Cable, Amembassy Seoul 11234 to SecState, Subject: Further Korean Reactionto the [redacted] Initiative, October 21, 1991 (Secret)

[IMMEDIATE] [SECRET] [SECRET] [INCOMING] [Seebaf-Cheney] PAGE 02 OF 07 SEOUL 11234 00 OF 03 210939Z C01/11 009825 NOD276 ACTION NODS-00 INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000W A26436 210942Z /25 38 0 210937Z OCT 91 ZFF-4 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6856 [OCT 21 1991 J: ISA PP] SEOUL 11234 [NODIS] DEPARTMENT PASS TO NSC AND U/S WOLFOWITZ [OCT 21 1991 Please retain.] TAGS: PREL, MARR, MNUC, KS, KN SUBJECT: FURTHER KOREAN REACTION TO THE [illegible] INITIATIVE REF: A) STATE 345609 B) STATE 345707 C) SEOUL 10976

1. [illegible]
2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR, GEN. RISCASSI, DCM, AND POLCOUNS MET WITH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR KIM CHONG WHI ON OCTOBER 21 TO DISCUSS THE PRESIDENT'S [illegible] INITIATIVE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE NORTH-SOUTH PREMIER TALKS SCHEDULED TO START OCTOBER 22. KIM HAD REVIEWED THE PRESIDENT'S AND ACTING SECRETARY'S LETTERS AND NONPAPER (REFS A AND B) WHICH DCM DELIVERED TO MOFA DIRECTOR-GENERAL BAN KI-MOON ON SATURDAY. [DECLASSIFIED] KIM IS NOW IN A BIND, HAVING TO FEND OFF PROBES FROM THE SEOUL MEDIA [SECRET] [SECRET] 13-M-4326 DOS 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 3.3 (b)(6) DASD(NM) 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 3.3 (b)(6)

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PAGE 03 OF 07 SEOUL 11234 00 OF 03 ZIM939Z C01/11 009825 NOD276 WHILE EXPLAINING PRIVATELY TO OTHER HIGH LEVEL ROKG OFFICIALS THAT HE WAS NOT HOLDING BACK CRITICAL INFORMATION. IN ADDITION, KIM REASONS THAT PYONGYANG WILL NOW VIEW THE MOVE AS A UNILATERAL USG DECISION AND AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF PLANS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES FROM THE PENINSULA.

THE ROKG SIDE WILL NOT PROPOSE A MUTUAL BAN ON REPROCESSING BUT WILL INDICATE THAT NORTH KOREA CANNOT EXPECT IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. OR JAPAN UNLESS IT FOREGOES REPROCESSING AND ENRICHMENT.

4. ACTION REQUEST: WE ARE AT A PIVOTAL TIME; THE KOREANS ARE CHAFING AT THE LEAK AND INTIMATIONS ABOUT A LACK OF PRIOR CONSULTATION. EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT UNDER SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ PLAN TO VISIT SEOUL TO DISCUSS THE CRUCIAL SERIES OF NEXT STEPS WITH KIM CHONG WHI AND TO SMOOTH SOME OF THE RUFFLED FEATHERS. WE WILL PROVIDE FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THIS PROPOSED VISIT SEPT EL. END SUMMARY.

5. IN OUR OCTOBER 21 MEETING, KIM MOVED IMMEDIATELY BEYOND THE QUESTION OF A BLUE HOUSE REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND HONED IN ON THE OBERDORFER PIECE IN THE POST THAT WAS CARRIED IN FULL BY THE SEOUL WEEKEND

SECRET

[DECLASSIFIED]

DOS § USC § 552(b)(1); E.O.13526 3.3(b)(6) DASD(NM) 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(6)

IMMEDIATE SECRET INCOMING PAGE 04 OF 07 SEOUL 11234 00 OF 03 210939Z C01/11 009825 NOD276 PAPERS. (NOTE: REF. C REPORTED THAT ROH'S REACTION TO OUR "HEADS UP" WAS BASICALLY POSITIVE.) KIM SAID THAT PEOPLE IN SEOUL WERE "REALLY CONCERNED" ABOUT THE ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC PRE-CONSULTATION. AT THE SAME TIME HE SAID THE U.S WAS [illegible] KIM CAUSTICALLY NOTED THAT NON-CONSULTATION WAS "NOTHING NEW" AND CITED EARLIER UNILATERAL ANNOUNCEMENTS ON THE CLOSURE OF U.S. AIR BASES IN KOREA. HE ALSO POINTEDLY REFERRED TO THE CONTRASTING PATTERN OF PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES.

[illegible] DCM PASSED ALONG CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY U/S WOLFOWITZ IN A PHONE CONVERSATION THAT MORNING, AND THE AMBASSADOR ASKED IF KIM STILL THOUGHT A WOLFOWITZ VISIT COULD BE USEFUL. KIM STRONGLY ENDORSED THE IDEA OF CONSULTATIONS WITH WOLFOWITZ, SAYING THAT FINAL DECISIONS NEED TO BE MADE. CLEARLY LOOKING BEYOND THIS WEEK'S PM MEETINGS WITH THE NORTH (ANOTHER ROUND IS TENTATIVELY PLANNED FOR SEOUL IN DECEMBER), KIM SAID WE NEED TO FIGURE OUT HOW TO DEAL WITH THE NORTH, WHEN AND IF TO MOVE FORWARD WITH ANNOUNCING A [illegible] HOW TO IMPLEMENT IT, AND DISCUSSION OF A RANGE OF OTHER SUPPLEMENTARY ACTIONS (PATRIOT MISSILE DEPLOYMENT, FOR EXAMPLE).

7. [illegible] [illegible] HE RETURNED TO POINTS DISCUSSED AT THE HONOLULU TALKS AND INDICATED THE ROK SIDE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN FURTHER REFINING THEIR PRINCIPLES, (INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF WHAT WORD TO USE IN PLACE [illegible] KIM MADE IT CLEAR THE ROKG WOULD LIKE TO COME FORWARD WITH A POLICY WITH SCOPE FOR [illegible] IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS, BUT HE DID NOT ELABORATE.

8. LOOKING AHEAD TO THIS WEEK'S PRIME MINISTERIAL, THE AMBASSADOR RAISED THE QUESTION OF HOW THE WEEKEND

DOS 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(6) DASD(NH) 5 USC § 552(b)(1); E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(6)

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATE SECRET INCOMING PAGE 05 OF 07 SEOUL 11234 00 OF 03 210939Z COI/11 009825 NOD276 DEVELOPMENTS WILL BE USED WITH THE NORTH KOREANS. KIM SAID THERE WILL BE NO LINKAGE, "WE WILL STICK TO I GIVE YOU MY WORD ON IT." HE THOUGHT THAT A FEW DAYS AFTER HIS RETURN FROM PYONGYANG ON OCTOBER 25 WOULD BE A GOOD TIME FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH WOLFOWITZ, WHO KIM THOUGHT WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO MAKE A NON-PUBLICIZED TRIP SO AS TO AVOID THE INTENSE MEDIA SPOTLIGHT.

[illegible] HE ADDED THAT PYONGYANG WILL LIKELY SEE THE MOVE AS PART OF A LONGER TERM PROCESS OF UNILATERAL DECISIONS BY THE U.S. TO LEAVE THE PENINSULA. THE DCM ASKED IF THE DECISION DID NOT IN FACT LEAVE THE SOUTH IN A BETTER NEGOTIATING POSITION. KIM RESPONDED THAT THE NORTH WILL HONE IN ON THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE AND TELL THE SOUTH THAT THE SEOUL GOVERNMENT SHOULD HAVE TAKEN THE INITIATIVE, NOT THE U.S., IMPLYING THAT THE ROKG SHOULD NOT EXPECT RECIPROCAL GESTURES IN THE DIALOGUE CHANNEL FOR DECISIONS IT DID NOT CONTROL.

10. THE AMBASSADOR ACKNOWLEDGED THAT KIM HAS BEEN PUT IN AN AWKWARD POSITION JUST PRIOR TO THE PM TALKS, AND HE EXPRESSED REGRET FOR THE WAY THINGS HAD DEVELOPED, SAYING IT WAS A GOOD DECISION BADLY HANDLED.

11. KIM TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON EXPECTATIONS FOR THE PYONGYANG TALKS, SAYING THE ROK SIDE WOULD BE WILLING TO SIGN A NON-AGGRESSION PACT IF THE NORTH AGREES TO A RANGE OF CBM'S AND EXCHANGES, AND IF THE PACT DOES NOT JEOPARDIZE EXISTING BILATERAL TREATY ARRANGEMENTS. KIM ADDED THAT IF THE NORTH DOES NOT SHOW FLEXIBILITY NOW, THEY MAY BE UNDER PRESSURE BY THE SPRING TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING. HE SAID THE FALL CROPS WILL KEEP FOOD SUPPLIES UP THROUGH THE

SECRET DECLASSIFIED DOS 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 3.3 (b)(6) DASD (N-M) 5 USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 3.3 (b)(6)

IMMEDIATE SECRET INCOMING PAGE 06 OF 07 SEOUL 11234 00 OF 03 210939Z C01/11 009825 NOD276 EARLY WINTER, BUT THAT NORTH KOREANS CAN EXPECT TO FACE THE "SPRING HUNGER" PHENOMENON. THIS COMBINED WITH THE LOSS OF MANY OF THE BENEFITS OF PAST TERMS OF TRADE WITH USSR WOULD ADD PRESSURE ON THE NORTH TO RESPOND. ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY KEYS THE ROKG DELEGATION WOULD BE LOOKING FOR IN THIS ROUND OF TALKS THAT MIGHT FORESHADOW MORE FLEXIBILITY BY THE DPRK, KIM SAID NO, A FURTHER INDICATION OF THE CURRENT SENSE OF CAUTION WE ARE SEEING AMONG ROKG OFFICIALS. DOS 5 USC § 552(b)(1); E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(6) DASD (WH) 5 USC § 552(b)(1); E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(6) 13. COMMENT: WHILE KIM WAS GENUINELY ILL AT EASE WITH THE UNTIMELY EFFECTS OF PUBLICITY SURROUNDING THE ... INITIATIVE TOWARD KOREA, HE WAS ALSO USING THE OCCASION TO PRESS HIS CASE FOR SUPPLEMENTING MILITARY SYSTEMS.. WE WILL BE DISCUSSING OPTIONS IN THIS REGARD FURTHER WITH SECRET DECLASSIFIED

IMMEDIATE SECRET INCOMING NODIS PAGE 07 OF 07 SEOUL 11234 00 OF 03 210939Z C01/11 009825 NOD276 GEN. RISCASSI AND FORWARDING OUR THOUGHTS TOGETHER WITH IDEAS FOR THE PROPOSED WOLFOWITZ VISIT. GREGG NODIS [DECLASSIFIED] NODIS SECRET

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