Paper, US-ROK Basic Positions, ca. August/September 1991, Secret (two versions: a and b)

REDACT STATE EQUITIES AS SHOWN 25X6,9. DOD CLEARANCE REQUIRED. SECRET Carl - Good paper. Paul W.

US-ROK BASIC POSITIONS

1. North Korea's quest for a nuclear weapons capability poses a serious threat to the peace and stability not only of the Korean peninsula but also of Northeast Asia as a whole. The threat will have been eliminated only when the world has been assured North Korean efforts have ceased and there is no nuclear weapons useable material anywhere on the peninsula. Our policy goal remains a Korean peninsula free of the means to produce nuclear weapons grade material.

2. Both the ROKG and the USG should make use of all possible diplomatic means and international pressures to bring North Korea to implement fully the provisions of the IAEA safeguards agreement -- i.e., declaring all nuclear-related materials and facilities and putting them under international inspection --and forego the reprocessing and enrichment of spent nuclear materials.

DASD (WH) S USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 3.3(b)(6) USD (P) S USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 1.4 (b)(d)(h) DOS S USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 3.3(b)(6)(9)

6. The ROK should take the lead in discussing with North Korea security matters on the peninsula. The US and other concerned countries may be called upon to play a supporting role in their own bilateral channels or in appropriate multilateral fora. In such cases, the US would continue to coordinate its positions with the ROKG. The USG would be willing to lift economic sanctions and lead an end to the diplomatic isolation of DPRK in return for termination of the North's nuclear program.

7. North-South discussions should be used to address all aspects of peace and stability on the peninsula: confidence building measures, non-aggression arrangements, and the North Korean nuclear problem.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET 13-M-4306

SECRET 8. The question of arriving at adequate assurances in the nuclear area may come up in the course of unannounced or "secret" talks between North and South Korea. It is recognized that a possible outcome of such talks might be a declaration by the ROKG of "non-nuclear principles" crafted in close coordination with the USG.

9. The ROKG and the USG should continue to urge the Government of Japan to use its normalization talks to push North Korea towards full implementation of the IAEA safeguards agreement and other steps that would assure a Korean peninsula free of reprocessing and enrichment. Japan and other countries should be urged to use economic leverage wherever possible to achieve those ends, but should ensure that its basic policy toward North Korea stays in step with U.S./ROK. Economic assistance should not be rendered to North Korea until the issue of North Korea's nuclear program, including the reprocessing problem, has been resolved.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED BY: DASD(NM) DOS, OUID(P) DATE 07 Sep 2012 FOIA CASE # 12-F-1306

SECRET

SECRET

US-ROK BASIC POSITIONS

1. North Korea's quest for a nuclear weapons capability poses a serious threat to the peace and stability not only of the Korean peninsula but also of Northeast Asia as a whole. The threat will have been eliminated only when the world has been assured North Korean efforts have ceased and there is no nuclear weapons useable material anywhere on the peninsula. Our policy goal remains a Korean peninsula free of the means to produce nuclear weapons grade material.

2. Both the ROKG and the USG should make use of all possible diplomatic means and international pressures to bring North Korea to implement fully the provisions of the IAEA safeguards agreement -- i.e., declaring all nuclear-related materials and facilities and putting them under international inspection --and foregoing the reprocessing and enrichment of spent nuclear materials.

3. The ROK should take the lead in discussing with North Korea security matters on the peninsula. The US and other concerned countries may be called upon to play a supporting role in their own bilateral channels or in appropriate multilateral fora. In such cases, the US would continue to coordinate its positions with the ROKG. The USG would be willing to lift economic sanctions and lead an end to the diplomatic isolation of DPRK in return for termination of the North's nuclear program.

4. North-South discussions should be used to address all aspects of peace and stability on the peninsula: confidence building measures, non-aggression arrangements, and the North Korean nuclear problem.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

DASD (NM) S USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 3.3 (b)(1) USD(P) S USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 1.4 (b)(3) DOS S USC § 552 (b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 3.3 (b)(1)(G)

SECRET

8. The question of arriving at adequate assurances in the nuclear area may come up in the course of unannounced or "secret" talks between North and South Korea. It is recognized that a possible outcome of such talks might be a declaration by the ROKG of "non-nuclear principles" crafted in close coordination with the USG.

9. The ROKG and the USG should continue to urge the Government of Japan to use its normalization talks to push North Korea towards full implementation of the IAEA safeguards agreement and other steps that would assure a Korean peninsula free of reprocessing and enrichment. Japan and other countries should be urged to use economic leverage wherever possible to achieve those ends, but should ensure that its basic policy toward North Korea stays in step with U.S./ROK.

[DECLASSIFIED]

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE

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