John A. Hall, Assistant General Manager for International Activities, Atomic Energy Commission to Philip Farley, "Records of Safeguard Discussions - PARIS, January 1960," 25 February 1960
National Security Archive
A 1960 back‑channel meeting in Paris let U.S., British and French scientists probe Soviet attitudes toward IAEA safeguards, revealing early Cold‑War nuclear diplomacy.
Source: John A. Hall, Assistant General Manager for International Activities, Atomic Energy Commission to Philip Farley, "Records of Safeguard Discussions - PARIS, January 1960," 25 February 1960 Date: Feb 25, 1960 Archive: SAE, box 304, 12H Peaceful Uses Subject File 18 Safeguards January-March 1960, Part 1 of 3 Collection: 60th Anniversary of the International Atomic Energy Agency Oct 26, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A Back‑Channel Test of Soviet Safeguard Intentions
On 25 February 1960 John A. Hall, the Atomic Energy Commission’s assistant general manager for international activities, sent a terse memorandum to State Department official Philip J. Farley. The note attached a two‑page “record of safeguard discussions” held in the St. James Hotel, Paris, from 20‑22 January 1960. Hall’s memo was not a public briefing but a classified dispatch meant to keep Washington’s diplomatic machinery apprised of a highly informal, scientist‑led dialogue that probed the Soviet Union’s willingness to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in future nuclear commerce.
The Paris meeting was a direct outgrowth of a series of ad‑hoc gatherings that began in New York in October 1959, when senior physicists—most notably Nobel laureate Isidor Rabi—met with their Soviet, British and French counterparts to explore how “effective safeguards” might be woven into both multilateral Agency transactions and bilateral nuclear‑technology contracts. By January 1960 the United States, Britain and France had agreed to bring the Soviet delegation, represented by physicist V.S. Emelyanov and First Secretary Palenikh, into a private salon for three days of frank exchange. The participants deliberately excluded official government officials (except for Hall, who acted as the U.S. liaison) to preserve an “informal and non‑governmental atmosphere,” a diplomatic formula that allowed scientists to speak more freely than their ministries would permit.
The broader episode belongs to the early‑Cold‑War struggle over the IAEA’s safeguard system, a cornerstone of the 1957 Atoms for Peace program. While the Agency’s statutes called for inspections of all nuclear material under its auspices, the United States and its allies feared that the Soviet Union would balk at any mechanism that could impede the export of reactors and fuel to the developing world. The Paris talks therefore served a dual purpose: to extract Soviet policy signals on safeguards and to test the limits of Soviet willingness to bind itself to the Agency’s inspection regime in the context of strategic sales to countries such as India, Indonesia, West Germany and Japan.
The document’s language reveals several striking dynamics. First, Emelyanov’s repeated insistence that safeguards be “logical and simple” and his willingness to support Annex II of the IAEA’s safeguard provisions only if contradictions were removed suggest a Soviet strategy of demanding technical minimalism while preserving political flexibility. Second, the overt questioning of Soviet intent regarding India—raised by Sir John Cockcroft—exposes a geopolitical fault line: the United States was eager to keep India within its sphere, while the USSR, according to Emelyanov, saw no political advantage in imposing safeguards on a bilateral reactor deal with New Delhi. Third, the exchange about West Germany and Japan betrays a cynical calculus: Emelyanov claimed the USSR would simply refuse to sell reactors to West Germany, yet he also asserted that the United States had already “given West Germany atomic weapons,” a thinly veiled reference to the 1955 West German nuclear‑weapons sharing arrangement. This comment underscores how safeguards were entangled with broader security guarantees and how both sides used the discussion to signal strategic intent rather than to negotiate technical details.
Hall’s memo also hints at the internal U.S. bureaucracy’s handling of the record. By suggesting that a copy be forwarded to Mr. Wiggins of the British Embassy, Hall was coordinating allied intelligence on Soviet nuclear policy, reinforcing the notion that the Paris dialogue was as much a collective intelligence‑gathering exercise as it was a scientific forum. The “confidential” stamp and the later declassification authority (NND 9491670) illustrate the document’s sensitivity; it was not intended for public consumption until the 1990s, when the National Archives released it as part of the IAEA’s 60th‑anniversary collection.
Why does this three‑day salon matter today? First, it provides a rare glimpse into how senior scientists, rather than diplomats, shaped the early architecture of the global safeguard regime. The willingness of Rabi, Cockcroft and French physicists to engage directly with Soviet peers demonstrates that scientific diplomacy was a crucial conduit for managing nuclear risk during the Cold War. Second, the record captures the Soviet Union’s early ambivalence toward the IAEA—a stance that would evolve into the more formal, though still limited, participation seen after the 1968 Safeguards Agreement. Finally, the transcript foreshadows contemporary debates over “dual‑use” technology and the balance between export‑control stringency and geopolitical influence, a balance that remains at the heart of today’s non‑proliferation negotiations.
In short, Hall’s February memorandum is more than an administrative footnote; it is a window onto a pivotal moment when the United States, Britain and France used a scientific back‑channel to test Soviet resolve, to map the political terrain of nuclear commerce, and to lay the groundwork for the safeguard architecture that still underpins the IAEA’s work today.
CONFIDENTIAL UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
[DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 9491670 BOX 219]
9.5 (25) S/AE FILE COPY [TF EJS [illegible] WC]
February 25, 1960
MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Philip J. Farley Department of State
SUBJECT: RECORD OF SAFEGUARD DISCUSSIONS - PARIS, January 1960
I have attached two copies of the record of the Paris discussions on safeguards. If you consider it appropriate, a copy could be given to Mr. Wiggins of the British Embassy.
John A. Hall Assistant General Manager for International Activities
Attachment (2) Record of Safeguard Discussions, Paris, 1/20-22/60
[SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY S/AE FEB 26 1960 AM 1 PM 7,8,9,10,11,12,1,2,3,4,5,6]
[illegible handwritten notes]
[Copy of encl - given to Mr. Wiggins, British Embassy 3/15/60 sml]
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Philip J. Farley/State,S/AE
UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
RECORD OF SAFEGUARD DISCUSSIONS
HELD AT THE ST. JAMES HOTEL, PARIS
January 20-22, 1960
THOSE PRESENT: Dr. Isador I. Rabi, United States
Mr. John A. Hall, United States
Professor V.S. Emelyanov, U.S.S.R.
Mr. Palenikh, U.S.S.R.
Sir John Cockcroft, United Kingdom
M. Francis Perrin, France
Mr. Bertrand Goldschmidt, France
In a private meeting at the American Embassy with Sir John Cockcroft
and Mr. Goldschmidt on January 19, 1960, it was agreed that Dr. Rabi would
lead the discussions but Cockcroft, Goldschmidt, and Perrin would assist
in every respect. It was also agreed that to avoid confusion between
safeguard discussions in Vienna and the basic objectives of the Paris
meeting, the document GOV/463 under discussion in Vienna would not be
discussed in Paris.
The objective of the Paris meeting would be to ascertain Soviet intentions
and policy on safeguards. To achieve this end, it was agreed to discuss the
larger and more serious problems of installations of 100 thermal megawatts
and greater, including the reactor complex, i.e., fuel, chemical reprocessing
plants, etc. It was finally agreed that in order to maintain an informal
and non-governmental atmosphere, advisers would be on call but not be
invited to the meetings with the exception of Mr. Hall. Dr. Rabi explained
that while the others represented their governments, he really did not
except through Mr. Hall.
----------
The meetings took place at the St. James Hotel in a small private salon
off the lobby.
Professor Emelyanov arrived by train from Vienna the morning of January 20th
with Mr. Palenikh, one of the First Secretaries of the Soviet Embassy in
Vienna, who acted as an interpreter. Emelyanov and Palenikh were met and
brought to the St. James Hotel by Goldschmidt. (Word had been received
from Vienna that Emelyanov was quite open about the meeting in Paris and
announced before the full Board that he was attending a special meeting
to discuss safeguards.)
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-2-
Dr. Rabi opened the discussions. He stated that the meeting should be considered a continuation of the informal discussions commenced in New York in October at the time of the Scientific Advisory Committee meeting with the addition of the French representatives. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss in an informal fashion the desirability of having effective safeguards on Agency transactions and in bilateral agreements. Dr. Rabi recalled that Emelyanov had expressed a view that he had agreed in principle with safeguards but he also stated that safeguards should be simplified and expressed a willingness to hold further talks for this purpose. At this point Emelyanov summarized what was happening in the Board of Governors' meeting in Vienna and was exceedingly critical of the Secretariat document on safeguards. He emphasized that he did not believe Agency safeguards would be workable but was willing to go along on the basis of principles and procedures which were "logical and simple, and if "contradiction" were removed and "principles clarified", he would support Annex II.
Sir John Cockcroft raised the question of India and asked Emelyanov specifically whether the Soviet Union would apply safeguards in an Indian-Soviet bilateral. Emelyanov said that it was not the intention of the Soviets to include safeguards in any bilateral, and it would be difficult politically for the Soviets to ask the Indians to accept safeguards. However, the question of India was a political decision and in any event, he personally was not interested in selling a power reactor to India because of the press of internal commitments in the Soviet Union. He stated that many countries did not need power reactors, and recalled discussions with representatives of Indonesia. The Indonesians wished a reactor from the Soviet Union but Emelyanov stated he told the Indonesians that they did not need a reactor. However, the Soviet Foreign Office advised Emelyanov that if he did not do it, the United States would. (This excursion by the Professor is open to several interpretations: (1) he means what he says, or (2) it is a defense against the Soviet inability to sell many reactors abroad.) [and many others!]
Professor Emelyanov was asked by Goldschmidt whether he would require safeguards on a reactor made by the Soviets and sold to West Germany. Emelyanov said he would not apply safeguards; he would simply not sell a reactor to West Germany. Rabi asked if the United States sold a power reactor to West Germany, would the Soviets be unhappy if the agreement contained no safeguard system. Emelyanov responded by saying what difference would it make inasmuch as the United States has given West Germany atomic weapons. After this point was clarified by Rabi, Emelyanov stated it did not make a great deal of difference inasmuch as you could not trust the Germans in any event. M. Perrin raised the question of the attitude of Communist China if the Soviet Union sold a power reactor to India without safeguards. Emelyanov answered by stating that India was not capable of making weapons. However, he did state Japan was capable of producing weapons and, accordingly, he would not sell a reactor to Japan.
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Dr. Rabi asked Emelyanov whether the United States should continue to strive for controls on uranium or should we give up. Emelyanov did not answer directly. Dr. Rabi stated the United States had 43 bilaterals, all with safeguards and these agreements, in a sense, provided security for all. Emelyanov agreed that it might be feasible for the next five to seven years to establish controls on uranium but the time was short.
At this point Emelyanov made another statement to the effect he thought under-developed countries should concentrate on the use of radioactive isotopes, and that they were not ready for power stations. In reference to Egypt, however, the Soviets probably would supply a power station but he did not think the Egyptians had the capacity to construct a weapon. However, this would be a political decision and not an economic one. Emelyanov, on several occasions, stated that the central problem was universal disarmament, not partial control through Agency safeguards. He pointedly raised the subject of East Germany and Communist China in regard to Agency safeguards. Dr. Rabi pointed out that this was a serious problem in the political area, and he recognized its importance.
Professor Emelyanov eventually admitted that the only reason the Soviets supported safeguards was because they were a member of the Agency. He stated that there had never been a study or any formal consideration of safeguards in Moscow. Decisions were made on a political basis. For example, Emelyanov said that the Soviets would have supported the Agency in 1956 without safeguard provisions. Article XII of the Statute was accepted by the Soviets in 1956 as a compromise with the United States and not because the Soviets were interested in the subject.
After two days of discussion, Emelyanov continued to display complete indifference to safeguards and complete skepticism to the effectiveness of any system. He cited pre-war German rearmament as a case in point.
The problem of disarmament was raised several times during the discussions, and it was made clear to Emelyanov by Cockcroft and Rabi, citing examples of India, Egypt, Japan and West Germany, that our objective was to develop safeguards as one of the important paths towards the reduction of armaments. Without safeguards, trade in the atomic field could cause serious international friction and promote dangerous suspicion.
At the conclusion, Professor Emelyanov agreed to the following points at the urging of Dr. Rabi:
- To raise with his government the question of whether as a matter of policy, safeguards should be applied to civil reactors over 100 thermal megawatts, either arranged through the Agency or on a bilateral basis (this would cover the reactor complex, fuel, chemical processing, etc.).
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The desirability of convening a panel of experts either from the four countries present or the seven countries of the Scientific Advisory Committee to the IAEA. These experts would meet as soon as possible to consider a system of safeguards with emphasis on developing techniques to simplify the problem of inspection and control.
The experts would report to four countries or seven members of the Scientific Advisory Committee, either before or after the April meeting of the Scientific Advisory Committee.
The United States and the USSR would be in communication on this subject (between Professor Emelyanov and Mr. McCone) with the United States representing the views of France and the United Kingdom.
[Procedural]
On several occasions Emelyanov stressed the difficulties he had within his country to maintain and develop relationships with the West in the field of atomic energy. He said that many people in his own office opposed this type of cooperation. He said the reason that he personally had to travel so much was that he did not have a spokesman who thought the same way he did on this subject. He pointed out that after forty years, the problem of rebuilding relationships with the Americans was difficult, and he was sure we had the same types of problems. He again emphasized on several occasions the Khrushchev "peace objective" and his access to Khrushchev.
As a matter of subsidiary interest in the field of high energy physics, he made the point that the Soviet Academy wished to build the accelerators, and Emelyanov told the Academy to go ahead and build the accelerators, but then Emelyanov, laughing, stated that his accelerator budget was ten times that of the Academy. He said that the Academy budget for accelerators was ninety million rubles.
At the conclusion of the meeting Emelyanov told Dr. Rabi privately that he understood and sympathized with the objectives of the United States. However, he stated he had many difficulties and found contradictory views in Soviet circles. He told a story to show that he had the "bear by the tail".
The next step is up to the Soviet Union through Professor Emelyanov to advise the United States that the Soviets are willing to proceed with further discussions on this subject. No adequate assessment of the Paris meeting can be made until we hear from Professor Emelyanov and see how far he has gone with his government on this subject. The Soviet attitude in the Agency drafting committee on Annex II on February 15th in Vienna might provide some evidence of Soviet cooperation or lack of cooperation.
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The objective of the meeting was achieved. Professor Emelyanov clearly and bluntly, in the presence of senior scientists, of whom he obviously has great respect, from France, the United Kingdom and the United States, confirmed the fact that the USSR does not consider safeguards a part of its security system. Soviet policy on safeguards is purely political and positions are taken on an ad hoc political basis. Since my first dealings with Soviet officials while in the Department of State in 1946, I have never witnessed a more open and frank discussion with a high member of the Soviet regime on this subject. But I am forced to conclude that if the Soviets seem to agree with us on Annex I or Annex II of the Agency safeguards system, the agreement is based not on an acceptance of common responsibility to achieve security in this field but merely to give an impression of a cooperative attitude -- a posture related to other motivations and not a security interest in Agency safeguards or bilateral safeguards. Pending further evidence from the Professor by way of progress on the points agreed to in Paris, I am exceedingly pessimistic about the sincerity of Soviet intentions in the field of safeguards.
In my judgment two points should be noted for future discussions with the Soviets:
1. Professor Emelyanov reacted favorably to the argument that a safeguards system was one of the several paths to the reduction of armaments;
2. Professor Emelyanov demonstrated a genuine concern over the possibility of West Germany and Japan producing atomic weapons.
To avoid closing with a completely pessimistic note, I must point out that Emelyanov has been put on the spot to the extent he agreed to raise these issues with his government. If he responds favorably, I would conclude that some progress has been made but at this stage very limited progress.
John A. Hall
CONFIDENTIAL
[DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 949670 BOX 219 ey]
March 3, 1960
[S/AE FILE COPY 95]
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: G - Mr. Hare
FROM: S/AE - Philip J. Farley
SUBJECT: Proposed Belgian Sale of Uranium Ore to India
BACKGROUND:
The United States has been seeking the adoption of safeguards to ensure that atomic energy materials made available for peaceful uses are not diverted to military purposes. In general terms, the safeguards involve undertakings by the country receiving atomic energy materials: (1) to use such materials only for peaceful purposes; (2) to permit review by the sending country of reactor and equipment designs, etc.; (3) to keep operating records and submit reports to assist in accounting of materials; and (4) to permit inspections by the sending state or the IAEA to verify the reports and account for special nuclear materials or source material. In addition to including appropriate safeguards in all of our bilateral agreements, we have been seeking the adoption of safeguards along two lines: (1) by endeavoring to obtain the agreement of the supplier nations to voluntarily limit sales of natural uranium without safeguards; and (2) through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Following several meetings with the supplier nations, we had been led to believe by the Belgians that they would observe a tacit understanding to limit sales without safeguards to certain agreed de minimis amounts after first informing other supplier nations. However, in August of last year, the Belgians proposed to sell 26.5 tons of natural uranium to India without safeguards. On that occasion, Mr. Murphy called in the Belgian Ambassador on September 9, 1959, and expressed our strong opposition to the proposed sale. The sale was not consummated. The Memorandum of Conversation and the Briefing
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