Telegram, State Department to Tokyo, etc., August 13, 1991, Subject: U.S.-ROK Hawaii Meeting on North Korea (Secret)
National Security Archive
This cable provides talking points on the results of U.S.-ROK consultations held August 6-7, 1991, in Hawaii on how to deal with the North Korea nuclear problem. The U.S. delegation was headed by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz and included other Pentagon, State, ACDA and NSC of
Source: Telegram, State Department to Tokyo, etc., August 13, 1991, Subject: U.S.-ROK Hawaii Meeting on North Korea (Secret) Date: Aug 13, 1991 Collection: Engaging North Korea: Evidence from the Bush I Administration Nov 8, 2017
DECLASSIFIED BY DASD(NM), DDS
DATE 02 OCT 2017
FOIA CASE # 12-F-1306
OUTGOING TELEGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INITIAL HERE ++
AUTH DA DRAFT DA
CLEARED
3
4
9 SS 10 SS0
EAP:DANDERSON SEKPOL 291J
08/13/91 77717
EAP:DANDERSON, ACTING
T:GDUNN
S/NP:HELEVIN
P:MKMCMILLION
DASD/ISA:CFORD
PM:UROPE
ACDA:NWULF
EAP/K:CKARTMAN
NSC:DMAAL +
PRIORITY TOKYO, CANBERRA PRIORITY, LONDON PRIORITY,
PARIS PRIORITY, BONN PRIORITY, OTTAWA PRIORITY
ROUTINE BEIJING, MOSCOW, USVIENNA, SEOUL
USVIENNA FOR UNVIE
TAGS: PREL, MNUC, PARM, KN, KS, US
SUBJECT: U.S.-ROK HAWAII MEETING ON NORTH KOREA
1.
2. ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE AUTHORIZED TO BRIEF HOST
GOVERNMENTS ON THE AUGUST 6-7 DISCUSSIONS WE HAD IN HAWAII
WITH THE SOUTH KOREANS.
BEGIN TALKING POINTS:
--THE USG AND ROKG HELD AUGUST 6-7 IN HAWAII WIDE RANGING,
INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS ON ISSUES RELATED TO NORTH KOREA.
THE DISCUSSIONS WERE PART OF ONGOING EXCHANGES AND
CONSULTATIONS ON SECURITY ISSUES, PARTICULARLY AS THEY
MIGHT RELATE TO NORTH KOREA AND THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR
FACILITIES. THE US TEAM, LED BY DEFENSE DEPT U/S PAUL
WOLFOWITZ, INCLUDED OTHER DEFENSE, STATE, ACDA, AND NSC
OFFICIALS. THE ROKG TEAM WAS LED BY DR. KIM CHONG WHI,
FROM THE BLUE HOUSE, AND INCLUDED REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE
MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
--THESE DISCUSSIONS WERE EXPLORATORY AND DID NOT INVOLVE
DECLASSIFIED
13-M-4303
2
MAKING ANY DECISIONS. WE REGARDED THESE AS VERY VALUABLE DISCUSSIONS.
--BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE DEVELOPMENT BY NORTH KOREA OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS USABLE MATERIALS POSED A GRAVELY SERIOUS THREAT TO SECURITY IN NORTH EAST ASIA, AND THAT NORTH KOREA SHOULD BE PRESSED BY ALL TO RATIFY IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND PLACE ALL OF ITS NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS, INCLUDING ESPECIALLY THE FACILITIES AT YONGBON, AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE.
--WE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD EXERT MAXIMUM EFFORTS DIPLOMATICALLY TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM. WE SHOULD WORK CLOSELY WITH OTHER CONCERNED COUNTRIES TO END THIS THREAT. {FOR TOKYO ONLY: WE AGREED THAT JAPAN HAS UNUSUAL LEVERAGE IN ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA ON NORMALIZATION BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, BUT NOTED THAT THE ROK, THE US AND OTHERS, AS WELL AS TOKYO, SHOULD PLAY APPROPRIATE ROLES IN DEALING WITH NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUES.}
-- WE AGREED TO PRESS PYONGYANG VIGOROUSLY FOR EXPEDITIOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF NORTH KOREA'S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS. THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESSURE FROM THE BROAD INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS STRESSED. WE ALSO AGREED THAT ROUGH TARGETS FOR A SATISFACTORY SCENARIO FOR RATIFICATION AND BRINGING INTO FORCE TO ALLOW INSPECTIONS OF NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES BY THE IAEA SHOULD BE DEVISED TO MAXIMIZE PRESSURE AT EACH STAGE.
-- U/S WOLFOWITZ STRESSED THAT THE US COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT AND MAINTAIN SOUTH KOREAN SECURITY AND DETER NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION WAS UNWAVERING.
THEY CONTINUE TO BE BASED ON REQUIREMENTS TO MAINTAIN SOUTH KOREAN SECURITY AND CANNOT BE LINKED IN ANY WAY TO NORTH KOREA'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NPT TO SAFEGUARD NUCLEAR PLANTS AND ACTIVITIES.
NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND ACTIVITIES ARE THE NEW AND DESTABILIZING FACTOR ON THE PENINSULA. EFFORTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED AT FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE DANGERS THIS NEW FACTOR HAS INTRODUCED.
DASD (NM) 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1); E.O. 13526 § 1.4(d)
DECLASSIFIED
3
-- A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE, AS ADVOCATED BY NORTH KOREA, IS NOT THE SOLUTION TO THE DPRK PROLIFERATION PROBLEM. WHAT IS NEEDED IS FOR NORTH KOREA TO FULFILL COMPLETELY ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, SIGN AND RATIFY THE NPT, AND PROCEED EXPEDITIOUSLY WITH SAFEGUARDS INSPECTIONS. NORTH KOREAN CAPABILITY TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS USABLE MATERIAL AND REPROCESSING WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO STABILITY ON THE PENINSULA AND TO NORTH EAST ASIA. SUCH EFFORTS SHOULD EITHER BE FOREGONE OR REVERSED.
--THE ROKG AND USG AGREED TO CONTINUE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS ON THESE ISSUES. 44
S/S: S/S-O:
4
[DECLASSIFIED]
NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
National Security Archive, Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University, 2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037, Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu