Military Information

IT-02-54-T Milosevic Exhibit # 716 Date Admitted: 28-301-04 Reference # p. 1/2 CODE RESTRICTED CZAS = 1134 CZG = 922 OUTGOING CODE CABLE MOST IMMEDIATE SSN = 1718 TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK "ONLY" INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA "ONLY" FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB DATE: 12 JULY 1995 NUMBER: Z -1147 SUBJECT: Military Information MOST IMMEDIATE This message is in reply to your MSC-2280 of 11 July 1995. Our ability to monitor Bosnian Serb military activities beyond visual sight from confrontation lines is generally limited to what can be seen by convoys or helicopters which pass on designated routes through Serb-controlled areas. Additional information, although less reliable, can be deduced from open sources or by correlating the reports of neighbouring UNPROFOR units. In order to deal with a threat from mechanized forces, armies deployed in defensive positions are provided with information out to a range of as much as 100 kilometres from its forward positions. This provides early warning in order to assess the intentions of an approaching force, and sufficient reaction time to engage it with long-range weapons including aircraft. Strategic intelligence also provides information on decisions of key political and military leaders. Much of this information is provided by satellites, airborne photography, and electronic interception--all of which are under national control. The sharing of national intelligence between nations is governed by strict bilateral agreements to which the United Nations is not a party. Occasionally, local embassies or national contingents provide us with additional information. This did not take place during the Bosnian Serb advance into Srebrenica, and we have not received any additional information about the situation around Zepa or Gorazde. It would not be appropriate for us to attempt, at our level, to improve access to national intelligence. We assess that the Serb attack on Srebrenica may signal future events. In light of the ease with which the Bosnian Serbs were able to move into the pocket, their planners may be considering the prospects of a similar success in Zepa--which is also lightly defended. Gorazde would be a more difficult objective. Events around Zepa are now following a similar pattern as those around Srebrenica, with an increase in artillery and small arms attacks. We do not, however, have SASC R0013497

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the surveillance capacity to determine the full extent of Serb build-up or intentions for the reasons already explained.

There are a number of possible explanations for the Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica, all of which are somewhat speculative. First, the Serbs may have selected Srebrenica as a vulnerable target against which to demonstrate their continued military capabilities, as well as to retaliate for the Croatian capture of Sector West and the long series of Bosnian government offensives that began last March. Secondly, the Serbs may be attempting to secure their rear areas against a growing threat from BiH raids against villages, and possibly roads or economic targets such as the bauxite mine near Srebrenica. Thirdly, the Serbs may be attempting to reduce the extent of the area they must contain in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, thereby freeing scarce troops. Fourthly, they may be demonstrating to the international community their ability and willingness to prosecute military operations in their own interests despite the injunctions and pressures of the international community. Finally, the Serbs may be attempting to re-arrange military and demographic facts on the ground, and to heighten the crisis, in order to increase pressure for changes to the peace process.

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