Department of State Instruction CA-10127 to Various Embassies, "Background on IAEA Safeguards Document to Be Considered at Fourth IAEA General Conference, September 1960," 3 June 1960, Official Use Only
National Security Archive
A 1960 State Department memo mobilized every U.S. embassy to back the IAEA’s first safeguards framework, revealing how Cold‑War diplomacy turned technical verification into a universal diplomatic mission.
Source: Department of State Instruction CA-10127 to Various Embassies, "Background on IAEA Safeguards Document to Be Considered at Fourth IAEA General Conference, September 1960," 3 June 1960, Official Use Only Date: Jun 3, 1960 Archive: Record Group 84. Records of Foreign Service Posts. U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna. International Atomic Energy Agency. Classified Files, 1957-1963, box 18, Safeguards April 1 - June 30, 1960 Collection: 60th Anniversary of the International Atomic Energy Agency Oct 26, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A diplomatic briefing for a world of atoms
On 3 June 1960 the State Department issued Instruction CA‑10127 to every U.S. embassy, a terse memo that would never have been seen by the public. Its purpose was to arm American diplomats with a unified talking‑point on the IAEA safeguards document that the agency’s Board of Governors had just pushed through a provisional vote and was about to submit to the Fourth IAEA General Conference in September. The memo arrived at a moment when the Cold War’s nuclear rivalry had moved from the battlefield to the conference table of the fledgling International Atomic Energy Agency, created in 1957 to promote peaceful uses of atomic energy while preventing proliferation.
The instruction is not a policy statement so much as a field‑guide. It sketches the history of the safeguards debate, enumerates the voting pattern that left the United States with a solid majority but a handful of dissenters (the Soviet bloc, India and Ceylon), and urges embassies to press host governments for support. By listing every capital from Accra to Wellington, the State Department signaled that the safeguard issue was to be treated as a universal diplomatic priority, not a niche concern for a few nuclear powers.
The safeguards controversy in context
The early IAEA safeguards negotiations were a micro‑cosm of the larger East‑West standoff. The agency’s statute (Article XII) required that any material supplied for peaceful purposes be subject to verification, but the statute left the details to be worked out by the Board of Governors. In 1959 the Board wrestled with a sprawling draft that the United States found “too onerous and detailed” and that the Soviet bloc dismissed as scientifically shaky and discriminatory. India, newly independent and eager to retain the freedom to develop nuclear technology, argued that safeguards should be universal and not imposed only on “have‑not” states.
The memo reveals how the United States navigated these competing pressures. It notes that the Board’s provisional approval came with 16 votes in favor, none against, and five abstentions—highlighting the narrow coalition of Western and non‑aligned states that could be counted on. The document also records the decision to refer the draft to a technical committee chaired by Norway’s Professor Gunnar Randers, a move designed to depoliticize the language and produce a single, streamlined text (GC(IV)/108). The United States framed this outcome as a “realistic balance of technical and political considerations,” implicitly contrasting its own pragmatic stance with the Soviet bloc’s more ideologically driven objections.
What the memo tells us about U.S. diplomatic strategy
First, the instruction underscores the importance Washington placed on the General Conference as the final arbiter. By urging embassies to “strongly hope” that a “substantial majority” would support the document, the State Department was mobilizing its global network to pre‑empt any last‑minute bloc voting that could derail the safeguards regime.
Second, the list of countries and the repeated “Official Use Only” stamps reveal the classified nature of the briefing. The United States was not merely informing its diplomats; it was managing a tightly controlled narrative about a technical regime that had profound strategic implications. The memo’s footnote about Soviet bloc criticism—labeling the safeguards as “question‑able scientific basis” and “discriminating”—provides a glimpse into the diplomatic language used to delegitimize opposition while avoiding outright confrontation.
Third, the document’s emphasis on the Board’s procedural history (the April 1959 circulation, the September revision, the January 1960 technical criticism) serves as a reminder to ambassadors that the safeguards text was not a raw proposal but the product of an exhaustive, multiyear process. This back‑story was intended to lend the U.S. position an aura of legitimacy and to counter any claims that Washington was imposing a unilateral safeguard regime.
Legacy of the 1960 safeguards push
The GC(IV)/108 document eventually became the first widely accepted IAEA safeguards framework, laying the groundwork for the agency’s later, more robust verification system that would survive the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Non‑Proliferation Treaty of 1968, and the post‑Cold War expansion of nuclear commerce. The CA‑10127 memo captures a moment when the United States recognized that the credibility of the non‑proliferation architecture depended as much on diplomatic consensus as on technical rigor.
In retrospect, the instruction is a reminder that today’s multilateral arms‑control regimes—whether concerning nuclear, chemical, or cyber weapons—are still built on the same diplomatic scaffolding: a series of classified briefs, coordinated embassy lobbying, and the careful framing of technical standards as universal norms. The language of “peaceful purposes” and “non‑discriminatory application” that the memo repeats continues to echo in contemporary negotiations on the Iran nuclear deal and the upcoming revisions to the IAEA’s Additional Protocol. By studying this 1960 briefing, historians can trace the continuity of U.S. diplomatic practice: marshal a global network, shape the technical agenda, and present a consensus‑building narrative that makes the extraordinary appear routine.
DECLASSIFIED Authority UND 489072 ACTION COPY ACTION TAKEN: NO.: DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTION OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3rd ON! (Security Classification) FOR DC USE ONLY CA-10127 June 3, 1960 SUBJECT: Background on IAEA Safeguards Document to be Considered at Fourth IAEA General Conference, September 1960. ACCRA BERN TO: ADDIS ABABA, ANKARA, ASUNCION, ATHENS, BAGHDAD, BANGKOK, BELGRADE, BONN, BRUSSELS, BUENOS AIRES, CARACUS, COLOMBO, COPENHAGEN, CUIDAD TRUJILLO, DJAKARTA, GUATEMALA, HELSINKI, KABUL, KARACHI, KHARTOUM, LIMA, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, MADRID, MANAGUA, MANILA, MEXICO CITY, [illegible], NEW DELHI, OSLO, PHNOM PENH, PORT-AU-PRINCE, QUITO, RABAT, RANGOON, REYKJAVIK, RIO DE JANEIRO, ROME, SAIGON, SAN SALVADOR, SEOUL, STOCKHOLM, TAIPEI, TEGUCIGALPA, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV, THE HAGUE, TOKYO, TUNIS, VIENNA, WELLINGTON. MIAA C/M AF RMP P+Y AF/RE
- 7.VI.60 - IAEA. I. Brief Background of IAEA Safeguards A. The term "safeguards" refers collectively to those principles and procedures which are utilized for the purpose of ascertaining that nuclear materials and equipment, destined for peaceful purposes, are not diverted to military use. Article XII of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides that the IAEA shall implement safeguards for materials and assistance provided through the IAEA. Since 1956, the United States and a group of friendly countries with similar views have been working for the establishment of effective and reasonable safeguards principles and procedures within the IAEA. During the past year, this effort has been intensified, as a result of which the principles and procedures incorporated in IAEA Document GC(IV)/108(Enclosure 2 to this instruction) have been provisionally approved by the 23-member Board by the very substantial majority of 16 for,XXXXX, none against, and 5 abstentions (3 Soviet Bloc, India, and Ceylon) with 2 Board members (UAR and Indonesia) not participating in the vote. na However, although not required by the Statute, the Board has referred the document to the Fourth IAEA General Confer id by AEA ence meeting in September 1960 for "appropriate action under the Statute" and the United States strongly hopes that a substantial majority of the General Confer will support the document so that the Board's provisio approval OFFICIAL USE ONLY (Security Classification) *See listing on Page 4 of countries voting for provisio approval. OFFICIAL USE ONLY OFFICE AMB DCM SPEC ASST. P PA OFFICE MIAA AC AF AP AS
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approval may be made final immediately after the Conference.
B. Since the United States has approached various governments in the past, especially those which are members of the IAEA Board, seeking their support on various aspects of the problem, the following detailed information may be useful:
- In April of 1959, the Safeguards Division of the IAEA circulated, for the comments of the IAEA's Board of Governors, a proposed set of principles and procedures for IAEA safeguards. This document was long and complex and contained features which were not acceptable to various members, including the United States. In September of 1959, the Board provisionally approved a much revised and condensed version of the safeguards principles. The Board requested that a set of procedures implementing the principles should be drafted by the IAEA Secretariat. These draft procedures were considered by the Board at its January 1960 meeting. At this meeting, the technical basis for the procedures prepared by the Secretariat and the previously approved principles came under particularly heavy criticism from the Soviet Bloc and neutral countries.1/
In addition, many other countries submitted extensive amendments to the draft procedures. Consequently, the Board decided to refer the whole problem to a technical drafting committee under the chairmanship of Professor Gunnar Randers of Norway.
1/ In opposing draft safeguards documents during the Board discussions, Soviet Bloc spokesmen have followed the general line that the proposed Agency safeguards system (a) is too onerous and detailed and rests on a question-able scientific basis; (b) is discriminating in that it would apply only to the less-developed countries, i.e., the atomic "have-not" countries; and (c) should consist merely of safeguards measures developed for each Agency project on a case-by-case basis.
India has followed much the same line, while professing its willingness to adhere to a safeguards system which has universal non-discriminatory application to all countries. India has also maintained that safeguards on nuclear source materials and equipment are not necessary since these are now normal articles of commerce. The UAR and certain other countries of the Afro-Asian bloc have tended to follow the Indian lead in this regard or remain silent during Board discussions.
- The drafting
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- The drafting committee included technical representatives from Brazil, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It was instructed to simplify and combine into one document the previously approved principles and the amended procedures. In February, the committee met in Vienna and prepared a draft document in accordance with its instructions. This document was considered at the crucial March-April Board of Governors Meeting, provisionally approved as finally amended, issued as GC(IV)/108, and referred to the General Conference as mentioned above. It is in general accordance with the United States safeguards position.
[?] 3. The United States strongly supports document GC(IV)/108, which represents the results of exhaustive consideration in the Board, as well as at the technical level, and reflects a realistic balance of technical and political considerations. Although the document was developed by the Board of Governors and the great majority of the IAEA members who will attend the General Conference have not participated actively in its preparation, all member countries have had the opportunity to review successive drafts during the period of the Board's consideration of this document. Therefore, the United States strongly hopes that, in order to achieve definitive action on this important problem at the General Conference, other member states will join us in seeking to avoid a recapitulation of the Board discussions by reopening each paragraph of the document to substantive debate.
As further background, a summary of the salient features of GC(IV)/108 is enclosed (Enclosure 1).
II. Action Required
In view of our intent to actively support this document at the General Conference in September, we will be initiating discussions with various IAEA member governments with the object of making clear the significance and need for IAEA approval of these principles and procedures. It is anticipated that the United States will be joined by other free world proponents of safeguards in approaching various IAEA member governments.
Addressee Missions are, therefore, requested:
a. To become thoroughly familiar with the contents of GC(IV)/108;
b. To address
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b. To address to the Department any questions on this document, or on safeguards in general, not later than July 1, in order that the Department may reply well in advance of the Conference;
c. To report any significant inquiries received on this subject; and
d. Not to initiate any formal discussions on this subject with representatives of the governments to which accredited at this time. Further specific instructions on this matter will follow at a later date.
*Countries on the IAEA Board of Governors voting for provisional approval of IAEA safeguards document at March/April 1960 Board Meeting: Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Union of South Africa, United States, Venezuela, the United Kingdom.
Enclosures: HERTER
- Summary of IAEA Safeguards Document.
- Copy of GC(IV)/108. with Action Copy
CC: The American Embassy, OTTAWA The American Embassy, PARIS The American Embassy, CANBERRA The American Embassy, LONDON The American Embassy, CAIRO The American Embassy, CAPETOWN IAEA Mission, VIENNA (Enclosure 1 only)
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ENCLOSURE 1
SUMMARY OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS DOCUMENT
The following is a summary of GC(IV)/108 with reference to the paragraph numbers in that document:
A. The proposed IAEA safeguards principles and procedures seek to prevent nuclear materials and equipment from being used in such a way as to further any military purpose in the following three situations: (Paragraph 1)
a. when the IAEA supplies the assistance;
b. when the IAEA is requested to administer safeguards for bilateral or multilateral agreements; and
c. when the IAEA is requested to apply safeguards to a State's own activities.
B. The scope of the principles and procedures covers the requirements anticipated by the IAEA in the immediate future and relates only to: (Paragraph 4)
a. research, test, and power reactors with less than 100 thermal megawatts output;
b. the source and special fissionable materials used and produced in these reactors; and
c. small research and development facilities.
C. Throughout GC(IV)/108 an important distinction is made between "attachment" and "application" of safeguards. (Paragraphs 21 and 22). "Attachment" means the requirement to apply appropriate procedures. "Application" is the implementation of those procedures.
D. IAEA safeguards will be applied to the various types of nuclear material supplied by the IAEA when the quantity of that material subject to IAEA consideration in the State exceeds (Paragraph 33):
a. two metric tons of uranium with a Uranium 235 (isotope) content between 0.5 and 1.0 per cent, or an equivalent amount of more highly enriched uranium corresponding to 200 grams of pure Uranium 235, Uranium 233, or plutonium (a formula for deriving
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deriving equivalent amounts of uranium of various enrichments is used, see appendix);
b. four metric tons of depleted uranium with a Uranium 235 content of less than 0.5 per cent; or
c. four metric tons of thorium.
Safeguards will be applied in only a nominal manner when the quantities are between 2 and 10 metric tons of natural uranium or its enriched equivalent, 4 and 20 metric tons of depleted uranium, or 4 and 20 metric tons of thorium.
E. IAEA safeguards will be applicable to nuclear materials pro- duced, processed, or used in nuclear facilities or materials which are subject to IAEA safeguards. IAEA safeguards will also be applicable to all special nuclear material produced in a reactor to which IAEA safeguards are not applicable but which contains nuclear material to which IAEA safeguards are applicable, if such material permits the reactor to operate at more than 2001/ per cent of the power at which it could operate without such material. (Paragraphs 26, 30, 34, 35, 36)
F. IAEA safeguards will be applicable to nuclear facilities supplied or substantially assisted by the IAEA. Reactors not fueled with IAEA supplied nuclear material, which, after an inspection at initial criticality, are assessed by the Board to have a maximum calculated power for continuous operation of less than 3 thermal megawatts, shall be exempted from safeguards provided that the total such power of reactors thus exempted in any State may not exceed 6 thermal megawatts.2/ (Paragraphs 27, 31, 37)
G. IAEA safeguards will be applicable to non-nuclear material and equipment supplied by the IAEA if it can substantially assist a nuclear facility or further a military purpose. (Paragraphs 27, 32, 38)
H. The IAEA safeguards principles and procedures provide for the review of the design of existing facilities and those which are planned or being constructed which will become subject to IAEA safeguards. The purpose of such a review is to determine whether the facility will further any military purpose and if it will permit effective IAEA safeguards.
I. A provision
1/ United States position favored 150 per cent. 2/ United States position favored placing all reactors under at least nominal safeguards with no exemption.
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I. A provision is made for records and reports which will be worked out in detail for specific facilities with a State receiving substantial assistance. Special reports are required in case of incidents involving possible loss of material. Reports are also required whenever significant changes are made in inventories of equipment subject to safeguards. The minimum routine report frequency for reactor facilities will be twice a year. (Paragraphs 41, 45-54, 63)
J. Special inspections are permitted in cases of possible material or equipment losses or changes in inventories or equipment which are reported as mentioned above. Routine inspections will be made at a maximum frequency provided by a technical evaluation of the significance of the quantity, enrichment and type of the material provided, or the special nuclear material production potential of the facility provided. These inspections will normally include verification of amounts of material by physical inspection, measurement sampling, auditing reports and records, and examining facilities. (Paragraphs 55-60, 64-66)
K. Nominal safeguards for less significant assistance will require only one annual routine report, no routine inspections, and special reports and inspections as necessary. (Paragraph 61)
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