Cable, US Embassy Tokyo 1020 to Secretary of State, February 5, 1997, Subject: Climate Change: GOJ Largely Supportive of USG Protocol Proposal (Unclassified)
National Security Archive
A 1997 diplomatic cable shows Japan’s ministries split over U.S. emissions‑budget proposals, foreshadowing the market mechanisms that would later define Kyoto and Paris.
Source: Cable, US Embassy Tokyo 1020 to Secretary of State, February 5, 1997, Subject: Climate Change: GOJ Largely Supportive of USG Protocol Proposal (Unclassified) Date: Mar 3, 2015 Archive: Department of State FOIA Collection: The Clinton White House and Climate Change: The Struggle to Restore U.S. Leadership Dec 11, 2015
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
Japan’s Climate Calculus in 1997
The February 5, 1997 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo is a routine diplomatic dispatch, but its timing and content reveal the fraught choreography of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. In late 1996 the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) had convened a special session in The Hague to hammer out the details of a post‑Kyoto architecture. The United States, under President Clinton, was pushing a “flexible mechanisms” package that combined a multi‑year emissions budget, limited “banking” of surplus reductions, and a controversial “borrowing” provision that would let Annex I parties draw on future savings to meet near‑term targets. The cable records the first systematic briefing U.S. officials received from Japan’s three key climate ministries—Environment Agency (EA), Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)—and it shows how Japanese officials were simultaneously supportive, cautious, and divided.
The document’s opening summary makes clear that Japan’s government had not yet reached an inter‑agency consensus. The Environment Agency’s deputy director, Katsunori Suzuki, voiced strong backing for the U.S. emissions‑budget approach but warned against “borrowing” from later periods, fearing it would erode discipline and undermine credibility with developing nations. MITI’s deputy, Michihiro Kishimoto, is noted as still questioning the very idea of emissions trading, while MOFA’s global‑issues division signaled a willingness to compromise. This three‑pronged picture mirrors the broader Japanese bureaucratic landscape of the 1990s, where the EA tended to champion environmental stewardship, MITI guarded industrial competitiveness, and MOFA balanced diplomatic imperatives.
The Stakes of the “Joint Implementation” Debate
One of the cable’s most revealing passages concerns Japan’s opposition to a Joint Implementation (JI) scheme that would credit developing‑country projects without binding emission caps. Suzuki’s insistence that JI be limited to countries with caps underscores Japan’s concern that a lax crediting system could become a loophole for Annex I parties to meet their obligations on paper while continuing emissions growth elsewhere. This stance foreshadows Japan’s later push for a more stringent “clean development mechanism” (CDM) and its insistence that any market‑based tool retain a strong compliance backbone.
The cable also notes Japan’s “relatively simple per‑capita reduction option” as a strategic entry point for post‑Kyoto talks. By proposing a flat target measured per person, Japan hoped to sidestep the politically explosive issue of differentiated responsibilities that had long divided the North‑South divide. The document records Suzuki’s interest in the U.S. strategy of persuading Australia and the EU to back a flat target, indicating that Tokyo saw alignment with Washington as a way to shape the emerging architecture rather than be a passive recipient.
What the Dispatch Reveals About U.S.–Japan Climate Diplomacy
The cable is not a neutral report; it is an “action request” that signals Washington’s intent to use Japan’s tentative support as leverage in the broader UNFCCC negotiations. By cataloguing the reservations of each Japanese agency, the embassy equips senior State Department officials with the diplomatic ammunition needed to tailor overtures—offering concessions on “banking” limits or framing emissions trading as a pilot scheme, for instance. The explicit mention of “priority” tags for EPA, DOE, and the Science Collective indicates that the U.S. was coordinating a multi‑agency push to keep Japan engaged.
Crucially, the document shows that even as the United States championed market mechanisms, the Japanese bureaucracy was already wary of their political fallout. The fear that “borrowing” could invite developing‑country skepticism reflects a broader anxiety within the G‑77 that Annex I parties were seeking loopholes. Japan’s caution thus mirrors the larger tension between environmental ambition and economic pragmatism that defined the Kyoto process.
Legacy and Contemporary Relevance
The 1997 cable offers a snapshot of the diplomatic underpinnings that shaped the Kyoto Protocol’s final text, especially the eventual inclusion of limited banking and the abandonment of a full‑scale borrowing mechanism. Japan’s insistence on caps for any JI‑type crediting foreshadowed the later CDM safeguards and the rigorous accounting rules that now underpin the Paris Agreement’s Article 6. Moreover, the document’s depiction of inter‑agency fragmentation anticipates the contemporary Japanese policy architecture, where the Ministry of the Environment still negotiates with a powerful Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry over climate‑related market reforms.
For today’s readers, the cable underscores that climate diplomacy is as much about internal bureaucratic bargaining as it is about international summitry. The nuanced positions of Suzuki, Kishimoto, and their MOFA counterparts illustrate how a single nation’s internal debate can ripple through global agreements. Understanding these dynamics helps explain why the United States, after withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol, later found it necessary to re‑engage through more flexible, nationally determined contributions—a strategy that acknowledges the very reservations recorded in this 1997 dispatch.
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-40055 Doc No. C05509591 Date: 03/03/2015
PTQ0596
[RELEASED IN FULL]
UNCLASSIFIED PTQ0596
PAGE 01 TOKYO 01020 01 OF 03 050118Z ACTION OES-01
INFO LOG-00 ACDA-10 ACDE-00 AF-01 AGRE-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 CEA-01 CIAE-00 CIP-00 COME-00 CTME-00 OASY-00 DINT-00. DODE-00 ITCE-00 ANHR-01 SRPP-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EB-00 E-00 UTED-00 FRB-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 ITC-01 L-01 ADS-00 M-00 NASA-01 NAS-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 NSF-01 OIC-02 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 P-00 CIO-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 EPAE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 DRL-09 G-00 /035W ----------------96B0D8 050118Z /38 O 050118Z FEB 97 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2326 INFO AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE HQEPA WASHDC PRIORITY SCIENCE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY DOE WASHDC PRIORITY AMCONSUL NAHA AMCONSUL SAPPORO AMCONSUL FUKUOKA AMCONSUL NAGOYA AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 001020
UNCLASSIFIED
[REVIEW AUTHORITY: Alan Flanigan, Senior Reviewer]
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 TOKYO 01020 01 OF 03 050118Z NAIROBI (US UNEP PERM REP) FOR A/S CLAUSSEN STATE FOR OES/EGC, EAP/J, G-DHARWOOD EPA/OIA FOR STROTHER DOE FOR HASPEL, PO-2; BRADLEY, PO-63
E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SENV, PGOV, ENRG, JA
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-40055 Doc No. C05509591 Date: 03/03/2015
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-40055 Doc No. C05509591 Date: 03/03/2015
SUBJECT: CLIMATE CHANGE: GOJ LARGELY SUPPORTIVE OF USG PROTOCOL PROPOSAL
REF: (A) STATE 18963; (B) TOKYO 894
THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST -- SEE PARAS 17 AND 18.
SUMMARY: WHILE GOJ OFFICIALS HAVE YET TO REACH CONSENSUS ON THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON VARIOUS SUB-ISSUES, THEY GENERALLY FIND THEY CAN WORK WITH THE USG PROPOSED CLIMATE CHANGE PROTOCOL. EA SUPPORTS MUCH OF THE USG PROPOSAL, BUT HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT OUR PLAN FOR JOINT IMPLEMENTATION WITHOUT DEVELOPING COUNTRY EMISSION TARGETS AND OUR "BORROWING" PROPOSAL. MITI CONTINUES TO QUESTION THE CONCEPT OF EMISSIONS TRADING, BUT MAY BE SHOWING A MORE OPEN MIND ON THE MATTER. MOFA EMPHASIZES IT IS READY TO SEEK COMPROMISE WITH THE USG IN ORDER TO MOVE FORWARD TOGETHER IN CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY.
PER REFTEL A REQUEST, ESTOFF RECEIVED SEPARATE BRIEFINGS FEBRUARY 4 FROM ENVIRONMENT AGENCY OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY ON CLIMATE CHANGE DIRECTOR KATSUNORI SUZUKI, MITI GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS OFFICE DEPUTY DIRECTOR MICHIHIRO KISHIMOTO AND MOFA GLOBAL ISSUES DIVISION UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 03 TOKYO 01020 01 OF 03 050118Z ASSISTANT DIRECTOR MASAMI TAMURA.
INTERAGENCY DISCUSSIONS
- THESE THREE KEY AGENCIES ARE STILL WORKING TO REACH CONSENSUS ON VARIOUS ISSUES, INCLUDING EMISSIONS TRADING, JOINT IMPLEMENTATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRY COMMITMENTS. EA'S SUZUKI SAID THE GOJ PROTOCOL PROPOSAL, SUBMITTED AT THE DECEMBER AGBM SESSION, IS NOTABLY THIN ON DETAILS BECAUSE THE GOJ DID NOT AND HAS NOT REACHED INTERAGENCY CONSENSUS.
ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (EA)
- SUZUKI SAID EA SUPPORTS THE USG'S MULTI-YEAR EMISSIONS BUDGET APPROACH AND AGREES NEGOTIATORS MUST USE THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS TO DEVELOP THE FRAMEWORK AND PUT OFF DISCUSSION OF REDUCTION TARGETS.
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-40055 Doc No. C05509591 Date: 03/03/2015
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-40055 Doc No. C05509591 Date: 03/03/2015
- EMISSIONS BUDGET: SUZUKI SAID EA CAN ACCEPT "BANKING" CREDIT FOR REDUCTIONS IN PERIOD ONE FOR USE IN A LATER PERIOD, BUT HAS SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT "BORROWING" FROM A LATER PERIOD TO COVER AN EARLIER ONE. EA FEARS IT WILL ALLOW COUNTRIES TO BE UNDISCIPLINED AND MAY CAUSE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO QUESTION THE COMMITMENT OF ANNEX ONE COUNTRIES TO REDUCE EMISSIONS. IF A BORROWING MEASURE MOVES FORWARD, EA WOULD INSIST A MAXIMUM LIMIT BE SET.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 04 TOKYO 01020 01 OF 03 050118Z 7. JOINT IMPLEMENTATION: SUZUKI WAS MOST ADAMANT ABOUT EA'S OPPOSITION TO A JOINT IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM WHICH WOULD ALLOW FOR CREDITING FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WHICH DO NOT HAVE EMISSION TARGETS. SUZUKI SAID EA COULD SUPPORT A JI SCHEME AMONG COUNTRIES WITH EMISSION CAPS.
DIFFERENTIATION: SUZUKI SAID THE GOJ, CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROLIFERATION OF COMPLEX DIFFERENTIATED REDUCTION PROPOSALS, PRESENTED ITS RELATIVELY SIMPLE PER CAPITA REDUCTION OPTION AS A MEANS TO OPEN THE WAY FOR POST-KYOTO TALKS ON MORE COMPLEX DIFFERENTIATED TARGETS. SUZUKI SAID HE IS INTERESTED IN THE USG STRATEGY ON PERSUADING OTHERS, PARTICULARLY AUSTRALIA AND THE EU, TO SUPPORT A FLAT TARGET.
EMISSIONS TRADING: EA IS STILL FORMULATING ITS VIEW ON EMISSIONS TRADING, BUT SUZUKI BELIEVES A TRADING REGIME MAY CATCH ON IF THE PARTIES FIRST BEGIN WITH A SMALL-SCALE MECHANISM TO ALLOW SKEPTICAL PARTIES TO OBSERVE HOW ONE WOULD OPERATE.
DEVELOPING COUNTRY COMMITMENTS: EA AGREES, IN PRINCIPLE, WITH USG VIEWS IN THIS AREA, BUT THINKS THE USG POSITION MAY BE TOO STRONG. SUZUKI FEARS DISCUSSION ON ARTICLE 4.1 MATTERS COULD BECOME SO HEATED IT COULD BECOME AN OBSTACLE TO THE ENTIRE PROCESS. SUZUKI BELIEVES IF THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ASK FOR STRONG G-77 COMMITMENTS, THE G-
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-40055 Doc No. C05509591 Date: 03/03/2015
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-40055 Doc No. C05509591 Date: 03/03/2015
NNNNPTQ0597
UNCLASSIFIED PTQ0597
PAGE 01 TOKYO 01020 02 OF 03 050118Z ACTION OES-01
INFO LOG-00 ACDA-10 ACDE-00 AF-01 AGRE-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 CEA-01 CIAE-00 CIP-00 COME-00 CTME-00 OASY-00 DINT-00 DODE-00 ITCE-00 ANHR-01 SRPP-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EB-00 E-00 UTED-00 FRB-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 ITC-01 L-01 ADS-00 M-00 NASA-01 NAS-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 NSF-01 OIC-02 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 P-00 CIO-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 EPAE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 DRL-09 G-00 /035W ----------------96B0E1 050119Z /38 O 050118Z FEB 97 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2327 INFO AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE HQEPA WASHDC PRIORITY SCIENCE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY DOE WASHDC PRIORITY AMCONSUL NAHA AMCONSUL SAPPORO AMCONSUL FUKUOKA AMCONSUL NAGOYA AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 TOKYO 001020
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 TOKYO 01020 02 OF 03 050118Z NAIROBI (US UNEP PERM REP) FOR A/S CLAUSSEN STATE FOR OES/EGC, EAP/J, G-DHARWOOD EPA/OIA FOR STROTHER DOE FOR HASPEL, PO-2; BRADLEY, PO-63
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-40055 Doc No. C05509591 Date: 03/03/2015
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-40055 Doc No. C05509591 Date: 03/03/2015
E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SENV, PGOV, ENRG, JA SUBJECT: CLIMATE CHANGE: GOJ LARGELY SUPPORTIVE OF USG PROTOCOL PROPOSAL
77 WILL PRESS FOR INCREASED FINANCING THROUGH THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY. SUZUKI NOTES THE G-77 IS NOT FOCUSING MUCH ON THE FINANCING QUESTION NOW AND HE DOES NOT WISH TO STIR THE POT. FOR THAT REASON, THE GOJ IS CONSIDERING DOWN-PLAYING DEVELOPING COUNTRY COMMITMENTS.
- BASKET/NET APPROACH: EA, MITI AND MOFA ALL SAID THAT BECAUSE OF THE UNCERTAIN SCIENCE IN MEASURING SOME GASSES, THE GOJ OPPOSES THE BASKET APPROACH ON GREENHOUSE GAS (GHG) ACCOUNTING, PREFERRING GAS-BY-GAS ACCOUNTING. THE GOJ ALSO OPPOSES INCLUDING SINKS AS A WAY TO MEASURE AND CREDIT GHG REDUCTION, BECAUSE OF SIMILAR MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTIES. BECAUSE OF ITS LIMITED ARABLE LAND SPACE, JAPAN IS AT A DISADVANTAGE WHEN IT COMES TO REFORESTATION.
MITI
- KISHIMOTO SAID WHILE MITI IS STILL STUDYING THE SPECIFICS OF THE USG PROPOSAL, OVERALL IT WELCOMED OUR UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 03 TOKYO 01020 02 OF 03 050118Z "REALISTIC" APPROACH. MITI GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS DIRECTOR KAZUHITO SAKURAI WILL PROBABLY SHARE MITI VIEWS WITH US MORE THOROUGHLY AT THE FEBRUARY 7-8 ACAP MEETING IN SAN DIEGO. THAT SAID, KISHIMOTO REPEATED SOME OF THE POSITIONS WE HAVE HEARD FROM MITI BEFORE -- INSISTENCE ON DIFFERENTIATION AND RESERVATIONS OVER EMISSIONS TRADING.
- EA'S SUZUKI, HOWEVER, POINTED OUT THAT MITI MAY BE SHOWING GREATER FLEXIBILITY ON EMISSIONS TRADING. AT A RECENT MITI/IPCC-SPONSORED CONFERENCE IN TOKYO (REFTEL B), MITI DEPUTY DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS YUKIO ISHIUMI SAID EMISSIONS TRADING WAS AN "INTERESTING" IDEA, WHICH WAS NOT WELL UNDERSTOOD, PARTICULARLY AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
MOFA
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-40055 Doc No. C05509591 Date: 03/03/2015
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-40055 Doc No. C05509591 Date: 03/03/2015
WHILE SECURING A TANGIBLE AGREEMENT WITH A POSITIVE AND EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT IS IMPORTANT, "GETTING RESULTS" IS THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE FOR MOFA ON THE CLIMATE CHANGE TALKS, ACCORDING TO TAMURA. FOR ITS PART, MOFA HAS FEW PROBLEMS WITH THE USG PROPOSAL AND WISHES TO MOVE FORWARD TOGETHER IN CLIMATE TALKS. TAMURA ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, MITI AND EA MAY NOT BE AT THIS STAGE YET.
EMISSIONS TRADING: TAMURA SAID A KEY HURDLE FOR THE GOJ IS ITS UNFAMILIARITY WITH EMISSIONS TRADING -- PARTICULARLY HOW JAPAN WOULD IMPLEMENT SUCH A MECHANISM DOMESTICALLY. ESTOFF SUGGESTED THE USG COULD INVITE GOJ OFFICIALS TO VISIT UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 04 TOKYO 01020 02 OF 03 050118Z THE UNITED STATES TO OBSERVE HOW THE ACID RAIN EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM OPERATES AND TO MEET WITH OFFICIALS WORKING ON THE SYSTEM. TAMURA WILL SUGGEST TO THE JAPANESE EMBASSY THAT IT WORK WITH WASHINGTON AGENCIES TO SET UP SUCH A PROGRAM FOR MOFA SPECIAL AMBASSADOR FOR THE ENVIRONMENT TOSHIAKI TANABE, WHO WILL BE IN WASHINGTON AND CHICAGO FROM MARCH 11-13, FOLLOWING THE AGBM MEETING. (NOTE: TANABE WAS JAPAN'S COUNSEL-GENERAL IN CHICAGO FROM 1992-1994. END NOTE).
- DEVELOPING COUNTRY COMMITMENTS: TAMURA NOTED THE USG PROPOSALS ON JOINT IMPLEMENTATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRY COMMITMENTS WERE THE STRONGEST OF THOSE PROPOSED THUS FAR. AS HOST TO COP-3, MOFA IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY OF BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN THE USG PROPOSAL AND LIKELY DEVELOPING COUNTRY OPPOSITION.
ACTION REQUESTS
- EMBASSY SUGGESTS DEPARTMENT COORDINATE WITH THE JAPANESE EMBASSY AND WASHINGTON AGENCIES TO INCLUDE BRIEFINGS ON THE ACID RAIN TRADING SYSTEM FOR AMBASSADOR TANABE DURING HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. A VISIT TO THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, WHERE ACID RAIN EMISSION CREDITS
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-40055 Doc No. C05509591 Date: 03/03/2015
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-40055 Doc No. C05509591 Date: 03/03/2015
NNNNPTQ0598
UNCLASSIFIED PTQ0598
PAGE 01 TOKYO 01020 03 OF 03 050119Z ACTION OES-01
INFO LOG-00 ACDA-10 ACDE-00 AF-01 AGRE-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 CEA-01 CIAE-00 CIP-00 COME-00 CTME-00 OASY-00 DINT-00 DODE-00 ITCE-00 ANHR-01 SRPP-00 DS-00 EAP-01 EB-00 E-00 UTED-00 FRB-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 ITC-01 L-01 ADS-00 M-00 NASA-01 NAS-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 NSF-01 OIC-02 OMB-01 OPIC-01 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 P-00 CIO-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 STR-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 EPAE-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 DRL-09 G-00 /035W ----------------96B0E5 050119Z/38 O 050118Z FEB 97 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2328 INFO AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE HQEPA WASHDC PRIORITY SCIENCE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY DOE WASHDC PRIORITY AMCONSUL NAHA AMCONSUL SAPPORO AMCONSUL FUKUOKA AMCONSUL NAGOYA AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 TOKYO 001020
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 02 TOKYO 01020 03 OF 03 050119Z NAIROBI (US UNEP PERM REP) FOR A/S CLAUSSEN
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-40055 Doc No. C05509591 Date: 03/03/2015
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-40055 Doc No. C05509591 Date: 03/03/2015
STATE FOR OES/EGC, EAP/J, G-DHARWOOD EPA/OIA FOR STROTHER DOE FOR HASPEL, PO-2; BRADLEY, PO-63
E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SENV, PGOV, ENRG, JA SUBJECT: CLIMATE CHANGE: GOJ LARGELY SUPPORTIVE OF USG PROTOCOL PROPOSAL
ARE TRADED, COULD BE ESPECIALLY VALUABLE.
- EMBASSY REQUESTS DEPARTMENT RESPONSE TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FROM EA'S SUZUKI REGARDING THE USG PROPOSAL.
-- ARTICLE 2.3.A.: COULD THE ALLOWABLE PERCENTAGE EXCEED 100 PERCENT?
-- ARTICLE 2.4: COULD EACH ANNEX B COUNTRY HAVE DIFFERENTIATED COMMITMENTS (I.E. ANNEX B1, ANNEX B2, ETC. RESPONSIBILITIES)?
-- WHAT IS THE USG VIEW ON THE AUSTRALIA PROPOSAL?
-- DID THE USG PURPOSEFULLY EXCLUDE ANY MENTION OF POLICY AND MEASURES IN ITS PROPOSAL?
END ACTION REQUEST. DEMING
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 03 TOKYO 01020 03 OF 03 050119Z
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-40055 Doc No. C05509591 Date: 03/03/2015
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-40055 Doc No. C05509591 Date: 03/03/2015
UNCLASSIFIED
NNNN
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2012-40055 Doc No. C05509591 Date: 03/03/2015