Vice Admiral L.E. Jacoby, Director, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Info Memo, Subject: CURVEBALL Background, January 14, 2005. Secret Codeword.
National Security Archive
CURVEBALL is the subject of this information memo, authored by DIA Director Lowell Jacoby. The source description section notes his role in the claim that Iraq had transportable biological warfare agent production facilities, his claimed background, and provides an assessment of his knowledge of the
Source: Vice Admiral L.E. Jacoby, Director, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Info Memo, Subject: CURVEBALL Background, January 14, 2005. Secret Codeword. Date: Jan 14, 2005 Archive: DIA Freedom of Information Act Release. Collection: DIA Declassified: A Sourcebook Nov 20, 2015
(b)(3).50 USC 403-1(i)
SECRET NOFORN//20300114 DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100
INFO MEMO
S-0020/DR 14 January 2005
FROM: Vice Admiral L. E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: (S//NF) CURVEBALL Background
(U) Source Description:
- (S//NF) Curveball (CB) was the main Intelligence Community source reporting Iraq had transportable biological warfare agent production systems.
- (S//NF) CB claimed to be a project manager, with intimate details of an Iraqi mobile BW program and he was specifically involved in the design of mobile production facilities.
- (S//NF) CB demonstrated extensive knowledge of Iraq's BW program.
(U) DIA Involvement:
(b)(1) 1.4 (c)
- (S//NF) CB was a source of the [illegible] DIA was made aware of CB in January 2000.
(b)(1).1.4 (c)
- (S//NF) [illegible] did not allow direct DIA contact with CB.
- (S//NF) DIA funneled requirements to the [illegible] and published the resulting report. (b)(1).1.4 (c)
- (S//NF) DIA's involvement ended in September 2001 when CB ceased to provide new information.
(U) Intelligence:
- (S//NF) CB provided detailed information on production processes, equipment, concealment methods, personnel, organizations, and locations of the transportable systems.
- (S//NF) CB's reporting resulted in [illegible] DoD Intelligence Information Reports. (b)(1),1.4 (c)
(b)(3); 50 USC 403-1(i)
SECRET NOFORN//20300114
(U) Credibility:
(b)(1) ↑ 4 (c) (b)(1) ↑ 4 (c)
- (S//NF) DIA assessed CB was a source based on evaluations of his reporting and assessments from the
- (S// NF) In March 2004 CIA gained access to CB and his credibility and access came into question.
- Scientists and engineers in Iraq refuted CB's claims that they had knowledge of Iraq's mobile BW program.
- CB's reporting did not match physical lay-outs at the suspect facilities.
- CB's behavior during the debriefing indicated he was being less than truthful. (b)(3); 50 USC 403-1(i)
- (S//NF) DIA and CIA determined that CB was a fabricator. DIA and CIA issued notifications to the entire IC that his reporting is suspect.
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