Memorandum, Richard J. Smith (OES) to Secretary of State Baker, May 16, 1989, Subject: Preparations for an International Conference on the Environment.

Source: Memorandum, Richard J. Smith (OES) to Secretary of State Baker, May 16, 1989, Subject: Preparations for an International Conference on the Environment. Date: May 16, 1989 Archive: Department of State FOIA Collection: U.S. Climate Change Policy in the 1980s Dec 2, 2015

Editorial Analysis

Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.

A Promise on the World Stage

The May 16, 1989 memorandum from Richard J. Smith, then Acting Director of the State Department’s Office of Environmental Security (OES), is a backstage pass to a moment when environmental diplomacy was being woven into the fabric of U.S. foreign policy. The document records the internal deliberations that followed George H. W. Bush’s campaign pledge to convene a “global conference on the environment” at the White House. In the weeks after his inauguration, senior officials from the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Security Council, and the White House’s policy teams were tasked with turning a campaign slogan into a concrete diplomatic event.

The Cold‑War Context and the Rise of Global Environmental Politics

The late 1980s were a transitional period. The Cold War was winding down, but the United States still viewed international gatherings through a security lens. Simultaneously, scientific consensus on climate change, acid rain, and marine degradation was coalescing into a new agenda that transcended traditional geopolitical rivalries. The Bush administration, aware that environmental leadership could bolster its post‑Cold‑War image, sought to showcase the United States as a constructive global partner. The memorandum therefore sits at the intersection of two larger currents: the diplomatic re‑orientation of the early 1990s and the emergence of climate change as a staple of multilateral negotiations.

Who Was Talking, and What Their Concerns Reveal

The memo references several actors: Bush’s campaign rhetoric, Bill Reilly of the EPA, and an “OES Policy Coordinating Committee” that included NSC staff. Their concerns are telling. While the President’s language was unequivocal—"we will talk about global warming, acid rain… and we will act"—the interagency draft reveals a cautious bureaucracy wary of over‑promising. The alternatives considered— a large high‑level summit, a focused expert workshop, or piggy‑backing on an existing international event—show the tension between political optics and logistical feasibility. The staff’s fear that a “large meeting bringing together groups with disparate views could be difficult to manage” underscores an early awareness of the coalition‑building challenges that would later dominate climate talks.

The Blueprint for a “Feeder” Strategy

Rather than a single, monolithic conference, the memo outlines a cascade of smaller meetings: a climate‑change summit in October 1989, a pollution‑prevention gathering in spring 1990, and a “state of the oceans” conference in fall 1990. These would act as “feeders” for the flagship 1991 Washington summit. This staged approach anticipates the iterative negotiation process that defines contemporary climate diplomacy, where technical panels and subsidiary bodies lay groundwork for plenary decisions. It also reflects a pragmatic budgeting mindset; the memo flags the need for “budgetary allocations beyond current projections” if the U.S. were to shoulder hosting costs and meet its financial commitments to multilateral bodies.

Why the Document Matters Today

The memorandum is more than an administrative footnote; it captures the moment the United States first attempted to institutionalize climate change within its diplomatic agenda. The very language that the memo treats as a “campaign pledge” became the seed for the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio Earth Summit). Moreover, the internal doubts recorded here presage the very challenges the U.S. would face in later climate negotiations—balancing domestic political constraints, interagency rivalry, and the need to manage a diverse coalition of state, non‑state, and industry actors.

Legacy and Continuing Relevance

The 1991 conference that the memo helped shape never materialized as a standalone event; instead, the agenda migrated to the Rio summit and subsequent UN Framework Convention processes. Nonetheless, the strategic thinking documented by Smith—particularly the use of “feeder” meetings and the emphasis on multilateral funding—remains a template for today’s climate architecture. As current administrations grapple with the prospect of a new global climate summit, the 1989 memo reminds policymakers that the logistical and political hurdles identified three decades ago have not disappeared; they have simply evolved. Understanding this continuity helps explain why contemporary climate diplomacy still wrestles with the same core question: how to translate lofty environmental rhetoric into actionable, internationally coordinated policy.

Bottom Line

The Smith memorandum offers a rare glimpse into the early bureaucratic choreography behind the United States’ first serious foray into global environmental leadership. Its blend of optimism, caution, and procedural detail provides a nuanced counterpoint to the public narrative of a decisive presidential pledge, revealing the complex machinery that must align before a campaign promise can become an international treaty‑making platform.

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