Marion W. Boggs, Memorandum, Subject: Discussion at the 473rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, January 5, 1961, Top Secret.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library Eisenhower: Papers, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman file) TOP SECRET January 5, 1961 EYES ONLY 1032 MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 473rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, January 5, 1961

Present at the 473rd NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget. Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant); Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Douglas); Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; the Secretary of the Army; the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and for Foreign Economic Policy; Mr. Huntington Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Execu- tive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken.

1. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVES

Mr. Gray said he wished to bring up first a matter which was not on the formal agenda. The Joint Study Group on Foreign Intel- ligence Activities, composed of representatives of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Direc- tor, Bureau of the Budget, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, had submitted its report and was now preparing a list of recommendations on which the Principals had agreed, as well as a list of recommendations which had not been con- curred in. A question had arisen whether a revision of the NSCID's would be necessary as their provisions affect the authority of the Secretary of Defense in the intelligence field. At the present time, the NSCID's refer to the Military Services, not to the Secretary of Defense. The suggestion had been made that the Secretary of Defense be given authority by amendment of the NSCID's to proceed with re- organization of military intelligence within the Department of Defense.

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Secretary Gates said this matter would affect the next Secretary of Defense. The first issue involved in the report of the Joint Study Group was the one Mr. Gray had mentioned, namely, the question of amending the NSCID's. Another issue, however, was also involved, namely membership on the U.S. Intelligence Board. The report by the Joint Study Group recom- mended that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than the Military Services be represented on the USIB. Secretary Gates was in favor of this recommendation but understood the Military Services were opposed. Mr. Dulles said he was also opposed to this recommendation. Secretary Gates said this matter affected the NSCID's since the organization of the USIB was covered in the NSCID's.

The President said he had been told that about $1.4 billion was being spent for the intelligence function in the Department of Defense. He believed we were not good administrators if we could not perform this function at less expense. He also believed that we were not doing everything that could be done to implement the concept of integrated strategic planning unless military in- telligence could be placed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was unable to understand why the antiquated system of separate intelligence organizations for each Military Service was retained.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that the Military Services at the present time had the personnel, the competence, and the back- ground in intelligence. Until this situation was changed, he would rather deal with representatives of the Military Services, who know intelligence, than with the representative of the Secre- tary of Defense, who would not have the experience, the personnel, and the background judgment required. When organizational changes were made so that the representative of the Secretary of Defense had competent collectors and analysts working for him, then Mr. Dulles would not disagree with the recommendation for a change in the membership of the USIB, but at present, he repeated, the change suggested would merely result in putting on USIB repre- sentatives with inadequate intelligence support.

The President believed that the Services should collect battlefield intelligence but did not see the necessity for strategic intelligence in the Services. He wondered what in- telligence officers in the Services could do to get information from the center of the USSR and correlate it with intelligence on the rest of the world. He said when he supported the establish- ment of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, he did it on the basis that the function of strategic intelligence should be in CIA and that duplication should be eliminated. General Lemnitzer felt that the acquisition of technical intelligence, e.g. inform- ation about enemy nuclear submarines, required officials who know

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nuclear submarines. The Services would be very much concerned if they were not represented on USIB. The President believed that the information referred to by General Lemnitzer was battle- field intelligence, whereas the discovery of the shipyards where nuclear submarines are being constructed was the business of CIA. He did not see why four intelligence services should attempt to find out where the submarines were made. He believed it was the function of CIA to acquire strategic intelligence. General Lemnitzer believed that each Military Service was working on a different intelligence target.

Mr. Gray pointed out that a substantive discussion of the material in the Joint Study Group report seemed to be underway. The President said that perhaps the membership of USIB could not be changed at once but that a different type of intelligence board could be organized once military intelligence within the Department of Defense was re-organized. Secretary Gates did not agree that the membership of USIB could not be changed immediately. A Defense representative on the Board could do his homework in the Pentagon and bring the Defense position to the Board in the same way a Defense representative on the Planning Board reports the Defense position. The President felt that changes in the membership of USIB must be correlated with changes in the military intelligence organization. Mr. Gates said that thus far intelligence has not been affected by reorganization of the Department of Defense. Mr. Dulles said when changes were made in the organization of military intelligence, there would be a reason for changing the membership of USIB, since there would then be one high-ranking official who knows intelligence representing the Department of Defense. The President said that there would in any case remain the need for technical intelligence gathered in connection with the normal deployment of forces.

Mr. Dulles said the figure of $2 billion had been mentioned occasionally as the sum spent by this government on intelligence activities. He wished to point out, however, that this figure included support of the radar station at Thule, support of SAMOS, etc., all of which were really early warning functions.

The President said he had read a summary of the report by the Joint Study Group. He felt that up to now we had not accomplished all it was possible to accomplish in integrating all our intelligence activities. Secretary Gates said there was no review in the Department of Defense of intelligence requirements. General Lemnitzer said the JCS agreed on the need for Defense re- view of intelligence requirements.

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Secretary Gates believed the policy question before the Council now was, how far would this Administration wish to go in reorganizing intelligence during its last two weeks in office. The President said he felt a directive on agreed matters could be issued and that he could pass on to his successor his views on other intelligence questions. Mr. Dulles said he would like to see the matter of the pictorial center worked out soon.

The President then remarked that soon after Pearl Harbor, he was engaged in an operation which required him to have certain information which he was unable to obtain from the Navy, i.e. the strength the Navy had left in the Pacific. The President also noted that the U.S. fought the first year of the war in Europe entirely on the basis of British intelligence. Subsequently, each Military Service developed its own intelligence organization. He thought this situation made little sense in managerial terms. He had suffered an eight-year defeat on this question but would leave a legacy of ashes for his successor.

Mr. Gray said language would be prepared to permit agreed recommendations from the report of the Joint Study Group to be put into effect.

The President pointed out that in military history a single man usually dominates the intelligence service of a country at any given time. He felt that a strong central position with respect to intelligence was necessary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should not be required to consult individually each of the Services, as well as CIA, in formulating their strategic plans; they should have their own intelligence service.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the question raised by the Secretary of Defense as to revising the National Security Council Intelligence Directives in the light of the recommendations relating to the military intelligence organization within the Department of Defense and to the membership of the U.S. Intelligence Board, submitted on December 15, 1960, by a Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities, composed of representatives of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

b. Agreed that the Secretary of Defense should submit his recommendations for appropriate revisions in the NSCID's

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Dwight D. Eisenhower Library Eisenhower: Papers, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman file) TOP SECRET tive to the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the military intelligence organization within the Department of Defense in consonance with the Defense reorganization Act of 1958.

c. Noted that the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense pursuant to b above, together with the views of the Principals of the Joint Study Group regarding the Group's report which are being consolidated by the Director of Central Intelligence, would be considered at the next NSC meeting on January 12, 1961.

NOTE: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. U.S. POLICY ON THE PANAMA CANAL AND A FUTURE INTER-OCEANIC CANAL IN CENTRAL AMERICA (NSC Action No. 2219-b-(3); SNIE 84-60; SNIE 80-1-59; NSC 5902/1; Cabinet Paper 60-108, "Isthmian Canal Plans--1960", dated April 12, 1960; NSC 6026)

Mr. Gray presented NSC 6026 to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum). In the course of his briefing Mr. Gray read Paragraph 4 of the Briefing Note which referred to the President's earlier interest in the canal route across Mexico.

The President said he realized that it might not be politically possible at the present time to construct a canal across Mexico. He then asked whether consideration had been given to the alterna- tive of building a new sea-level canal through the present Canal Zone, meanwhile maintaining the present canal in operation. Mr. Gray said this alternative had not received extended consideration. The President said that one difficulty with canal plans was that the canal was the only business in Panama. If a new canal some distance removed from the present canal were built, Panama's cities would become ghost towns. It was for this reason he had wondered whether a second canal could be built in the present Canal Zone. However, he realized that in their present state of mind, the Panamanians would not be inclined to grant more land to the U.S. for the purpose of canal building. Mr. Gerard Smith pointed out that there was a reference in the Appendix to NSC 6026 to a sea- level canal across the Canal Zone as one alternative. However, it would be very difficult to use nuclear explosives to build another canal near the present canal. Secretary Herter thought that the problem of digging deep enough to construct a sea-level canal in the present Canal Zone would be a difficult one. The President believed this problem would be encountered on any canal route. Mr. Gray pointed out that a sea-level canal through the

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present Canal Zone was the most expensive alternative. Secretary Brucker said the Board of Directors of the Panama Canal Zone Company had commented on the possibility of a sea-level canal through the Canal Zone and had concluded it would be feasible to build a new canal there by means of conventional excavation methods.

Secretary Gates said he understood it was not the purpose of the present paper to recommend a decision on the location of the new canal. Mr. Gray agreed and then resumed his briefing, referring to the objectives of NSC 6026 and reading paragraphs 26 and 28 thereof.

Secretary Herter thought NSC 6026 was an admirable paper which marked a real advance in inter-oceanic canal policy. He wondered how action might be initiated in view of the problem that might be encountered in Congressional relations. The President supposed that a treaty would first have to be made with the country through whose territory the canal would pass. This treaty would then have to be approved by the Senate. Secretary Herter said it would be undesirable to conclude a formal treaty until Congressional sentiment had been sounded out. There seemed to be a difference of opinion among engineers as to the date of obsolescence of the present canal. If the Panama Canal would become obsolete in ten years, then action looking toward a new canal should be initiated at once.

The President believed the recommendations of NSC 6026 should be approved.

Mr. Stans agreed but wished to amend two paragraphs. He pointed out that Annex B to NSC 6026 contained the following sentence: "Inasmuch as a sea-level canal constructed by nuclear methods at any of these locations is expected to provide a profit within a short time... it should be entirely possible to finance such a canal by public bond issue..." There was no reference to financing the canal in the NSC 6026 recommendations. Mr. Stans suggested that Paragraph 20 of the Objectives and Paragraph 26 of the Policy Guidance refer to the desirability of making the new canal a self-financing project. The President asked whether it would then be similar to the Suez Canal. Mr. Stans said he was not suggesting that the new canal be built by a private corporation but only that it be self-financing. Secretary Herter believed it had been a mistake not to amortize the Panama Canal. The President said we had wanted to retain as much U.S. authority in the canal as possible.

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Secretary Anderson pointed out that the Footnote on Page 12 of NSC 6026 was not accurate and suggested that it be corrected factually. Mr. Gray said the necessary corrections would be made.

The President pointed out again that construction of a new canal might mean suffering for Panama. Mr. McCone said that if the new canal were excavated by nuclear methods, a large passage would be created and little or no service would be re- quired. He added that there were many unknown factors at the present time in connection with the use of nuclear explosives for excavations of this kind. The President said the canal could not be too wide because the country in which it was located would certainly want to build some bridges across it. He repeated that the recommendations, amended as suggested, should be approved.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject con- tained in NSC 6026.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 6026, subject to the following amendments:

(1) Page 12: Factual correction of the footnote to paragraph 18.

(2) Page 14, paragraph 20: In the 4th line, delete the word "and"; in the 5th line, add the words "and preferably organized on a self-financing basis".

(3) Page 15, paragraph 26: In the 4th line, delete the word "and"; in the 5th line, add the words "and that preferably it should be self-financed."

NOTE: NSC 6026, as amended by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 6102 for imple- mentation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and referred it to the Operations Co- ordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

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(Ann Whitman file)

3. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY*

Mr. Dulles reported that Castro had reacted violently and defiantly to the rupture in U.S.-Cuban diplomatic relations. The controlled Cuban press had hurled a great deal of invective at the U.S. On the eve of the rupture in diplomatic relations, Khrushchev had said at a Cuban reception in Moscow that the U.S. was pursuing a dangerous policy in attempting to suppress the Cuban revolution; while reiterating Soviet support for Cuba, he had remained vague as to the character of that support. Peru was pleased at our action in breaking off diplomatic relations; Chile had indicated it would not follow our example; Venezuela, Honduras and other countries were considering a rupture but will take no immediate action. Newspapers in Brazil are calling the present situation a crisis and suggesting that Latin American countries do not follow the U.S. lead. The President said this was a typical South American reaction. Continuing, Mr. Dulles said Panama seemed on the verge of declaring the Cuban Ambassador persona non grata while Mexico had remarked that it would now be difficult to influence Cuba and get rid of Castro. Secretary Herter said the reaction from Mexico had been much more moderate than anticipated.

Mr. Dulles said that all Latin American Communists and Communist front groups were urging support for Castro. Apparently, Canada will continue to maintain relations with Cuba. Mr. Dulles said the 50,000 applicants for U.S. visas in Cuba were very distressed at the severance of diplomatic relations. He added that the Soviet, Czechoslovakian, Polish, and Chinese Communist embassies in Cuba now contained about 100 persons and that 200 additional Bloc nationals not directly attached to the embassies were in Cuba. Five more Bloc countries - Hungary, Roumania, Albania, North Vietnam, and Mongolia - had been recognized by Cuba. Military equipment from the Bloc continues to arrive in Cuba.

Secretary Anderson pointed out that economic controls had not been applied against Cuba. He thought such controls would have little effect now although they might have had some effect if applied a year ago. The Treasury Department was prepared to apply these controls if a political decision were made to do so. Secretary Herter said the application of these controls would involve invoking the Trading-with-the Enemy Act. Secretary Gates asked why it would not be desirable to apply such controls. He thought this would mean a desirable psychological move even though there was not much U.S.-Cuban trade at present. The President

• Including Item 4: U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (NSC Actions Nos. 2177, 2191, 2195, 2201, 2206, 2213, 2217, 2225, 2239, 2259, 2261, 2269, 2273, 2283, 2309, 2322, and 2329)

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(AIII minutes 1145)

said that the Secretary of Commerce should be consulted with respect to our trade with Cuba. The Vice President noted that many people in Florida objected very strenuously to such trade as we still carried on with Cuba. Mr. Dulles said the businessmen he talked to believed that the elimination of our lard exports to Cuba would have a desirable effect because the Cuban people would blame Castro for the lack of lard.

The President asked whether economic controls could be applied to Cuba without a public order. Secretary Herter said an Executive Order would be required. Secretary Anderson said the application of such controls would not have much economic effect now, so that the decision for such application should rest on a political judgment. The Vice President felt that economic controls should be applied to Cuba now that diplomatic relations with that country had been severed. In response to a question from the President, Mr. Randall said that while he had been opposed to the early invocation of the Trading-with-the Enemy Act, he now favored using all the instruments at hand against Cuba and would, therefore, favor economic controls. The President asked Secretary Herter, consulting as necessary with Secretaries Anderson and Mueller, to let him have recommendations on the imposition of economic controls against Cuba.

Mr. Dulles then reported: .................................................................................... .................................................................................... .................................................................................... .................................................................................... .................................................................................... .................................................................................... .................................................................................... ............................................................indicated that UAR agents were slipping into Stanleyville with arms and money. The UAR nationals going into the Congo were publicly described as technicians.

Secretary Herter said that the activities of the UAR in the Congo had long disturbed him but he had been unable to indicate the extent of such activities to the Secretary General of the UN .................................................................................... .................................................................................... .................................................................................... ........................................................................................................repre-sentatives had briefed the Secretary General on UAR activities

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lack of efficiency in agricultural production. He noted that the Chinese Communists needed to increase agricultural production substantially each year in order to keep abreast of a population increase of about 15 million persons per year.

The National Security Council:

3. Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to reactions to the U.S. break in diplomatic relations with Cuba; and developments with respect to the Congo, Ethiopia, Algeria, Laos, and the food supply in Communist China.

4. Noted the President's request that the Secretary of State, in consultation as appropriate with the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce, study and report promptly to the President whether the economic controls authorized by the Trading-with-the Enemy Act should be applied to Cuba.

NOTE: The above action, as approved by the President, transmitted to the Secretaries of State, the Treasury and Commerce.

5. POSSIBLE DEFICIENCIES IN THE U.S. POSTURE FOR LIMITED MILITARY OPERATIONS (Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject:"Capabilities of Forces for Limited Military Operations", dated June 18, 1958; NSC Action No. 1934; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962", dated September 28,1960; NSC Action No. 2317-c; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Possible Deficiencies in the U.S. Posture for Limited Military Operations", dated December 30, 1960)

Mr. Gray explained the background of this subject to the Council and called upon General Lemnitzer to make a presentation. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum).

General Lemnitzer recalled the study on limited war (transmitted to the Council on September 28, 1960) which had dealt with hypothetical situations in five areas - Berlin, the Taiwan Strait , Iran, Southeast Asia, and Korea. Contingency plans of some magnitude had been prepared for possible operations in these key areas.

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The JCS had prepared a report on possible deficiencies in the U.S. posture for limited military operations, pursuant to NSC Action 2317. The JCS report had first made certain overall comments on studies of this nature: (1) limited war studies are not a valid basis for programming or decision-making; (2) the adequacy of forces to cope with any one limited war situation depends on prompt action to initiate partial mobilization, augment existing lift capabilities, expand the war production base, and waive financial limitations; (3) the U.S. overall capability for general war would not be unacceptably degraded by participating in one of these limited operations. In fact, it could be argued that one limited war situation would increase U.S. readiness for general war because of the measures which would be taken to meet the limited situation; (4) any weakness in the U.S. posture is due to acceptance of calculated risks pertaining to the balance of forces and their supporting elements; (5) the early use of relatively small military forces in limited war situations would be more effective than the subsequent use of much larger forces; (6) many factors others than the purely military factors affect our limited war posture.

General Lemnitzer then summarized the comments by the JCS on the specific possible deficiencies in our limited war posture. With respect to airlift, a resumption of hostilities on the scale of Korea would result in a shortage during the first twenty days but after that airlift would be adequate. Two actions to improve airlift had been taken since the date of the limited war study: (1) funds for purchasing additional C-130's had been made available; and (2) additional allocations had been made to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. General Lemnitzer pointed out that terminal facilities constituted an extremely important factor in airlift. With respect to sea lift, the JCS had concluded that our capabilities were generally adequate, although there might be some shortage in the first sixty days of hostilities.

Turning to military logistics base plans, General Lemnitzer noted that specific guidance had been issued last March but there had not been time for its full implementation. If this guidance is implemented, our capability to support limited war situations should be improved in the near future without degrading general war readiness. The Army has problems connected with the availability of units, the modernization of equipment, and the maintenance of readiness for general war. The Navy is unable to fulfill certain mobilization plan objectives connected with modern conventional weapons and ammunition. The Air Force is generally ready for limited war operations, having distributed its assets around

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the world near possible limited war areas, with the striking force, of course, remaining in the U.S. The Marines have problems with reserves and with reconstituting reserve stocks.

General Lemnitzer then summarized the JCS comments on Southeast Asia. Limited operations there, he said, were handi- capped by logistical limitations stemming from lack of communi- cations, lack of transportation, and lack of port and terminal facilities. Furthermore, the existing facilities were extremely vulnerable to disruption and are inadequate to support sustained operations. These limitations, however, have been offset to some degree by countermeasures. The Pacific Command has recently been augmented by an airborne battle group and an aircraft carrier. Equipment has been pre-stocked in the Pacific area. Periodic mobility training exercises are planned. The Air Force moderniza- tion program will improve our limited war capability in the Pacific. We now have authority for overflights in the Pacific area. Other corrective action which is, or could be, taken will enable us to use additional bases and improve strategic signal communications and strengthen over-the-beach supply methods.

In concluding, General Lemnitzer said that most of the prob- lems adverted to in the limited war study were not new. Additional funding would alleviate many of the deficiencies pointed out in the study but in the light of total requirements, not all of the deficiencies could be remedied at once.

The President said this was the kind of report he could under- stand. Secretary Herter said the JCS report was very encouraging, especially as regards airlift. However, Secretary Herter felt he must take exception to Paragraph 9 on Page 6 of the JCS report. This paragraph indicated that indecision and lack of clear-cut policies could contribute to starting a conflict we desired to avoid and then went on to say "a pertinent example is the recent conflict of judgment between the Department of Defense and the Department of State concerning the proper implementation of U.S. policy in Laos." General Lemnitzer said this paragraph appeared in the JCS report because the JCS thought that last August when Kong Le rebelled, the U.S. should have built up the Phoumi forces. At that time the State Department embarked on a course of building up Souvanna Phouma. This issue was not settled and as a result Kong Le had several months in which to build up his forces. Secre- tary Herter replied that the Phouma government became the recog- nized government of Laos and therefore the government with which the U.S. had to deal. Moreover, our allies supported Souvanna Phouma and were opposed to Phoumi. We had been successful in con- tinuing military assistance to Phoumi even when he was a rebel against the recognized government. Moreover, we had worked con- stantly to shift power from Souvanna Phouma to Phoumi and had finally succeeded. If the U.S. had armed Phoumi last August, it would have been arming rebels against the recognized government.

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The President said the word "indecision" must be eliminated from the JCS report. No agency of the government had the right to say that another agency was indecisive and did not know what it was doing. It was proper to say that the problems were such that decisions could not be made immediately but dereliction of duty should not be imputed to another agency. The President said that even now we did not know what we could do about Laos because of the attitude of our allies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were correct from the military point of view in stating that it was better to use small forces promptly than to use larger forces later but the question of when small forces can be used involved a political judgment.

General Lemnitzer said the JCS had experienced for some time a feeling of frustration about Laos. The President asked to whom the JCS report was made. Secretary Gates said the report was made to him and would be a part of the NSC files. The President said the criticism in the report of another government department must be removed.

Mr. Gray noted that the JCS report spoke of allied cooperation in sea lift but made no mention of such cooperation in air-lift. General Lemnitzer said it had been proved in the Congo that the U.S. has the only real airlift capability. The President agreed that we should plan on allied assistance in sea lift. He said that if we could not get cooperation from our allies, we were foolish in attempting to establish a collective defense posture in peace time.

Secretary Gates said he had not, during his tour of duty in the Pentagon, noted any deficiencies in our limited war capabilities. The JCS had never pointed out any deficiencies to him. The President said he would like to see two division redeployed from Europe to the U.S. He believed these divisions were too much on the front line in Europe. He said that the Secretary of State should brief the Secretary of State-designate on the situation in NATO and on the desirability of inducing the European countries to do their full share with respect to the support of ground forces.

Mr. Gray referred to a draft Record of Action which had been distributed at the meeting. Mr. Stans felt the word "improving" was rather weak in the light of the JCS report. It was impossible to improve starting from "0". Mr. Douglas agreed. The President suggested that a word should be used to indicate that our limited war capabilities were good now but were still improving. Mr. McCone proposed that the word "substantial" be used for this purpose. The

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The President said our estimate of the situation was that a balanced military program did not require a radical allocation of additional resources to limited war but that some additional improvements would be made in our capabilities for limited war.

Mr. Stans said that Paragraph c of the draft Record of Action might give a misleading impression. He believed the phrase "without degrading our capabilities for general war" should be inserted in this sub-paragraph.

The President suggested that General Lemnitzer's summary of the report should be retained in the official minutes of the National Security Council.

Secretary Herter inquired about progress on the limited war study directed by NSC Action 2317-b. Secretary Gates said this study was underway but that problems had arisen in connection with formulating the assumptions on which to base the study.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense on the subject and the report attached thereto from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 30, 1960); as summarized at the meeting by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Agreed that U.S. capabilities to conduct limited war are substantial and will show a further improvement on the basis of the FY 1962 budget as submitted and other actions taken since the completion in July 1960 of the Limited War Study. Agreed that a balanced military program does not require a radical allocation of additional resources to limited war capabilities.

c. Noted further that planned logistics support capability is, or will be, adequate to meet any one or combination of contingencies without degrading to an unacceptable degree U.S. overall capability for general war, provided in sum they do not exceed the general order of magnitude contained in the Korean contingency plan.

d. Noted the President's directive that the summary by the Chairman, JCS, of the report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (enclosed with the reference memorandum of December 30, 1960) be included in the official files of this NSC meeting.

NOTE: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS.

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6. MISSILES AND MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS (NSC Actions Nos. 1433, 1484, 1615-c, 1653, 1690, 1733, 1765, 1800, 1846, 1956, NOTE following 2013, 2081, 2118, 2168, 2207, 2208, 2238-b-(9), 2300-g, and 2315; Memo for NSC from Deputy Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 14, 1960; NSC 6021; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 30, 1960, and January 4, 1961)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on this subject (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum). The President asked how many POLARIS submarines would be operational by mid-1964. Secretary Gates said he believed fifteen would be operational by then and added that almost all of those now approved would be operational by the end of 1964. The President felt that with 540 MINUTEMEN missiles, 320 POLARIS missiles (3/5 of which would be on station) plus ATLAS, TITAN, and our IRBMS, we would be in a good missile position in 1964. At that time we should certainly have enough missiles to destroy the USSR in the event we are attacked. Secretary Gates said he had never at any time been worried about the situation after 1963. In fact, the farther into the future we look, the better off we will be. General Lemnitzer pointed out that in addition to the forces mentioned by the President, a great bomber force would be available. The President said he understood we also had 23,000 megatons. Mr. Gray then pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had some problems with the adoption of NSC 6021. He was not clear whether these problems were substantive or procedural. General Lemnitzer said that some statements incorporated in NSC 6021 were actually statements made in 1955. Accordingly, if these statements are now adopted and sent out for implementation, the impression would be fostered that we are just beginning to implement the policy contained therein. The President felt that a policy adopted some years ago could be repeated in a later policy paper if it had been reviewed.

Secretary Gates then read Paragraph 2 of NSC 6021 and pointed out that it could be considered out of date at this time since it referred to the early development of the IRBM program. The President said we might need to note that some of the missiles referred to in this 1955 paragraph were now operational.

Mr. Douglas was not sure that the end of Paragraph 3, which referred to a statement by Khrushchev at the Paris meeting, was entirely accurate. Secretary Gates added that the statement in NSC 6021 appeared to be broader than the statement Khrushchev had actually made. The President disagreed, saying that at the Paris

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meeting De Gaulle had stated that a Soviet satellite had passed over France seventeen times and might, for all he (De Gaulle) knew, be taking pictures. Khrushchev had replied that he did not care how many satellites took pictures over the USSR. Mr. Gray recalled that the language at the top of Page 3 of NSC 6021 had come from two NSC actions which the Departments of State and Defense had checked against the records last spring. The President had approved that Record of Actions at that time because it had turned out to be a correct statement. The President said he realized, of course, that Khrushchev, if it suited his purposes, would deny saying what he did say.

Secretary Herter said he had certain editorial revisions to suggest in NSC 6021. Mr. Gray said the paper could be referred back to the Planning Board for revision in the light of the discussion.

The President asked whether the Council would meet only one more time during this Administration. Mr. Gray said there would be a long meeting next Thursday. The President agreed and added that no NSC meeting should be scheduled on the 19th.

In response to a question from the President, Mr. Dulles said he had not held a personal briefing for the President-elect during the last three or four weeks. The President asked whether the President-elect had conveyed any distress or disagreement with U.S. policy to the Department of State, particularly as regards Cuba. Secretary Herter said the President-elect had taken no position on our policy and, indeed, had not been asked to take such a position. The Department of State had confined itself to informing the President-elect of developments.

The National Security Council:

a. Concurred in the recommendation of the Deputy Secretary of Defense (transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 30, 1960) that NSC Action No. 2207 be revised to provide:

"An operational force objective which specifies the achievement of 540 MINUTEMAN operational missiles by mid-calendar year 1964."

b. Concurred in the recommendation of the Deputy Secretary of Defense (transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 30, 1960) that NSC Action No. 2315 be revised to provide:

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"a. A total of 19 POLARIS submarines authorized for construction (5 included in the FY 1962 budget submission).

"b. Long lead time planning and procurement actions authorized to permit the construction of 5 additional POLARIS submarines (included in the FY 1962 budget submission)."

c. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6021, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, transmitted by the reference memorandum of January 4, 1961; and referred it to the NSC Planning Board for revision in the light of the discussion at this meeting.

NOTE: The actions in a and b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense.

Marion W Boggs MARION W. BOGGS

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