Briefing Book, Deputies Committee Meeting, ca. 12/13/1991 (Secret)

SECRET THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON 20911 December 13, 1991 [RECEIVED DEC 13 PM 2:13 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE]

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. KARL D. JACKSON Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

MS. PHYLLIS PROVOST MCNEIL Executive Secretary Central Intelligence Agency

MR. W. ROBERT PEARSON Executive Secretary Department of State

COL GEORGE SUMRALL, JR. Secretary Joint Chiefs of Staff

BG JOHN A. DUBIA Executive Secretary Department of Defense

MS. BARBARA STARR Executive Secretary Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: NSC/DC Meeting on Korea Nuclear Program

The National Security Council Deputies Committee will meet on December 17 at [2:30] p.m. in the White House Situation Room to discuss next steps in confronting the North Korea nuclear program. The agenda is at Tab A. The background paper will be provided shortly. Attendance should be limited to principals plus one. Please call your attendance to the Executive Secretary's office (456-2224).

[DECLASSIFIED]

William F. Sittmann Executive Secretary

Attachment Tab A Agenda cc: Andrew Card

[Declassify on: OADR] SECRET 91/46182 Sec Def Cont Nr: X57755

REDACT STATE EQUITIES AS SHOWN 25X6

DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING

AGENDA

SCOPE PAPER

A. TALKING POINTS FOR MR. LILLEY

B. GAMEPLAN PAPER

C. STATE PROPOSED DRAFT TALKING POINTS WITH DPRK

D. ISA/EAPR MEMO ON RON LEHMAN TRIP

E. SEOUL CABLE WITH ROK JOINT DECLARATION PROPOSAL

F. SEOUL CABLE WITH N-S NON-AGGRESSION AGREEMENT

[DECLASSIFIED BY DOD, IS, RAYMOND NSC, DOS, OUD(P) DATE 21 Aug 2017 FOIA CASE # 12-F-1306]

[DECLASSIFIED]

#43 13-M-1334

SECRET 20911

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING Tuesday, December 17, 1991 4:15 - 2:15 p.m. 2:30 3:30 KOREA NUCLEAR PROGRAM Agenda

I. Introduction....................................................Jonathan Howe II. Debrief on Recent ACDA Mission...........................Ronald Lehman III. Discussion of Next Steps....................................Arnold Kanter IV. Draft Talking Points for US/DPRK Meeting.........Arnold Kanter

[DECLASSIFIED]

Declassify on: OAPR SECRET

[SECRET]

DEPUTIES' COMMITTEE MEETING ON NORTH KOREA DECEMBER 17, 1991

The objective of this meeting is to consider approval of a "game plan" to bring North Korea's nuclear weapons program under control, as outlined in the attached paper. In addition, this meeting should consider approval of the following specific steps:

-- Preliminary contact with North Korea in New York at the UNS level, to be double tracked by means of an approach by Ambassador Roy in Beijing, inviting the North Koreans to send a high level official - preferably Party Secretary for International Affairs Kim Yong Sun - to meet with a USG counterpart in New York prior to President Bush's arrival in Seoul on January 5.

-- A high level meeting in New York, with the U.S. represented by an Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, or other appropriate official. The meeting should be held before President Bush arrives in the ROK in order to underscore his public statements there regarding the North Korean nuclear issue and our support of ROK positions.

-- Approval of talking points for the preliminary and high level meetings and a cable to Beijing with instructions for double tracking the contact.

-- Demarche to those countries having relations or potential influence with the North, alerting them to our concerns about the North Korean nuclear problem.

SEKPOL 3531 12/12/91 x77717 drafted: EAP/K: NSHastings cleared: EAP: LDAnderson, Acting EAP/K: CFKartman

[DECLASSIFIED]

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR ASD/ISA

THRU: ACTING DIRECTOR, ISA/EAPR

SUBJECT: DC Meeting on North Korea Nuclear Program (U)

Tomorrow at 1430, there will be a Deputies Committee (DC) meeting on the North Korea Nuclear Program at the White House, to be chaired by new Deputy National Security Advisor Admiral Jonathan Howe. The purpose of the meeting is two-fold: to discuss the "gameplan" on the strategy to deal with the North Korean nuclear program, and to approve a one-time high-level U.S. meeting with the DPRK on the nuclear issue.

The gameplan (TAB B) lays out the steps which the U.S. will take in the next two months, with the next decision point being the late February IAEA Board of Governors meeting. The plan calls for: (1) Continued international effort, working with Japan, the Soviet Union, China, and other key friends and allies such as the UK and Australia, to pressure DPRK. (2) Ensuring that the ROKs press the North at North-South talks on this issue. During Ron Lehman's trip recently, we provided more ammunition for the South by agreeing to the concept of a North-South inspection regime. (Frankly, we are concerned that the South seems to have rushed ahead with a non-aggression agreement while placing the nuclear issue off to the side. We will know more after the North-South nuclear talks this weekend.) (3) The need to clearly enunciate our position on a peninsula-ban on reprocessing and enrichment to the world, and especially to DPRK directly via a high-level one-time U.S.-DPRK meeting. A core-demarche cable to friends and allies is necessary to do the former, but that cable has been stalled at State on USP's desk. We expect the discussion at the DC on the gameplan to be generally non-contentious, but some points needed to be emphasized by you can be found in TAB A.

A central element in the gameplan is the one-time high-level U.S.-DPRK meeting to ensure information gets to Kim Il Sung, We will send the same message via the Chinese simultaneously. This meeting is necessary to let the North Koreans know directly of our concern about their nuclear program and inform them how we measure progress. I.e., signing IAEA safeguards is not enough, but the North should reciprocate Roh Tae Woo's November 8 policy of foreswearing the development--including reprocessing and enrichment--of nuclear weapons. There is no dispute within USG, or with the ROK, that such a meeting, if approved by the DC, will take place before the President's visit to Korea. However, how forward-leaning should the U.S. be is in dispute.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET 2 (a) The attached talking points (TAB C) for the one-time U.S.-DPRK meeting is, in our view, much too forward-leaning. We believe that the fact this meeting is taking place, at possibly USP's level, is a carrot. The promise of a second meeting which clearly connotes dialogue towards better relations is another carrot. It is far too early to use the word "normalization" in this first meeting, especially since thus far, the North's strategy is to stall and impose additional conditions while refusing to sign an IAEA safeguards agreement. We want to see the North sign and implement safeguards; agree to a reciprocal non-nuclear policy with the South; and agree to at least trial inspections before we hold a second meeting. The second meeting should not be characterized as the beginning of "normalization" dialogue. The points drafted by State reflect the views held by AS Solomon, and they are not satisfactory to DoD. This view is shared strongly by the JCS. Talking points on this issue for your use are in TAB A.

(b) Other related issues which may arise during the DC meeting are Team Spirit 92 and NCND policy. The ROKs are divided over whether to hold Team Spirit 92, with the Blue House leaning toward postponement, and MND wanting a "bigger and better" one to show resolve. Our position is that we defer to a decision by the ROKs--which we predict to be a decision to postpone. USFK has indicated that January 1 is the last date for a decision to postpone. As for NCND, a DoD working group under the direction of USD P is looking into revising this policy.

[JH] [Zdon]

Attachments: TAB A- Talking Points for ASD/ISA Use TAB B- Gameplan Paper TAB C- State Proposed Draft Talking Points with DPRK

DASD (M) 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 1.4 (d)

SECRET [DECLASSIFIED]

SECRET

[DECLASSIFIED]

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR MR. LILLEY

GAMEPLAN:

-- If the ROKs are only half-hearted on the nuclear issue, we will have a great deal of difficulty gathering international pressure on the North, especially if the North signs an IAEA safeguards agreement by February but does nothing else.

-- To keep the pressure on and to clearly state our position that the North must reciprocate Roh's non-nuclear policy--to include foreswearing of reprocessing--we need to send the core-demarche cable out to friends and allies.

U.S.-DPRK MEETING:

-- Draft talking points reflect the position that normalization should be presented as the carrot to entice the North to stop its nuclear program.

-- However, DPRK track record has been very poor. We have seen no DPRK movement but only a series of additional demands. Putting normalization forward could lead the North to believe that its program is paying off and weakening our resolve. It could also alarm the South.

-- DoD only agreed to a one-time meeting to specifically and clearly explain our position on the nuclear issue to the North. The current draft is unfocused and goes beyond what is wise. We need to say up front what our concern about the nuclear program is and what DPRK must do: (1) Sign and implement safeguards; (2) Agree with Roh's non-nuclear principles and sign up to South's Joint Declaration; and (3) Initiate trial inspections ASAP, to include Yongbyon.

-- The carrot would be another meeting, obviously leading to better relations and potential normalization, if the North does the above first.

-- There is no need to be so forward-leaning.

SECRET

OUSDP(R) 5 USC 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 1.4(b)(d)

STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

This paper puts forward a plan that seeks to persuade North Korea to give up its pursuit of nuclear weapons by diplomatic, political, and economic measures.

[DECLASSIFIED]

Current Situation. We are making progress in mobilizing international pressure on the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Our nuclear weapons decisions, Seoul's subsequent proposal for a non-nuclear Korea, the trips of Secretaries Cheney and Baker, and the recent North-South Prime Ministerial talks have focused global and regional attention on the issue. Japanese terms for DPRK normalization have toughened. Beijing may press the North harder and may be willing to work quietly with us to get the problem under control. Our deferral of EASI-II troop reductions has strengthened Seoul's (and Japan's) confidence in our reliability and reminded Pyongyang that pursuit of nuclear weapons is not cost-free. We must now build on this momentum.

Responding to these increasing pressures, Pyongyang on November 25 issued a Foreign Ministry statement saying it would [redacted] Elements of the statement were encouraging, but it contained linkage of IAEA inspections of North Korean nuclear activities to North Korean inspections of U.S. bases in the ROK and called for direct negotiations with the U.S. on simultaneous nuclear weapons inspections in the North and South--none of which was acceptable to us. As well, there is a well-established history of Pyongyang raising expectations that it will sign, only to back off at the last minute with additional demands. Seoul's recent unofficial acknowledgment that there are no nuclear weapons in the ROK has not elicited any further response from Pyongyang.

Being Realistic. We have to recognize that the odds may be against us in pursuing this plan to get the North Korean program under control. Intelligence analysis indicates that we may not know when the Yongbyon reprocessing plant "goes hot" and that we do not know whether North Korea may have reprocessed some material already. Given the DPRK's pattern of stalling on the safeguards issue, it is possible Pyongyang has no intention of changing course. If so, its aim will be to

[redacted]

DASD (NM) 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 1.4(d)

-2- delay, diffuse international pressure, and use any opportunity to seem forthcoming, without making meaningful concessions. There are early indications, moreover, that the North may attempt to move and hide its reprocessing facilities, then agree to inspection. Or the North may sign, but not implement. IAEA safeguards at the eleventh hour hoping to short circuit international pressure.

Strategy. Our plan for the next few months combines escalating international pressure with concrete inducements for Pyongyang. In addition to gaining DPRK acceptance of IAEA safeguards, our short-term objective is a verifiable freeze on North Korea's reprocessing effort. Our long-term objective is for North Korea to sign on to the same non-nuclear principles that the ROK has adopted, by means of a credible North-South agreement. As we have foreshadowed in Seoul, Beijing, and Moscow, the plan includes a US-DPRK meeting to present our positions to the North Koreans, but not to negotiate with them. Between now and the late February IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) meeting our plan focuses largely on diplomatic persuasion and laying out the positive benefits for Pyongyang of cooperation with us on this problem. After that, we would seek to maximize international pressure and further isolate the DPRK, economically and diplomatically.

MULTILATERAL EFFORTS

With the International Community in General. We would send a core demarche to those countries that have relations, or potential influence, with North Korea. It would seek to widen the range of bilateral pressures on the North, reinforce our own message, and build a diplomatic record that would enable us to gain support for possible later coercive diplomatic measures. As we launch and follow up this campaign we should stress the urgency of the problem but eschew rhetoric that would gain the DPRK sympathy or appear to back it into a corner. This campaign should make clear to the DPRK that the costs of continuing its nuclear efforts include further diplomatic isolation. The President's January trip can reinforce this message, as he voices our concerns in Australia, Singapore, Korea, and Japan.

With Key Regional Actors. We need to stay in close touch with Tokyo, which has now linked normalization not only to IAEA safeguards but to an end to reprocessing. We want the Japanese to continue to dangle the carrot of normalization and its benefits, but if the North continues to stall we want the Japanese to consider tougher measures in coordination with others vis-a-vis the DPRK after February.

[DECLASSIFIED]

[SECRET/NOFORN] -3-

A similar approach should be taken with China, trying to press Beijing to bear down on the DPRK. We can engage the Chinese in New York, Beijing, and Vienna hoping they will convey to Pyongyang that they cannot hold back international pressure for long. We should make clear that stepped up pressure in the IAEA and the UN must be pursued if North Korea hasn't come around by late February. (We may also wish to discuss with the Chinese our need for more reliable information regarding North Korean nuclear efforts.) We cannot be absolutely certain of PRC motives, however, and it is unlikely they would be prepared to take any measures they perceived as putting the survival of the Pyongyang regime in question.

Moscow is seized of this issue and has raised it with us several times in the past few weeks, most notably in a letter from FM Shevardnadze to Secretary Baker. We have prepared a reply and talking points for Secretary Baker to use with Shevardnadze :o encourage a strong effort to bring Pyongyang around, to include Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachov's visit here in late December. We would let Moscow know of our willingness to meet with the North to seek improvement of relations in exchange for responsible behavior; but we would stress the need for stronger measures if nothing comes of this by late February. As with China, we may wish to discuss the need for information exchanges on North Korean nuclear efforts. With Republic officials, we would use many of the same themes.

At the IAEA and in the UN. To improve chances for success in the IAEA, we and our allies would not seek direct action against Pyongyang at the December BOG meeting. Instead, we would lay down markers seeking support for a possible resolution by the late February BOG meeting. Such a resolution would notify the Security Council of the DPRK's failure to honor NPT obligations, terminate IAEA technical assistance to North Korea, and call on member states to do likewise. This would have wide support, though we will have to work hard on the Chinese. It would be harder to impose sanctions immediately if the DPRK were to sign a safeguards accord as the ratification process and implementation would provide the DPRK ample excuses for further delay.

Once the IAEA sent a resolution to the UNSC, the Council could call on Pyongyang to take all necessary steps, on an urgent basis, to fulfill its NPT obligations. There may be substantial problems with this course, however. There may be little chance that the Security Council would be willing to adopt sanctions or other coercive measures, and therefore the

[SECRET/NOFORN] [DECLASSIFIED] 3

-4- wisdom of pursuing Security Council action could be doubtful. Even an initial resolution could run the risk of limiting our ability to act outside the Security Council framework. The process could also invite invidious comparisons to other unsafeguarded programs (e.g. Israel's).

Thus, while moving ahead in the IAEA and discussing UN options with governments suc. as China offers a means of maintaining international pressure, we will need to weigh carefully whether and how we might engage this issue in the Security Council. (We should keep in mind, however, that other interested governments, e.g. Australia and Japan, may press for referral to the UNSC in any case, and that the threat of resort to UN action is ar important element of our own strategy to move the DPRK, whether or not we ultimately press the issue to a vote.) Ultimately, should we find we cannot assure UNSC approval for coercive measures, an alternative would be for key countries to pursue sanctions outside the UN umbrella. In this instance, as at the UN, Chin-se participation would be critical to success; yet Beijing's position is likely to be problematic.

NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE

As the recent Prime-Ministerial talks have shown, the North-South channel is crucial to any solution of the nuclear issue and other Korean problems. At the December 10-13 Prime Ministerial talks, Seoul followed up Roh's recent announcement with a concrete proposal to discuss a ROK-DPRK non-nuclear agreement, including a ban on reprocessing and enrichment and a bilateral inspection regime. North and South agreed to talks on this issue to take place December 20. The South has told us that they have insisted that their proposal will be the basis for discussion rather than a merging of the ROK's and the DPRK's proposals.

Secretary Cheney had told the ROK that we could consider inspections of U.S. bases under the right circumstances. Inspections should be reciprocal, simultaneous and involve both civil and military facilities. They should also follow public commitment of both Koreas to a non-nuclear policy. It is important to remember that reciprocal inspections could not replace and would not serve the same function as IAEA safeguards. This position was conveyed by the Lehman team in greater detail to Seoul which incorporated it into its proposals for a bilateral inspection regime and trial inspections.

[SECRET] [DECLASSIFIED]

S[illegible] NOTES -5- The results of the recent Prime-Ministerial talks, while positive, point to a potential danger of divergence between ourselves and the ROKG. So far, the ROKG has avoided euphoria and kept the focus on the need for progress on the nuclear issue. However, even the appearance of significant progress in North-South dialogue will have political resonance in Seoul. With elections scheduled later in 1992, the ROKG may be reluctant to move from dialogue with the North to tougher measures, including cutting off North-South trade, which would be important to any embargo. As we did with the Lehman visit, we will need to coordinate closely with the ROK at every step to assure that the nuclear issue is pursued vigorously and to coordinate on the many policy and technical issues.

Next spring's Team Spirit exercise, which Pyongyang regularly uses as an excuse to break off dialogue, will be a matter our two governments need to consider carefully as we pursue the overall problem. Many key figures in the ROK are now considering a postponement of Team Spirit. This is not unprecedented; last year we consulted closely with the ROK over the potential of Team Spirit to disrupt the North-South dialogue. In the end, the ROK decided it wished to proceed with the exercise, although this is by no means certain this year.

The President's visit in January will afford an opportunity to coordinate policy at the most authoritative level.

US-DPRK DIALOGUE

Because of the urgency of the problem, we need to bring the US-DPRK bilateral track into play rapidly to tell the North Koreans what we expect of them, to reinforce the ROK in its dialogue with them, and to lay down clearly the incentives we can provide if they put their nuclear program under acceptable controls. To do this, we would hold a high level US-DPRK meeting as soon as possible to support the ROK's proposals but before the President's early January visit to Asia and Seoul, so that his visit can be used to highlight our policy and strengthen international support for our efforts.

Some preliminary contact would be necessary to implement the decision to hold a high level meeting. We would pass a message to the DPRK in New York, and double track it through the Chinese government in order to keep the PRC engaged and to assure delivery to the highest levels in Pyongyang. In our message we would state that we are ready for a high level meeting to discuss our concerns on the nuclear issue; explain clearly and unequivocally our requirements for resolving this issue.

[DECLASSIFIED]

-6-

concerns; and outline a concept for potential US-DPRK normalization. We would also state that we were proceeding on the assumption that there will be continued progress in North-South dialogue. Finally, we would lay down one critical marker, one that we would reinforce at each succeeding stage: should we at any time learn the DPRK is developing nuclear weapons or producing weapons-usable nuclear material, we would be unable to proceed further in the direction of dialogue and normalization.

Through the latter proviso, we would seek to achieve a de facto freeze on reprocessing while any US-DPRK talks proceed. If we were successful in maintaining this as a condition for further progress, we would have achieved at least a temporary, albeit not fully verifiable, solution to the reprocessing problem.

At the high-level meeting, we would indicate a willingness to move step-by-step toward normalization under the right conditions. We would review our nuclear proliferation concerns and the consequences we foresee if the DPRK refuses to implement safeguards fully and promptly abandon reprocessing. We would emphasize the primacy of the North-South channel, and strongly support Roh's proposals for a summit and for a North-South agreement to forego reprocessing and the development of nuclear weapons.

To make our package attractive, we would lay out a "gameplan" of clearly defined incentives for moving to a better relationship with the North in which improving US-DPRK relations--contingent upon resolution of the nuclear issue and continued progress in North-South dialogue--would facilitate Pyongyang's effort to break out of its political and economic isolation. The incentives and steps we envisage are as follows:

-- Once the DPRK brings into force a safeguards agreement providing for inspections of all DPRK nuclear material, to include visits to all suspect facilities, we would establish a formal, high-level normalization dialogue.

-- After full implementation of IAEA safeguards and conclusion of a North-South agreement banning possession of nuclear weapons and production of weapons-grade nuclear material, with appropriate inspection provisions, we would be prepared to make a positive, interim move toward normalization. This could be in the form of offices established in capitals (trade, liaison, or interest sections as in Havana).

SECRET/NOFORN

[DECLASSIFIED]

-7-

-- Thereafter, we would intensify our normalization effort and move toward full normalization as progress was achieved in other areas--e.g. North-South dialogue, missile proliferation, POW/MIAs, and terrorism. This could include support for North Korean access to IFIs (if Pyongyang met normal conditions) and for diplomatic relations with others.

This approach would give the DPRK a serious positive proposal up front. It would take the "face" argument from the DPRK by presenting an offer that would be hard to refuse. As others learned of it, our multilateral position would be strengthened. The President could make this approach public during his January visit to Seoul.

MORE COERCIVE OPTIONS

By February, if the DPRK is still stalling, we will have to move to the IAEA and, if feasible, to the UN to pursue a coercive diplomatic course. If we are to have multilateral support for sanctions, we will have to build support for our approach over the next few months and demonstrate that a policy of offering positive incentives to the North has failed to elicit Pyongyang's cooperation. It is just possible that in the face of a deteriorating economy and even greater isolation, the Pyongyang regime would respond to our incentives, although they may try to hold on to their nuclear program at all costs. Secretary Cheney told ROK and Japanese leaders that we should not consider "military measures," since such discussion could jeopardize our initial diplomatic strategy.

[illegible]

[DECLASSIFIED]

• 2 -

DECLASSIFIED

TIMELINE

? late November: Demarche in many capitals to keep pressure on DPRK and continue to build international consensus. Letter to FM Shevardnadze.

November/December: Continue to seek informal talks among P-5.

✓ November/December: Coordinate with Seoul on December 10-13 North-South talks -- especially re ROKG proposal on nuclear and related issues.

✓ December 5-7: IAEA Board of Governors meets in Vienna. DPRK's failure to sign safeguards agreement to be discussed.

✓ December 10-13: North-South talks, in Seoul. ROK tables non-nuclear proposals based on Roh's November 8 announcement.

★ Mid-December: Preliminary approach through New York/Beijing to set up high-level US-DPRK meeting in New York. Set out precondition re reprocessing; mention possibility of normalization dialogue if DPRK signs and implements IAEA safeguards regime.

Mid-December: High-level US/DPRK meeting in New York. Support ROK proposal by dangling normalization.

Late December: Rogachev trip to Pyongyang, Soviets to press North Korea.

January 5-7: President's trip to Asia. National Assembly speech in Korea reflects state of play with North Korea, reaffirms security commitment to ROK.

January 10-15: Possible A/S Solomon follow-up discussions in Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo.

January/February: North-South talks in Pyongyang. Possible Roh-Kim Il Sung summit.

February 25-28. IAEA Board of Governors meeting. If the North has not implemented the agreement, the board could report to the UNSC.

March: Possible UNSC consideration of sanctions.

Late March/early April: Team Spirit exercise. Conventional military enhancements, e.g. Patriots, Stealth fighters, play a prominent role as promised during SCM.

DASD(NH) S USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 1.4(a) DOS S USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 3.3 (b)(6)

[OSG changes not incorporated]

[illegible]

TALKING POINTS PRELIMINARY CONTACT WITH DPRK

o You have repeatedly suggested, directly and indirectly, that higher level discussion between our two governments could help to remove the sources of concern that prevent bilateral relations from improving.

o We are satisfied under current circumstances with the established channel, between our political counselors in Beijing. During Secretary Baker's visit to Beijing, however, his hosts insisted that a higher level discussion would be productive [on the important issue of your nuclear activities].

o I have been authorized to inform you that we are willing to hold such a discussion in New York, as soon as practical arrangements can be made, if your government wishes to send an authoritative representative from Pyongyang. We propose a meeting on December 27 or 28 in New York.

o The U.S. side would be chosen from the policy level of our government. UN ambassadors could attend as hosts.

o [Specifically,] In this meeting we will be prepared to discuss the following:

-- U.S. and other neighboring countries' deep concerns regarding the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula;

-- Potential methods to resolve concerns about your nuclear program and security in Northeast Asia;

[delete] [-- Conditions for a potential normalization dialogue between the DPRK and the U.S.]

o The U.S. hopes the North will continue to promote progress in the North-South dialogue, and reiterates that a productive North-South dialogue is an essential condition for any US-DPRK dialogue.

o The creation and continuation of a U.S.-DPRK dialogue also depends on progress on nuclear issues in North-South channels. We hope that in the upcoming meeting in Panmunjom, the DPRK responds positively to the denuclearization proposal tabled by the ROK at the last round of Prime Minister talks.

[SECRET]

[DECLASSIFIED]

• 2 - o Finally, I must caution you on a critically important point. Should we, at any time, learn that the DPRK is producing weapons grade useable nuclear material or developing nuclear weapons, we would be unable to proceed further in the direction of dialogue [and normalization] [delete] SEKPOL 3465

[DECLASSIFIED]

DECLASSIFIED

TALKING POINTS FOR HIGH-LEVEL MEETING

Insert: (*) o Recent events make this meeting essential so that you can hear from us directly and authoritatively our positions on issues of special concern to the U.S. government and people, but especially your nuclear program.

o We also wish to make clear our view of the opportunities presented to North Korea by changing world realities, especially the opportunity to participate in a process leading to peace, security, and economic development on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

delete o The end of the Cold War has been accompanied by an historic effort by the U.S. and the Soviet Union to reduce the risk of nuclear war. President Bush's September 27 announcement of nuclear policy was a major step in this direction.

o At the same time, significant social, economic, and political changes in the world have been producing a transformation in most of the nations of Asia.

o In the space of one generation, Asia has transformed itself into the most rapidly developing region on earth. Asians have enjoyed tremendous economic growth in the last decade. We believe that all nations of the region should share this growth and prosperity.

o Another positive effect of the end of the Cold War is a new focus on reducing weapons, and especially weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons; opposing the proliferation of weapons and the technology of weapons of mass destruction; and easing regional tensions.

-- The U.S. and the Soviet Union are making major reductions in nuclear weapons and cooperating to ensure that nuclear proliferation is not an outcome of the reorganization of the Soviet Union.

-- China has indicated that it will soon join the NPT.

-- There have been breakthroughs in long-standing regional disputes such as Cambodia and some progress in the Middle East talks.

-- Your admission to the UN and welcome progress in your dialogue with the Republic of Korea have also contributed to this positive trend toward reducing tensions.

(*) This issue is your nuclear program. This is the principal reason why we feel this face-to-face meeting at this level is necessary. o We want to take this opportunity to definitively clarify our concerns about your nuclear program and how progress on the nuclear issue can be measured.

• 2 - [delete] We are fully committed to doing everything in our power to encourage these trends and buttress movement toward a world in which all nations will be secure, peaceful, prosperous, and stable.

It should be clear from this that we believe North Korea should also benefit from these positive trends. We supported your admission into the UN.

In our view, North Korea is at a crossroads in its relations not only with the United States, but also with the rest of the world.

You can, through your actions and policy decisions, make progress toward improved relations with your neighbors and with the United States and get on the road to dynamic economic growth.

In deciding to enter the UN earlier this year, your government gave an indication that it might be prepared to move in these new directions, including by fulfilling its international obligations as called for by the UN Charter. We welcomed and supported this effort by co-sponsoring the entry of both Koreas into the UN, without prejudice to eventual reunification on terms acceptable to all Koreans.

[delete] Our strong preference is to sustain progress in these areas with the ultimate goal of paving the way toward normal US-DPRK relations. And we are prepared to take steps to reciprocate positive actions in ways which will be of considerable benefit to you and your people.

The actions we look to you to take are well known to you through our contacts in the Beijing channel and which we have restated consistently since 1988.

But first and foremost among our concerns is the nuclear issue. The elimination of international concern and suspicions about your nuclear program is a matter of fundamental importance and urgency. It is the issue which will most significantly affect whether our contacts can go forward or whether our relations will be set back, engendering serious consequences.

DECLASSIFIED

~ 3 ~

o We are firmly opposed to nuclear weapons proliferation by any country, yours included. There is broad support for this position among countries in the region and the international community, and a shared determination to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in this very sensitive part of the world -- as there was in the Gulf.

o A nuclear arms race on the Korean peninsula would constitute a threat to international security and would be unacceptable to the rest of the world.

o Indeed, even the current suspicion that you are developing nuclear weapons inhibits North Korea's relations with other countries. It is also very destabilizing as it could provoke other countries in the region to take similar steps to ensure their security.

o It is possible that you are seeking a nuclear capability under the misapprehension that this additional military capacity would enhance your security.

o In fact, it will only have the opposite effect since your actions will only raise widespread concerns and could potentially encourage your neighbors to develop nuclear weapons of their own.

o We look to you to meet your unconditional international obligations as a signatory to the NPT by signing and implementing fully and promptly an IAEA Safeguards agreement. We also look to you to work out an agreement with the Republic of Korea on the banning of all nuclear reprocessing and enrichment capabilities on the Peninsula. This is the only way to ensure that there is no nuclear arms race on the Korean peninsula.

o The U.S. took the initiative in improving bilateral relations with your country in 1988 with measures that facilitated contact between our countries.

o At that time we indicated that relations could improve on a reciprocal basis, and we noted a number of specific areas where we looked for improvement. We have welcomed the beginning of progress in the areas of North-South dialogue, the return of a very limited number of Korean War MIA's, and academic exchanges and family reunions. We look to continuing progress in these and other areas for our relations to advance.

o President Bush also took a major initiative in his September 27 declaration on nuclear policy.

[DECLASSIFIED]

• 4 -

o The objective of this global initiative is to decrease the risk of nuclear proliferation and war and to enhance the security of all nations.

o As we have declared frequently, the U.S. poses no threat to North Korea, nor are we seeking to interfere in your internal affairs. The U.S. affirms its obligation and commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force except in accordance with the UN Charter against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country, including the DPRK. None of its weapons will ever be used except in self defense or otherwise in accordance with the UN Charter. This is an internationally legally-binding commitment we have undertaken and honor.

o In addition, ROK President Roh announced on November 8 a comprehensive non-nuclear policy, which stressed the ROK's acceptance of international inspection of its nuclear facilities and committed the ROK neither to acquire nuclear weapons grade material nor to reprocess or enrich nuclear material. We welcomed and fully supported that statement as a comprehensive and bold initiative which made a significant contribution to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.

o We also supported the concept of a joint declaration of non-nuclear policy by both Koreas as proposed by the ROKG in Seoul a few days ago.

o Taken together, the two initiatives go far toward achieving an objective you have stated that you share with us and the ROKG, a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons or the capacity to develop them. However, in order for this objective to be fully attained, your government must accept the same degree of inspection and verification as the ROK has already accepted or is now proposing to deal with the reprocessing issue.

o Thus, we now look to the DPRK to reciprocate the recent U.S. and ROK policy initiatives by:

-- Fulfilling its NPT obligations unconditionally by accepting and implementing by an early date the IAEA agreement on full-scope safeguards of all nuclear materials and facilities;

-- Accepting fully the ROKG proposal at the December 10-13 North-South talks regarding the nuclear issue, including trial inspections of one civilian and one military facility before the end of January.

[DECLASSIFIED]

• 5 -

o If the DPRK responds positively to the opportunities in the present situation and ends its nuclear weapons program, we are prepared to [move toward normalization of our relations. We believe other countries would respond similarly, and we would urge them to do so.] [replace] [hold another high-level meeting to discuss ways to improve relations]

o Once you have signed and ratified the IAEA safeguards agreement providing for inspections of all your nuclear activities, and the inspection process has begun (including physical inspection of all suspect reprocessing facilities), we are prepared to regularize these political level contacts in New York to include discussion of the full range of relevant issues of concern, including the possibility of the normalization of relations. [delete]

o When IAEA inspections have been fully implemented, and when the DPRK and ROK have mutually agreed to abandon all reprocessing and enrichment activities on a verifiable basis, we are prepared to [open formal discussions on full normalization of U.S. - DPRK relations.] [replace] [You or better relations.] [Hold another meeting with]

o As progress is sustained in the nuclear area is well as in other essential areas, most importantly the North-South dialogue, but including matters of missile proliferation, limitations on chemical and biological weapons, POW/MIA accounting, and terrorism, we will take additional steps toward normalization of our relations, including development of economic and diplomatic relations.

o This process of normalizing our relations could include urging our friends to move more expeditiously toward normalization with you and negotiations on appropriate economic benefits.

o For our part, after our concerns on nuclear proliferation issues have been fully met, we are prepared to take steps to contribute to other confidence-building and arms control measures in Korea.

o The beginning of this process of normalizing our bilateral relations should provide you with the means of planning for a better economic future for your people, the expansion of your international standing, and a more secure future.

o We must stress from the outset that resolution of the problems of the Korean peninsula is fundamentally a matter for the Korean people. We will support and facilitate internationally-acceptable agreements reached between North and South Korea.

DECLASSIFIED

• 6 -

o We continue to support the efforts of the Korean people to achieve peaceful reunification, and believe the North-South dialogue is the best means to achieve that objective. In that regard, we believe the time has come for a summit meeting between the leaders of the two Korean sides as proposed by President Roh. This would build on the progress already made at the last round of talks and the talks at Panmunjom on nuclear issues.

o If you do not respond to the positive steps we and the ROKG propose -- which we prefer to be the path all will follow -- and if you do not forego your nuclear weapons development, there will be a steady expansion of international opposition to your nuclear activities.

[delete] o As a final point, I would reiterate that our willingness to pursue this positive course [toward normalization] will end if we gain information that you are engaged in producing weapons grade useable nuclear material or developing nuclear weapons.

o (IF ASKED FOR FURTHER HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS) I believe that I have fully and definitively explained our position. However, if there are any elements on which you desire clarification, you can communicate with us through the existing channel in Beijing.

o To reiterate, we are prepared to regularize this higher level channel if you sign and implement an IAEA safeguards agreement. And when you and the South have agreed on a verifiable ban on reprocessing and enrichment, we are prepared to initiate a formal normalization dialogue.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET DECLASSIFIED In reply refer to: I-91/09269

MEMORANDUM FOR USDP

THROUGH: PDASD/ISA

SUBJECT: ACDA Director Lehman Visit to Korea on Nuclear Issue (U)

(a) ACDA Director Ron Lehman led a small interagency team to the Republic of Korea (ROK) last weekend for the purpose of discussing with the South Koreans how they should handle the North Korean nuclear issue with the North Koreans at this week's North-South ministerials. The team was composed of representatives from ACDA, State, JCS and OSD.

(b) During the visit, Director Lehman impressed upon the South Koreans that the North Korean nuclear issue should be "front and center" in the upcoming ministerials with the North.

(c) The remainder of the short visit was devoted to revising a draft joint declaration which the South plans to propose to the North at this week's ministerials. There were some serious deficiencies in the ROK proposal which raised U.S. concerns. The three major ones were: (1) The ROKs placed in the middle of this declaration a joint agreement to observe IAEA safeguards. Our view is that this is an international obligation of North Korea and should not be part of a North and South agreement. (2) The ROKs wanted to limit the inspection regime described in the declaration to only military facilities of both sides, leaving the civil sites to be inspected by the IAEA. Our position is that IAEA inspections have proven to be inadequate to detect a covert weapons program and may not cover the suspected reprocessing facility, so we must be able to have the ROKs--probably with U.S. participation--examine Yongbyon and other suspected civil sites. (3) The ROK wanted to state the purpose of these inspections as "to check on presence of nuclear weapons." Our position is that this comes too close to sounding like checking for U.S. weapons. Besides, the North has no nuclear weapons for us to check; rather, we want the inspection regime to verify that both North and South are biding by the joint declaration.

SECRET CLASSIFIED BY: DUSD/P DECLASS ON: OADR

DUSD (P) 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 1.4(b)(d)

SECRET
2

DECLASSIFIED

(S) The ROKs balked at our changes initially, claiming that this makes the declaration too tough for the North Koreans to accept, and more disturbingly, claiming that it is difficult to pressure the North on inspecting reprocessing facilities since reprocessing is legal. This latter position is a reversion to old ROK thinking which we frankly thought disappeared with President Roh Tae-woo's November 8 non-nuclear policy announcement. The ROKs exhibited a lack of confidence in--or perhaps understanding of--the strength of Roh's policy and were hesitant to press the North to reciprocate this policy. We spent the better part of the visit explaining the inadequacies of IAEA inspections, the need to press the North to stop reprocessing, the powerfulness of Roh's November 8 pronouncement, and the costs which are mounting for the North. At the end of the visit, our changes were accepted by the ROKs. Specifically, in the final draft of the joint declaration, reference to IAEA was moved to the preamble; civil sites were included in the proposed inspections, and the purpose of these inspections is to confirm that the North Koreans adhere to a non-nuclear policy similar to Roh's. (See TAB A.) As for trial inspections, the ROKs will propose that separately in a Prime Minister speech in the ministerials.

(S) The ROKs are very concerned that once the North signs the IAEA safeguards agreement--which may take place at the late February IAEA board meeting--international pressure will dissipate. We explained that Japan is hardening its position, and we are working with friends and allies on pressuring the North to not just sign a safeguards agreement, but actually to reciprocate Roh's non-nuclear policy. We do not know if we succeeded in dispelling all of the ROKs' concerns, but it is clear that we have to do some more work to convince the ROKs. For the next two months, the ROKs appear to accept our "carrot-and-stick" approach.

It is important that we send out the so-called "core demarche" cable to friends and allies. This cable states definitively our goal of getting the North to reciprocate Roh's non-nuclear policy and stop reprocessing. It would clearly state that signing of IAEA safeguards is insufficient to allay the world's concerns. The sooner we get this cable out, the easier it is to avoid the accusation that we are "moving the goalposts" on our demands. This would have the added benefit of showing the ROKs that there is international support for seeking a stop to DPRK reprocessing. This same message would be given to the North Koreans at the high-level U.S.-DPRK bilateral which is being proposed for late December.

The second thing is to engage the Chinese in more depth on the issue. The ROKs told Director Lehman that they thought China's role was very important, especially if the UN would be involved later, and they pleaded for the U.S. to lobby the Chinese more on this issue. The ROKs believe that China, although it works always in indirect ways, has more influence with the North than any other country. The current gameplan of including this issue as talking points in wide-ranging talks with the Chinese

SECRET

3 [SECRET] foreign minister is not focussed or quick enough. A high-level trip specifically to discuss this issue seems in order. State/PM has just sent a memorandum to USP Kanter about this suggestion.

Finally, it was clear from this visit that the ROKs are divided on what to do with 1992's Team Spirit exercise. Minister of Defense Lee explained in strong terms to Director Lehman his desire to see a bigger and more visible Team Spirit to demonstrate resolve to the North. However, the Blue House seems to lean towards a postponement, fearing that an exercise announcement would jeopardize progress in North-South relations. We were told by USFK that any cancellation decision must be made by January 1 due to the extensive preparations required. State and ACDA will be inquiring with DoD soon whether this January 1 date is firm and whether planning can go forward without any public announcement. They believe that if the North by February is still dragging its feet, then an announcement at that time to conduct Team Spirit, as a "stick" measure, would be extremely effective. Hence this is an issue which will be discussed in the interagency arena for the next two weeks.

This was a very useful visit for explaining U.S. positions to the ROKs and also persuading them on the strategy to deal with the North on the nuclear issue. Nevertheless, with the rapid development of a reprocessing capability by the North, we must continue on a fast track with follow-up actions as proposed in this memorandum. A DC meeting has been tentatively set for Monday, December 16, where the "gameplan"--including many of the above issues--will be addressed.

Eden Y. Woon, Col, USAF OSD/ISA/EAPR

Attachment a/s

[DECLASSIFIED]

[SECRET]

IMMEDIATE SECRET INCOMING ejb GW PAGE 02 OF 05 SEOUL 13075 00 OF 02 090949Z C10/10 023918 NOD386 ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000W DEC 9 1991 c/o: ISA PP O 090951Z DEC 91 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL PDASD/ISA has seen TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8485 8 DEC 1991 PDASD EAP NDDKS +d 12/9 SECRET SEOUL 13075

ALSO PASS TO CINCPAC/FPA FOR AMBASSADOR GREGG ONLY

TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, KN, KS SUBJECT: LEHMAN VISIT: ROKG PROPOSAL FOR A N/S NON-NUCLEAR JOINT DECLARATION

REF: STATE 397504

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DISCUSSIONS DURING ACDA DIRECTOR LEHMAN'S DECEMBER 6-9 VISIT CENTERED ON ROKG PLANS FOR DEALING WITH NUCLEAR ISSUES AT THIS WEEK'S NORTH-SOUTH PRIME MINISTERIAL. AS DEPARTMENT IS AWARE, DURING THE PM TALKS THE ROKG WILL TABLE A JOINT N/S DECLARATION EMBODYING PRESIDENT ROH'S NOVEMBER 8 NON-NUCLEAR INITIATIVE. THIS PROPOSAL EMERGED IN DRAFT FORM AFTER A SERIES OF HIGH LEVEL ROKG INTER-MINISTERIAL MEETINGS DECEMBER 4-6 (PRIOR TO PRESENTATION OF USG THOUGHTS CONTAINED IN REFTEL).

3. ALTHOUGH THE ROK BASIC DRAFT TRACKED IN GENERAL WITH U.S. THINKING, SERIOUS DIFFERENCES EXISTED AND WERE ADDRESSED BY DIRECTOR LEHMAN WITH THE KOREANS. DISCUSSIONS CENTERED ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN IAEA

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

SECURE DISTRIBUTION SECDRE DEPSEC SPECASST EXECSEC CRO CCO PERSEC (7)(3) CABLE/CH FILE

IMMEDIATE SECRET INCOMING

PAGE 03 OF 05 SEOUL 13075 08 OF 02 090949Z C10/10 023910 NOD386
INSPECTIONS AND ANY BILATERAL N/S INSPECTION AGREEMENT,
THE NEED TO INCLUDE CIVIL SITES IN ANY N/S BILATERAL
INSPECTION AGREEMENT, THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF HAVING AS THE
STATED PURPOSE OF BILATERAL INSPECTIONS TO CHECK FOR THE
PRESENCE OF U.S. WEAPONS -- EVEN THOUGH THE EFFECT WOULD
BE JUST THAT -- AND TRIAL INSPECTIONS.

4. IN THE END, THE ROKG SIDE AGREED WITH U.S. FIXES AND
WILL PROVIDE THE MODIFIED JOINT DECLARATION (SEE PARA 6)
TO THE NORTH DURING THE DECEMBER 10-13 PM TALKS. THEY
WILL ALSO PROPOSE TRIAL INSPECTIONS, AS SUGGESTED BY US,
IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MAIN SPEECH. ONCE AGAIN, THE ROKG
IMPRESSED THE U.S. TEAM WITH WORK DONE REGARDING
STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH THE NORTH. USG CONCERNS, ONCE
SURFACED, WERE TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY OUR INTERLOCUTORS.

5. THE ROKG AGREED WITH THE U.S. THAT THE NUCLEAR ISSUE
WILL BE "FRONT AND CENTER" AT THE UPCOMING TALKS. THE
JOINT DECLARATION WILL BE USED BY THE ROKG TO "ATTACK" THE
DPRK'S FOUR POINTS OF NOVEMBER 25. THE ROK'S EXPECT THIS
STRATEGY TO LEAD TO A MAJOR CONFRONTATION ON THE NUCLEAR
ISSUE, AND ACCORDING TO PM ADVISER LEE DONG BOK, THEY ARE
DETERMINED TO COME OUT OF THE FIGHT DURING THIS ROUND AS
"TOP DOG."

6. BEGIN TEXT OF JOINT DECLARATION:

THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH WILL STRIVE TO CREATE AN
ENVIRONMENT FAVORABLE TO THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF
DIVIDED FATHERLAND AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE IN ASIA AND
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD BY SECURING A NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE
KOREAN PENINSULA AND ELIMINATING CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS FROM OUR LAND.

THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH WILL ABIDE BY THE NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND CONCLUDE A NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS
AGREEMENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND

[DECLASSIFIED]

IMMEDIATE SECRET INCOMING PAGE 04 OF 05 SEOUL 13075 08 OF 02 090949Z C10/10 023910 NOD386 ACCEPT FULL-SCOPE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION ON ALL NUCLEAR-RELATED FACILITIES AND MATERIALS ON THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES.

IN ADDITION TO DISCHARGING THEIR EXISTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE 1. THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH WILL USE NUCLEAR ENERGY SOLELY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, AND DO NOT MANUFACTURE, POSSESS, STORE, DEPLOY OR USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

ARTICLE 2. THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH WILL NOT POSSESS NUCLEAR REPROCESSING AND URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITIES.

ARTICLE 3. THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH WILL ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS FOR TOTAL ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND ABIDE BY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN THIS AREA.

ARTICLE 4. IN ADDITION TO IAEA INSPECTION OF THEIR NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND MATERIALS, THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH WILL IMPLEMENT MUTUALLY AGREED INSPECTIONS ON ANY MILITARY AND ANY CIVIL FACILITIES, MATERIALS AND SITES IN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH IN A MANNER TO BE AGREED UPON BY BOTH SIDES, IN ORDER TO CONFIRM COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABOVE ARTICLES.

THESE FACILITIES AND SITES WILL BE SELECTED BY THE INSPECTING SIDE.

ARTICLE 5. THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH WILL DISCUSS AND DECIDE ON DETAILS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 4 BY PROCEDURES TO BE ESTABLISHED.

DECEMBER, , 1991

PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA CHUNG WON SHIK

DECLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATE SECRET INCOMING PAGE 05 OF 05 SEOUL 13075 00 OF 02 090949Z C10/10 023910 NOD386 PRIME MINISTER OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA YEON HYUNG MUK BURGHARDT [DECLASSIFIED] SECRET

[CONFIDENTIAL] JOINT STAFF INFO SERVICE CENTER [DECLASSIFIED]

IMMEDIATE R201432Z DEC 91 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO SECRETARY OF STATE IMMEDIATE 0694 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0766 AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4282 CONSULGENE SEOUL PS-/G3-CC/B/8 SR CINCPAC 15 JCS WASHDC CINCPAC SLOCH 45/MUNCH/

22ND RUT0322 14:09:2 AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0015 AMEMBASSY TOKYO 708 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4912 +EN MOD/SDEI-J/KG USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//PACOM/ SECDEF WASHDC

SECTION 02 OF 06 SEOUL 13322

CINCPAC FOR FPA

TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, KS, KN, US SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTERS SIGN JOINT AGREEMENT ON RECONCILIATION AND NONAGGRESSION: "THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE NORTH-SOUTH DOCUMENT SINCE THE DIVISION OF THE PENINSULA"

REF: SEOUL 13276 (NOTAL) AND PREVIOUS

1. [illegible] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ON THE MORNING OF DECEMBER 13, ROK PM CHUNG WON-SHIK AND DPRK PM YON HYUNG-MUK SIGNED THE "JOINT AGREEMENT ON RECONCILIATION, NONAGGRESSION, COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES," WHICH HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED. (UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT IS IN PARA 15.) WHEN ASSISTANT FM LEE SEE-YOUNG BRIEFED THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS THAT AFTERNOON HE DESCRIBED THE SIGNING AS AN "HISTORIC MOMENT." HE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF NORTH KOREAN ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT REPLACEMENT OF THE ARMISTICE IS A NORTH-SOUTH ISSUE, AND THE VALUE OF INCLUDING SPECIFIC CBM'S IN THE TEXT. LEE ALSO REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT THE ROKG WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS THE NORTH KOREANS TO SIGN THE "JOINT DECLARATION OF A NON-NUCLEAR KOREAN PENINSULA," AND AGREE TO TOTAL INSPECTIONS OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY FACILITIES. END SUMMARY.

3. ON THE MORNING OF DECEMBER 13, ROK PM CHUNG WON-SHIK AND DPRK PM YON HYUNG-MUK SIGNED THE "JOINT AGREEMENT ON RECONCILIATION, NONAGGRESSION, COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES," WHICH HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED. AFTER THE SIGNING, THE PRESS SPOKESMEN OF THE TWO SIDES ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT COVERING THE FOLLOWING POINTS (UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION):

-- THE TWO SIDES SIGNED THE AGREEMENT AND AGREED TO TAKE NECESSARY STEPS FOR ITS ENTRY INTO EFFECT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. -- BOTH NORTH AND THE SOUTH RECOGNIZE THAT THE KOREAN PENINSULA SHOULD BE "FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS" AND AGREED TO JOINT STAFF ACTION INFO CINCS(1) D3S(1) NIDS(1) J5(2) QUAD CONTROL(1) J5:SOVCEN-3(1) J5:PAC-3(1) SECDEF-W(1) DARP(1) SD3O(5) USDA:PDL(1) USPA:AE(1) USD:TCP(1) USDA:IP(2) EC(1) ASD:PA&E/EPP(1) ASD:PA&E/TNF(1) USDP:SPACEP(1) USDP:EAP(2) USDP:DASDEUR(2) USDP:DSA/A(1) USDP:ISR(1) USDP:PPFS(1) USDP:DISA/SP(1) USDP:DISA/TD(1) USDP:SDSS(1) USDP:SFP(1) USDP:TNF(1) USDP:IEEA(1) USDP:NPP(1) USDP:TSD(1) USDP:CFBACP(2) USDP:EM ECON(1) USDP:EUR POL(1) USDP:SEE(1) USDA:ANTOFOL(1) USDP:RA(1) USDP:DSDSSVP(1) DI(1) +OCSN WASHINGTON DC +CRO WASHINGTON DC +USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM +OSTA WASHINGTON DC +DNA WASHINGTON DC/OPRAC/OPMAM/ +MAC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL/ZIV/// +USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CN MACDILL AFB FL +SAFE

LATER THIS MONTH ON THE QUESTION OF THE DECLARATION OF NON-NUCLEAR KOREAN PENINSULA: (NOTE: EACH DELEGATION WILL CONSIST OF TWO DELEGATES, ASSISTED BY 5 EXPERTS...)

-- THE TWO SIDES AGREED THAT THE SIXTH PRIME MINISTERS MEETING WOULD BE HELD FEBRUARY 18-21 IN PYONGYANG.

NOTE: THIS JOINT STATEMENT COVERED THE POINTS THAT THE ROKG PLANNER 'S INCLUDE, AS REPORTED IN PARA 12 OF REFTBL EC' WAS NOT EXACTLY WHAT THE SOUTH INTENDED. THE SOUTH HAD WANTED TO SPECIFY DECEMBER 31 AS THE STARTING DATE FOR NEGOTIATING THE NON-NUCLEAR DECLARATION AND JANUARY 21-24 AS THE DATE FOR THE SIXTH ROUND.

4. IN THE AFTERNOON, ASSISTANT FOREIGN MINISTER LEE SEE-YOUNG BRIEFED THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS ON THE RESULT OF THE FIFTH ROUND. LEE DISTRIBUTED AN ENGLISH LANGUAGE VERSION OF THE JOINT DECLARATION, BUT HE CAUTIONED THAT IT WAS NOT AN EXACT TRANSLATION. THE TEXT OF THAT VERSION IS IN PARA 15. LEE DESCRIBED THE SIGNING AS AN "HISTORIC MOMENT" AND ADDED "WE'RE ALL VERY EXCITED" AT THE DEVELOPMENT.

5. LEE SEE-YOUNG DESCRIBED THE NEGOTIATION OF SEVERAL ARTICLES WHICH HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY CONTENTIOUS. HE SAID ARTICLE FIVE WAS IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT REQUIRED THE NORTH TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT REPLACEMENT OF THE ARMISTICE WAS A NORTH-SOUTH MATTER, NOT AN ISSUE BETWEEN THE NORTH AND THE U.S. LEE SAID THE ARTICLE FULLY REFLECTED THE ROKG POSITION.

6. IN AGREEING IN ARTICLE 7 THAT LIAISON OFFICES SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED AT PANMUNJOM, RATHER THAN IN THE RESPECTIVE CAPITALS, THE SOUTH SHOWED FLEXIBILITY. (NOTE: THE SOUTH WANTED TO KEEP OPEN THE OPTION OF MOVING THE OFFICES TO CAPITALS IN THE FUTURE, BUT RELented ON THAT POINT.) LEE SAID THE SOUTH AGREED TO DELETE REFERENCE TO THE U.N.

SECTION 02 OF 06 SEOUL 13322

CINCPAC FOR FPA

TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, KS, KN, US SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTERS SIGN JOINT AGREEMENT OF CHAPTER FOUR ARTICLE 10 ON PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES. HOWEVER, IN ARTICLE 11, THE SOUTH'S VERSION OF THE AREAS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE TWO SIDES WAS PRESERVED.

7. LEE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE THE ROKG ATTACHED TO THE OUTCOME OF ARTICLES 12, 14 AND 15, WHICH LISTED SPECIFIC CBM'S AS THE ROKG DESIRED. IN ARTICLE 18 ON EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION AS WELL, LEE INDICATED ROKG SATISFACTION WITH THE OUTCOME, SINCE THE NORTH AGREED TO LISTING THE KINDS OF EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION THAT COULD BE DEVELOPED. ON THE OTHER HAND, IN ARTICLE 22, THE ROKG HAD WANTED TO SPECIFY THAT THE EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION WOULD COVER TELECOMMUNICATIONS, TRANSPORTATION AND TRADE, BUT ACCEPTED THE NORTH'S VERSION, WHICH REFERRED ONLY TO SETTING UP JOINT COMMITTEES FOR "SPECIFIC SECTORS."

8. LEE NOTED THAT THE ROKG HAD AGREED TO DELETE ONE WHOLE ARTICLE WHICH STATED THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT DID NOT AFFECT THE TWO SIDES' EXISTING INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS. HOWEVER, HE POINTED OUT THAT, AS PLANNED, ROK PM CHUNG WON-SHIK INCLUDED IN HIS CLOSING STATEMENT AN AFFIRMATION THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT HAD NO EFFECT ON THE ROKG'S INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS UNDER TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS.

9. LEE STATED THAT THE ROKG PLACED STRONG EMPHASIS ON THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS QUESTION THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATION, CALLING ON THE NORTH TO ACCEPT NUCLEAR INSPECTIONS AND STOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT. AS A KEY CBM THE SOUTH URGED THAT TOTAL INSPECTIONS OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN [Avic]

MCN=91347/03143 TDR=91347/09492 TAD=91347/10102 CDSN=MAUE17 PAGE 1 OF 4 130948Z DEC 91 OF SEPT MCR

[CONFIDENTIAL] JOINT STAFF INFO SERVICE CENTER

[illegible]ILITIES, SI CONDUCTED BY THE END OF JANUARY 1992. REFERRING TO THE DRAFT "DECLARATION OF A NON-NUCLEAR KOREAN PENINSULA" WHICH CHUNG INCLUDED IN HIS KEYNOTE SPEECH ON DECEMBER 11, LEE EMPHASIZED THAT IT EXPRESSLY CALLED FOR ELIMINATION OF REPROCESSING AND ENRICHMENT. TO "IRON OUT" ANY POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE PROPOSAL FOR TRI-L INSPECTIONS WAS DESIGNED TO BUILD CONFIDENCE INITIALLY AND TO AVOID PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS.

IF CONCERNING THE NORTH'S RESPONSE TO THE ROK'S DRAFT "DECLARATION OF A NON-NUCLEAR KOREAN PENINSULA," LEE SAID THE NORTH KOREAN DELEGATES ORIGINALLY SIMPLY REPEATED THEIR EARLIER PROPOSAL FOR AN N2. LATER THEY CALLED THE SOUTH'S PROPOSAL "A STEP FORWARD" AND URGED DISCUSSION OF BOTH DRAFTS. LEE SAID THE ROK SIDE CALLED THE N2 PROPOSAL "MOST UNCERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES" AND INSISTED ON NEGOTIATING FROM ITS DRAFT BY THE END OF THIS MONTH.

11. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, LEE SAID THE PRESS HAD REPORTED THE SOUTH WOULD SUSPEND TEAM SPIRIT 82 IF THE NORTH WOULD ACCEPT SAFEGUARDS AND AREA INSPECTIONS. BUT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THERE HAD BEEN SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THIS PROSPECT EITHER AT WORKING LEVEL OR BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTERS. HE SAID THE ROK WOULD BE FLEXIBLE, LOOKING AT THE NORTH-SOUTH ATMOSPHERE BUT ALSO CONSIDERING THE NEED FOR "A SOLID DEFENSIVE POSTURE." HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE ROK WOULD WATCH CAREFULLY THE NORTH'S APPROACH TO THE NON-NUCLEAR DECLARATION AND COULD DECIDE BASED ON THE NORTH'S ATTITUDE IN THE LATE DECEMBER MEETING AT PANMUNJOM.

12. IN A "PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT" OF WHAT HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, LEE SEE-YOUNG NOTED THAT THIS JOINT AGREEMENT WAS THE FIRST OFFICIAL DOCUMENT AGREED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF BOTH SIDES WHICH WOULD GOVERN BASIC INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS. UNLIKE THE JULY 4, 1972 JOINT COMMUNIQUE WHICH ONLY DEALT WITH INTENTIONS, THIS IS INTENDED TO BIND BOTH SIDES AND REQUIRES BOTH SIDES TO SUBMIT IT TO THEIR RESPECTIVE RATIFICATION PROCESSES. AS SUCH, IT IS "THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE NORTH-SOUTH AGREEMENT SINCE THE DIVISION." HE ALSO CALLED IT "A MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT WHICH COULD BRING ABOUT A MAJOR CHANGE IN NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS." THIS AND DUAL ENTRY INTO THE U.N., LEE SAID, WILL LAY A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR THE FUTURE.

BY [illegible] SECTION 03 OF 06 SEOUL 13322 CINCPAC FOR FPA E.O. 12356: DECL. [illegible] TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, KS, KN, US SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTERS SIGN JOINT AGREEMENT ON 13. AS MOST OTHER ROKS OFFICIALS HAVE, LEE NOTED THE "UNEXPECTEDLY FLEXIBLE" NORTH KOREAN STANCE. HE OPINED THAT THE NORTH MAY NEED TANGIBLE PROOF OF PROGRESS IN THE DIALOGUE AS A STEP TO BETTER RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND AS A MEANS OF ENDING ITS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND ITS INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION. LEE SAID NORTH KOREAN REPRESENTATIVES EXPLICITLY SUGGESTED THAT ECONOMIC COOPERATION SHOULD FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT.

14. AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS PRESENTATION, LEE FIELDED A WIDE RANGE OF QUESTIONS, WITH VARYING DEGREES OF ASSURANCE. IN HIS RESPONSES, LEE:

-- WAS CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF SIGNING THE JOINT AGREEMENT ON OTHER COUNTRIES' NORMALIZATION EFFORTS TOWARD THE NORTH. HE SAID THAT THE SIGNING REPRESENTED "MEANINGFUL PROGRESS" IN THE DIALOGUE AND "A SORT OF BREAKTHROUGH" BUT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO GAUGE IMPLEMENTATION. ALSO, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO WATCH THE NORTH'S IMMEDIATE PERFORMANCE ON THE "VERY, VERY IMPORTANT" NUCLEAR ISSUE.

-- THE SOUTH'S RATIFICATION PROCESS WOULD REQUIRE A VOTE IN THE ASSEMBLY PRECEDED BY DISCUSSION IN "OPINION GATHERING". HE INDICATED THIS MIGHT BE COMPLETED NEXT MONTH. AS FOR THE NORTH, LEE NOTED THAT ONE NORTH KOREAN DELEGATE HAD ASSERTED ALL THEY REQUIRED WAS APPROVAL BY KIM IL-SUNG.

-- SAID HE WAS NOT ABLE TO STATE WHETHER IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLES 17 AND 18 WOULD REQUIRE REVISION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY LAW. THAT QUESTION WOULD HAVE TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE "AGENCIES CONCERNED".

-- WHEN ASKED IF THE INSPECTIONS UNDER THE NON-NUCLEAR DECLARATION WOULD BE CONDITIONAL ON THE NORTH'S ACCEPTING IAEA SAFEGUARDS, LEE SAID THIS BECAUSE THE REFERENCE TO SAFEGUARDS WAS IN THE PREAMBLE THE DECLARATION PRESUPPOSED ACCEPTANCE.

-- ASKED IF THE EXISTENCE OF THE ROK DRAFT NON-NUCLEAR DECLARATION WAS OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION THAT THERE ARE NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE SOUTH, LEE SAID "THE ROK IS ALREADY PREPARED TO ALLOW INSPECTIONS OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND BASES."

-- DESPITE THE AGREEMENT, HE DID NOT EXPECT EARLY PROGRESS ON EXCHANGES OF PEOPLE, SINCE THE NORTH WAS SO FEARFUL OF OPENING UP.

-- HE HAD NO DETAILS OF THE MEETING BETWEEN ROH TAE-WOO AND YOK HYONG-MU AT THE BLUE HOUSE AFTER THE SIGNING CEREMONY.

15. FOLLOWING IS AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION WHICH THE ROK MINISTRY OF INFORMATION MADE OF THE FINAL AGREEMENT:

WHEREAS IN KEEPING WITH THE YEARNING OF THE ENTIRE PEOPLE FOR THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF THE DIVIDED LAND THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH REAFFIRM THE UNIFICATION PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN THE JULY 4 (1972) SOUTH-NORTH JOINT COMMUNIQUE:

WHEREAS BOTH PARTIES ARE DETERMINED TO RESOLVE POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND ACHIEVE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION;

WHEREAS BOTH DESIRE TO PROMOTE MULTI-FACETED EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION TO ADVANCE COMMON NATIONAL INTERESTS AND PROSPERITY;

WHEREAS BOTH RECOGNIZE THAT THEIR RELATIONS CONSTITUTE A SPECIAL PROVISIONAL RELATIONSHIP GEARED TO

BY [illegible] SECTION 04 OF 06 SEOUL 13322 CINCPAC FOR FPA E.O. 12356: DECL. [illegible] TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, KS, KN, US SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTERS SIGN JOINT AGREEMENT ON UNIFICATION; AND

WHEREAS BOTH PLEDGE TO EXERT JOINT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION.

THEREFORE, THE PARTIES HERETO AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE 1: THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH SHALL RESPECT EACH OTHER'S POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEM.

ARTICLE 2: BOTH PARTIES SHALL NOT INTERFERE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

ARTICLE 3: BOTH PARTIES SHALL NOT SLANDER AND VILIFY EACH OTHER.

MCN=91347/03143 TOR=91347/09492 TAD=91347/10102 CDSN=MAUB17 [CONFIDENTIAL] PAGE 2 OF 4 130948Z DEC 91 MC COPY MEF

[DECLASSIFIED]

CONFIDENTIAL
JOINT STAFF
INTEL SERVICE CENTER

ARTICLE 4: BOTH PARTIES SHALL NOT ATTEMPT IN ANY MANNER TO SABOTAGE AND SUBVERT THE OTHER.

ARTICLE 5: BOTH PARTIES SHALL ENDEAVOR TOGETHER TO TRANSFORM THE PRESENT ARMISTICE REGIME INTO A FIRM STATE OF PEACE BETWEEN THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH AND SHALL ABIDE BY THE PRESENT MILITARY ARMISTICE AGREEMENT (OF JULY 27, 1953) UNTIL SUCH TIME AS SUCH A STATE OF PEACE HAS TAKEN HOLD.

ARTICLE 6: BOTH PARTIES SHALL SEEK CONFIRMATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE AND SHALL COOPERATE AND ENDEAVOR TOGETHER TO PROMOTE NATIONAL INTERESTS AND ESTEEM.

ARTICLE 7: TO ENSURE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS AND LIAISON BETWEEN BOTH PARTIES, A SOUTH-NORTH LIAISON OFFICE SHALL BE ESTABLISHED AT PANMUNJOM WITHIN THREE (3) MONTHS OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT.

ARTICLE 8: A SOUTH-NORTH POLITICAL SUBCOMMITTEE SHALL BE ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE INTER-KOREAN HIGH-LEVEL TALKS WITHIN ONE MONTH OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT WITH A VIEW TO DISCUSSING CONCRETE MEASURES TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION AND OBSERVANCE OF THE ACCORDS OF SOUTH-NORTH RECONCILIATION.

ARTICLE 9: BOTH PARTIES SHALL NOT USE ARMED FORCE AGAINST EACH OTHER AND SHALL NOT MAKE ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST EACH OTHER.

ARTICLE 10: DIFFERENCES OF OPINION AND DISPUTES ARISING BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES SHALL BE PEACEFULLY RESOLVED THROUGH DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATIONS.

ARTICLE 11: THE SOUTH-NORTH DEMARCATION LINE AND AREAS FOR NONAGGRESSION SHALL BE IDENTICAL WITH THE MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE SPECIFIED IN THE MILITARY ARMISTICE AGREEMENT OF JULY 27, 1953 AND THE AREAS THAT HAVE BEEN UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF EACH PARTY RESPECTIVELY THERE UNDER UNTIL THE PRESENT.

ARTICLE 12: TO ABIDE BY AND GUARANTEE NONAGGRESSION, THE TWO PARTIES SHALL CREATE A SOUTH-NORTH JOINT MILITARY COMMITTEE WITHIN THREE (3) MONTHS OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT. THE SAID COMMITTEE SHALL DISCUSS AND CARRY OUT STEPS TO BUILD MILITARY CONFIDENCE AND REALIZE ARMS REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING THE MUTUAL NOTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MAJOR MOVEMENTS OF MILITARY UNITS AND MAJOR MILITARY EXERCISES, THE PEACEFUL UTILIZATION OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, EXCHANGES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AND INFORMATION, PHASED REDUCTIONS IN ARMAMENTS INCLUDING THE ELIMINATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND SUPPRESS ATTACK CAPABILITIES, AND VERIFICATIONS THEREOF.

ARTICLE 13: A TELEPHONE HOTLINE SHALL BE INSTALLED BETWEEN THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES OF BOTH SIDES BY
[illegible] SECTION 05 OF 06 SEOUL 13322

CINCPAC FOR FPA

BT
TAGS: PREL, PARM, KNUC, KS, KN, US
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTERS SIGN JOINT AGREEMENT ON TO PREVENT ACCIDENTAL ARMED CLASHES AND AVOID THEIR ESCALATION.

ARTICLE 14: A SOUTH-NORTH MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE SHALL BE ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE INTER-KOREAN HIGH-LEVEL TALKS WITHIN ONE (1) MONTH OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO DISCUSS CONCRETE MEASURES TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION AND OBSERVANCES OF THE ACCORDS ON NONAGGRESSION AND TO RESOLVE

MCN=91347/03143 TOR=91347/09492 TAD=91347/10102 CDSN=MAUB17

MILITARY CONFRONTATION.

ARTICLE 15: TO PROMOTE AN INTEGRATED AND BALANCED DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE WELFARE OF THE ENTIRE PEOPLE BOTH PARTIES SHALL CONDUCT ECONOMIC EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION, INCLUDING THE JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF RESOURCES, TRADE IN GOODS OF EACH KIND, DOMESTIC COMMERCE AND JOINT INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS.

ARTICLE 16: BOTH PARTIES SHALL CARRY OUT EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION IN DIVERSE FIELDS, INCLUDING SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, EDUCATION, LITERATURE, THE ARTS, HEALTH, SPORTS, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND PUBLISHING AND JOURNALISM, INCLUDING NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, TELEVISION, AND PUBLICATIONS IN GENERAL.

ARTICLE 17: BOTH PARTIES SHALL GUARANTEE REUNION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS FREE INTER-KOREAN TRAVEL AND CONTACT

ARTICLE 18: BOTH PARTIES SHALL: PERMIT FREE CORRESPONDENCE, REUNIONS AND VISITS BETWEEN FAMILY MEMBERS AND OTHER RELATIVES DISPERSED SOUTH AND NORTH; SHALL PROMOTE THE RECONSTITUTION OF DIVIDED FAMILIES OF THEIR OWN AND SHALL TAKE MEASURES TO RESOLVE OTHER HUMANITARIAN ISSUES.

ARTICLE 19: BOTH SIDES SHALL RECONNECT RAILROADS AND ROADS THAT HAVE BEEN CUTOFF AND SHALL OPEN SOUTH-NORTH LAND, SEA AND AIR TRANSPORT ROUTES.

ARTICLE 20: BOTH PARTIES SHALL ESTABLISH AND LINK FACILITIES NEEDED FOR SOUTH-NORTH POSTAL AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES AND SHALL GUARANTEE THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF INTER-KOREAN MAIL AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS.

ARTICLE 21: BOTH PARTIES SHALL COOPERATE ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE IN THE ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND VARIOUS OTHER FIELDS AND CARRY OUT JOINT BUSINESS UNDERTAKINGS ABROAD.

ARTICLE 22: TO IMPLEMENT ACCORDS ON EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION IN THE ECONOMIC CULTURAL AND VARIOUS OTHER FIELDS BOTH PARTIES SHALL ESTABLISH JOINT COMMITTEES FOR SPECIFIC SECTIONS, INCLUDING A SOUTH-NORTH ECONOMIC EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION COMMITTEE, WITHIN THREE (3) MONTHS OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT.

ARTICLE 23: A SOUTH-NORTH EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION SUBCOMMITTEE SHALL BE ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE INTER-KOREAN HIGH-LEVEL TALKS WITHIN ONE (1) MONTH OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT WITH A VIEW TO DISCUSSING CONCRETE MEASURES TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION AND OBSERVANCE OF THE ACCORDS ON SOUTH-NORTH EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION.

ARTICLE 24: THIS AGREEMENT MAY BE AMENDED OR SUPPLEMENTED BY CONCURRENCE BETWEEN BOTH PARTIES.

ARTICLE 25: THIS AGREEMENT SHALL ENTER INTO FORCE AS OF THE DATE BOTH PARTIES EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE PROCEDURES FOR BRINGING IT INTO EFFECT.

BT
[illegible] SECTION 06 OF 06 SEOUL 13322

CINCPAC FOR FPA

BT
TAGS: PREL, PARM, KNUC, KS, KN, US
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTERS SIGN JOINT AGREEMENT ON
DATE: DECEMBER 13, 1991
END TEXT.

PAGE 3 OF 4
130948Z DEC 91
06 SECT MSG

NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE

National Security Archive, Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University, 2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037, Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu