Cable, Amembassy Seoul 11536 to SecState, October 29, 1991, Subject: Meeting with Kim Chong Whi (Secret)

IMMEDIATE SECRET INCOMING [DoD-Wolfowitz/ Ford] PAGE 01 OF 06 SEOUL 11536 00 OF 02 290730Z C08/11 B21620 NOD486 INFO: SS(10) SWO(01) 29/0751Z A2 JL (TOTAL COPIES: 011) SUBJ: MEETING WITH KIM CHONG WHI ///REPEATED TOSEC BY SSO//// ///NQT/NOT PASSED TO U/S WOLFOWITZ BY SSO//// [REDACT STATE EQUITIES AS SHOWN 25X6; requires DOD review] [DECLASSIFIED BY DASD(NM), DOS, OUSD(P) DATE 04 OCT 2017 FOIA CASE # 12-F-1306] DIST AUTH BY READ BY DISTRIBUTED BY EXSEC (S/S-IRM) DEPEXSEC DATE/TIME REPEATED TO BY DATE/TIME SENSITIVE THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT MAY BE SEEN ONLY BY THE ADDRESSEE AND, IF NOT EXPRESSLY PRECLUDED, BY THOSE OFFICIALS UNDER HIS AUTHORITY WHOM HE CONSIDERS TO HAVE A CLEAR-CUT "NEED TO KNOW." IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED, GIVEN ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION, OR DISCUSSED WITH NON-RECIPIENTS WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT. ADDRESSEES OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SHOULD HANDLE THE DOCUMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS AND WITH CURRENT DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTIONS ON NODIS. WHEN THIS DOCUMENT IS NO LONGER NEEDED, THE RECIPIENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPERVISING ITS DESTRUCTION AND FOR MAILING A RECORD OF THAT DESTRUCTION TO S/S-IRM/RMD, ROOM 7512, TEL. 647-2991. DECLASSIFIED EXECUTIVE SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET 13-M-4328

IMMEDIATE SECRET INCOMING PAGE 02 OF 06 SEOUL 11536 00 OF 02 290730Z C08/11 021620 NOD486 ACTION NODS-00 INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000W ------------------A5CA42 290735Z /10 38 O 290734Z OCT 91 ZFF4 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7118 SEOUL 11536 NODIS. FROM THE AMBASSADOR PASS TO UNDER SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ E.O. 12356. DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, MARR, MNUC, KS, KN, US SUBJECT: MEETING WITH KIM CHONG WHI

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2. SUMMARY: IN AN HOUR-LONG MEETING, KIM CHONG WHI SPOKE ABOUT KOREA'S PLAN TO MOVE FORWARD WITH AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS NUCLEAR POLICY POSSIBLY PRIOR TO SECRETARY CHENEY'S VISIT; NORTH KOREA'S DILEMMA, AND THE NEED FOR CONTINUED PRESSURE; HIS STRONG OPPOSITION TO A HIGH LEVEL US/NORTH KOREA MEETING IN THE NEAR FUTURE; HIS HOPE THAT PAUL WOLFOWITZ CAN COME OUT TO CONTINUE CONSULTATION ON NUCLEAR MATTERS; AND ATMOSPHERICS AND ANECDOTES FROM NORTH KOREA. END SUMMARY.
3. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OVER TWO YEARS OF MEETINGS, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR KIM CHONG WHI HAD A NOTETAKER PRESENT DURING OUR 28 OCTOBER MEETING. HE WAS KIM JAE SUP, A SECONDED MOFA OFFICER WHO DEALS WITH NUCLEAR AND OTHER SENSITIVE MATTERS.
4. ROK NUCLEAR POLICY [OCT 30 1991] [ISA] [PP] DECLASSIFIED SECRET

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KIM OPENED THE MEETING BY STATING THAT THE KOREANS ARE THINKING OF MAKING A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON ROKG NUCLEAR POLICY BEFORE THE CHENEY VISIT. I ASKED IF THE TIMING FOR THIS ANNOUNCEMENT WAS SET. KIM SAID THAT IT WAS NOT. HE THEN REITERATED HIS HOPE THAT UNDER SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ COULD COME TO KOREA IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO CONTINUE THEIR CONSULTATION. LOOKING DIRECTLY AT ME, KIM SAID "WE WANT TO CONSULT WITH YOU ON THIS MATTER. DO YOU HAVE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS I RAISED WITH WOLFOWITZ IN NEW YORK?" I SAID I DID NOT. KIM THEN SPOKE OF THE

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5. PYONGYANG ATMOSPHERICS

KIM STATED THAT THE ATMOSPHERE DURING THE TALKS IN THE NORTH HAD BEEN COLD AND AT TIMES BITTER. HE SAID AT ONE TIME HE HAD HAD TO BREAK UP A NEAR "SHOUTING MATCH" BETWEEN THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS. HE SAID THE KOREAS REMAIN APART ON ALMOST EVERY ISSUE OF DETAIL THAT WAS DISCUSSED, FROM TERMINOLOGY USED TO DESCRIBE THE TWO SYSTEMS; THE NAME FOR THE DOCUMENT WHICH THEY WILL NOW WORK ON; THE RATIONALE FOR CBM'S; AND METHODS OF OPENING UP MEDIA EXCHANGES THROUGH TV AND RADIO. STILL, UNDERNEATH THEIR OBDURACY KIM SAID HE SENSED AN EAGERNESS ON THE PART OF THE NORTH KOREANS TO ESTABLISH BETTER LINKS WITH THE WORLD. THEIR DILEMMA IS THAT IF THEY OPEN UP THEIR SYSTEM TO REACH OUT, THEIR LEGITIMACY WILL BE DESTROYED. KIM STATED HIS FEELING THAT IF PRESSURE IS CONTINUED, NORTH KOREA CAN BE MADE TO ACCEPT A GRADUAL OPENING OF ITS SYSTEM. KIM STATED THAT THE NORTH KOREANS WERE ANXIOUS TO TALK TO HIM PRIVATELY AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE WAS THE MAN WHO HAD ARRANGED PRESIDENT ROH'S TALK WITH GORBACHEV. HE SENSED A TREMENDOUS FEELING OF DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE SOVIET COUP HAD FAILED, THAT KIM IL SUNG HAD NOT BROUGHT ANYTHING TANGIBLE BACK

OUSD(P) 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); EO. 13526 § 1.4 (b)(d) DASD(NM) 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); EO. 13526 § 1.4 (d) DOS 5 USC § 552 (b)(1), EO. 13526 § 3.3 (b)(6) [illegible]

IMMEDIATE SECRET INCOMING PAGE 04 OF 06 SEOUL 11536 00 OF 02 290730Z G08/11 021620 NOD486 FROM CHINA, THAT THE JAPANESE HAVE NOT COME UP WITH AID AND THAT TALKS WITH THE U.S. HAD NOT EXPANDED. KIM STATED THAT THE ECONOMY IN THE NORTH GROWS WORSE ALL THE TIME. HIGH LEVEL OFFICERS NOW SAID THEY WERE WALKING TO WORK TO IMPROVE THEIR HEALTH AND TO AVOID POLLUTING THE AIR. THE REAL REASON WAS, OF COURSE, THE LACK OF GAS. GIFTS WERE NOT EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS. KIM FELT THE REASON WAS THAT THE NORTH KOREANS WERE FEARFUL OF THE IMPACT OF HIGH TECH GIFTS THAT THE SOUTH KOREANS HAD BROUGHT WITH THEM ON PREVIOUS VISITS.

6. PRESSURE ON PYONGYANG KIM SAID TO ME THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO TIGHTEN THE SCREWS. HE THEN ALLUDED TO A MESSAGE FROM HIS EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON TALKING ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING BETWEEN DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ANDERSON AND HO JUNG IN NEW YORK. AGAIN LOOKING DIRECTLY AT ME, HE STATED "PLEASE DON'T DO IT AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER OUR DECEMBER NORTH-SOUTH MEETING IN SEOUL." HE URGED THAT WE SEND THROUGH OUR EXISTING CHANNEL IN BEIJING THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE MESSAGE TO THE NORTH KOREANS THAT THEY MUST TALK OVER MILITARY MATTERS WITH THE SOUTH. KIM STATED THAT THE NORTH KOREANS HAVE GOT THEIR RICE HARVESTED AND HAVE ENOUGH FOOD TO LAST THE WINTER. HE BELIEVES THAT THE TRADITIONAL PERIOD OF SPRING HUNGER MAY BE THE TIME WHEN THE PRESSURE CAN TAKE EFFECT TO BRING CHANGES ABOUT. AGAIN HE SAID DIRECTLY "PLEASE DO NOT HOLD A HIGH LEVEL MEETING AT THIS TIME."

7. TALKS IN PANMUNJOM THE WORKING LEVEL TALKS IN PANMUNJOM WILL START IN 10-14 DAYS. FROM THE NORTH WILL COME PAEK NAM JOON, FORMER NORTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR TO POLAND; CHOI WU-JIN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE PEACE AND DISARMAMENT INSTITUTE AND FORMER AMBASSADOR TO GHANA, AND MAJOR GENERAL KIM YONG CHOL. THE ROK DELEGATION WILL BE LED BY VICE MINISTER OF UNIFICATION SONG KAN-HO, AMBASSADOR LIM DONG WON FROM IFANS, AND LEE DONG BOK, SPOKESMAN FOR THE TALKS, WHO IS A SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO NSP DIRECTOR SUH.

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8. TWO-STAGE DEALINGS WITH PYONGYANG KIM CHONG WHI SAID HE HAD HAD AN INTERESTING CONVERSATION WITH KIM JONG WOO, DEPUTY MINISTER OF INTERNATIONAL PROJECTS, WHO IS SUPPOSEDLY RELATED TO KIM IL SUNG. THIS KIM SCOLDED OTHERS AND ACTED IN A SWAGGERING AND CONFIDENT MANNER. HE WAS VERY INTERESTED IN ROK/U.S. ECONOMIC COOPERATION, BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT NO ECONOMIC OPENINGS WOULD TAKE PLACE WITH THE SOUTH UNTIL SOME SORT OF NON-AGGRESSION AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SIGNED BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH. KIM CHONG WHI TOLD ME HE NOW BELIEVES THIS DESIRE FOR A NON-AGGRESSION AGREEMENT MUST BE ACCOMMODATED AND THAT IT CAN PAVE THE WAY FOR DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR MATTERS, ECONOMIC EXCHANGES, ETC. HE FEELS THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD BE SIGNED BY THE SPRING. AFTER THAT HE THINKS THAT THE IMMINENT EMERGENCE OF A NEW ROK GOVERNMENT MAY DELAY THE PROSPECTS OF TALKS. KIM CHONG WHI URGED HIS NORTH KOREAN COUNTERPART TO MOVE QUICKLY IN DEALING WITH ROH TAE WOO'S CONSERVATIVE REGIME. HE DREW A PARALLEL BETWEEN ROH TAE WOO AND PRESIDENT NIXON AND RELATED TO NORTH KOREAN KIM THAT IT HAD BEEN CONSERVATIVE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS WHO HAD MADE THE GREATEST OPENINGS TO PREVIOUSLY HOSTILE COMMUNIST REGIMES.

9. KIM AGAIN URGED ME TO SEND A MESSAGE ASKING THAT UNDER SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ COME SOON TO KOREA. HE SAID "WE WANT TO CONSULT." HE STATED FLATLY THAT BAN KI MOON, WHOM HE RESPECTS VERY MUCH, CANNOT SPEAK FOR THE BLUE HOUSE OR THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND THAT HE CANNOT ACT AS A SUBSTITUTE CHANNEL.

10. [illegible] I ASKED KIM IF HE HAD ANY THOUGHTS ON WHAT WOULD BE BEST IN TERMS OF THE [illegible] HE SAID HE HADN'T THOUGHT ABOUT IT. I TOLD HIM I HOPED THAT WE COULD BE FLEXIBLE ON THE ISSUE AND THAT HE SHOULD LET ME KNOW WHAT KOREA'S SENSE OF TIMING ON THAT ISSUE WOULD BE.

11. IN CLOSING, KIM ASKED IF WE HAD NOTED ANY SIGNIFICANT FALLOUT DASD(NM) 5 USC 552(b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 1.4(d) DOS 5 USC 552(b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 3.3(b)(6) SECRET

IMMEDIATE SECRET INCOMING PAGE 06 OF 06 SEOUL 11536 00 OF 02 290730Z C08/11 021620 NOD486 FROM KIM IL SUNG'S VISIT TO CHINA. I SAID WE HAD NOT. HE ASKED TO BE INFORMED OF ANY INSIGHTS THAT WE RECEIVE. HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE NEW MIYAZAWA GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN CONTINUE ITS TOUGH LINE TOWARD NORTH KOREA. I SAID WE WOULD DO ALL WE COULD TO INSURE THAT THAT WAS THE CASE.

12. COMMENT: THIS WAS A SLIGHTLY NEW AND DIFFERENT KIM CHONG WHI. HIS NOTETAKER WROTE FURIOUSLY ALL THOUGH THE MEETING AND KIM IS CLEARLY, FOR THE FIRST TIME, NOW BUILDING A PAPER RECORD OF OUR CONVERSATIONS. I HOPE THAT THIS WILL NOT RESTRICT THE FRANKNESS WITH WHICH WE HAVE TALKED. HE CLEARLY FEELS VULNERABLE ON THE CONSULTATION ISSUE. I HOPE THAT WE CAN BE AS POSITIVE AS POSSIBLE.

THE THREAT TO ANNOUNCE A [illegible] BEFORE SECRETARY CHENEY'S VISIT MAY BE BLUFF TO PRESSURE US ON CONSULTATIONS, BUT IT WOULD NOT BE WISE TO CALL THEIR BLUFF, IF WE CAN AVOID DOING SO.

GREGG

DASD(NM) 5 USC 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 1.4(d)

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