Robert S. McNamara, Memorandum for the President, Subject: Establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), July 6, 1961. Top Secret.
National Security Archive
This memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President John F. Kennedy notes the origins in the Eisenhower administration of the effort to establish a Defense Intelligence Agency, the reason for implementing such a plan, the expected benefits, and the work done in the new administration to
Source: Robert S. McNamara, Memorandum for the President, Subject: Establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), July 6, 1961. Top Secret. Date: Jul 6, 1961 Archive: National Archives and Records Administration. Collection: DIA Declassified: A Sourcebook Nov 20, 2015
TOP SECRET (175) 1 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON
JUL 6 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: The Establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
On 18 January 1961, following action by the National Security Council, President Eisenhower approved most of the recommendations of a special committee, under the Chairman- ship of Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Government. One of the principal recommendations was that the Secretary of Defense should take appropriate action "to bring the military intelligence organiza- tion within the Department of Defense into full consonance with the concept of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958." The Kirkpatrick recommendations are generally supported by the findings of other studies which have been made within DoD over the last few years looking toward improvement in DoD intelligence activities.
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On the basis of previous studies and extensive investigation of the various DoD intelligence organizations, it was found there is considerable overlap and duplication in the DoD intelligence effort, and, as a result, a maldistribution of critical intelligence resources. Over-all direction and management of DoD's total intelligence effort becomes a very difficult if not impossible task. Indeed, the fragmentation of effort creates "barriers" to the free and complete interchange of intelligence information among the several components of the Department of Defense.
This problem apparently is greatly accentuated by the critical interrelationship of intelligence estimates and the deter- mination of military requirements. Today, the military depart- ments develop separate intelligence estimates which exert a
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substantial influence on the identification and justification of their own force requirements. This process may well mean that the estimates and requirements statements of the separate Services do not provide the optimum basis for developing the total military posture of the United States.
The principal objectives sought were to eliminate these deficiencies and to strengthen the capacity of the Department of Defense to carry out its principal intelligence mission -- the collection and production of military intelligence. Upon careful evaluation, the organizational solution which seemed to offer the most promise for achieving these objectives and for implementing the many Kirkpatrick Committee recommendations applicable to the Department of Defense is the creation of a Defense Intelligence Agency.
This solution should also facilitate DoD's support of the entire national intelligence community. In particular, the DIA should provide improved intelligence support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified combatant commanders. Moreover, this solution is consonant with the expressed intent of the Congress in adopting the McCormack Amendment to the 1958 Defense Reorganiza- tion Act. More effective management and allocation of critical DoD intelligence resources should be obtained with considerable savings in personnel, publications, and facilities.
The concept and plan of the DIA has been developed on the basis of recommendations submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and endorsed by the Secretaries of the military departments. The DIA will be responsible for the operation of a large part of the intelligence resources now assigned to the separate Services and the Joint Staff. It will also review and coordinate the intelligence functions retained by the military departments. DIA will assume the vital task of supplying military intelligence to the major com- ponents of the Department of Defense, the United States Intelligence Board, and other organizations in the national intelligence community. It will not, however, interfere with conduct of the intelligence activities in the unified and specified combatant commands which will remain under the operational control of their respective com- manders. It is contemplated that under the general supervision of
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DIA, some major intelligence activities; such as, personnel,
plant, and installations security, and intelligence training will
be retained by the military departments.
Nothing in DIA's charter or terms of reference affects
any of the functions of the National Security Agency (NSA).
Five alternative locations for DIA were considered:
(1) Under the Joint Staff;
(2) Under one of the military departments;
(3) Directly under the Chairman, JCS;
(4) In the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and
(5) Under the JCS.
After consideration of the possible advantages and disadvantages
of each of the first three alternatives, none appeared to offer a
viable solution. The final choice lay between (4) and (5). Alterna-
tive (4) would establish a large operating organization in a staff
office of the Secretary of Defense and would increase the number
of offices which report directly to the Secretary. Moreover, the
DoD intelligence function is inextricably linked to the strategic
planning functions of the JCS and to the combatant responsibilities
of the unified commanders. On balance, I have concluded that the
best solution is to place DIA under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
On 30 June 1961, at the request of Dr. Killian, a formal
briefing on DIA was given to the Foreign Intelligence Activities
Board. Yesterday, Dr. Killian stated that he and other members
of the Board were favorably impressed with the proposed plan and
recommended its early adoption.
Robert S. McNamara
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Attachment II
Financial Summary
Increase in Strength Increase in FY 62 NOA (in millions)
Army Personnel and O&M 285,000 1618 Procurement 552 Total 2170
Navy and Marine Corps Personnel and O&M 131,000 619 Procurement 800 Total 1419
Air Force Personnel and O&M 63,327 329 Procurement 425 Total 754
TOTAL Personnel and O&M 2566 Procurement 1777 Total 479,327 4343
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NSC Registry (Permanent File) RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON
March 26, 1952 A REPORT
MEMORANDUM FOR ALL HOLDERS OF NSC 4
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Pursuant to a request from the Department of the Army and with the concurrence of the Department of State, the classification of NSC 4, "Coordination of Foreign Information Measures," is hereby downgraded from "Confidential" to "Restricted."
JAMES S. LAY, Jr. Executive Secretary
DECLASSIFIED Auth: James W. Davis Date: 11 MAR 1975 By: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
14475 RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION
NSC 4 CONFIDENTIAL
December 9, 1947
NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY to the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL on COORDINATION OF FOREIGN INFORMATION MEASURES REFERENCES a: SANACC 304/11 b: NSC Action No. 11
At its second meeting the National Security Council referred SANACC 304/11 to the National Security Council Staff for revision in the light of the comments at the meeting. The enclosed report has been prepared pursuant to that directive, after consultation with representatives of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, and of the Central Intelligence Agency.
It is recommended that the National Security Council approve the enclosed report and authorize its submission to the President, with the recommendation that he approve the "Conclusions" contained therein and direct that they be implemented by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State.
SIDNEY W. SOUERS Executive Secretary
Distribution: The President The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, National Security Resources Board
NSC 4
DECLASSIFIED Auth: Sidney W. Souers Date: 11 MAR 1975 By: [illegible] NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL