Harold C. Vedeler, U.S. Embassy, Austria, to Francis Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, 19 November 1957, with Wilcox's response attached, 9 December 1957, Confidential
National Security Archive
A 1957 diplomatic memo shows how the U.S. won key IAEA posts but risked alienating allies, while the USSR quietly plotted influence.
Source: Harold C. Vedeler, U.S. Embassy, Austria, to Francis Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, 19 November 1957, with Wilcox's response attached, 9 December 1957, Confidential Date: Dec 9, 1957 Archive: RG 59, Central Decimal Files, 1955-1959, 398.1901-IAEA/11-1957 Collection: 60th Anniversary of the International Atomic Energy Agency Oct 26, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A Diplomatic Balancing Act at the Dawn of the IAEA
The November‑December 1957 exchange between Harold C. Vedeler, the U.S. Embassy’s political officer in Vienna, and Assistant Secretary Francis O. Wilcox captures a pivotal moment in the early history of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The correspondence was drafted in the wake of the IAEA’s first General Conference (19–30 September 1957) and the subsequent Board of Governors meetings, where the fledgling agency wrestled with its institutional architecture, leadership, and the geopolitical fault lines of the Cold War.
Vedeler’s memo, sent from Vienna on 19 November, is not a routine briefing; it is a candid appraisal of how the United States’ hard‑won diplomatic victories—securing an American Director‑General, a $40,000 salary package, and the election of the Austrian delegate as conference president—had simultaneously bruised its standing among other members. The United States achieved its “major objectives” by leveraging its economic clout and technical expertise, but the tone of the memo reveals an acute awareness that the price was a loss of goodwill, especially among smaller European states and even some of the traditional “Big Five” allies. The document therefore illuminates a classic diplomatic dilemma: how to translate material advantage into lasting influence without alienating partners.
The broader episode is the institutionalization of nuclear governance after the 1955 Atoms for Peace speech. The IAEA was conceived as a technical forum where East and West could cooperate on peaceful uses of atomic energy, yet the agency’s very structure—its Board, the Director‑General’s office, and the budgetary framework—became a micro‑cosm of the larger ideological contest. Vedeler’s assessment of the Soviet delegation is especially revealing. He notes that the USSR behaved “moderately” and avoided the high‑profile Chinese representation dispute, opting instead to project a cooperative, technically‑oriented image. This reading aligns with Soviet diplomatic practice at the time: present the agency as a venue for showcasing Soviet scientific achievement while keeping strategic ambitions discreet. The memo’s observation that the Soviets were assembling a sizable, technically competent staff underscores their intention to become a “major influence” rather than a mere participant.
Wilcox’s December‑9 response, though not reproduced in full, completes the picture by confirming that the State Department viewed the IAEA as a strategic arena where the United States could both contain Soviet expansion and cultivate a coalition of smaller European nations. The memo’s emphasis on the “good relationship” with those states—who felt shut out of the Board—suggests that Washington deliberately cultivated a secondary network to offset any resentment generated by its aggressive push for leadership positions.
What the document does not say, but which the subtext betrays, is the extent to which personal ambition and bureaucratic rivalry shaped the negotiations. The push for an American Director‑General and the specific salary figure hint at an internal U.S. competition to place a particular individual in a role that would become a springboard for future nuclear policy influence. Likewise, the criticism of British and French conduct points to lingering Anglo‑American friction over the post‑war European order; the British and French are described as “undiplomatic” and as trying to channel contacts through themselves, reflecting a desire to preserve a semblance of European autonomy within the U.S.-dominated framework.
The legacy of this exchange is evident in the IAEA’s evolution. The United States retained the Director‑General post for several terms, and the agency’s governance model—balancing the Board of Governors (where the Big Five hold permanent seats) with broader member participation—remains a cornerstone of its operation. Moreover, the early recognition that “smaller European countries” could serve as a diplomatic bulwark against Soviet overtures foreshadowed the West’s later strategy of integrating non‑NATO states into multilateral institutions to dilute Soviet influence.
In sum, Vedeler’s confidential note and Wilcox’s reply provide a rare, unvarnished window into the calculus of Cold‑War nuclear diplomacy. They reveal how the United States, while achieving its immediate agenda, was already grappling with the longer‑term need to manage perception, build secondary alliances, and anticipate Soviet moves—all within the fragile architecture of a newly minted international organization.
5939 DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONFIDENTIAL OFFICIAL-INFORMAL OFFICE USE ONLY Vienna, Austria. November 19, 1957. 1957 POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE IAEA ORIGINAL FILES P.C. 1501-IAEA/11-1957 (316)
Dear Fran:
I owe you a frank assessment of the position of the United States and of other principal Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency as they appear now following the recent General Conference and meetings of the Board of Governors. I am sure that these observations will be supported generally by similar comments from Members of the United States Delegation who have returned to Washington. These views also reflect the substance of a draft confidential report which we sent from here last Friday for further consideration by the Delegation Members now in the Department.
- United States. The United States emerged from the Conference with its major objectives generally attained but it paid a price for this accomplishment. Some of the other Delegations felt that the United States had too large a list of objectives conceived in its own particular interest and that the United States pushed too vigorously for the achievement of these ends. The list included the appointment of an American Director General, agreement on total emolument of $40,000 for the Director General, the election of the head of the Austrian Delegation as President of the Conference, adoption of the basic organization chart presented by the United States, acceptance of the position of Special Adviser to the Director General and acceptance of the position of Special Consultant to the Director General. Furthermore, some of these items were agreed to by other Delegations when all the conditions were not known, such as the inability of the Director General to assume his duties until December and his absence from Vienna before the end of the General Conference and the meetings of the Board of Governors. The result was disgruntlement among some of the Delegations, which they took out on the Director General and the United States Delegation, and a sensitiveness about the relationship of the Director General and the Board of Governors. Some were never persuaded that all of
The Honorable Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, Department of State.
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our objectives were desirable in themselves and they only went along because of United States drive for them and because of their interest in preserving good relations with the United States. As a consequence, we suffered a certain loss in standing and influence in connection with the Agency among some of the other Members.
At the same time, however, we appreciated more than any of the other major participants the position of the smaller European countries who were not Members of the Board of Governors. We took account of their feelings of being shut out of the most vital and focal organ of the Agency, the Board of Governors, and were responsive to their desire for access to information on the work of the Board. The United States, accordingly, was able to maintain a good relationship with these countries which strongly defended positions taken by us and often turned to us for advice.
- The USSR. The Soviet Delegation played its part astutely. They were moderate in their political efforts and never pressed any political interest to a bitter fight. They agreed with us beforehand to avoid introducing the Chinese representation issue in the opening meeting, which was highly publicized, and they limited their propaganda references in the general debate to allusions to their disarmament proposals to ban the nuclear bomb and tests of nuclear weapons. When they did introduce the Chinese representation issue and opposed our efforts to obtain a vote to take no decision on the validity of Hungarian credentials, they submitted to defeat without pursuing either matter heatedly and spoke mainly for the record. They acquiesced in the appointment of an American for Director General and went along with our organization chart. They deliberately endeavored to appear cooperative and to contribute to a harmonious atmosphere. They thus gave the impression that they desired to see the Agency operate as an effectively functioning technical organization in which through active Soviet participation they might reflect credit upon the attainments of Soviet science. They tried to pick up credit with other Delegations by appearing reasonable and constructive in discussions and cloaking longer-range Soviet interests as we were obliged to work more directly in the attainment of immediate objectives. Their plans for staffing their Mission to the Agency as revealed in their conversation with Mr. McKinney of October 28 (Embtel 1522) indicate that they hope to take an effective part in the work of the Agency. They are planning to have a staff adequate to make technically sound proposals and to criticize those of other Delegations and of the Agency staff. The impression we have, therefore,
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is that they are seeking a position of major influence and possibly of leadership in the Agency's activities.
The question arises why, if this is the Soviet attitude, they did not make a larger offer of materials to the Agency. It is possible that, even though they may be interested in its success, they do not wish to commit themselves to any greater extent until they are certain what the future of the Agency is going to be.
- Other Members of the Big Five. British and French participation in the Conference and the Board of Governors was on the whole disappointing. They usually supported the positions of the United States but often after unnecessary difficulties. They opposed the interest of the smaller European countries in seeking a larger share in the Agency's activities. They thus for some time opposed the admission of observers from Member States to the Board of Governors and were undiplomatic in dealing with the Western European countries. They did not keep them adequately informed of the proceedings in the Board of Governors and sought to channel contacts with the United States, Canada, and the Latin American Delegations only through themselves. They also gave the impression that their interest in Euratom exceeded that in the Agency and admitted that their main efforts would be directed toward Euratom. The principal British representative, Mr. Michaels, although he did yeoman service for the United States in the Preparatory Commission in New York, did not cooperate too closely with us in the Conference itself and frequently irritated Members of the Conference and of the Board by his condescending remarks and by his impatient efforts to win others to the British point of view.
Canada proved our best friend and most effective proponent in our behalf at the Conference. Ambassador Wershof was a very forceful, effective participant who was always ready to come to our aid and who played a most constructive role in both the Conference and the Board.
- The Underdeveloped Countries. Of the Asian and African countries, India had the delegation of greatest ability, headed by Dr. Bhabha, its foremost nuclear scientist. Both he and Dr. Rajan, one of India's ablest Foreign Service officers, were exceedingly articulate and active spokesmen. Their ability and the quality of their participation indicated India's serious interest in the Agency and desire to see it flourish as an organization for dealing with atomic energy affairs in inter- national relations. India showed that it is interested not only
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in technical assistance benefits expected from the Agency but it is attracted by the Agency as a concept. At the same time the Indians felt some frustration in not being elected to any Conference office or obtaining support for any Indian in a second echelon staff position of the Agency. They expressed their feelings of frustration and sensitivity about the United States drive to achieve its own objectives by making polite but carefully directed thrusts in the Board meetings at proposals of the United States Delegation and at the position of the American Director General.
The Egyptian Delegation was likewise active but in a more aggressive way. Mr. Fahmy in the Board of Governors frequently supported the Soviet line against the United States, but sometimes departed from it or even opposed it or again cooperated with the United States Delegation. One was struck by the appearance that frequently he was not pursuing any particular interest of his Government but injecting his own individual views from his position as Chairman of the Administrative and Legal Committee and as a Member of the Board of Governors for the sake of indulging his vanity.
- Small European Countries. These States, such as The Netherlands and Norway,had not participated in the work of the Preparatory Commission and did not sit on the Board of Governors. They, consequently, felt that they were not participating fully in the activities of the Agency. Their discontent was increased by the fact that the Conference was organized so as to keep them idle and uninformed between the First Session and the Special Session when the Board of Governors was acting on the recommendations of the Preparatory Commission. The attitude of the United Kingdom and France added to their sense of non-participation and dissatisfaction. The result was to produce a rebellion on the part of these States which was expressed in the desire to open the closed meetings of the Board of Governors to the attendance of observers from the non-Board Members and to obtain reports on the work of the Board. In the end the Board yielded to this pressure and agreed on the attendance of observers and to the transmission to the non-Board Members of agenda of the Board meetings, of final summary records and monthly reports of actions taken. The attitude of the small States thus served to raise essentially an issue of the powers of the Board versus those of the General Conference. This general issue can be expected to arise again in various forms in the future, and a problem facing the United States is how to cope with this issue. If the United States does not continue to be attentive to these aspirations of the smaller States and join with other Board Members in actions which will go toward their realization, the interest of the small States
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in the Agency will likely wither. Already some of these Delegations are adopting a "wait-and-see" attitude and The Netherlands Delegation will see how the Agency develops before making further voluntary contributions and will probably not make any contribution to the fellowship program of the Agency during the first year.
Conclusions and Recommendations: The United States has so far exercised the principal leadership in the inception and genesis of the Agency. Many of the Members continue to expect this leadership particularly inasmuch as they are not technically qualified to make concrete proposals of their own and need to await the guidance of more technically developed countries. But as indicated above our standing and prestige in connection with the Agency suffered some losses during the recent Conference and meetings of the Board of Governors. It is believed, however, that this position can be repaired and extended if careful plans are laid and wisely followed for establishing our leadership and influence on a firm basis. It should be less difficult in the future to accomplish such a purpose, since the United States will not be obliged again to press for so many objectives at one time. Toward this end the following recommendations are made.
(1) Continuing manifestations of unreserved support of the Agency as a key United States policy. This is essential if we are to convince a number of Members who now adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude that the Agency has a future to which they can commit themselves.
(2) Sympathetic cultivation of the good will and responsiveness toward the United States of other Members. We should take a perceptive account of their sensitivities in reconciling their interests with our own. Every effort should be made to insure the maintenance of an active, consultative relationship with them based on a "give and take" exchange of views.
(3) Attentiveness to interests of the small European countries not Members of the Board. These States are anxious to cooperate with the United States if we continue to give careful consideration to their needs. It is believed that these States can make a solid contribution to the success of the Agency and, if we fail to insure their interest and active participation, the Agency will receive a blow at its very beginning.
(4) Thorough technical preparation for United States participation. The work of organization has now been largely accomplished and during the next year the activities of the General Conference and the Board of Governors should be increasingly devoted to
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technical projects. If the United States is to maintain its initiative and leadership in the Agency, it will be necessary for the United States Mission and Delegation to be prepared to present sound technical proposals, to review those of other Members before the Board and to work with the staff of the Agency in the development of technical projects and in the consideration of its proposals. Without such thorough technical preparation United States participation will suffer especially in comparison with what probably may be expected of the Soviets. As we have learned from conversations with the Soviet representatives here (Embtel 1522), the Soviets are planning to have an eventual staff that will include five to seven scientific members. They tell us that their initial staff will include five to seven officers and will have two scientists trained in nuclear fields. With such a staff they may be prepared to exploit any situation that opens and grasp the technical leadership should there be a default in the United States technical preparation.
(5) Maintenance of adequate staff for the United States Mission. The preceding statements lead naturally to a consideration of the needs for our own Mission staff. We have given very careful thought to these needs in the light of developments since the meeting of PRECO in Vienna. It seems to us that if we are to discharge our responsibilities adequately the staff within six months should consist of a senior technical adviser, a legal adviser and an executive officer in addition to Mr. McKinney and myself. It would be most helpful to have for the position indicated as legal adviser for want of a better designation Algie Wells, who is now on the legal staff of the AEC. His all-round background in the atomic energy field from his years of work with the AEC, his legal training, his knowledge of the developments of the Agency since the PRECO meetings in New York and his general usefulness as demonstrated by his work on the Delegation here would make him admirably suited to join our Mission staff.
The officer designated as executive officer would in reality be largely a second political officer and would need to give but little time to work of an administrative or executive nature. The officer to be most useful to the Mission should be not lower than FSO-3 in grade with an extensive background in international organization affairs.
This is a long letter but it gives the substance of our thought on the relation of the United States to the Agency to date, and I hope that it may be of some use to the Bureau in the consideration of IAEA problems.
Sincerely yours,
Harold C. Vedeler Harold C. Vedeler.
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- 2 - effort to establish and maintain the closest relationships to Mr. Cole. We all recognize that he is now an international civil servant and not a part of the Government of the United States. In my opinion, however, there are very wide limits within which we can quite properly communicate our ideas to him. I am sure that particularly in the early stages of his work in Vienna he will come to rely on our suggestions. We have consulted with him several times here in Washington and have talked quite directly on various problems, particularly the staffing of the Agency. I cannot say that he has accepted all — or even most — of our suggestions but he has certainly welcomed them and I am sure that they will have an influence on his thinking.
I was pleased to note your solicitude for the position of the smaller European countries who were not members of the Board of Governors. This attitude will not only pay dividends to the United States but will undoubtedly contribute to effective action on the part of future Boards, which I assume will include the smaller European countries more or less on a rotating basis.
The USSR. Your summary of the operations of the Soviet Delegation corresponds very much with the impression which I received from the reports of the Conference as it was progressing. We have thoroughly discussed with Bob McKinney probable Soviet intentions. Upon his return to Washington he wrote a letter to the Secretary, containing a summary of Soviet intentions and certain concrete recommendations for meeting the formidable Soviet competition for leadership in the Agency's affairs. In case you have not been furnished with a copy of Bob's letter to the Secretary and the Secretary's reply, I am enclosing copies herewith. We are particularly aware of the Soviet offer of fellowships, and are working here to develop a program which should be just as attractive as the Soviet proposition. Of this you will hear more in due course.
Other Members of the Big Five. We are worried about the attitudes of the British and French delegations at the Conference and are taking certain steps which we hope will improve the situation. One of these steps is to recommend that in appropriate bilateral discussions during the course of the December 16-18 NATO meeting the United States representative would point out the importance of appointing qualified high-level representatives on the Delegations at the IAEA in order to demonstrate that the host continues to feel that the Agency is important and worthy of active support. We are also contemplating that after agreement has been reached as to the size and composition of our Mission to the Agency, consultations might be held with the British and French Embassies here to inform them of our plans and urge them to recommend strengthening their respective missions in Vienna.
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We were pleased to have your acknowledgement of Canadian assistance during the Conference. I will take the next opportunity of expressing our appreciation to the Canadian Embassy here.
Underdeveloped Countries. I was most interested in your comments on the Indian participation in the Conference. We feel very definitely that through their serious interest in the Agency, the Indians should be considered for one of the second-level staff positions in the Agency. This matter was discussed with Mr. Cole on November 26 (I believe you already have a copy of the memorandum of this conversation). Mr. Cole's present ideas do not include a second-level place for India but run more in the direction of two third level positions. We stressed with Mr. Cole our feeling that some Asian -- and particularly Indian -- representation at the second-level was likely to be most important to the successful functioning of the Agency and I hope that he will come to agree with us on this matter. I would suggest that you take any opportunity which offers itself to press the subject with him.
Small European Countries. I would hope that the sensitivity of these countries toward their participation in the work of the Board of Governors may be largely overcome in time, as consultative procedures improve. I thoroughly agree with you that we must continue to be attentive to the aspirations of these states and I know that you and Bob McKinney, as well as the other members of the Mission, will make every effort to see that they are not forgotten. This kind of effort will, I am sure, repay us handsomely.
Your Conclusions and Recommendations.
(1) I certainly agree that it is essential that we show continuing manifestations of unreserved support of the Agency as a key United States policy. Apart from the contributions which the United States has already pledged, we hope that within the coming months we can come up with some concrete suggestions for the Agency's program that will very clearly prove our interest in its work.
(2) My view as to the necessity for sympathetic cultivation of the good-will and responsiveness toward the United States by other members of the Agency should already be apparent from the remarks I have made above.
(3) Also, as indicated above, I thoroughly appreciate your concern about the interests of the small European countries not members of the Board.
(4) We are giving much thought in the Department and the AEC to the development of technical projects, now that the
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initial work of organizing the Agency is well along. We expect that most of the technical work, both on the development of United States projects and the review of other members' proposals, will take place in Washington. We do have in mind, however, that it will undoubtedly be worthwhile to have a strong technical representation in the Mission in Vienna. For the time being this need can probably be supplied by the presence when needed of special technical consultants. Eventually, of course, we may want to have additional technical officers assigned to the Mission on a permanent basis. I understand that the AEC would oppose assigning any more than the contemplated two technical officers for the moment, out of fear that until the Agency program is well under way, they might have too little to do and thus become dissatisfied. As regards the possible Soviet competition, my feeling is that we will have no trouble in securing the persons and the means for meeting it effectively.
(5) We have considered your recommendations regarding the Mission staff and have reached agreement between S/AE, IO and the AEC that for the immediate future there might be a staff of four officers in addition to you and Bob McKinney. This would consist of one senior and one assistant technical adviser (Clyde McClelland), a legal adviser, and an assistant political adviser who could carry out the functions of an executive officer. Your nomination of Algie Wells for the Legal Adviser position is appreciated and I believe will be readily concurred in by all concerned.
May I take this opportunity to congratulate you on the very fine job you have been doing over there. The word that has come to me from people who have recently returned from Vienna has been most favorable indeed, and certainly entitles you to great credit.
Sincerely yours,
S/S-CR [illegible] signed DEC 9 1957 P.M.
Francis C. Wilcox Assistant Secretary
Enclosures: (2)
- Copy of letter from Robert McKinney to the Secretary dated 11/11/57
- Copy of Secretary's reply dated 11/21/57 [initials] IO:UNP:Howsley:sh 12/6/57
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