Memorandum, John Negroponte (OES) to Acting Secretary of State John C. Whitehead, May 8, 1987, Subject: Ozone Protection Negotiations [with attached cable].
National Security Archive
Negroponte’s 1987 memo reveals how a modest draft, diplomatic encouragement, and inter‑agency juggling paved the way for the Montreal Protocol’s success.
Source: Memorandum, John Negroponte (OES) to Acting Secretary of State John C. Whitehead, May 8, 1987, Subject: Ozone Protection Negotiations [with attached cable]. Date: May 8, 1987 Archive: Department of State FOIA Collection: U.S. Climate Change Policy in the 1980s Dec 2, 2015
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A Diplomatic Push at the Edge of the Ozone Crisis
John Negroponte’s May 8, 1987 memorandum to Acting Secretary of State John C. Whitehead captures a decisive moment in the multilateral effort to curb ozone‑depleting substances. Drafted just after the third Geneva round of the United Nations‑led negotiations, the note is less a routine briefing than a strategic nudge: it urges the Secretary to publicly commend UNEP Executive Director Mostafa Tolba, whose personal involvement had turned a stalled process into a concrete draft protocol. The memo’s timing is crucial—February 1987 had seen the United States press Tolba to take a more active role, and by early May the Geneva meeting had produced a “Chairman’s draft” that, while non‑binding, mapped a realistic trajectory for phase‑out schedules. Negroponte’s recommendation to send a congratulatory cable reflects both the administration’s desire to reward diplomatic momentum and its awareness that domestic political pressures were mounting.
The Geneva Round in Context
The 1980s ozone saga unfolded against a backdrop of mounting scientific consensus that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were eroding the stratospheric ozone layer, a discovery that earned the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s predecessor, the Montreal Protocol. By 1987, the United States, the European Community, the USSR, Japan and Canada were the principal industrial emitters and thus the key negotiating parties. Earlier rounds had produced little more than statements of intent; the Geneva session, organized by Tolba, was the first to assemble a tight “small group” of heads of delegation and hammer out quantitative targets. The draft outlined a freeze at 1986 levels within two years of the protocol’s entry into force, a 20 % cut two years later, and a further 30 % reduction by either 1994 or 1996, contingent on a later technical assessment. While no delegation formally endorsed the text, the memo records that most parties found it “probably not far from what the eventual protocol might look like,” signalling a convergence of interests that had previously been fragmented.
Actors, Interests, and the Subtext of the Memo
Negroponte, then the Director of the State Department’s Office of European Security (OES), was a seasoned diplomat with a reputation for hard‑ball bargaining. His briefing highlights several domestic actors: EPA Administrator Lee Thomas, who favored a “quasi‑automatic schedule” to spur industry substitution; the Interior Department, OMB, OSTP and the Domestic Policy Council, each wary of imposing steep compliance costs. The memo also references a forthcoming Senate hearing (Senators Baucus and Chafee) that would test the administration’s resolve. By noting that “some environmentalists are disappointed that we did not hold out for a 95 % CFC reduction,” Negroponte signals the internal tension between a pragmatic, incremental approach and the more ambitious aspirations of the environmental lobby. The recommendation to commend Tolba serves a dual purpose: it reinforces UNEP’s leadership, encouraging continued facilitation, and it signals to Congress and the press that the United States is steering a constructive, internationally coordinated solution.
Why the Document Matters Today
The memorandum foreshadows the final shape of the Montreal Protocol, which was signed in September 1987 and entered into force in 1989. The incremental steps outlined—freeze, 20 % cut, then 30 % cut—became the backbone of the Protocol’s original schedule, later tightened by subsequent amendments. Moreover, the memo illustrates how U.S. diplomatic practice blended environmental science with geopolitical calculation: the inclusion of the USSR and Japan, the careful handling of developing‑country concerns, and the coordination with inter‑agency players all reveal a sophisticated policy architecture that treated ozone protection as a national‑security issue.
Legacy and Lessons
Decades later, the Montreal Protocol is hailed as the most successful environmental treaty, having phased out 98 % of the ozone‑depleting chemicals it targeted. Negroponte’s memo reminds us that such success hinged on timely diplomatic encouragement, the willingness to endorse a modest but workable draft, and the management of domestic political constituencies. The document also underscores a pattern repeated in later climate negotiations: the need for a strong international convenor (here, Tolba) and a domestic champion who can translate scientific urgency into politically viable commitments. As contemporary policymakers grapple with the Paris Agreement’s implementation, the 1987 memorandum offers a concise case study of how strategic diplomatic messaging can convert scientific consensus into binding international law.
C05327496 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-07559 Doc No. C05327496 Date: 03/03/2015 CABLE SENT 5/9::ORIG TO FAIM DIST TO: D S/S S/S-S-DIR TMA2 TMB2 IO OES RF/tlc
8713231 (EOH)
United States Department of State Washington, D. C. 20520
RELEASED IN FULL
CONFIDENTIAL 87 MAY -6 P4:33 ACTION MEMORANDUM 5/8 S/S
cc - ENH May 8, 1987 5/11 SN/RB cc: JON E ENH 87 MAY -9 P8:15
TO: The Acting Secretary FROM: OES - John D. Negroponte SUBJECT: Ozone Protection Negotiations
When you met with UN Environment Program Executive Director Mostafa Tolba in February, you urged him to take an active role in the negotiations to control ozone-depleting chemicals. Under Tolba's effective leadership, difficult but productive negotiations last week brought participating nations within reach of agreement on a protocol. I suggest you send the attached message to Tolba to commend his leadership.
The Geneva Round
In Geneva last week, Tolba (who had not participated personally in previous rounds) organized a small group consisting only of heads of delegation from the US (Richard Benedick), EC (UK, Denmark, Belgium and Commission), Canada, Norway, USSR, and Japan. The resultant nonbinding "Chairman's" draft for the key article on controls provided for:
(a) a freeze on certain CFC's at 1986 levels within two years of the protocol's entry into force (EIF). (Tolba strongly urged that the protocol be ratified by 1988, which would imply a freeze effective in 1990.)
(b) a 20% reduction two years later (1992).
(c) a further reduction of 30%, for which two options were provided: (1) six years afer EIF (1994) if a majority of the parties so decide, or (2) eight years after EIF (1996) unless 2/3 of the parties otherwise decide. Four years before this reduction there would be a scientific/technical/economic assessment.
(d) further actions to be decided by the parties later.
None of the delegations gave formal assent to this package. Some (Canada, Nordics, Switzerland, New Zealand) indicated that it might be too weak, and others (EC, USSR, Japan) that it
CONFIDENTIAL DECL:OADR
REVIEW AUTHORITY: Adolph Eisner, Senior Reviewer
rone Bdx 5 59.96.1262
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-07559 Doc No. C05327496 Date: 03/03/2015
C05327496 U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-07559 Doc No. C05327496 Date: 03/03/2015
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
might be too strong. Benedick stated that the USG would carefully examine the details. Nevertheless, there was general agreement that this text is probably not far from what the eventual protocol might look like.
Progress was made on other aspects, particularly toward including a broader number of chemicals as the U.S. has urged, but many points remain to be decided, including the precise substances to be covered, and treatment of non-parties, late-joiners, and developing countries.
Next Steps
Tolba has asked that all delegations submit their governments' comments on the Chairman's draft to him by June 19. Tolba's small group will then meet in Brussels June 29-30, when he hopes to reach sufficient agreement that a legal group can prepare a near-final text July 6-8. Formal negotiations would resume September 8-11 in Montreal, followed by the Diplomatic Conference September 14-16 for signing the protocol.
Since OMB, Interior and others have requested a Cabinet decision on the protocol, the Domestic Policy Council will meet this month to consider the U.S. position. EPA's Lee Thomas wants a firm, quasi-automatic schedule to provide strong incentives for industry to develop substitutes; others (Interior, OMB, OSTP, OPD) will resist this.
A Senate (Baucus/Chafee) hearing next week will question Thomas, Benedick, and other Administration officials on our intentions. Some environmentalists are disappointed that we did not hold out for a 95 percent CFC reduction; others feel this is a reasonable text given the original intransigence of the EC, Japan and USSR. US press commentary has been strongly favorable to what is described as a tentative accord. If the DPC departs significantly from this, there will be political costs.
Recommendation:
That you approve the attached message to Tolba. 9 MAY 1987
Attachments:
- Cable to Tolba
- State 59840 (report on Tolba visit)
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-07559 Doc No. C05327496 Date: 03/03/2015
C05327496FIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2010-07559 Doc No. C05327496 Date: 03/03/2015 [CONFIDENTIAL]
Letter to Deputy Secretary from Amb. Negroponte
Drafter:OES/ENH:SButcher [SB] 4658T x79312
Clearance:OES/E:REBenedick [RES] OES/ENH:JRouse [JB] OES/ENR:EParsons [AB] IO/T:BPowell [AB]
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2010-07559 Doc No. C05327496 Date: 03/03/2015 [CONFIDENTIAL]
C05327498-IED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2010-07559 Doc No. C05327498 Date: 03/03/2015 [Sent 5/9]
UNCLASSIFIED 4689 T
OES/ENH:SBUTCHER 5/7/87 EXT. 647-9312 D:JWHITEHEAD
[RELEASED IN FULL]
OES:JDNEGROPONTE OES/ENH:JROUSE OES/ENR:EPARSONS
OES/E:REBENEDICK IO/T:BPOWELL S/S:BLPASCOE
PRIORITY NAIROBI
FOR UNEP PERMREP N/A SENV, UNEP
JW SB JDN REB JR BP EP S/S
MESSAGE TO TOLBA ON OZONE PROTECTION NEGOTIATIONS
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO UNEP EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR TOLBA:
DEAR DR. TOLBA:
RICHARD BENEDICK, THE HEAD OF OUR DELEGATION TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON A PROTOCOL TO CONTROL OZONE-DEPLETING SUBSTANCES, HAS REPORTED TO ME ON THE PROGRESS MADE LAST WEEK IN GENEVA UNDER YOUR ABLE LEADERSHIP. WHEN WE MET LAST FEBRUARY, I SAID I HOPED YOU WOULD TAKE AN ACTIVE PERSONAL ROLE IN MOVING THESE NEGOTIATIONS. I AM VERY PLEASED TO SEE THAT YOUR EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP IN THE THIRD ROUND HAS ENABLED THE NEGOTIATIONS TO ADVANCE SIGNIFICANTLY. I HOPE YOU WILL CONTINUE YOUR ACTIVE PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT TO BRING THIS IMPORTANT EFFORT TO FRUITION WITH SIGNATURE OF AN EFFECTIVE PROTOCOL IN MONTREAL THIS SEPTEMBER.
REVIEW AUTHORITY: Adolph Eisner, Senior Reviewer
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2010-07559 Doc No. C05327498 Date: 03/03/2015
C05327498 IED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2010-07559 Doc No. C05327498 Date: 03/03/2015 UNCLASSIFIED 2 WITH ALL BEST WISHES, SINCERELY, JOHN C. WHITEHEAD ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE 44 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2010-07559 Doc No. C05327498 Date: 03/03/2015
NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
National Security Archive, Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University, 2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037, Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu