Memorandum: North Korea Deputies' Committee. March 12, 1992 (Secret)

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NORTH KOREA DEPUTIES' COMMITTEE MARCH 12, 1992

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Charles Lahiguera, Senior Reviewer

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Issues for Discussion

Our basic policy remains that nuclear weapons in North Korean hands are intolerable. There is no immediate issue for decision nor requirement to change our strategy, since North Korea is still on a plausible schedule leading to compliance with its IAEA and bilateral non-proliferation agreements (Tabs 1-3 illustrate best and worst case scenarios for possible DPRK action). Upcoming policy questions are: how long can we wait before embarking on a course of coercive measures; what measures are both feasible and effective; and what are the tactical implications?

State of Play

We are in the midst of a testing period for the DPRK. High level officials in the ROKG affirm that the DPRK promised the ROK that it would sign and ratify an IAEA Safeguards Agreement by February 19 and then failed to fully meet the commitment. DPRK representative Kim Young Sun told U/S Kanter on January 22 that he thought the DPRK would ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement "in a month or two." Pyongyang is also negotiating the establishment of a JNCC to monitor obligations under the North-South non-nuclear agreement by March 19 -- a deadline both North and South have accepted. Talks over the past two weeks have greatly narrowed North-South differences over a JNCC charter.

The DPRK has announced that the Supreme People's Assembly will meet on April 8, and entry into force of the Safeguards Agreement thus is possible within April. The DPRK has hinted that there would be inspections by June, although these remarks have not been more officially confirmed.

North Korea's intentions remain unclear. There are indications of an internal debate that may be slowing decisions; the North may perceive some political advantage in delay; or it may be playing for time to destroy, dismantle, or convert sensitive facilities before allowing inspections to take place. It may be seeking time to hide its nuclear weapons program or to produce and then hide significant quantities of plutonium; or it may even plan not to accept meaningful inspections.

There is no conclusive evidence that the DPRK is increasing activity at Yongbyon or taking steps to move materials away.

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Our key regional allies, the ROK and Japan, agree with

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us on not moving towards improved ties with the DPRK until the nuclear issue is resolved. The ROK has toughened its posture, emphasizing that progress on the nuclear issue is now a prerequisite for movement in other North-South areas. The ROK has indefinitely postponed a summit meeting, and it will be likely to postpone the next round of PM talks (May 5-8) if the DPRK has not ratified its safeguards agreement.

If the North moves by mid-April to ratify the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and negotiate a bilateral inspection regime, we will have grounds for hope that a satisfactory resolution of the nuclear issue is unfolding. However, we will still need to watch for the completeness of the DPRK's declarations to the IAEA.

DPRK "Plausible Delay":

Despite the DPRK's failure to move quickly, and the concerns expressed at the February IAEA BOG meeting, many have been willing to give it the benefit of the doubt. Any long-term U.S. strategy will have to take account of this and recognize that the DPRK continues to have room for "plausible delay." This will be particularly true with China and Russia. A "delay" scenario is outlined at Tab 1.

If the North employs such tactics, it may be difficult to mobilize international pressure before this summer, unless the South is willing to break off North-South dialogue and China and Russia can be persuaded to support more drastic pressure. This may be unachievable unless we obtain the sort of clear information on North Korean intentions that we now lack and we can use it to galvanize international pressure to compel the North to fulfill its obligations.

Continuing Incentives, Long Term Pressure

Our approach for now must be to continue to accept the possibility that the North will meet its obligations and hold open incentives for it to do so. Our public statements must walk a fine line between this waiting strategy and maintaining international concern. At the same time, we should lay a foundation for action over the next few months that can, at successive junctures, enable us to narrow the DPRK's freedom of action and tighten international pressure.

Action Program. Our challenge is to minimize DPRK wiggle room. Pyongyang may try to delay accepting inspections, we should seek international support for a reasonable deadline calling for initial IAEA inspections at all nuclear installations, including the suspected reprocessing facility at Yongbyon. This will help

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lay the groundwork for effective international action should it become necessary to coerce Pyongyang. A reasonable timetable can be based on the assumption that North Korea will take the full range of internal DPRK steps (action by Pyongyang's Supreme People's Assembly, signature by Kim Il-sung, etc.), plus notification to the IAEA in April, as the DPRK's IAEA delegate stated they would do after the February BOG meeting. If this is accomplished, Pyongyang will have until the end of May to submit its inventory of nuclear material, and the IAEA can request a visit (effectively an ad hoc inspection) to all North Korean nuclear facilities at the beginning of June. A "best case" IAEA scenario is at Tab 3.

Consultations and Pressure Points. Having established this timetable in our own minds we should initiate consultations with key governments anticipating several potential pressure points over the next two months. Although the following is heavily IAEA oriented,

In tone, all of these consultations should reflect our hope that the North is soon going to ratify and we shold avoid any talk that will give Pyongyang grounds for claiming we are "pressuring" the DPRK.

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--With the Chinese, who have the most influence in Pyongyang, we will stress that North Korean performance on our timetable is critical and urge Beijing to "make it happen." The emphasis should be on Beijing's own national interest, the need for further progress toward peace on the peninsula, the incentives that exist for Pyongyang, and, finally, our determination to pursue tough international steps --which we will expect the PRC to join -- if Pyongyang fails to perform.

--At the IAEA we should begin immediately to build support for a possible special BOG meeting in May. We should express our hope that the DPRK will meet its stated deadline and that the BOG will be able to "hear good news;"

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--In New York at the UN. Though it may be months before we hope to achieve effective UNSC measures to coerce Pyongyang, we should initiate regular discussion of the North Korean nuclear issue among the Perm Three and the Perm Five. The purpose should be to exchange views on the degree of progress and to discuss, if appropriate, possible courses of UN action. Initially the focus would be on steps to be taken at the IAEA; but we should make clear that we see a role for the UN if the North does not make good on its April commitment or stalls on the timetable thereafter.

In Tokyo we should continue to closely coordinate

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with the GOJ, which plays a critical role in putting pressure on the DPRK to implement both the IAEA and bilateral inspection regimes.

--Russia, preoccupied and with its leverage substantially weakened, appears to have done little to encourage North Korea to meet its nuclear obligations.

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--At the U.S.-DPRK Counselors talks in Beijing on March 17, we should again convey our views specifically and clearly, so that Pyongyang can have no illusions that we will acquiesce to delaying tactics.

As these consultations move ahead and we watch Pyongyang's behavior hopefully, we will have the following additional milestones and possible actions:

--Possible May Special BOG Meeting. The most likely scenario for successfully seeking a special BOG meeting would be if ratification has not occurred.

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--June IAEA Board of Governors Meeting. The next regular meeting of the BOG is scheduled for mid-June. This will afford a further opportunity for coordinated action, as needed.

June and Beyond

Much now depends on precisely how the DPRK behaves in the interim. Much will also depend on the IC's view of events at Yongbyon. If we find in June that North Korea is still stalling and a case for a coercive course can be made, we will have laid the foundation during our March-May consultations and meetings. Ideally, such measures would be achieved through the UN, with economic sanctions being the chief instrument pursued. Alternatively, we could consider a variety of coercive steps, either on our own or in concert with like-minded nations.

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