Department of State Instructions CA-640, "IAEA Safeguards Document to be Considered at IAEA Fourth General Conference, September 1960.," 21 July 1960, Confidential
National Security Archive
A declassified 1960 State Department memo maps the U.S., U.K., and Canada’s procedural strategy to push a key IAEA safeguards text through the Fourth General Conference.
Source: Department of State Instructions CA-640, "IAEA Safeguards Document to be Considered at IAEA Fourth General Conference, September 1960.," 21 July 1960, Confidential Date: Jul 21, 1960 Archive: SAE, box 305, 12H Peaceful Uses File 18.5 Safeguards April-August 1960 Collection: 60th Anniversary of the International Atomic Energy Agency Oct 26, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A Diplomatic Playbook for the Fourth IAEA Conference
The July 21, 1960 State Department Instruction (CA‑640) is not a policy statement so much as a battlefield map for a diplomatic skirmish that would take place in September at the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Fourth General Conference in Vienna. The memo records the United States, United Kingdom and Canada coordinating a “tactical plan” to shepherd the agency’s safeguards document (GC/IV/108) through the conference without a paragraph‑by‑paragraph debate that could expose fissures among the 71 member states. The instruction was drafted after intensive consultations with British and Canadian counterparts and after a preliminary round of lobbying at the June Board of Governors meeting, where the three allies gauged the receptivity of a dozen other delegations.
The document sits squarely in the early‑Cold‑War contest over the peaceful‑use clause of the Atoms for Peace program. The IAEA, created in 1957, was still defining the scope of its inspection regime. The United States wanted a robust, agency‑wide safeguards system that would limit the diversion of nuclear material to weapons, while a number of non‑aligned and developing nations feared that such measures could become tools of political control. By 1960 the agency’s draft safeguards text had become the most contentious agenda item, and the United States feared that a protracted amendment process could stall or water down the provisions.
Who was pulling the strings?
The memo lists a surprisingly broad set of U.S. actors—State Department regional desks (EUR, AF S), the CIA, the Army, the Navy, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense—indicating that the safeguards issue was treated as a national‑security priority across the whole bureaucracy. The British and Canadian delegations are portrayed as equal partners, each signing off on the draft resolution and the coordinated outreach. The instruction also names a litany of prospective co‑sponsors—Australia, South Africa, Portugal, Spain, Japan, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, France, Norway, the Netherlands and the Philippines—showing the United States’ desire to assemble a geographically diverse coalition that could lend the appearance of universal support.
The language of the plan is deliberately procedural: secure a “procedural resolution” that simply takes note of the safeguards document and returns it to the Board of Governors, block any amendment motions, and prevent a deferral to a future conference. The memo even specifies that the Administrative and Legal Committee, where the real technical debate would occur, should be chaired by a “friendly, impartial” member—an acknowledgement that the real power lay in committee chairmanship rather than in the plenary vote.
What the paper reveals beneath the surface
First, the instruction betrays a high degree of anxiety about the possibility of a “paragraph‑by‑paragraph substantive debate.” The United States was prepared to use procedural weapons—motion to close debate, pre‑emptive resolution, control of committee leadership—to sideline dissent. Second, the stepwise outreach plan (Board members first, then India and Ceylon, then the rest) reflects an awareness that the non‑aligned bloc could be a swing factor; India, in particular, was a vocal critic of what it saw as Western dominance of the IAEA.
Finally, the memo’s emphasis on “maximum co‑sponsorship” and “broad geographical distribution” signals an early form of what later scholars would call “soft power coalition‑building.” By securing signatures from a mix of developed and developing states, the United States aimed to mask its own strategic motives and present the safeguards text as a consensual, technical measure rather than a geopolitical instrument.
Legacy of the tactical plan
The Fourth IAEA General Conference ultimately adopted the safeguards document with only limited amendment, and the United States’ procedural strategy proved effective. The episode set a precedent for how the major powers would manage contentious agenda items in multilateral nuclear forums: focus on procedural control, build a wide‑ranging coalition, and keep the debate out of the public plenary. The CA‑640 instruction thus offers a rare, candid glimpse into the bureaucratic choreography behind a landmark moment in the institutionalization of nuclear non‑proliferation—an episode whose playbook still informs contemporary negotiations at the IAEA and other arms‑control bodies.
DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 949670 MENT OF STATE INSTRUCTION 1736 CONFIDENTIAL [Superseded by [illegible] file]
ORIGIN: S/AE NO.: CA-640 July 21, 1960 SUBJECT: IAEA Safeguards Document to be Considered at IAEA Fourth General Conference, September 1960.
TO: CANBERRA, CARACAS, LIMA, LISBON, MADRID, MANILA, MEXICO CITY, OSLO, PRETORIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, THE HAGUE, TOKYO Rptd info: LONDON, OTTAWA, PARIS, VIENNA FOR IAEA MISSION
Reference: Department Instruction CA-10127, June 3, 1960.
EUR OSD IRC USIA E USUN ICA S/SA IO U/IGC L M/OP MC AEC OIC AIR PSS ARMY P CIA SS COMM NAVY OCB
IAEA.
- Recent Developments:
Extensive consultation with British and Canadian representatives has resulted in agreement on a course of action designed to obtain favorable action on the IAEA safeguards document, GC/IV/108, at the forthcoming Fourth General Conference. The general objective of the course of action is to limit debate at the General Conference on the safeguards document to the document as a whole (i.e., avoid paragraph-by-paragraph substantive debate) and to conclude the discussion with the adoption of a procedural resolution which takes note of the document and returns it to the Board of Governors for implementation, along with the records of the Conference discussions and the text of proposals submitted.
During the recent Board of Governors meeting at Vienna, the United States, British and Canadian delegations, each speaking on behalf of the three, held preliminary consultations with the following delegations concerning the proposed tactical plan and the draft resolution: Australia, South Africa, Portugal, Spain, Japan, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, France, Norway, The Netherlands and the Philippines. Most of these delegations reacted favorably to the proposed course of action but, of course, could not make firm commitments of support for it or to co-sponsor the draft resolution pending consultations with their Governments.
- The Draft Resolution:
The draft resolution (copies enclosed) agreed to by the three CONFIDENTIAL delegations
DRAFTED BY: S/AE:MTManfull:njf 7/18/60 CLEARANCES: ARA - Mr. Wilson (in draft) EUR - Mr. Nunley (in draft) FE - Miss Bacon (in draft) AFS - Mr. Schneider (in draft)
APPROVED BY: UNP - W. I. Cargo AEC - Mr. Vinciguerra (in draft) AEC - Mr. Quinn (in draft) UNP - Mr. Keller
DECLASSIFIED Authority XND 949670 PAGE 2 CONFIDENTIAL (Security Classification)
delegations has been drafted with a view to developing at the outset a reasonable text which could command the support of other Member Governments and would facilitate obtaining the maximum number of co-sponsors in advance of the General Conference. It should be noted that the draft resolution has been carefully drafted to provide maximum tactical advantage at the Conference. While it can be anticipated that certain prospective co-sponsors may wish to amend the enclosed text, it is hoped that such suggested changes can be kept to a minimum and are not aimed at altering the procedural character of the resolution.
- The Tactical Plan:
The tactical plan agreed by the three Governments involves joint or coordinated diplomatic representations to friendly Member Governments of the IAEA with a view to obtaining agreement of these Governments to instruct their delegations to the General Conference:
(a) to support the safeguards document, GC/IV/108 as such;
(b) to support adoption of the draft procedural resolution mentioned above as finally agreed among the co-sponsors;
(c) to support procedural motions at the General Conference designed to prevent votes on amendments or on any individual parts of the safeguards document;
(d) to oppose any motions calling for deferral of the safeguards item to a future General Conference;
(e) to support action referring the document on Privileges and Immunities of the Agency's Inspectors to the Board of Governors to implementation in the same manner as the basic safeguards document, GC/IV/108.
The tactical plan also calls for obtaining the maximum number of co-sponsors for the draft resolution in advance of the General Conference and in this process to attempt to obtain a broad geographical distribution among the co-sponsors, including some of the underdeveloped countries. With regard to the timing of diplomatic approaches, it was agreed that the following sequence would be followed: (1) obtain maximum co-sponsorship in the first instance from friendly Member Countries represented on the Board; (2) following an examination of the outcome of these representations, to approach the Indian and Ceylonese Governments to seek their support; and (3) to make representations to other friendly Member Governments not represented on the Board beginning in August.
CONFIDENTIAL (Security Classification)
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The three Governments also agreed to support at the General Conference the reference of the safeguards item to the Administrative and Legal Committee for final consideration as proposed by the IAEA Secretariat in its draft agenda for General Conference (GOV/562). Since the main focus of debate at the Conference is likely to occur in this committee, the three Governments consider it essential to elect a friendly, impartial Chairman of this committee. It is anticipated consultations on this subject will be held with other Governments at a later date.
- Consultations at Vienna:
As indicated in Paragraph 1 above, the United States, British and Canadian delegations at Vienna held preliminary consultations with the delegations of the friendly countries represented on the Board during the recent June Board Meeting concerning the above tactical plan and draft resolution. Separate instructions follow to each addressee post summarizing results of these consultations and additional information which may be useful in approaches to Governments.
For the information of the Mission only, the Department considers it essential to continue to maintain the closest possible collaboration with the British and the Canadians if the common objective of obtaining favorable action on Agency safeguards is to be achieved at the forthcoming General Conference. Considerable time and effort have been devoted to date to developing an agreed course of action. It is equally important that approaches to other Governments seeking support for the tripartite position be carried out on a joint or coordinated basis. The British and the Canadian Governments have been requested to issue parallel instructions to concert with United States Embassies in joint or coordinated approaches to Governments on the safeguards question. END FTI.
- Action Requested:
Upon receipt of the instructions mentioned in Paragraph 4 above, the Embassies are requested to consult with the British and Canadian Missions with regard to making a joint or coordinated approach to appropriate officials in the Government to which accredited at the earliest possible time, seeking the agreement of that Government: (a) to the tactical approach outlined above, particularly points (a) through (e) of Paragraph 3; and (b) to co-sponsor the enclosed draft resolution.
In making this approach, the Mission should draw, as necessary, upon information contained in the referenced instruction. Should the officials inquire as to why the United States is opposed to referring the safeguards document to the General Conference for approval, the following additional arguments may be used:
(a) United States believes that the Board of Governors is the competent body to elaborate and put into effect the Agency safeguards system as required by the Statute. Nevertheless, the United States has gone along with the majority view that the item be referred to the General Conference for "appropriate action under the Statute";
(b) Referral
CONFIDENTIAL (Security Classification)
DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 949670 PAGE 4 CONFIDENTIAL (Security Classification)
(b) Referral of the document for approval would open the door for further delaying tactics by the opponents of the safeguards (i.e., reopening the document to extensive amendment and debate) and invite further referral of the document to a future General Conference;
(c) The safeguards question has received exhaustive consideration by the Board and by technical experts and reflects a realistic compromise between political and technical considerations. It is unlikely that further debate would produce a better product. Further, the United States considers the safeguards principles and procedures contained GC(IV)/108 as reasonable and adequate, although they are, of course, subject to improvement in light of future experience.
The Mission is requested to report to the Department results of the above approach and subsequent developments in this subject, repeating the reports in each case to the American Embassy at Vienna for the United States Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Enclosure:
Draft Resolution.
HERTER
CONFIDENTIAL (Security Classification)
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