SECRET//NOFORN Report No. DODIG-2013-112 August 5, 2013

Inspector General United States Department of Defense

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS

(U) ASSESSMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LONG-TERM INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS CAPABILITIES

(U) This document will not be released or shared outside the Department of Defense without prior written approval of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense

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Additional Information

The Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Programs prepared this report. If you have questions, please contact the signer of the report.

Suggestions for Audits and Evaluations

To suggest ideas for, or to request future audits and evaluations, contact the Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Program Assessments at (703) 882-4860 (DSN 381-4860) or UNCLASSIFIED fax (571) 372-7451. Ideas and requests can also be mailed to:

Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Inspector General Intelligence and Special Program Assessments Attn: Project Suggestions/10J25 4800 Mark Center Drive Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE hotline To report fraud, waste, mismanagement, and abuse of authority. Send written complaints to: Defense Hotline, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1900 Phone: 800.424.9098 e-mail: hotline@dodig.mil www.dodig.mil/hotline

Acronyms and Abbreviations CCMD Combatant Command DIAP Defense Intelligence Analysis Program DIE Defense Intelligence Enterprise MIDB Modernized Integrated Database MFA Military Forces Analysis

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INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Assessment of Department of Defense Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities (Report No. DODIG-2013-112) (U//FOUO)

(U) We are providing this report for your information and use. We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report.

(U) DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly. The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Intelligence and Security's comments were partially responsive. We accepted the proposed revised recommendation A.1, but still require an implementation plan for addressing the recommendation. The Office of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency's comments were also partially responsive. DIA should develop and present a plan to address the Combatant Command concerns as described in recommendation B.1. Therefore, we request additional comments on recommendation A.1 and B.1 as indicated in the recommendations table on page ii by September 5, 2013.

(U) If possible, send your comments in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat file only) to DoD OIG (b)(6) @dodig.mil. Copies of your comments must have the signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We are unable to accept the / Signed / symbol in place of the signature. If sending classified comments electronically, you must send them over SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) to DoD OIG (b)(6) @dodig.smil.mil or via Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) to DoD OIG (b)(6) @dodig.ic.gov.

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at DoD OIG (b) , or DoD OIG (b)(6) at DoD OIG (b)(6) 7.

Anthony C. Thomas Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence and Special Programs Assessments

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Report No. DODIG-2013-112 (Project No. D2012-DINT01-0186) August 5, 2013 SECRET//NOFORN (U) Results in Brief: Assessment of DoD Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities What We Did (FOUO) We evaluated multiple concerns about the perceived degradation in the capability of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) to perform long-term intelligence analysis caused by a decade-long focus on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency crisis support. What We Found (FOUO) The DIE did reallocate analytic resources to support the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as other contingency type operations. But any assessment about the impact of this resource realignment on the enterprise's capability to perform long-term intelligence analysis is much more complicated than just competition for analytic capacity. (FOUO) Highlighting the common thread gleaned from our interviews is that it is not analytic capacity that is in short supply but rather subject-matter expertise. Additional mission requirements, an increase in the magnitude and variety of analytic questions, crisis response fatigue, and customer-shortened time-horizons, have all stressed the DIE's capability to produce and retain the subject-matter expertise essential to DoD needs. (FOUO) Additionally, Combatant Command (CCMD) representatives stated that current Defense Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP) processes are inadequate for addressing CCMD mission-essential task analysis requirements. (FOUO) Finally, we found that significant concerns exist within the CCMDs on the DIE's "foundational knowledge" databases and the current remediation efforts underway to address known shortfalls. What We Recommend (FOUO) We recommend the OUSD (I) establish specific all-source analytic training, certification, and accreditation standards for the DIE, with metrics calibrated toward developing subject-matter experts based on defined defense intelligence priorities. (FOUO) We also recommend that the Director, DIA, conduct a top-to-bottom review of all-source intelligence analyst resources in the DIE so that analyst manpower billets are aligned with current CCMD intelligence requirements. (FOUO) In addition, we recommend that the Director for Analysis, DIA, capture CCMD requirements for non-traditional intelligence that can be addressed in the DIAP analytic production prioritization process. Management Comments and Our Response (U) Of our three recommendations, management concurred with two and non-concurred with one. Two recommendations still require action plans for implementation. i SECRET//NOFORN

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Recommendations Table

Please provide comments by September 5, 2013.

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Table of Contents (U) Introduction 1 Objective 2 Background 2 Scope and Methodology 2

(U) Finding A. Subject Matter Expertise in the Defense Intelligence Enterprise not keeping pace with DoD intelligence requirements 5 The Changing National Security Environment and the Need for Subject Matter Expertise 5 Conclusion 6 Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response 7

(U) Finding B. Defense Intelligence Analysis Program not satisfying Combatant Command intelligence requirements 8 Defense Intelligence Analysis Program and the National Intelligence Priority Framework 8 Conclusion 9 Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response 9

(U) Finding C. Efforts to improve the Defense Intelligence Enterprise foundational data bases are not adequate 11 MIDB and the need for Non-Traditional Intelligence Data Analysis 11 Conclusion 12

(U) Observation I. Intelligence Support to the Acquisition Mission Area 13 (U) Observation II. Intelligence Support to the Campaign Planning Mission Area 14

(U) Management Comments Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Intelligence and Security 15 Director, Defense Intelligence Agency 16

(U) Appendix I: Previous Intelligence Analysis Reviews & Lessons Learned Papers 18 (U) Appendix II: Terms of Reference 20

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Introduction

Throughout the course of history, world events have always presented militaries with both complexity and unpredictability. Today's environment sustains this norm, but adds the unprecedented speed at which events unfold and information travels. The pace of change is accelerating. There are emerging factors at work in today's strategic environment that we cannot ignore. The sheer number of connections between people and societies has increased exponentially. An ever-present global media can instantly elevate local actions to matters of strategic import. Technology and weapons once reserved to states can now find their way into the hands of disaffected individuals and disruptive groups...

U.S. Army Chief of Staff, in "The Force of Tomorrow," Foreign Policy, February 4, 2013 (U)

(U) Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department of Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) has supported an unprecedented number of military activities across a wide spectrum of conflicts, ranging from major combat operations to multiple disaster relief efforts. The major combat operations include:

• (U) Operation Enduring Freedom, covering primarily Afghanistan and, other small operations under the Global War on Terror (GWOT) or Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), ranging from the Philippines to Djibouti;
• (U) Operation Noble Eagle, providing enhanced security for U.S. military bases and for other Homeland Defense assets, that was launched in response to the terrorist attacks and continues today;
• (U) Operation Iraqi Freedom, which began in the fall of 2002 with the buildup of troops for the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, and continued with counter-insurgency and stability operations; and
• (U) Operation Odyssey Dawn, in support of international military operations in Libya to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution.

(U) The DIE has supported these military actions, while also responding to the past decade's rapidly-changing world geo-political environment and an increased demand for intelligence analysis in support of national security policies. Below are just some of the major events requiring DIE action and resources:

• (U) The financial crisis that began in the United States in 2008 and rapidly spread to most of the industrialized world economies, leading to deep recessions and economic turmoil in both U.S. allies and adversaries;

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• (U) The Arab Spring, beginning in December 2010, which has led to dictators being overthrown, presidents ousted, parliaments completely reorganized, and civil wars raging across the Middle East and North African regions;
• (U) The January 2012 national security strategy of rebalancing the nation's defense focus toward the Asia-Pacific region after more than a decade of counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism operations primarily in the Middle East and North Africa;
• (U) The unprecedented challenges presented by the potential threat of Cyber Operations against U.S. interests.

(U) This summary does not exhaust all of the changes that have occurred in the national security environment since the 21st century began. But it does capture the incredible complexity of the challenges that the DIE analytic force faced since then and provides a context for the resource allocation and prioritization decisions under consideration.

Objective

(U) Assess and determine the impact to the DIE's long-term intelligence analysis capability, due to the 10-plus-year focus on crisis and current intelligence support for DoD activities. The objective assessment was an attempt to determine the root causes behind the perceived degradation in capability and to capture from an "opportunity cost" perspective the widely-held view within the Intelligence Community (IC) that over the past decade the intelligence analysis enterprise has reduced long-term analysis production.

Background

(U) This assessment was initiated in response to requests/recommendations from multiple CCMD staffs and was intended to complement the then-draft 2012 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Intelligence (OUSD (I)) "Review of Defense Intelligence Analysis." Representatives from OUSD (I) Defense Analysis and this office met early in 2012 to coordinate actions and focus areas in order to minimize duplication of effort.

Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this assessment from July 2012 through February 2013. Our approach to answering the exceptionally broad question our objective posed was to divide this assessment into two phases. During Phase I, we captured the DoD operational, policy, planning, and intelligence organizational view of the current state of the DIE's long-term analytic capabilities. In order to frame the discussion, we asked each organizational representative to describe how they viewed the DIE analytic community's support to the following DoD mission areas:

• (U) Intelligence support to Acquisition

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• (U) Intelligence support to Campaign Planning
• (U) Intelligence support to Indications and Warning
• (U) Intelligence support to Theater Engagement
• (U) Intelligence support to Human Terrain Knowledge Management
• (U) Intelligence support to the Asia-Pacific Rebalancing Strategy

In our work, we:

• (U) Reviewed DoD, and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) policy and doctrine regarding intelligence preparation of the operational environment, National Unified Intelligence Strategies, Defense Intelligence Strategies, intelligence community-wide lessons-learned papers, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans, and Defense Planning Guidance
• (U) Visited all Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands to interview General Officers, Senior Executive Service, and Directors from the Operations, Plans, and Intelligence Directorates for their views on the current state of intelligence analysis capabilities and their perspectives on which departmental mission areas warranted a more detailed review
• (U) Visited all of the Military Service Directorate of Intelligence Staffs and the service intelligence production organizations to obtain their perspectives
• (U) Visited with a number of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD (P)) representatives to obtain their perspectives
• (U) Visited with the staffs of both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) to obtain their perspectives
• (U) Visited the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and interviewed select personnel responsible for intelligence analytic production or supporting functionality to obtain their perspectives
• (U) Interviewed both current and former USD/I leaders to obtain their perspectives
• (U) Also interviewed a number of former high-ranking intelligence community and academic analysis experts to capture their perspectives

(U) Also, in preparation for this project, we researched a number of previous studies or publications concerning intelligence analysis. A very short sampling of studies is attached as Appendix 1.

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(U) This assessment process had built-in limitations. Our Phase I assessment is subjective due to the stated objective to gather a wide range of opinions about the current status of long-term analytic capabilities. Our interviewees offered uniformly frank and candid comments. We have not subscribed specific opinions to specific individuals. However, we believe that their common observations are worthy of record and consideration concerning current processes and procedures. Also, after an extensive review of DoD authorities, policies, and doctrine, we determined that no formal definition of "long-term intelligence analysis" exists. The Intelligence and Special Program Assessment (ISPA) team recognized this absence of a definition and we purposely allowed the community stake-holders wide latitude to describe their concerns without imposing an artificial analytic time frame to limit their observations. "In-depth analytic analysis" would be a more all-encompassing description of the questions we asked.

(U) Finally, it became clear during our interviews with both the DoD's operational and intelligence communities that the DIE's capability to supply long-term intelligence analysis for two of the department's core mission activities required a more rigorous evaluation than envisioned in Phase I. In Phase II, we will simultaneously conduct a more in-depth objective assessment of the DIE's current capability to satisfy the Acquisition and Campaign Planning community's analysis requirements as outlined in Observations I and II of this report.

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(U) Finding A. Subject Matter Expertise in the Defense Intelligence Enterprise not keeping pace with DoD Intelligence Requirements

(U) The DIE is unable to satisfy all DoD long-term analytic intelligence requirements due to a shortage of analysts with in-depth subject matter expertise for defense activities in the current geopolitical environment. The Combatant Commands, Service Intelligence Centers, Combat Support Agencies, and a host of other DIE stakeholders offered multiple reasons for this situation. Significant reductions in force during the late 1990s and the large number of new hires following 9/11 led to a limited number of experienced analysts in the DIE to mentor and pass on their knowledge to junior analysts. As a result, large numbers of all-source analysts have been shifted from crisis to crisis, loaded down with new additional intelligence responsibilities, and burdened with a production metric mentality, without ever having the opportunity to develop long-term detailed knowledge of a particular subject necessary for producing high-quality anticipatory intelligence.

The Changing National Security Environment and the Need for Subject Matter Expertise (U)

(U) Almost all CCMD Directors told us that crisis support intelligence is prioritized in their area of responsibility and therefore the demand signal for longer-term all-source analytic effort has significantly decreased. It should be noted that staff members at every level of the organization we interviewed assumed that "someone, somewhere in the enterprise" was continuing to perform this type of analysis. We found, however, that a crisis-focused operating environment consumes vast amounts of both command organic analytic capacity and large segments of the rest of the "inter-agency" enterprise. The enterprise intelligence production organizations confirmed this demand-signal increase and have given priority to "crisis support" to the detriment of their traditional in-depth strategic military capability analysis.

(U) We were told that because of significant reductions in force in the DIE during the late 1990s and the large number of new hires following 9/11, only a limited number of "old hand" experienced analysts are available to mentor and pass on their hard-earned knowledge. Many older generation analysts are now approaching retirement age and instead of prioritizing the long-term development of replacement subject matter experts, the DIE has attempted short-term fixes, such as analytic tradecraft training.

(U) In addition, numerous operational, policy, and planning consumers told us that unlike before, they themselves have become more demanding customers of intelligence analysis. Their requirements today range far beyond traditional threat capability analysis and have increased granularity or detail requirements, along with significantly shortened response time demands. These additional factors, which required so much enterprise capacity, contribute to and disrupt the analytic communities' capability to develop subject-matter expertise.

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(U) We also learned from the CCMDs, service intelligence centers, and other DIE elements that DoD has significantly increased its demand for non-traditional military capability analysis. For example, the CCMDs described an increased requirement to emphasize the shaping and deterring phases of their Operation and Contingency Plans. The information requirements necessary for developing plans to execute shaping and deterrence activities are significantly different from traditional military capability analysis. The CCMDs said this increased demand signal for non-general military intelligence analysis, along with their traditional intelligence needs, far exceeds the organizations current available manpower.

(U) The service intelligence organizations also described an environment where the demand signals for other non-general military intelligence, such as socio-cultural and cyber threat analysis, was constantly increasing. These organizations acknowledged that the "new" missions offered critically important contributions for achieving national security objectives. But they told us that adding these new missions onto their all-source analytic workforce, already constrained by resource and capability limitations, would diminish their ability to conduct specified military intelligence tasks.

(U) Finally, an increased emphasis has been made on producing reports as a metric for evaluating analyst performance. Multiple analysts described an environment where they felt pressured to create event reports rather than longer-term forecasts. This over-emphasis on product and production metrics, at the expense of developing more in-depth knowledge, has contributed to the overall negative perception about the DIE's capability to support DoD requirements.

(U) Conclusion

(U) The DIE cannot currently satisfy the DoD long-term analytic intelligence requirements. The reduced number of experienced subject matter experts and the large hiring effort post 9/11 have forced the DIE to change its operating mechanisms. In addition, the current national security environment's complexity and unpredictability, a focus on short-term reporting, an increase in scope and demand for more detailed understanding of world events, and the substantial increase in new analytic focus areas have all affected the DIE's ability to develop new experts. The DoD and DIE leaders must establish a culture of substantive knowledge development and empower line managers to create practical day-to-day mechanisms for developing all-source analysts with the expertise the department requires. As previous lessons-learned reports have consistently highlighted, no quick-fix shortcuts exist to develop the in-depth understanding necessary for responding to current events, as well as providing the maximum flexibility for shaping an uncertain future.

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(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Revised Recommendation

(U) A.1. We recommend that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD (I)), partnering with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Combatant Commands, and the Services, develop an All-Source Analysis certification program that leads to training, developing, and retaining a more experienced and robust workforce. We recommend that such a program includes common core analytic skills and performance standards, and an enterprise-wide all-source analysis occupational-specialty career track and development program.

Management Comments. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Intelligence & Security, (OUSD (I&S)) concurred with the recommendation's intent and proposed revised language to align with the Department's efforts to improve the all-source analysis foundation in the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

Our Response. Although the OUSD (I&S) concurred with the recommendation's intent we consider their comments as partially responsive. We concur with the revised language proposed by OUSD (I&S), but request an action plan with milestones to address creating the All-Source Analysis Certification Program.

(U) A.2. We recommend that the Director, DIA, conduct a top-to-bottom review of all DIE all-source intelligence analyst resources to ensure that apportioning of analyst manpower billets is properly aligned with current all-source intelligence requirements.

Management Comments. The Director, DIA, concurred with this recommendation. DIA recognizes the need to maximize using scarce analytic resources in a fiscally-constrained environment. We are currently conducting an internal review of mission requirements, capabilities, and priorities, and of how DIA all-source analysts are allocated to work these issues. This review should be completed in about six months (November 2013). Once the internal review results are received, DIA, in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, will expand the effort to include combatant commands and service intelligence centers. We anticipate that the reviews second phase can be finished within six months.

Our Response. We consider that the comments from the Director, DIA responded to recommendation A.2, and no additional comments are required.

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SECRET//NOFORN (U) Finding B. Defense Intelligence Analysis Program not satisfying Combatant Command Intelligence Requirements [illegible] Defense Intelligence Analysis Program and the National Intelligence Priority Framework (U) (U) The DIAP establishes policies, procedures, responsibilities and levels of analytic effort required to provide timely, objective, and cogent military intelligence to all U.S. Government customers, according to the August 2011 DIAP Management Guidance. The NIPF is a strategic priorities process that the Director of National Intelligence leads based on National Security Presidential Directives. The Intelligence Community (IC) uses the NIPF to ensure that an emphasis is placed on key topics, countries, and non-state entities that are important to senior policymakers. (U) CCMD J-2, J-3, and J-5 staff members expressed numerous concerns about the current DIE intelligence analysis production process. They described situations where, in their view, the analytic capacity and priorities necessary to support their command requirements were not available either organically or in the greater enterprise due to current resource allocation directives. A typical comment was: "...DIAP is too tightly coupled with NIPP" and the CCMDs were tasked or expected to analyze a broader set of "non-traditional intelligence for defense" requirements outside of the NIPF. A number of interviewees told us that the NIPF was designed for the National Security Council and the National Command Authorities and was never intended to address CCMD requirements. [illegible] (U) Another common CCMD concern was that the prevailing DIAP-directed focus on supporting tactical counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and other crisis-action priorities left little enterprise 8 SECRET//NOFORN

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analytic capacity for the longer-term analytic efforts required for other command activities, such as theater campaign planning. CCMDs told us that under the current DIAP program the CCMDs were responsible for short-term analysis, defined as the immediate moment up to six months. Other DIE entities were tasked to perform analysis for beyond six months. Theater OPLAN and CONPLAN intelligence requirements are primarily more long term in nature. With the on-going reduction in organic command intelligence analyst manpower, the staffs felt, therefore, that current DIAP priorities and resource allocations were out of synch with command requirements. In their view, not enough DIE greater enterprise capacity was allocated to work these longer-term analytic requirements.

(U) Conclusion

Our assessment's scope does not extend to addressing the appropriateness of specific NIPP priorities or any linkages between NIPP and DIAP current priorities. But our interviews clearly reveal that the current DIAP resource allocation processes are addressing only some of the CCMDs' intelligence requirements. While we acknowledge that the DIAP is a "living" process, extra vigilance must be maintained to ensure that the program captures and addresses both national policymaker needs, and the present day additional departmental requirements levied on the CCMDs. Once these additional non-traditional intelligence requirements are captured, the DIE must seek to rebalance the analytic capacity and capability across the enterprise.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) B.1. We recommend that the Director for Analysis, DIA, through the DIAP Board of Governors, establish a plan with specific milestones and metrics agreed to by the CCMDs for capturing DoD's non-traditional intelligence requirements and incorporate them into the DIAP requirements/analytic production priority processes.

Management Comments. The Director, DIA, nonconcurred with our recommendation. In his written comments, the Director stated that the current DIAP governance model accommodates identifying and incorporating nontraditional intelligence requirements and associated metrics. Each year, a "DIAP Open Season" is conducted, and during this season, member organizations can raise new issues or requirements that the DIAP Board of Governors' consider. Carrying out approved changes to DIAP management guidance--including production topics, responsibilities, and related procedures--is coordinated during regularly scheduled analytic and production conferences, which member organizations attend.

Our Response. Comments from the Director, DIA, were partially responsive. We fully acknowledge that existing DIAP governance processes exist to address new issues or requirements brought forward by the CCMDs. We also recognize the challenges of addressing additional intelligence analysis requirements in the current fiscal environment. However, our interviews with senior CCMD and other DIE stakeholders reveal their concerns about the DIE plan for actually

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addressing the nontraditional intelligence requirements, not the governance process. These additional nontraditional intelligence requirements should be given priority during DIA's internal review of mission requirements, capabilities, and priorities, as defined by their response to Recommendation A.2. We request the DIA DI reconsider the recommendation and use the process already agreed upon to address analyst resource allocation. We also request you provide this office a plan on your road map for apportioning analytic DIE resources to address their non- traditional intelligence requirements.

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(U) Finding C. Efforts to Improve the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Foundational Data Bases are not Adequate

(U) Efforts to improve the DIE's foundational knowledge databases are not adequate to meet both CCMDs' and Service Intelligence Center (SIC) requirements. These organizations are concerned that not enough DIE resources are allocated to ensure database currency and accuracy. They also believe that the current emphasis on crisis-support operations has significantly downgraded the priority of database maintenance. In addition, the CCMDs and the services said more resources need to be allocated for cataloging non-traditional military intelligence data currently being collected. As a result, the CCMD and service component elements lack confidence that their warfighting intelligence requirements will be satisfied when a crisis arises.

MIDB and the need for Non-Traditional Intelligence Data Analysis (U)

DIA (b)(1)-1.4(g) (S//NF) DIA (b)(1)-1.4(g)

(U) To substantiate these concerns, we interviewed the staff of the DIA's Military Forces Analysis Office (MFA). MFA provides foreign military forces analysis for the warfighter, national security policymakers, and the acquisition community and validates the order of battle data in MIDB. The MFA staff confirmed that MIDB and other data-basing efforts had been negatively affected by the responsible production organizations prioritizing crisis support over database maintenance. This was especially true for the lower priority countries.

(U) We were also told that most of the personnel currently assigned to MFA will be moving to the new regional centers created as part of DIA's Vision 2020. MFA was created in 2003 because the-then DI regional offices failed to provide timely management of MIDB. Therefore, the potential for a dilution of database maintenance effort under this new construct is of great concern.

(U) Finally, we were also told that MIDB's "order of battle" focus does not support the entirety of command data basing requirements. However, a methodology for capturing non-traditional intelligence collection, such as social media data, in database form still presented a challenge for the DIE. The CCMDs' did cite a need for applying a greater analytic effort across the DIE on the non-traditional intelligence data that was being collected and in an architecture that the entire community could access.

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Conclusion

(U) Based on our interviews, we conclude that the DIE is not adequately giving priority to creating and maintaining foundational databases necessary for CCMD operations. It remains to be seen whether the current remediation strategies will address CCMD concerns. We also believe that the disestablishment of a dedicated MIDB production organization potentially dilutes the focus on database maintenance. Addressing CCMD concerns about MIDB maintenance and other DIF "foundational knowledge" database requirements must be among the community leadership's top priorities. We will assess the status of the database remediation efforts currently underway during Phase II of this project.

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(U) Observation I: Intelligence Support to the Acquisition Mission Area

(U) Multiple organizations and individuals expressed concern about the significantly diminished science and technology expertise that the DIF possesses and the prioritizing of analytic efforts to support defense acquisition processes.

Background

(U) As directed by DoDD 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition System, DoDI 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, CJCSI 3170.01H, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, intelligence analysis integration is critical to DoD acquisition programs. Identifying projected adversarial threat capabilities--to include scientific and technical developments that may affect a program or a capability's design or implementation--is crucial to a successful development process. Furthermore, the applicable threat information must be continually updated in response to adversarial capability advances throughout the acquisition life-cycle to maintain the programs technological superiority.

(U) Our interviews with CCMD, Service Intelligence Centers, and selected DIA offices revealed that the DIE has major shortfalls in scientific and technological expertise that is required to satisfy DoD acquisition directives. Our interviewees offered subjective and anecdotal reasons for these shortfalls. In addition to concerns expressed about analytic capability to support current and future acquisition efforts, these same interviewees also said that prioritizing these activities fell victim to the requirement to shift resources in support of current operations.

Conclusion

(U) Our assessment's scope and methodology precluded us from gathering objective data about shortfalls in specific acquisition intelligence analytic programs; therefore we will initiate a separate assessment dedicated to this question in Phase II of this project.

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(U) Observation II: Intelligence Support to the Campaign Planning Mission Area

(U) Multiple CCMDs expressed concerns that certain DIAP analytic time-frame reporting requirements were out of sync with the Joint Strategic Capability Plans and Guidance for Employment of Force-mandated OPLAN/CONPLAN intelligence production requirements.

Background

(U) The DoD Joint Planning series of directives, DoD Series, "Guidance for Employment of Force (GEF)," CJCSI 3110.01 Series, "Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan," CJCSM 3122.01 Series, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I. (Planning Policies and Procedures)", specify the policies, procedures, and formats to be used in the planning required to conduct military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Our assessment interviews revealed general concerns from CCMD J-3, J-5, and J-2 personnel about the current DIAP management guidance for the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) JIOCs. Specifically, these representatives detailed how the GCC JIOC responsibilities for analyzing and reporting on near-term (zero to six months) theater and national implications of activities and trends occurring throughout their AOR are affecting their commands' ability to satisfy current JSCP and GEF requirements. We were unable to solicit during our interviews specific instances where the DIAP guidance affected a command's OPLAN/CONPLAN development. Therefore, we will make no judgment at this time on the validity of these concerns.

Conclusion

(U) Our assessment's scope and methodology precluded us from gathering objective data about specific CCMD OPLAN/CONPLAN intelligence analytic requirements and potential shortfalls; therefore we will initiate a separate assessment specifically dedicated to this question in Phase II of this project.

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SECRET//NOFORN (U//FOUO) Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, Intelligence & Security

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000

INTELLIGENCE

JUN 20 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS)

SUBJECT: (U) Response to Draft Report, "Assessment of Department of Defense Long- Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities" (Project No. D2012-DINT01-0186.000)

(U//FOUO) We are aware of the challenges identified in the DoD Inspector General (IG) draft report issued on May 6, 2013 and are overseeing development of a multi-pronged approach to solving the identified shortfalls. This approach includes improvements to training, education, and mentoring, as well as joint duty opportunities to grow a workforce that has the requisite subject matter expertise to meet evolving requirements. We agree with the intent of the recommendation outlined in the subject draft report, however, we propose revised language to align with efforts in the Department to improve the all-source analysis foundation in the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

• (U//FOUO) Recommendation A.1 revised language: We recommend that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD(I)), in partnership with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Combatant Commands, and the Services, develop an All-Source Analysis certification program that leads to the training, development, and retention of a more experienced and robust workforce. We recommend such a program include common core analytic skills and performance standards, an enterprise-wide all-source analysis occupational-specialty career track and development program.

Revised Recommendation A.1

(U) My staff is partnering with DIA to lead development of a nationally accredited all-source analysis certification program that will ensure core all-source analytic skills and a common body of knowledge are identified, taught, and measured throughout the community in a consistent manner. This initiative will build better analytic capabilities and posture the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to meet the growing demand for in-depth knowledge and analytic expertise to support the range of DoD missions and customers.

(U) My point of contact in OSD JS (b)(6) [illegible], Defense Analysis Directorate, at OSD JS (b)(6) [illegible]

RAL HIGGINS RM Higgins Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence & Security)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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SECRET//NOFORN (U) Director, Defense Intelligence Agency DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, DC 20340-5100 JUN 1 1 2013 U-13-1096/CE To: Mr. William R. Rainey Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Intelligence Evaluations Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General 4800 Mark Center Drive Alexandria, VA 22350-1500 Subject: Comments on Draft Assessment of Department of Defense Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities Reference: Department of Defense Office of Inspector General Assessment of Department of Defense Long-Term Intelligence Analysis Capabilities (Project No: D2012-DINT01-0186.000, May 2013)

1. As requested in the Reference, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provides the following comments regarding report recommendations A.2. and B.1.
2. Recommendation A.2. Director, DIA, conduct a top-to-bottom review of all Defense Intelligence Enterprise all-source intelligence analyst resources to ensure that the apportionment of analyst manpower billets is properly aligned with current all-source intelligence requirements. a. DIA concurs with this recommendation. DIA recognizes the need to maximize the use of scarce analytic resources in a fiscally constrained environment. We are currently conducting an internal review of mission requirements, capabilities, and priorities and of how DIA all-source analysts are arrayed against the latter. This effort should be complete in about 6 months (November 2013). Once the results of the internal review are received, DIA, in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, will expand the effort to include combatant commands and service intelligence centers. We anticipate that the second phase of review can be accomplished within 6 months.
3. Recommendation B.1. Director for Analysis, DIA, through the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program (DIAP) Board of Governors, establish a plan with specific milestones and metrics agreed to by the combatant commands for capturing the department's nontraditional intelligence requirements and incorporate them into the DIAP requirements/analytic production priority processes. a. DIA nonconcurs with this recommendation. The current DIAP governance model accommodates the identification and incorporation of nontraditional intelligence requirements and associated metrics. Each year, a "DIAP Open Season" is conducted, and during it, member organizations can raise new issues or requirements for consideration by the DIAP Board of Governors. The implementation of approved changes to DIAP management guidance—including production topics, responsibilities, 16 SECRET//NOFORN

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and related procedures-- is coordinated during regularly scheduled analytic and production conferences, which are attended by member organizations. DIA (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 424 4. DIA's primary point of contact in this matter is DIA (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. 424

MICHAEL T. FLYNN Lieutenant General, USA Director

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(U) Appendix I: Previous Intelligence Analysis Reviews and Lessons Learned Papers

Schlesinger, James R.; Office of Management and Budget; March 10, 1971; A Review of the Intelligence Community.

Brown, Harold, and Rudman, Warren B.; March 1, 1996; Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence.

Jeremiah, David E., ADM, USN (Ret); CIA; June 1, 1998; The Jeremiah Report: The Intelligence Community's Performance on the Indian Nuclear Tests (U).

Bodnar, John W.; Joint Military Intelligence College, DIA; December 2003; Warning Analysis for the Information Age: Rethinking the Intelligence Process.

Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA; June 2004; Intelligence and Policy: The Evolving Relationship.

Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA; November 2004; Intelligence and Policy: "Train Wreck: The Haiti Crisis of 1993."

DIA; November 16, 2004; Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned Project, (Draft).

Johnson, Rob, PhD; Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA; 2005; Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study.

Warner, Michael, and McDonald, Kenneth J.; Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA; April 2005; U.S. Intelligence Community Reform Studies Since 1947.

Gutjahr, Melaine M. H.; Joint Military Intelligence College, DIA; May 2005; The Intelligence Archipelago: The Community's Struggle to Reform in the Globalized Era.

Cooper, Jeffrey R.; Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA; December 2005; Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence Analysis.

Lahneman, William J., PhD; Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland; March 10, 2006; The Future of Intelligence Analysis.

Coffey, Thomas G.; Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA; December 2006; Intelligence and Policy: Policymaker Perspectives: The Clinton Years, 1993-2001.

McDonnell, Janet A., DIA; October 2007; The 1998 Indian Nuclear Tests and the Jeremiah Report: A Ten Year Reassessment.

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Coffey, Thomas G.; Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA; July 2011; Intelligence and Policy: Policymaker Perspectives: The G. W. Bush Years, 2001-2009.

McCullough, Roy L., PhD, DIA; 2012; Historical Perspectives: The Evolution of Estimates/Long-Range Analysis at the Defense Intelligence Agency.

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(U) Appendix II: Terms of Reference

(U) For the purpose of this assessment, we needed to establish a common reference for describing the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE.) In this case, the DIE refers to those organizations within the Department of Defense having all-source intelligence analysis production responsibilities as defined in the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program.

(U) We also adopted a subjective concept for discussing particular analytic practices within the DIE for Long-Term Analysis (LTA) and Non-Traditional Intelligence (NTI). These terms of reference are neither definitive nor recommended for adoption by the DIE, but will hopefully help the reader understand the framework we employed.

(U) Long-Term Analysis--As described by Mark Lowenthal in "Intelligence, From Secrets to Policy," 4th ed., 2009, "long-term intelligence deals with trends and issues that may not be an immediate concern but are important and may come to the forefront, especially if they do not receive some current attention." In our assessment, we adopted a framework similar to Mr. Lowenthal's, adding an "in-depth" or "long-stare" requirement necessary to make rational value judgments about any given particular intelligence problem. We were reluctant to artificially define LTA within a specified time-frame reference, such as "greater than six months," "three-five years," etc., which could potentially devolve into a product production metric assessment, rather than a capability assessment--which was our objective.

(U) Non-Traditional Intelligence – Numerous CCMDs described a rapid increase in the number of requirements related to what they commonly referred to as NTI. In this case, NTI is anything other than general military intelligence, as defined in Joint Pub 1.02, military capabilities of foreign countries or organizations.

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SECRET//NOFORN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Inspector General Department of Defense SECRET//NOFORN