Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "CINCEUR/SACEUR 1959 Atomic Weapons Requirements Studies, Reference: J.C.S. 1823/256," 1823/281, 3 July 1956, Top Secret

Source: Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "CINCEUR/SACEUR 1959 Atomic Weapons Requirements Studies, Reference: J.C.S. 1823/256," 1823/281, 3 July 1956, Top Secret Date: Jul 3, 1956 Collection: U.S. Cold War Nuclear Target Lists Declassified for First Time Dec 22, 2015

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Editorial Analysis

Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.

Atomic Planning on the Eve of the 1959 NATO Nuclear Posture

The note dated 3 July 1956 is a bureaucratic waypoint that reveals how the United States calibrated its nuclear commitments to Europe during the height of the Cold War. It was not a public policy statement but an internal memorandum from the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff directing the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to review the “CINCEUR/SACEUR 1959 Atomic Weapons Requirement Study.” The study itself, prepared for the commander of U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), was a response to a February 1956 directive (SM‑129‑56) that asked each major command to project its atomic weapon needs for 1959. The July note therefore sits at the intersection of two urgent pressures: the rapid expansion of the Soviet strategic arsenal and the NATO alliance’s demand for credible deterrence on the continent.

The document’s immediate purpose was procedural. It attached a letter from General Alfred M. Gruenther, the U.S. Army commander in Europe, and instructed the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to deliver a report by 8 August 1956. The urgency—“as a matter of priority”—signals that Washington was racing to integrate the upcoming 1959 requirements into the broader NATO nuclear planning cycle, which was being reshaped by the 1957‑58 “dual‑track” negotiations on the European Defence Community and the subsequent 1958 NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) reforms.

The Strategic Context of 1956‑59

By mid‑1956 the Soviet Union had fielded a credible intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force and was expanding its medium‑range missile deployments in Eastern Europe. The United States, meanwhile, was transitioning from the first‑generation fission bombs to thermonuclear weapons, and the Army, Air Force, and Navy were each lobbying for a share of the limited “oralloy” (high‑explosive) production ceiling. The note references two distinct parts of the study: Part I, which lists required targets without regard to production caps, and Part II, which translates those targets into a feasible stockpile under the Joint Chiefs’ alloy ceiling. This bifurcation shows the tension between strategic ambition (covering every “ground zero” with a weapon) and logistical reality (limited fissile material and delivery platforms).

The memorandum also notes a “command coordination conference” that resolved duplications among European, Atlantic, and Pacific commands, except for certain forward airfields and ports. This reflects the early stages of NATO’s “shared nuclear burden” discussions, where the United States sought to avoid redundant targeting while preserving control over key logistics nodes that were vital to both U.S. and allied forces.

What the Language Reveals

The phrasing “not a measure of the atomic weapons requirement for this command” is a diplomatic way of saying that the listed stockpile was a minimum force structure, not a full accounting of what the theater might need in a full‑scale war. The memo stresses “flexibility” and “reserve” capabilities, hinting at concerns that a single‑weapon‑per‑target model would be brittle if any weapon failed or if Soviet defenses proved more robust than anticipated. The inclusion of a two‑officer briefing team underscores the expectation that senior NATO planners would scrutinize the study in person, suggesting that the document was intended to feed directly into the nascent NPG’s deliberations.

The distribution list is a who's‑who of senior military leadership: the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (Adm. Radford), the Army Chief of Staff (Gen. Taylor), the Chief of Naval Operations (Adm. Burke), and the Air Force Chief (Gen. Twining), among others. Their presence indicates that the study’s conclusions would have immediate implications for service‑level force allocation, procurement priorities, and the allocation of delivery systems such as the Air‑Force B‑47 Stratojet, the Army’s Pershing missile project, and the Navy’s submarine‑launched ballistic missiles that were still in development.

Legacy and Contemporary Relevance

Although the note itself is a routine administrative memo, its existence confirms that by 1956 the United States was already conducting forward‑looking, theater‑specific nuclear requirement studies for 1959—three years ahead of the target year. This foresight helped shape the 1958 NATO Nuclear Planning Group’s first comprehensive nuclear force allocation, which later evolved into the “dual‑track” approach that balanced conventional and nuclear forces in Europe.

For historians, the memo is a concrete illustration of how the Cold War’s strategic calculus was translated into paper trails, revealing the interplay between high‑level policy (the SM‑129‑56 directive) and the nitty‑gritty of target selection, alloy ceilings, and inter‑command coordination. It also shows the early institutionalization of what would become the NATO nuclear sharing regime, a structure that still underpins transatlantic security today.

In short, this July 1956 note is a window onto the meticulous, often hidden, planning that underwrote the visible posturing of nuclear deterrence during the late 1950s. Its procedural tone belies the strategic stakes it helped define: a credible, flexible atomic arsenal for Europe that could deter Soviet aggression while accommodating the practical limits of production and delivery.

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