Paper, US-ROK Basic Positions, ca. August/September 1991, Secret (two versions: a and b)
National Security Archive
These two versions of a paper, with different redactions and marginal notes in one (Document No. 3-a) that were incorporated into the other version (Document No. 3-b), lay out the basic positions held by the U.S. and South Korea regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons program, which poses a "serious
Source: Paper, US-ROK Basic Positions, ca. August/September 1991, Secret (two versions: a and b) Date: Sep 1, 1991 Collection: Engaging North Korea: Evidence from the Bush I Administration Nov 8, 2017
SECRET DECLASSIFIED US-ROK BASIC POSITIONS
- North Korea's quest for a nuclear weapons capability poses a serious challenge to the peace and stability not only of the Korean peninsula but also of Northeast Asia as a whole. This will end only when the world has been assured that unacceptable North Korean nuclear activities have ceased. Our policy goal remains a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons grade material and the means to produce them. The best way to bring this about is by an agreement between North and South Korea.
- Both the ROKG and the USG should make use of all possible diplomatic means and international pressures to bring North Korea to implement fully the provisions of the IAEA safeguards agreement, i.e., declaring all nuclear-related materials and facilities and putting them under international inspection, and also foregoing the reprocessing and enrichment of nuclear materials.
- The USG and ROKG will continue their close consultations on security matters. [illegible]
- The US nuclear umbrella will continue to be an element of the U.S. security commitment to the ROK. [illegible]
- The ROK should take the lead in discussing with North Korea security matters on the peninsula. The US and other concerned countries may play a role in their own bilateral channels or in appropriate multilateral fora in coordination with the efforts of the ROK.
- North-South discussions should be used to address all aspects of peace and stability on the peninsula: confidence building measures, non-aggression arrangements, and the North Korean nuclear problem.
- The question of arriving at adequate assurances in the nuclear area may come up in the course of either announced or "secret" talks between North and South Korea. It is recognized that a possible outcome of such talks might be a declaration by the ROKG of "non-nuclear principles" crafted in close coordination with the USG. SECRET [USD (R) 5 USC §552 (b)(1); EO 13526§1.4 (c),(d),(h) DASD (PM) 5 USC §552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 3.3 (c)(6)] 13-M-4313
[SECRET]
Apart from having all nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, in order to achieve the objective of a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons grade material and the means to produce them, the USG would be willing to lift economic sanctions and promote the end of the diplomatic isolation of the DPRK.
The ROKG and the USG should encourage Japan to continue to use its influence in the normalization talks to induce North Korea to agree to full implementation of the IAEA safeguards agreement plus steps that would assure a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons grade material and the means to produce them. Other countries should be urged to use economic and diplomatic leverage wherever possible to achieve this. Japan should also be encouraged to keep its basic policy toward North Korea in step with the U.S. and ROK. Economic assistance should not be rendered to North Korea until the issue of North Korea's nuclear program, including the reprocessing problem, has been resolved.
[DECLASSIFIED]
[DECLASSIFIED BY OSD, DASH(NM), OUSD(P), DOS DATE 21 Aug 2017 FOIA CASE: 12-F-13060]
[SECRET]
NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
National Security Archive, Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University, 2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037, Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu