Netherlands, North Korea, the Czech Republic, and South Africa.

Figure 4.3-2. RSCAAL

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Table 4.3-1. Detection, Warning, and Identification Technology Parameters

(cont'd)

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Table 4.3-1. Detection, Warning, and Identification Technology Parameters (cont'd)

(cont'd)

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Table 4.3-1. Detection, Warning, and Identification Technology Parameters (cont'd)

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Table 4.3-2. Detection, Warning, and Identification Reference Data

(cont'd)

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Table 4.3-2. Detection, Warning, and Identification Reference Data (cont'd)

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SECTION 4.4—CHEMICAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS

OVERVIEW

Chemical defense includes individual and collective protection and decontamination. The goal of individual and collective protection is to use clothing ensembles and respirators as well as collective filtration systems and shelters to insulate forces from chemical agents. Decontamination is essential to return personnel and equipment to normal operating conditions. Technologies for these types of equipment are included in this subsection.

Masks protect the respiratory system by preventing the inhalation of toxic chemical vapors and aerosols. They protect eyes and face from direct contact with chemical agents as well. Important considerations in mask design are the ability to don the mask and hood quickly, communications, respiration, performance degradation, and the ability to consume fluids while the mask is in place. Masks must be compatible with operational missions and equipment (e.g., night vision goggles). Ideally, protective clothing (garments, gloves, and boots) should provide protection from contact with chemical agents as well as flame protection, with a minimum amount of heat stress. Ensembles must be durable and able to be laundered and decontaminated. Protective equipment reduces the efficiency of the person wearing it.

Collective protection enables groups to work in a toxic-free environment in tents, vehicles, or special shelters. Efforts are aimed at making systems mobile and easy to erect. Air supplied to shelters is purified in much the same way as it is for individual masks.

Shelf life of protective equipment is a concern to all users. Periodic inspections are necessary to ensure readiness.

Decontamination removes toxic substances or renders them harmless. Individuals and equipment must be decontaminated. Depending on the particular agent, CW agents can be washed and rinsed away, evaporated, absorbed, or removed by heat treatment.

There is medical treatment available to offset the effects of chemical weapons. Atropine and 2-PAM chloride can be administered upon suspicion of exposure to a nerve agent. Atropine is an anticholinergic agent. It blocks the action of acetylcholine (a nerve transmitter substance), preventing it from stimulating nerves. 2-PAM chloride is anoxime, which increases the effectiveness of drug therapy in poisoning by some—but not all—cholinesterase inhibitors. Atropine and 2-PAM chloride only work to a limited degree with refractive nerve agents such as GD. Their administration when an exposure has not occurred can be harmful. Diazepam (more commonly known as Valium) is used as an anticonvulsant once an individual exhibits incapacitating

Highlights

• Masks and protective clothing are needed to defend against many toxic chemicals.
• Reduction in combat efficiency from wearing protective gear is estimated to be up to 50 percent.
• Proliferators may not provide the same measure of protection that is afforded U.S. troops.
• Training and protection reduce the effectiveness of chemical weapons.

symptoms of nerve agent exposure. The carbamate pyridostigmine, given in a dose of 30 mg every 8 hours, can be used as a pretreatment for nerve agent exposure.

Without appropriate chemical defenses, operations may have to be limited. Forces could be required to remain covered until the threat of further exposure is reduced. This could be mission threatening if persistent agents are encountered. An alternative is to avoid contamination. To do this, detection equipment must be integrated with a command and control system to ensure an alarm is disseminated.

In chemical warfare, effective chemical defense measures can greatly limit the damage inflicted by a chemical attack. In World War I the gas mask had a dramatic effect in limiting the significance of chemical weapons. Developments since then (improved masks, protective clothing, detectors, and training) have further widened the margin of protection. Collective protection takes defensive measures one step further by providing a toxic-free environment for group functions such as command centers and medical facilities. Since World War I, chemical warfare has only been used against those entirely lacking or highly deficient in protective equipment. Some suggest that chemical defense acts as a deterrent to the initiation of chemical warfare because there is less incentive to attack a well-protected force. World War II is cited as an example of this theory, since both sides were well equipped for chemical defense and neither side used chemical weapons. Others suggest that equivalent offensive capability is the real deterrent. While protective clothing can reduce the effects of CW, its use poses other problems.

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Figure 4.4-1. Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) The wearing of individual protective equipment can hinder performance by interfering with vision, communication, and dexterity. High ambient temperatures are particularly devastating to those required to don protective clothing. With training, many of the negative effects can be minimized. Overheating, however, is difficult to overcome. In hot weather, full protective gear is very burdensome. Even the threat of agents can dictate the donning of gear. Commanders must then consider limiting the duration of operations or elect to compromise the protection afforded by individual gear. Figure 4.4-1 shows the newest U.S. protective clothing.

Although the CWC prohibits the development, production, possession, and transfer of chemical weapons, it places no restraint on chemical defensive measures. The Convention ensures the rights of parties to maintain chemical defense programs and grants parties the right to "...participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material, and scientific and technological information concerning means of protection against chemical weapons."

Chemical defense systems are needed by both an attacker and a defender. An offensive unit needs to limit the number of casualties caused by inadvertent exposure. In addition, troops must be prepared for a retaliatory strike once chemical agents have been used. Since the attacker chooses the time, place, extent, and duration of an attack, defensive measures by the attacker can be planned accordingly. The extent of defensive equipment needed by a proliferant is dictated primarily by the value the nation places on human life and well-being of its forces. Other factors include potential adversaries, extent of CW use expected, quality of munitions and sealing techniques, and proficiency of both military and civilian populations obtained through training.

RATIONALE (See Table 4.4-1)

Even proliferants must provide some amount of protection for their people if they are to prevent casualties during production, storage, transport, and employment of chemical weapons. Often rogue states include defensive training for their ground forces. That is not to say that protection must or will be supplied according to U.S. standards. In World War II, the Soviets were reported to have filled chemical shells in the open with no protection. When workers died, they were replaced.

If a defensive posture is developed, individual protection, decontamination, and collective protection could be part of the program. Military requirements are much more stringent than commercial applications which deal with known substances. Ground, air, and naval forces are all subject to attack with unknown agents and must be protected. A robust defensive capability not only protects troops but could act as a deterrent against a chemical-capable adversary.

Technologies in this section can enhance chemical protection for troops. If contamination is unavoidable, protective clothing enables an individual to continue operations in a chemical environment. Collective protection is important for providing a safe and contamination-free work area and rest/relief facilities. A key use of collective protection is in medical facilities.

FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 4.0-2)

Numerous countries produce chemical protective gear. Production of masks is the most common, including masks for civilians (as seen in Israel during Operation Desert Storm), although limited shelf life remains a problem. Many NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries as well as Middle East and Asian states produce protective clothing. Only a few manufacture aircraft respiratory equipment: Canada, Norway, Russia, and the UK. A number of countries have developed collective protection for shelters: Finland, France, Israel, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. In addition, Russia has fielded and maintains a substantial inventory of collective protection systems for a wide variety of vehicles and shelters.

Since 1990 North Korea has placed a high priority on military and civilian chemical defense readiness. Training in a chemical environment is mandatory and an integral part of armed forces training. Pyongyang is attempting to equip all forces, including its reserves, with full protective gear. In addition, it has directed that the entire population be issued gas masks. Iran has increased defensive chemical warfare training in the last few years and is making efforts to buy foreign equipment.

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Table 4.4-1. Chemical Defense Systems Technology Parameters

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Table 4.4-2. Chemical Defense Systems Reference Data

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SECTION V

NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY

SECTION 5—NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY

Scope 5.1 Enrichment Feedstocks Production ........................................ II-5-10 5.2 Uranium Enrichment Processes ............................................ II-5-13 5.3 Nuclear Fission Reactors ................................................ II-5-42 5.4 Plutonium Extraction (Reprocessing) ..................................... II-5-48 5.5 Lithium Production ...................................................... II-5-54 5.6 Nuclear Weapons Design and Development .................................. II-5-58 5.7 Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing ...................................... II-5-67 5.8 Radiological Weapons .................................................... II-5-75 5.9 Manufacturing of Nuclear Components ..................................... II-5-79 5.10 Nuclear Weapons Development Testing .................................... II-5-91 5.11 Nuclear Weapons Custody, Transport, and Control ........................ II-5-109 5.12 Heavy Water Production ................................................. II-5-112 5.13 Tritium Production ..................................................... II-5-117

Highlights

• The design and production of nuclear weapons in 1997 is a far simpler process than it was during the Manhattan Project.
• Indigenous development of nuclear weapons is possible for countries with industrial bases no greater than that of Iraq in 1990. Given a source of fissile material, even terrorist groups could construct their own nuclear explosive devices.
• At least two types of nuclear weapons can be built and fielded without any kind of yield test, and the possessors could have reasonable confidence in the performance of those devices.
• The standing up of elite units to take custody of nuclear weapons or to employ them would be a useful indicator that a proliferant is approaching the completion of its first weapon.
• The acquisition of fissile material in sufficient quantity is the most formidable obstacle to the production of nuclear weapons.

BACKGROUND

General

This section examines the technologies needed to construct nuclear and radiological weapons and to employ both kinds of weapons either for military purposes or an act of terror. Since their introduction in 1945, nuclear explosives have been the most feared of the weapons of mass destruction, in part because of their ability to cause enormous instantaneous devastation and of the persistent effects of the radiation they emit, unseen and undetectable by unaided human senses. The Manhattan Project cost the United States $2 billion in 1945 spending power and required the combined efforts of a continent-spanning industrial enterprise and a pool of scientists, many of whom had already been awarded the Nobel Prize and many more who would go on to become Nobel Laureates. This array of talent was needed in 1942 if there were to be any hope of completing a weapon during the Second World War. Because nuclear fission was discovered in Germany, which remained the home of many brilliant scientists, the United States correctly perceived itself to be in a race to build an atomic bomb.

For many decades the Manhattan Project provided the paradigm against which any potential proliferator's efforts would be measured. Fifty years after the Trinity explosion, it has been recognized that the Manhattan Project is just one of a spectrum of approaches to the acquisition of a nuclear capability. At the low end of the scale, a nation may find a way to obtain a complete working nuclear bomb from a willing or unwilling supplier; at the other end, it may elect to construct a complete nuclear infrastructure including the mining of uranium, the enrichment of uranium metal in the fissile isotope 235U, the production and extraction of plutonium, the production of tritium, and the separation of deuterium and 6Li to build thermonuclear weapons. At an intermediate level, the Republic of South Africa constructed six quite simple nuclear devices for a total project cost of less than $1 billion (1980's purchasing power) using no more than 400 people and indigenous technology.

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Although talented people are essential to the success of any nuclear weapons program, the fundamental physics, chemistry, and engineering involved are widely understood; no basic research is required to construct a nuclear weapon. Therefore, a nuclear weapons project begun in 1996 does not require the brilliant scientists who were needed for the Manhattan Project.¹

Acquisition of a militarily significant nuclear capability involves, however, more than simply the purchase or construction of a single nuclear device or weapon. It requires attention to issues of safety and handling of the weapons, reliability and predictability of entire systems, efficient use of scarce and valuable special nuclear material (SNM) (plutonium and enriched uranium), chains of custody and procedures for authorizing the use of the weapons, and the careful training of the military personnel who will deliver weapons to their targets.

In contrast, a nuclear device used for terrorism need not be constructed to survive a complex stockpile-to-target sequence, need not have a predictable and reliable yield, and need not be efficient in its use of nuclear material. Although major acts of terrorism are often rehearsed and the terrorists trained for the operation, the level of training probably is not remotely comparable to that necessary in a military establishment entrusted with the nuclear mission.

Testing of Nuclear Weapons

The first nuclear weapon used in combat used an untested gun-assembled design, but a very simple and inefficient one. The first implosion device was tested on July 16, 1945, near Alamogordo, New Mexico, and an identical "physics package" (the portion of the weapon including fissile and fusion fuels plus high explosives) was swiftly incorporated into the bomb dropped on Nagasaki.

Nuclear weaponry has advanced considerably since 1945, as can be seen at an unclassified level by comparing the size and weight of "Fat Man" with the far smaller, lighter, and more powerful weapons carried by modern ballistic missiles.

Most nations of the world, including those of proliferation interest, have subscribed to the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which requires that nuclear explosions only take place underground. Underground testing can be detected by seismic means and by observing radioactive effluent in the atmosphere. It is probably easier to detect and identify a small nuclear test in the atmosphere than it is to detect and identify a similarly sized underground test. In either case, highly specialized instrumentation is required if a nuclear test explosion is to yield useful data to the nation carrying out the experiment. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was opened for signature and signed at the United Nations on 24 September 1996 by the five declared nuclear weapon states, Israel, and several other states. By the end of February 1998, more than 140 states had signed the accord. The Treaty bans all further tests which produce nuclear yield. In all probability, most of the nations of greatest proliferation concern will be persuaded to accede to the accord, although the present government of India has refused to sign.

Rate of Change of Nuclear Weapons Technology

American nuclear technology evolved rapidly between 1944 and 1950, moving from the primitive Fat Man and Little Boy to more sophisticated, lighter, more powerful, and more efficient designs. Much design effort shifted from fission to thermonuclear weapons after President Truman decided that the United States should proceed to develop a hydrogen bomb, a task which occupied the Los Alamos Laboratory from 1950 through 1952.² From 1952 until the early years of the ICBM era [roughly to the late 1960's], new concepts in both fission primary and fusion secondary design were developed rapidly. However, after the introduction of the principal families of weapons in the modern stockpile (approximately the mid 1970's), the rate of design innovations and truly new concepts slowed as nuclear weapon technology became a mature science. It is believed that other nations' experiences have been roughly similar, although the United States probably has the greatest breadth of experience with innovative designs simply because of the more than 1,100 nuclear detonations it has conducted. The number of useful variations on the themes of primary and secondary design is finite, and designers' final choices are frequently constrained by considerations of weapon size, weight, safety, and the availability of special materials.

U.S. nuclear weapons technology is mature and might not have shown many more qualitative advances over the long haul, even absent a test ban. The same is roughly true for Russia, the UK, and possibly for France.

The design of the nuclear device for a specific nuclear weapon is constrained by several factors. The most important of these are the weight the delivery vehicle can carry plus the size of the space available in which to carry the weapon (e.g., the diameter and length of a nosecone or the length and width of a bomb bay). The required yield of the device is established by the target vulnerability. The possible yield is set by the state of nuclear weapon technology and by the availability of special materials. Finally, the choices of specific design details of the device are determined by the taste of its designers, who will be influenced by their experience and the traditions of their organization.

¹ When the Manhattan Project began far less than a microgram of plutonium had been made throughout the world, and plutonium chemistry could only be guessed at; the numbers of neutrons released on average in ²³⁵U and ²³⁹Pu fissions were unknown; the fission cross sections (probabilities that an interaction would occur) were equally unknown, as was the neutron absorption cross section of carbon.

² The "Mike" test of Operation Ivy, 1 November, 1952, was the first explosion of a true two-stage thermonuclear device. The "George" shot of Operation Greenhouse (May 9, 1951) confirmed for the first time that a fission device could produce the conditions needed to ignite a thermonuclear reaction.

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A Caution on the Use of "Authoritative Control Documents and Tables"

Authoritative lists of export-controlled and militarily critical equipment and materials used in the construction and testing of nuclear weapons necessarily have flaws:

• They consistently lag the technology actually available on the world market. Some items at the threshold of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Dual-Use List restrictions may not be available as newly manufactured equipment. On the other hand, it would be improper to place the thresholds higher, since equipment much less sophisticated than can be bought today was used with great success in both the United States and the Former Soviet Union.
• Second, these limits do not always define the limits at which the technologies have utility to proliferators.

OVERVIEW

This section will discuss the fundamentals of nuclear weapons design, engineering, and production including the production of special nuclear materials (uranium enriched to greater than 20 percent in the isotope $^{235}$U, $^{235}$U, and for plutonium). It will also look at the other technologies including production of uranium and plutonium metal; manufacturing; nuclear testing; lithium production; safing, arming, fuzing, and firing (SAFF); radiological weapons; the custody, transport, and control of nuclear weapons; heavy water production; and tritium production.

It is possible to capture schematically the progress in nuclear weapons technology and the technologies which support nuclear weapons in the following graph (Figure 5.0-1). The X axis is time, beginning in 1942 when the Manhattan Project was fully activated. The top two lines show the development of electronics and the introduction of devices which affected the design of the non-nuclear components of the weapons. The second pair of lines shows the progress made in preparing special nuclear materials, with the processes above the dashed line referring to methods of enriching uranium and those below the dashed line referring to plutonium production and the materials for fusion weapons.

The oddly shaped heavy curve shows the rate at which U.S. nuclear weapons scientists made new discoveries and progress. The distance between the two curves represents the rate of progress, while the area between the curves from 1942 to any arbitrary date gives an estimate of the total knowledge acquired. The rate of progress drops almost to zero on 30 October 1958, when the Eisenhower-Khrushchev Moratorium on nuclear testing went into effect.

Superimposed on the heavy curve are events of historic importance: the first testing and use of nuclear weapons, the first Soviet test along with the dates when other nations joined the nuclear club, the evolution of hydrogen weapons and boosting, the introduction of powerful computers, computerized numerically controlled (CNC) tools, the year when the IBM PC made its appearance on desktops, tailored effects weapons such as the x-ray laser, and the end of nuclear testing. Specific U.S. achievements are also noted in the area bounded by the heavy curves. A similar chart could be made for the progress of every other nuclear weapon state, acknowledged or unacknowledged, if the information were available.

This chart illustrates several trends which are important to an understanding of the process by which a proliferator might gain a nuclear capability. At the same time, it indicates the few choke points where the control of technologies might be helpful. The top line shows advances over time in electronic components. The second and third lines show advances over time in the production of SNM. All five acknowledged nuclear weapons states (NWSs) are shown to have tested their first devices before computer numerically controlled machine tools and four- or five-axis machine tools were generally available.

Modern computers incorporating large amounts of solid-state fast memory did not make their appearance until the early 1970's, and even fast transistorized (not integrated circuit chips) computers were not generally available until the early 1960's. By the time such computers became available to the American design laboratories, most of the fundamental families of modern nuclear weapons had already been conceived, designed, and tested. Computation brought a new ability to design for nuclear weapon safety and a new capability to execute complex designs which might reduce the amount of fissile materials and other scarce fuels used in the weapons.

Finally, an inspection of the chart indicates very rapid qualitative progress in the early years of the U.S. nuclear effort, with new design types and wholly new weapon families emerging in rapid succession. In part, this occurred because the creative scientists were given permission to try almost any idea which sounded good, and in part it is because of the rapid interplay between conceptual advances and all-up nuclear tests. During the 1958–61 moratorium on testing the rate at which new ideas were introduced slowed, although a great deal of progress towards ensuring weapon safety was made. By the early 1970's the era of new concepts in nuclear weapon design had virtually come to an end, although qualitative improvements in yield, weight, and the efficient use of special materials were made.

Similar statements, differing in detail but not in outline, could probably be made for each of the five NWSs and any threshold states with active weapons projects. However, it is unlikely that the evolution of nuclear designs, means of assembly, and initiation followed the same course in any two countries.

More detailed descriptions of the various components of a nuclear weapons program will be found in the numbered sections below.

Production of Fuel for Nuclear Weapons

Ordinary uranium contains only 0.72 percent $^{235}$U, the highly fissionable isotope, the rest of the material being largely the much less fissionable isotope $^{238}$U (which cannot sustain a chain reaction). The fissile material must be separated from the rest of the uranium by a process known as enrichment. Several enrichment techniques have

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been used. The earliest successful methods were electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS), in which large magnets are used to separate ions of the two isotopes,³ and gaseous diffusion, in which the gas uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) is passed through a porous barrier material; the lighter molecules containing ²³⁵U penetrate the barrier slightly more rapidly, and with enough stages significant separation can be accomplished. Both gaseous diffusion and EMIS require enormous amounts of electricity. More efficient methods have been developed.

The third method in widespread use is the gas centrifuge [Urenco (Netherlands, Germany, UK), Russia, Japan] in which UF₆ gas is whirled inside complex rotor assemblies and centrifugal force pushes molecules containing the heavier isotope to the outside. Again, many stages are needed to produce the highly enriched uranium needed for a weapon, but centrifuge enrichment requires much less electricity than either of the older technologies.

Atomic and molecular laser isotope separation (LIS) techniques use lasers to selectively excite atoms or molecules containing one isotope of uranium so that they can be preferentially extracted. Although LIS appears promising, the technology has proven to be extremely difficult to master and may be beyond the reach of even technically advanced states.

The South African nuclear program used an aerodynamic separation technique in an indigenously designed and built device called a vortex tube. In the vortex a mixture of UF gas and hydrogen is injected tangentially into a tube, which tapers to a small exit aperture at one or both ends; centrifugal force provides the separation. The Becker Nozzle Process, also an aerodynamic separation technique, was developed in Germany. The Becker process is not in common use; the vortex tube was used in South Africa for producing reactor fuel with a ²³⁵U content of around 3–5 percent in addition to making 80–93 percent ²³⁵U for the weapons program. Aerodynamic enrichment processes require large amounts of electricity and are not generally considered economically competitive; even the South African enrichment plant has apparently been closed.

Uranium enriched to 20 percent or more ²³⁵U is called highly enriched (HEU). Uranium enriched above the natural ²³⁵U abundance but to less than 20 percent is called low-enriched (LEU).

Plutonium is produced in nuclear reactors by bombarding “fertile” ²³U with neutrons from the chain reaction. Since each fission produces only slightly more than two neutrons, on average, the neutron “economy” must be managed carefully, which requires good instrumentation and an understanding of reactor physics, to have enough neutrons to irradiate useful quantities of ²³⁸U.⁴ A typical production reactor produces about 0.8 atoms of plutonium for each nucleus of ²³⁵U which fissions. A good rule of thumb is that 1 gram of plutonium is produced for each megawatt (thermal)-day of reactor operation. Light-water power reactors make fewer plutonium nuclei per uranium fission than graphite-moderated production reactors.

The plutonium must be extracted chemically in a reprocessing plant. Reprocessing is a complicated process involving the handling of highly radioactive materials and must be done by robots or by humans using remote manipulating equipment. At some stages of the process simple glove boxes with lead glass windows suffice. Reprocessing is intrinsically dangerous because of the use of hot acids in which plutonium and intensely radioactive short-lived fission products are dissolved. Some observers have, however, suggested that the safety measures could be relaxed to the extent that the proliferator deems his technicians to be “expendable.” Disposal of the high-level waste from reprocessing is difficult. Any reprocessing facility requires large quantities of concrete for shielding and will vent radioactive gases (¹³¹I, for example) to the atmosphere.

Tritium for thermonuclear weapons is usually produced in a nuclear reactor similar or identical to that used to make plutonium. Neutrons from the reactor are used to irradiate lithium metal, and the nuclear reaction produces a triton.

Lithium-6, an isotope of lithium, is used in some thermonuclear weapons. When struck by a neutron, ⁶Li (actually the compound ⁷Li nucleus formed in the collision) frequently disintegrates into tritium and ⁴He. Thus, the tritium needed for the secondary of a fusion weapon can be formed in place within the nuclear device and need not be transported from the factory to the target as heavy hydrogen.

The lighter isotope, ⁶Li, is separated from the principal isotope, ⁷Li, in a process which exploits the fact that the lighter isotope more readily forms an amalgam with mercury than does the heavier one. This process is called “COLEX” (Column Exchange). Lithium hydroxide is dissolved in water, and the aqueous solution is brought into contact with the mercury. Lithium-6 ions in the solution tend to migrate into the mercury, while Li in the amalgam tends to migrate back into the aqueous hydroxide solution. The reaction is generally carried out in large columnar processors. While other processes for separating the lithium isotopes have been tried, the United States found COLEX to be the most successful. It is believed that the Soviet Union chose the same process.

³ The first large-scale uranium enrichment facility, the Y-12 plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, used EMIS in devices called “calutrons.” The process was abandoned in the United States because of its high consumption of electricity, but was adopted by the Iraqis because of its relative simplicity and their ability to procure the magnet material without encountering technology transfer obstacles.

⁴ Note, however, that during the Manhattan Project the United States was able to scale an operating 250 watt reactor to a 250 megawatt production reactor. Although the instrumentation of the day was far less sophisticated than that in use today, the scientists working the problem were exceptional.

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Nuclear History

Thyratron (α, n) Initiators ZIPPER Integrated Circuits Laser-Fiber Optics High Density Electrical Storage EBW/ BC Firing Transistor Flux Compression SPRYTRON Modern Pulse Control & Shaping EMIS Thermal Diff. + Gaseous Diff. Centrifuge Helikon/Becker LIS Reactor PUREX Tritium 6Li (colex) Accelerator Based 3H

Greenhouse/GEORGE & Item Joe 1 War Shots Terrorist Choices Ivy/MIKE Castle/BRAVO Stretch Computer UK China France US/USSR Build-up CNC Tools Era of Modern Computers India Israel IBM PC XRL RSA US Testing Ceases Stewardship Begins

U implosion Fatman Improved Fatman 2-Stage Device Boosting Plowshare Modern Primary Modern Secondary MIRV Tailored Effects Era of Scientific Understanding

U gun Deliverable "Dry" Bomb (1953) PALS Eisenhower Moratorium

Possible Proliferant Steps Proliferant Route to Major Capacity Practical ICBM or MRBM China Post-1996

1942 1952 1962 1972 1982 1992 1996

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Figure 5.0-1. Nuclear History

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Use Control and Weapons Delivery Because of the high cost and high value of a new entrant's first few nuclear weapons, it is likely that the proliferant state would take great care to ensure that the crews selected to deliver the special ordnance would be highly proficient in the use of their weapon systems. This requires extensive training in the specialized procedures required to place nuclear weapons reliably on target.

Nuclear weapons training may be both distinctive and visible, particularly when it involves those parts of the stockpile-to-target sequence which are explicitly nuclear. Some observers believe, however, that such training will be difficult to observe and identify.

Expected Rates of Progress for New Proliferants New proliferants with First-World technological bases can probably construct their first nuclear weapons 3 to 5 years after making a political decision to do so, even including constructing an infrastructure to make special nuclear materials, assuming that finances and resources are available.⁶ The first intellectual steps towards reducing the size and mass of fission weapons should not take more than another 1 to 2 years to master. Boosting and multistage weapons may require anywhere from 3 to 10 more years to develop in the absence of yield testing, and some nations may still fail to succeed. China, however, progressed from a very simple fission design to a two-stage weapon by its fifth full-scale test—but one of the intervening tests was an end-to-end firing of a ballistic missile with a live nuclear warhead in its nosecone.

Radiological Weapons Radioactive isotopes suitable for use as weapons include ¹³⁷Cs, ⁶⁰Co, ¹³¹I, and other short-lived, relatively easy-to-produce fission products. The most readily available source for the materials of radiological weapons is spent fuel from nuclear reactors; indeed, the spent fuel rods themselves are sufficiently "hot" that they can be used essentially directly, although chopping or pulverization would be useful. Medical isotopes are another readily available source of radioactive material in quantities suitable for spreading terror.

Proliferation Implication Assessment Many of the items on which the greatest control efforts have focused, at least in the public's perception—computers, switch tubes, capacitors—are either not control-lable or, at a controllable level, are far more capable than what is required to design and build a weapon.

FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2) Five nations, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China are nuclear weapon states according to the definition in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (countries that tested a nuclear explosive device before 1 January 1967). All five possess all technologies needed to build modern compact nuclear weapons and all have produced both high-enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium.

India detonated a nuclear device using plutonium implosion in 1974. India has held no announced tests since then, although they have on occasion taken steps which would imply that a test is imminent. India does not enrich uranium. It has heavy-water moderated reactors, not all under international safeguards.

Pakistan has an operating uranium enrichment plant. Senior Pakistani officials have alluded to possession of a small nuclear stockpile.

South Africa constructed six simple gun-assembled uranium bombs but dismantled them and signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-weapons state. The HEU for these bombs was obtained from an aerodynamic isotope separation technique developed indigenously. South Africa has shut down its aerodynamic enrichment facilities, but is developing a molecular LIS (MLIS) process for producing LEU for commercial nuclear power reactors.

Israel is believed by some to possess nuclear weapons. It operates one unsafeguarded nuclear reactor at Dimona and presumably is capable of reprocessing spent fuel to extract plutonium. It is a technically advanced state and probably has all of the electronics needed to build and test nuclear weapons. Its elite air force may be nuclear trained.

Iraq had a flourishing nuclear weapons and civilian nuclear program until the 1991 Gulf War. It was able to enrich uranium using EMIS and was pursuing centrifuge enrichment as well. It anticipated constructing implosion weapons using HEU as the fuel.

Iran has many components of a nuclear weapons program in place and has been attempting to purchase turnkey nuclear reactors on the world market.

North Korea built and operated CO₂-cooled, graphite-moderated reactors and had built and operated a reprocessing facility before agreeing to allow the United States and South Korea to replace its gas-graphite "power" reactor with a light-water moderated unit less suited to the production of weapons-grade plutonium. The amount of plutonium it currently has in hand outside of that contained in its spent fuel storage facility is not well known by outsiders.

Sweden came very close to building nuclear weapons in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Many experts judge its weapon designs as sophisticated and efficient; the

⁶ Nations such as Germany and Japan, which have advanced civilian nuclear power programs and stocks of plutonium (either separated or still contained in spent fuel) may be able to produce their first weapons in even less time. Countries which have a nuclear infrastructure and which have expended considerable effort in learning how to build nuclear weapons while still not crossing the nuclear threshold (e.g., Sweden) also are in a favorable position to go nuclear in short order.

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country has the industrial base to “go nuclear” in a short period and has adequate amounts of plutonium contained in stored spent reactor fuel.

Switzerland had a nuclear weapons program until the early 1970’s. Both Sweden and Switzerland are highly industrialized Western nations with broad access to a full spectrum of modern technology, whether developed indigenously or imported. Both operate nuclear reactors.

Germany has developed an indigenous uranium enrichment process (not believed to be currently in use) and has adequate stocks of spent fuel from which to prepare nuclear weapons.

Japan is as far advanced as Germany and also operates a reprocessing plant. Either nation could construct nuclear weapons in a short time.

Many other states have capabilities in some or all of the relevant technologies and could assemble a nuclear weapons program in a short time.

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| Country | Sec 5.1 Enrichment Feedstocks Production | Sec 5.2 Uranium Enrichment Processes | Sec 5.3 Nuclear Fission Reactors | Sec 5.4 Plutonium Extraction (Reprocessing) | Sec 5.5 Lithium Production | Sec 5.6 Nuclear Weapons Design and Development | Sec 5.7 Safing, Arming, Fuzing, and Firing | Sec 5.8 Radiological Weapons | Sec 5.9 Manufacturing of Nuclear Components | Sec 5.10 Nuclear Weapons Development Testing | Sec 5.11 Nuclear Weapons Custody, Transport, and Control | Sec 5.12 Heavy Water Production | Sec 5.13 Tritium Production |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Argentina | ♦ | | ♦♦ | | | ♦♦ | | | | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Austria | | | ♦ | | | | ♦ | | | ♦ | ♦ | | ♦♦ |
| Belgium | | | ♦♦♦♦ | | | | ♦ | | | ♦ | | | ♦♦ |
| Brazil | ♦♦ | | ♦♦ | | | ♦♦ | | | | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ |
| Canada | ♦♦♦ | | ♦♦♦♦ | | | ♦♦♦ | ♦ | | | ♦ | ♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| China | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Czech Republic | | | ♦♦ | | | | | | | | | | |
| France | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Germany | | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | | | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | | ♦♦♦♦ | | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ |
| India | ♦♦ | | ♦♦♦♦ | | | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| Iran | | ♦ | ♦♦ | | | ♦♦ | | | | ♦ | ♦♦ | | |
| Iraq | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦ | | ♦♦♦ | ♦ | | ♦♦ | ♦ | ♦♦ | | |
| Italy | | | | ♦♦♦ | | | ♦♦ | | ♦♦ | | | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Japan | | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | | ♦♦♦♦ | | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Netherlands | | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | | | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | | | | | ♦♦ | ♦ |
| North Korea | ♦♦ | | ♦♦ | ♦ | | ♦♦♦ | | | | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | | |
| Pakistan | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | | | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦ | | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | |
| Russia | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| South Africa | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | | | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | | ♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| South Korea | | | ♦♦♦♦ | | | ♦♦♦ | ♦ | | | | | ♦ | ♦ |
| Sweden | | | ♦♦♦♦ | | | ♦♦♦ | | | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Switzerland | | | ♦♦♦♦ | | | ♦♦♦ | | | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ | ♦♦♦ | ♦♦ |
| Taiwan | | | ♦♦♦ | | | ♦♦♦ | | | | ♦♦♦ | | ♦ | ♦ |
| Ukraine | | | ♦♦♦ | | | ♦ | | | | ♦ | ♦♦ | ♦ | |
| United Kingdom | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |
| United States | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ | ♦♦♦♦ |

Legend: Sufficient Technologies Capabilities: ♦♦♦♦ exceeds sufficient level ♦♦♦ sufficient level ♦♦ some ♦ limited
Because two or more countries have the same number of diamonds does not mean that their capabilities are the same. An absence of diamonds in countries of concern may indicate an absence of information, not of capability. The absence of a country from this list may indicate an absence of information, not capability.

Figure 5.0-2. Nuclear Weapons Foreign Technology Assessment Summary

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SECTION 5.1—ENRICHMENT FEEDSTOCKS PRODUCTION

OVERVIEW

This subsection covers technologies utilized in the conversion of uranium ore concentrates to highly purified uranium hexafluoride (UF$_6$) and uranium tetrachloride (UCl$_4$) for subsequent use as feedstock in a uranium-enrichment process. Gaseous UF$_6$ is used as the feed in the gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion processes, and UCl$_4$ is used as feed in the electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) process.

Uranium ore concentrates, also known as yellowcake, typically contain 60–80 percent uranium and up to 20 percent extraneous impurities. There are two commercial processes used to produce purified UF$_6$ from yellowcake. The primary difference between the two processes—solvent extraction/fluorination (“wet process”) and fluorination/fractionation (“dry process”)—is whether the uranium is purified by solvent extraction before conversion to UF$_6$ or by fractional distillation of the UF$_6$ after conversion.

In the wet process, yellowcake is dissolved in nitric acid (HNO$_3$), and the insoluble residue is removed by filtration or centrifugation. Uranium is separated from the acid solution with liquid-liquid extraction, the uranyl nitrate product is decomposed to uranium trioxide (UO$_3$) via thermal denitration, and the trioxide is reduced to uranium dioxide (UO$_2$) with hydrogen or cracked ammonia (NH$_3$). In most cases, the standard Purex process, using tri-n-butyl phosphate (TBP) in a hydrocarbon diluent, separates uranium from its impurities in the extraction step.

In the dry process, the conversion and purification steps occur throughout the process. If the yellowcake was produced by the alkali-leach process (yields Na$_2$U$_2$O$_7$), the sodium must be removed from the material by partial digestion in sulfuric acid followed by ammonia precipitation of ammonium diuranate [(NH$_4$)$_2$U$_2$O$_7$]. The ammonium-containing uranium salt is decomposed to UO$_3$ by heating, and this oxide is reduced to UO$_2$ with hydrogen or cracked NH$_3$.

The remaining steps used to produce UF$_6$ for both processes are similar in that the UO$_2$ is converted to UF$_4$ by hydrofluorination (using hydrogen fluoride gas—HF). The UF$_4$ (impure in the dry process) is converted to UF$_6$ using electrolytically generated fluorine gas (F$_2$). In the dry process, the UF$_6$ is purified in a two-stage distillation step. Direct fluorination of UO$_3$ to UF$_6$ has been used, but this procedure is more amenable to relatively small capacity plants.

Highlights

• UF$_6$ and UCl$_4$ are the principal compounds used as inputs to uranium enrichment processes.
• Manufacture of these feedstocks is straightforward industrial chemistry.
• These processes are unclassified and widely known.

The EMIS uranium-enrichment process uses UCl$_4$ for its feed material. Uranium tetrachloride is produced by the reaction of carbon tetrachloride (CCl$_4$) with pure UO$_2$ at 700 °F.

RATIONALE

A country choosing to join the nuclear weapons community must acquire the necessary weapons (fissile) material ($^{235}$U or $^{239}$Pu). A state selecting uranium for its weapons must obtain a supply of uranium ore and construct an enrichment plant because the $^{235}$U content in natural uranium is over two orders of magnitude lower than that found in weapons grade uranium (>90 percent $^{235}$U). Nearly all uranium enrichment plants utilize UF$_6$ as their feed. A country may select the EMIS process, which uses UCl$_4$ as its feed material, for enriching uranium.

FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2)

The processes outlined above are unclassified and have been described extensively in the literature on the nuclear fuel cycle. Many countries around the world have extracted uranium from its ores or from yellowcake. The processes for preparing the feedstocks are basic industrial chemistry.

The enabling technologies are those which use HF, NH$_3$, F$_2$, CCl$_4$, and precursor uranium compounds to prepare UF$_6$ and UCL$_4$.

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Table 5.1-1. Enrichment Feedstocks Production Technology Parameters

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Table 5.1-2. Enrichment Feedstocks Production Reference Data

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SECTION 5.2—URANIUM ENRICHMENT PROCESSES

OVERVIEW

It is generally recognized that the acquisition of fissile material in sufficient quantity is the most formidable obstacle to the production of nuclear weapons. Fissile material production consumes the vast majority of the technical, industrial, and financial resources required to produce nuclear weapons. For example, production of fissile materials—highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium—accounted for more than 80 percent of the $1.9 billion (1945 dollars) spent on the Manhattan Project.

Fissile materials can produce energy by nuclear fission, either in nuclear reactors or in nuclear weapons. The principal fissile materials of interest are ²³⁵U, ²³³U, and ²³⁹Pu. Uranium-235 is of particular interest because it is the only fissile material that occurs in nature in significant quantity, and it can be used to construct a nuclear explosive device if a sufficient quantity can be acquired. In a typical sample of natural uranium, only 0.72 percent of the atoms are ²³U atoms, and it can be assumed that all of the remaining atoms are ²³⁸U atoms.⁸ Higher concentrations of ²³⁵U are required for many applications, and the use of uranium isotope separation processes to increase the assay of ²³U above its natural value of 0.72 percent is called uranium enrichment.

While low-enriched uranium (LEU) could technically mean uranium with an assay anywhere between slightly greater than natural (0.72 percent) and 20 percent ²³⁵U, it most commonly is used to denote uranium with an assay suitable for use in a light-water nuclear reactor (i.e., an assay of <5 percent). Similarly, the term “highly enriched” uranium (HEU) could be used to describe uranium with an assay >20 percent, but it is commonly used to refer to uranium enriched to 90 percent ²³⁵U or higher (i.e., weapons-grade uranium). The term “oralloy” was used during World War II as a contraction of “Oak Ridge alloy,” and it denoted uranium enriched to 93.5 percent ²³⁵U.

When plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, inevitably some ²⁴⁰Pu (as well as heavier plutonium isotopes, including ²⁴¹Pu and ²⁴²Pu) is produced along with the more desirable ²³⁹Pu. The heavier isotope is not as readily fissionable, and it also decays by spontaneous fission, producing unwanted background neutrons. Thus, nuclear weapon designers prefer to work with plutonium containing less than 7 percent ²⁰Pu.

Highlights

• The acquisition of fissile material in sufficient quantity is the most formidable obstacle to the production of nuclear weapons.
• Gas centrifuges are today the technology of first choice for enriching uranium, based on process economics and minimum consumption of electricity.
• Technologies considered obsolete for commercial uranium enrichment, such as electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS), can be employed by a proliferant state at some added cost in electric power and labor requirements.
• Aerodynamic separation processes developed in South Africa and Germany have proven satisfactory for a limited number of nuclear weapons, despite their high cost to operate.
• Laser isotope separation (LIS) techniques are based on advanced technologies and represent potential uranium enrichment processes of the future.

A method for separating plutonium isotopes could be used to remove the heavier isotopes of plutonium (e.g., ²⁴⁰Pu) from reactor-grade plutonium, thus producing nearly pure ²³⁹Pu. Uranium isotope separation techniques [e.g., atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS)] might be applied to this task. However, this would require mastery of production reactor and reprocessing technologies (to produce and extract the plutonium) in addition to isotope enrichment technology (to remove the heavier plutonium isotopes). In practice, it is simpler to alter the reactor refueling cycle to reduce the fraction of plutonium which is ²⁴Pu.

Manhattan Project scientists and engineers explored several uranium-enrichment technologies, and production plants employing three uranium-enrichment processes—electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS), liquid thermal diffusion, and gaseous diffusion—were constructed at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, during the period from 1943 to 1945. Centrifugation was tried, but the technology needed to spin a rotor at an appropriate speed was not then practical on an industrial scale. The aerodynamic separation processes developed in Germany and South Africa did not exist during World War II;

⁷ Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, The New World: A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Volume I, 1939/1946, University of California Press, a 1990 edition of a book originally published by Pennsylvania State University Press in 1962. ⁸ Natural uranium typically has a composition of 0.0055 atom % ²³⁴U, 0.7205 atom % ²³⁵U, and 99.274 atom % ²³⁸U. For most purposes, the tiny fraction of ²³⁴U can be neglected.

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neither, of course did laser isotope separation or plasma separation. The World War II Japanese nuclear program made some attempts to find a purely chemical process.

RATIONALE

Methods of Separation

Electromagnetic Isotope Separation

The EMIS process is based on the same physical principle as that of a simple mass spectrometer—that a charged particle will follow a circular trajectory when passing through a uniform magnetic field. Two ions with the same kinetic energy and electrical charge, but different masses (i.e., 235U+ and 238U+), will have different trajectories, with the heavier 238U+ ion having the larger diameter. The different diameters of the trajectories of the two uranium ions allow for the separation and collection of the material in receivers or “collector pockets.” EMIS is a batch process that can produce weapons-grade material from natural uranium in only two stages. However, hundreds to thousands of units would be required to produce large quantities of HEU because of the process’s relatively low product collection rate and the long cycle time required to recover material between runs.

In the uranium EMIS process, uranium ions are generated within an evacuated enclosure (called a “tank”) that is located in a strong magnetic field. For the EMIS ion source, solid uranium tetrachloride (UCl4) is electrically heated to produce UCl4 vapor. The UCl4 molecules are bombarded with electrons, producing U+ ions. The ions are accelerated by an electrical potential to high speed and follow a circular trajectory in the plane perpendicular to the magnetic field. In the U.S. EMIS separators, the ion beam traverses a 180-deg arc before the ions pass through slit apertures at the collector. A major problem with the EMIS process is that less than half of the UCl4 feed is typically converted to the desired U+ ions, and less than half of the desired U+ ions are actually collected. Recovery of unused material deposited on the interior surfaces of the tanks is a laborious, time-consuming process that reduces the effective output of an EMIS facility and requires a large material recycle operation.

In the U.S. EMIS program, production of weapons-grade uranium took place in two enrichment stages, referred to as the α and β stages. The first (α) stage used natural or slightly enriched uranium as feed and enriched it to 12–20% 235U. The second (β) stage used the product of the (α) stage as feed and further enriched it to weapons-grade uranium. To allow more efficient use of magnets and floor space, the individual stages were arranged in continuous oval or rectangular arrays (called “racetracks” or, simply, “tracks”) with separator tanks alternated with electromagnetic units. The U.S. EMIS separators are referred to as “calutrons” because the development work was carried out at the University of California (Berkeley) during the early 1940’s using cyclotrons.

Although most applications of the EMIS process have been applied to the commercial production of both stable and radioactive isotopes, all five recognized weapons states have tested or used the EMIS process for uranium enrichment. Even with the problems associated with using the process, an EMIS facility could be attractive for a country desiring a limited weapons-grade uranium enrichment program. The process might be especially appealing as a method for further enriching partially enriched material. It has been well documented that EMIS was the principal process pursued by the Iraqi uranium enrichment program. This occurred at a time when EMIS had been discarded and largely forgotten as a method for uranium enrichment because it is both energy intensive and labor intensive, and it is not economically competitive with other enrichment technologies.

Thermal Diffusion

Thermal diffusion utilizes the transfer of heat across a thin liquid or gas to accomplish isotope separation. By cooling a vertical film on one side and heating it on the other side, the resultant convection currents will produce an upward flow along the hot surface and a downward flow along the cold surface. Under these conditions, the lighter 235U gas molecules will diffuse toward the hot surface, and the heavier 238U molecules will diffuse toward the cold surface. These two diffusive motions combined with the convection currents will cause the lighter 235U molecules to concentrate at the top of the film and the heavier 238U molecules to concentrate at the bottom of the film.

The thermal-diffusion process is characterized by its simplicity, low capital cost, and high heat consumption. Thermal diffusion in liquid UF6 was used during World War II to prepare feed material for the EMIS process. A production plant containing 2,100 columns (each approximately 15 meters long) was operated in Oak Ridge for less than 1 year and provided a product assay of less than 1% 235U. Each of these columns consisted of three tubes. Cooling water was circulated between the outer and middle tubes, and the inner tube carried steam. The annular space between the inner and middle tubes was filled with liquid UF6.

The thermal-diffusion plant in Oak Ridge was dismantled when the much more energy-efficient (by a factor of 140) gaseous-diffusion plant began operation in the 1940’s. Today, thermal diffusion remains a practical process to separate isotopes of noble gases (e.g., xenon) and other light isotopes (e.g., carbon) for research purposes.

Gaseous Diffusion

The gaseous-diffusion process has been highly developed and employed to produce both HEU and commercial reactor-grade LEU. The United States first employed gaseous diffusion during WWII and expanded its capacity after the war to produce HEU. Since the late 1960’s, the U.S. facilities have been used primarily to produce commercial LEU, with the last remaining HEU capacity being shut down in 1992. China and France currently have operating diffusion plants. Russia’s enrichment facilities have been converted from diffusion to centrifuge technology. Britain’s diffusion facility was shut down and dismantled.

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The gaseous-diffusion process depends on the separation effect arising from molecular effusion (i.e., the flow of gas through small holes). On average, lighter gas molecules travel faster than heavier gas molecules and consequently tend to collide more often with the porous barrier material. Thus, lighter molecules are more likely to enter the barrier pores than are heavier molecules. For UF6, the difference in velocities between molecules containing 235U and 238U is small (0.4 percent), and, consequently, the amount of separation achieved by a single stage of gaseous diffusion is small. Therefore, many cascade stages are required to achieve even LEU assays.

The production of a sustainable, efficient separating membrane (barrier) is the key to the successful operation of a diffusion plant. To obtain an efficient porous barrier, the holes must be very small (on the order of one-millionth of an inch in diameter) and of uniform size. The porosity of the barrier must be high to obtain high flow rates through the barrier. The barrier must also be able to withstand years of operation while exposed to corrosive UF6 gas. Typical materials for the barrier are nickel and aluminum oxide.

Diffusion equipment tends to be rather large and consumes significant amounts of energy. The main components of a single gaseous-diffusion stage are (1) a large cylindrical vessel, called a diffuser or converter, that contains the barrier; (2) a compressor used to compress the gas to the pressures needed for flow through the barrier; (3) an electric motor to drive the compressor; (4) a heat exchanger to remove the heat of compression; and (5) piping and valves for stage and interstage connections and process control. The entire system must be essentially leak free, and the compressors require special seals to prevent both out-leakage of UF6 and in-leakage of air. The chemical corrosiveness of UF6 requires use of metals such as nickel or aluminum for surfaces exposed to the gas (e.g., piping and compressors). In addition to the stage equipment, auxiliary facilities for a gaseous-diffusion plant could include a large electrical power distribution system, cooling towers to dissipate the waste process heat, a fluorination facility, a steam plant, a barrier production plant, and a plant to produce dry air and nitrogen.

Gaseous diffusion is unlikely to be the preferred technology of a proliferator due to difficulties associated with making and maintaining a suitable barrier, large energy consumption, the requirement for procuring large quantities of specialized stage equipment, large in-process inventory requirements, and long equilibrium times. Gas Centrifuge

The use of centrifugal fields for isotope separation was first suggested in 1919; but efforts in this direction were unsuccessful until 1934, when J.W. Beams and co-workers at the University of Virginia applied a vacuum ultracentrifuge to the separation of chlorine isotopes. Although abandoned midway through the Manhattan Project, the gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment process has been highly developed and used to produce both HEU and LEU. It is likely to be the preferred technology of the future due to its relatively low-energy consumption, short equilibrium time, and modular design features.

In the gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment process, gaseous UF6 is fed into a cylindrical rotor that spins at high speed inside an evacuated casing. Because the rotor spins so rapidly, centrifugal force results in the gas occupying only a thin layer next to the rotor wall, with the gas moving at approximately the speed of the wall. Centrifugal force also causes the heavier 238UF6 molecules to tend to move closer to the wall than the lighter 235UF6 molecules, thus partially separating the uranium isotopes. This separation is increased by a relatively slow axial countercurrent flow of gas within the centrifuge that concentrates enriched gas at one end and depleted gas at the other. This flow can be driven mechanically by scoops and baffles or thermally by heating one of the end caps.

The main subsystems of the centrifuge are (1) rotor and end caps; (2) top and bottom bearing/suspension system; (3) electric motor and power supply (frequency changer); (4) center post, scoops and baffles; (5) vacuum system; and (6) casing. Because of the corrosive nature of UF6, all components that come in direct contact with UF6 must be fabricated from, or lined with, corrosion-resistant materials.

The separative capacity of a single centrifuge increases with the length of the rotor and the rotor wall speed. Consequently, centrifuges containing long, high-speed rotors are the goal of centrifuge development programs (subject to mechanical constraints).

The primary limitation on rotor wall speed is the strength-to-weight ratio of the rotor material. Suitable rotor materials include alloys of aluminum or titanium, maraging steel, or composites reinforced by certain glass, aramid, or carbon fibers. At present, maraging steel is the most popular rotor material for proliferants. With maraging steel, the maximum rotor wall speed is approximately 500 m/s. Fiber-reinforced composite rotors may achieve even higher speeds; however, the needed composite technology is not within the grasp of many potential proliferants. Another limitation on rotor speed is the lifetime of the bearings at either end of the rotor.

Rotor length is limited by the vibrations a rotor experiences as it spins. The rotors can undergo vibrations similar to those of a guitar string, with characteristic frequencies of vibration. Balancing of rotors to minimize their vibrations is especially critical to avoid early failure of the bearing and suspension systems. Because perfect balancing is not possible, the suspension system must be capable of damping some amount of vibration.

One of the key components of a gas centrifuge enrichment plant is the power supply (frequency converter) for the gas centrifuge machines. The power supply must accept alternating current (ac) input at the 50- or 60-Hz line frequency available from the electric power grid and provide an ac output at a much higher frequency (typically 600 Hz or more). The high-frequency output from the frequency changer is fed to the

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high-speed gas centrifuge drive motors (the speed of an ac motor is proportional to the frequency of the supplied current). The centrifuge power supplies must operate at high efficiency, provide low harmonic distortion, and provide precise control of the output frequency.

The casing is needed both to maintain a vacuum and to contain the rapidly spinning components in the event of a failure. If the shrapnel from a single centrifuge failure is not contained, a “domino effect” may result and destroy adjacent centrifuges. A single casing may enclose one or several rotors.

Although the separation factors obtainable from a centrifuge are large compared to gaseous diffusion, several cascade stages are still required to produce even LEU material. Furthermore, the throughput of a single centrifuge is usually small, which leads to rather small separative capacities for typical proliferator centrifuges. To be able to produce only one weapon per year, several thousand centrifuges would be required.

The electrical consumption of a gas centrifuge facility is much less than that of a gaseous diffusion plant. Consequently, a centrifuge plant will not have the easily identified electrical and cooling systems typically required by a gaseous diffusion plant.

Aerodynamic Processes

Aerodynamic uranium enrichment processes include the separation nozzle process and the vortex tube separation process. These aerodynamic separation processes depend upon diffusion driven by pressure gradients, as does the gas centrifuge. In effect, aerodynamic processes can be considered as nonrotating centrifuges. Enhancement of the centrifugal forces is achieved by dilution of UF with a carrier gas (i.e., hydrogen or helium). This achieves a much higher flow velocity for the gas than could be obtained using pure UF₆.

The separation nozzle process was developed by E.W. Becker and associates at the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center in Germany. In this process, a mixture of gaseous UF₆ and H₂ (or helium) is compressed and then directed along a curved wall at high velocity. The heavier ²³⁸U-bearing molecules move preferentially out to the wall relative to those containing ²³⁵U. At the end of the deflection, the gas jet is split by a knife edge into a light fraction and a heavy fraction, which are withdrawn separately.

Economic considerations drive process designers to select separation nozzles with physical dimensions as small as manufacturing technology will allow. The curved wall of the nozzle may have a radius of curvature as small as 10 µm (0.0004 in.). Production of these tiny nozzles by such processes as stacking photo-etched metal foils is technically demanding.

A typical stage consists of a vertical cylindrical vessel containing the separation elements, a cross piece for gas distribution, a gas cooler to remove the heat of compression, and a centrifugal compressor driven by a electric motor.

The Uranium Enrichment Corporation of South Africa, Ltd. (UCOR) developed and deployed its own aerodynamic process characterized as an “advanced vortex tube” or “stationary-walled centrifuge” at the so called “Y” plant at Valindaba to produce hundreds of kilograms of HEU. In this process, a mixture of UF₆ and H₂ is compressed and enters a vortex tube tangentially at one end through nozzles or holes at velocities close to the speed of sound. This tangential injection of gas results in a spiral or vortex motion within the tube, and two gas streams are withdrawn at opposite ends of the vortex tube. The spiral swirling flow decays downstream of the feed inlet due to friction at the tube wall. Consequently, the inside diameter of the tube is typically tapered to reduce the decay in the swirling flow velocity. This process is characterized by a separating element with very small stage cut (ratio of product flow to feed flow) of about 1/20 and high process-operating pressures.

Due to the very small cut of the vortex tube stages and the extremely difficult piping requirements that would be necessary based on traditional methods of piping stages together, the South Africans developed a cascade design technique, called Helikon. In essence, the Helikon technique permits 20 separation stages to be combined into one large module, and all 20 stages share a common pair of axial-flow compressors. A basic requirement for the success of this method is that the axial-flow compressors successfully transmit parallel streams of different isotopic compositions without significant mixing. A typical Helikon module consists of a large cylindrical steel vessel that houses a separating element assembly, two axial-flow compressors (one mounted on each end), and two water-cooled heat exchangers.

For both of these aerodynamic processes, the high proportion of carrier gas required in relation to UF₆ process gas results in high specific-energy consumption and substantial requirements for removal of waste heat.

Laser Isotope Separation

In the early 1970’s, significant work began on the development of laser isotope separation technologies for uranium enrichment. Present systems for enrichment processes using lasers fall into two categories: those in which the process medium is atomic uranium vapor and those in which the process medium is the vapor of a uranium compound. Common nomenclature for such processes include “first category—atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS or SILVA)” and “second category—molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS or MOLIS).”

The systems, equipment, and components for laser-enrichment plants embrace (a) devices to feed uranium-metal vapor (for selective photoionization) or devices to feed the vapor of a uranium compound (for photo-dissociation or chemical activation); (b) devices to collect enriched and depleted uranium metal as product and tails in the first category and devices to collect dissociated or reacted compounds as product and unaffected material as tails in the second category; (c) process laser systems to selectively excite the ²³⁵U species; and (d) feed preparation and product conversion

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equipment. The complexity of the spectroscopy of uranium atoms and compounds may require incorporation of any number of available laser technologies.

AVLIS

The atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) process is based on the fact that $^{235}$U atoms and $^{238}$U atoms absorb light of different frequencies (or colors). Although the absorption frequencies of these two isotopes differ only by a very small amount (about one part in a million), the dye lasers used in AVLIS can be tuned so that only the $^{235}$U atoms absorb the laser light. As the $^{235}$U atom absorbs the laser light, its electrons are excited to a higher energy state. With the absorption of sufficient energy, a $^{235}$U atom will eject an electron and become a positively charged ion. The $^{235}$U ions may then be deflected by an electrostatic field to a product collector. The $^{238}$U atoms remain neutral and pass through the product collector section and are deposited on a tails collector.

The AVLIS process consists of a laser system and a separation system. The separator system contains a vaporizer and a collector. In the vaporizer, metallic uranium is melted and vaporized to form an atomic vapor stream. The vapor stream flows through the collector, where it is illuminated by the precisely tuned laser light. The AVLIS laser system is a pumped laser system comprised of one laser used to optically pump a separate dye laser, which produces the light used in the separation process. Dye master oscillator lasers provide precise laser beam frequency, timing, and quality control. The laser light emerging from the dye master oscillator laser is increased in power by passage through a dye laser amplifier. A total of three colors are used to ionize the $^{235}$U atoms.

Many countries are pursuing some level of AVLIS research and/or development, and major programs exist in the United States, France, Japan, and probably Russia. Principal advantages of the AVLIS process include a high separation factor, low energy consumption (approximately the same as the centrifuge process), and a small volume of generated waste. However, no country has yet deployed an AVLIS process, although several have demonstrated the capability to enrich uranium with the process. While conceptually simple, the actual implementation of the process is likely to be difficult and expensive, especially for countries with limited technical resources. The AVLIS process requires much sophisticated hardware constructed of specialized materials that must be capable of reliable operation for extended periods of time in a harsh environment.

MLIS

The idea for the molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS) process was conceived by a group of scientists at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in 1971. There are two basic steps involved in the MLIS process. In the first step, UF${6}$ is irradiated by an infrared laser system operating near the 16 µm wavelength, which selectively excites the $^{235}$UF${6}$, leaving the $^{238}$UF${6}$ relatively unexcited. In the second step, photons from a second laser system (infrared or ultraviolet) preferentially dissociate the excited $^{235}$UF${6}$ to form $^{235}$UF${5}$ and free fluorine atoms. The $^{235}$UF${5}$ formed from the dissociation precipitates from the gas as a powder that can be filtered from the gas stream.

MLIS is a stagewise process, and each stage requires conversion of the enriched UF${5}$ product back to UF${6}$ for further enrichment. CO${2}$ lasers are suitable for exciting the $^{235}$UF${6}$ during the first step. A XeCl excimer laser producing ultraviolet light may be suitable for the dissociation of $^{235}$UF$_{6}$ during the second step. However, there is currently no known MLIS optical system which has been successfully designed to handle both infrared and ultraviolet. Consequently, most MLIS concepts use an all infrared optical system.

In terms of the gas flow for the MLIS process, gaseous UF${6}$ mixed with a carrier gas and a scavenger gas is expanded through a supersonic nozzle that cools the gas to low temperatures. Hydrogen or a noble gas are suitable as carriers. A scavenger gas (such as methane) is used to capture the fluorine atoms that are released as a result of the dissociation of $^{235}$UF${6}$ molecules.

There are many complexities associated with the process, and the United States, UK, France, and Germany have stated that their MLIS programs have been terminated. Japan also has had a small MLIS program. South Africa has recently stated that their MLIS program is ready to be deployed for low-enriched uranium (LEU) production. Principal advantages of the MLIS process are its low power consumption and its use of UF$_{6}$ as its process gas.

Chemical and Ion Exchange

Chemical-exchange isotope separation requires segregation of two forms of an element into separate but contacting streams. Since many contacts are required to achieve the desired separation, the contacting process must be fast and achieve as much separation as possible. For heavy elements such as uranium, achieving a suitable separation factor involves contact between two valence (oxidation state) forms such as hexavalent [U$^{6+}$ as in uranyl chloride (UO${2}$Cl${2}$)] and the quadrivalent [U$^{4+}$ as in uranium tetrachloride (UCl$_{4}$)]. The $^{235}$U isotope exhibits a slight preference for the higher valence, for example, the hexavalent over the quadrivalent in the Asahi process or the quadrivalent over the trivalent (U$^{3+}$) in the French solvent-extraction process.

The chemical-exchange process, developed by the French, is commonly referred to as CHEMEX. It uses the exchange reaction that takes place between two valence states (U$^{3+}$ and U$^{4+}$) of uranium ions in aqueous solution. Isotopic enrichment results from the tendency of $^{238}$U to concentrate in the U$^{3+}$ compound while $^{235}$U concentrates in the U$^{4+}$ compound. It is therefore possible to obtain enriched uranium by removing the U$^{4+}$ ions with an organic solvent that is immiscible with the aqueous phase (concentrated hydrochloric acid). Several possible extractants are available; however, tributyl phosphate (TBP), the choice of the French, is typically used. TBP is diluted with an aromatic solvent, and this organic phase moves countercurrent to the aqueous phase through a series of pulsed columns.

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In the pulse column, the heavier aqueous phase is fed into the top of the column, and the lighter organic phase is fed into the bottom of the column. A rapid reciprocating motion is applied to the contents of the column, providing efficient and intimate contact of the two phases. In an HEU plant, centrifugal contactors might be employed particularly for the higher assay sections, since the stage times and corresponding specific uranium inventory could be reduced significantly.

After passing through the column, the enriched and depleted uranium streams must be chemically treated so that they can be recirculated through the column again (refluxed) or sent to another column for additional enrichment. This requires complicated refluxing equipment at both ends of the column.

The ion-exchange process was developed by the Asahi Chemical Company in Japan and uses the chemical isotope effect between two valences (U4+ and U6+) of uranium. In this process, the organic phase is replaced by a proprietary ion-exchange resin. The aqueous phase flows through the stationary resin held in a column, and the net effect of all the chemical reactions is a "band" of uranium that moves through the ion-exchange column. The exchange between the unadsorbed uranium flowing through the band and that adsorbed on the resin enhances the isotopic separation. In this continuous separation system, 235U and 238U tend to accumulate respectively at the entrance and exit ends of the adsorption band. In this process, it is economical to regenerate many of the chemicals by reaction with oxygen and hydrogen in separate equipment.

The development and manufacture of the appropriate adsorbent beads are based on technology and know-how gained by Asahi in over 25 years of ion-exchange membrane development and manufacture. The adsorbent is a spherical bead of porous anion-exchange resin with a very high separation efficiency and an exchange rate over 1,000 times faster than the rates obtained in most commercially available resins.

The two exchange processes discussed here are representative of exchange processes now under study in several countries. At present, no country has built or operated a full-scale uranium enrichment plant based on an exchange process. The primary proliferation concern is that they are based on standard chemical engineering technology (except for the proprietary ion-exchange resins).

Plasma Separation

The plasma separation process (PSP) has been studied as a potentially more efficient uranium-enrichment technique that makes use of the advancing technologies in superconducting magnets and plasma physics. In this process, the principle of ion cyclotron resonance is used to selectively energize the 235U isotope in a plasma containing 235U and 238U ions. A feed plate of solid uranium serves as the source of neutral uranium atoms. These atoms are vaporized by bombarding the plate with energetic ions in a process called sputtering. A microwave antenna located in front of the plate energizes free electrons which collide with neutral uranium atoms in the vapor sputtering off the plate. This in turn displaces electrons from the uranium atoms and produces a plasma of 235U and 238U ions.

The plasma is subjected to a uniform magnetic field along the axis of a cylindrical vacuum chamber as the plasma flows from source to collector. The magnetic field is produced by a superconducting magnet located around the outside of the chamber. The high-strength magnetic field produces helical motions of the ions, with the lighter 235U ions spiraling faster and having a higher ion cyclotron frequency than the heavier 238U ions. As the ions move toward the collector, they pass through an electric field produced by an excitation coil oscillating at the same frequency as the ion cyclotron frequency of the 235U ions. This causes the helical orbit of the 235U ions to increase in radius while having minimal effect on the orbit of the heavier 238U ions. The plasma flows through a collector of closely spaced, parallel slats, the physical appearance of which roughly resembles a venetian blind. The large-orbit 235U ions are more likely to deposit on the slats, while the remaining plasma, depleted in 235U, accumulates on an end plate of the collector. PSP is a batch process that would require several stages to produce HEU from natural feed.

The only countries known to have had serious PSP experimental programs are the United States and France. PSP became a part of DOE's Advanced Isotope Separation research and development program in 1976, but development was dropped in 1982 when AVLIS was chosen as the advanced technology of choice. The French developed their own version of PSP, which they called RCI. Funding for RCI was drastically reduced in 1986, and the program was suspended around 1990, although RCI is still used for stable isotope separation.

Proliferation Implication Assessment

Uranium gun-assembled weapons are the easiest of all nuclear devices to design and build. It is generally conceded to be impossible to prevent any nation having the requisite amount of HEU from building one or more gun-assembled weapons. Therefore, the acquisition of significant quantities of 235U or a facility in which to separate the fissile material is an indicator that the acquiring state could be in the process of gaining a rudimentary nuclear capability. Because HEU is used in certain research reactors, another interpretation is possible. Because of the weapons potential, the United States and France have sought to replace HEU-fueled reactors with ones using a lower grade (<20% 235U, for example) of uranium which cannot be so readily converted to weapons use. The uranium gun-bomb route was successfully taken by South Africa. Any nation having uranium ore in sufficient quantity, a sufficiently well-developed technological and industrial infrastructure, sufficient electric power, and the desire to acquire nuclear weapons might well choose the uranium gun technology.

FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (See Figure 5.0-2)

All five nuclear weapon states have demonstrated the ability to enrich uranium to weapons grade. In addition, enrichment is a commercial process in The Netherlands

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and Japan. Germany has also demonstrated the ability to enrich uranium; the South African nuclear weapons were made from 80–90% $^{235}$U produced indigenously. Brazil and Argentina sought to build enrichment plants but have abandoned the effort. Iraq used EMIS to enrich uranium prior to the Gulf War and was in the process of building a centrifuge enrichment cascade. Iraq produced some enriched uranium (not weapons grade) before the Gulf War terminated its program. Iran has invested large sums in various enrichment schemes, some of which appear to have been clever scams by outsiders, without achieving any significant enrichment capability. Pakistan has built a gas centrifuge enrichment facility, believed to produce material for nuclear weapons.

The nozzle enrichment process was to be used in Germany and in a plant to be built in Brazil by NUCLEBRAS (a Brazilian firm) in cooperation with a German company, Interatom. Neither plant appears to have been completed and placed in commercial service.

Germany operates a commercial centrifuge enrichment plant for its nuclear power industry. The Becker nozzle process is not believed to be in use anywhere in the world today.

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Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters

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Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

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Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

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Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

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Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

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Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

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Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

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Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

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Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

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Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

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Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)

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Table 5.2-1. Uranium Enrichment Processes Technology Parameters (cont'd)