Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Atomic Weapons Requirements Studies for 1959, JCS 1823/262, 15 March 1956, Confidential

Source: Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Atomic Weapons Requirements Studies for 1959, JCS 1823/262, 15 March 1956, Confidential Date: Mar 15, 1956 Collection: U.S. Cold War Nuclear Target Lists Declassified for First Time Dec 22, 2015

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Editorial Analysis

Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.

A Bureaucratic Tug‑of‑War Over the 1959 Nuclear Arsenal

The note dated 15 March 1956 is a routine‑looking memorandum, but it opens a window onto the internal frictions that shaped the United States’ nuclear posture at the height of the Cold War. Drafted by the secretaries of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it records the Joint Chiefs’ approval of a recommendation from the Air Force chief of staff to extend the deadline for the 1959 atomic‑weapon requirements studies. The underlying issue was not merely a calendar slip; it reflected a clash between the strategic services, which were eager to secure larger, more sophisticated arsenals, and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), whose production schedules and budget constraints demanded predictability.

The immediate circumstance was a series of memoranda—DM‑13‑56, SM‑129‑56, and SM‑212‑56—that set a “suspense date” of 1 May 1956 for the unified combatant commanders (CINCs) to submit their 1959 weapon requirements. The Air Force chief of staff, in a memorandum dated 13 March, argued that the five‑month window previously granted for the 1958 studies had already been stretched by a month, and that the new 1959 studies, far more detailed, were being squeezed into a two‑month period. He highlighted that the same data were needed for the atomic annexes due 30 September 1956, creating a duplication of effort that could only be resolved by granting extra time.

The Broader Strategic Context

The memo sits squarely in the “Arsenal Expansion” phase of the Eisenhower administration, when the United States was moving from the modest stockpiles of the early 1950s to the massive, diversified force that would define the late‑Cold‑War deterrent. The 1956‑57 period saw the first deployment of thermonuclear weapons, the rollout of the Minuteman I ICBM, and the planning of the “New Look” strategy that emphasized nuclear weapons as the primary means of containing the Soviet Union. Within this framework, the 1959 requirements studies were not academic exercises; they were the data‑driving force behind the AEC’s production plans, the Air Force’s bomber and missile procurements, and the Navy’s emerging submarine‑launched ballistic missile (SLBM) program.

The memo’s recommendation to limit the July 1956 guidance to the AEC to “technical changes” while postponing the substantive stock‑pile composition revisions until September underscores a pragmatic compromise. It allowed the AEC to continue its budgeting and plant‑capacity planning without being blindsided by a flood of new requirement data, while giving the services the breathing room to produce a more realistic assessment of future needs.

Actors and Their Signals

The signatories—Richard H. Phillips and R. D. Wentworth—were senior secretaries of the Joint Secretariat, acting as the conduit between the services and the Joint Chiefs. Their endorsement signals that the Joint Chiefs, after a brief meeting on 13 March, were willing to accommodate the services’ plea. The memorandum repeatedly cites the requests of five combatant commanders (CINCFE, CINCPAC, CINCSAC, CINCLANT, CINCAL), indicating that the pressure came from across the strategic spectrum—from Europe to the Pacific, from the Atlantic to the Alaskan theater. Their collective request for a July deadline suggests a coordinated recognition that the existing schedule was untenable.

What the document does not say, but which the subtext reveals, is the underlying competition for resources. By pushing the deadline, the services were buying time to incorporate emerging technologies—such as the B‑61 bomb or the Polaris missile—into their forecasts, thereby justifying larger allocations from the AEC. The AEC, meanwhile, was constrained by congressional appropriations and the need to avoid production bottlenecks. The compromise reflects a delicate balancing act: the military’s desire for a robust, future‑proof arsenal versus the civilian agency’s mandate for fiscal and technical prudence.

Why It Still Matters

The note exemplifies how nuclear policy was forged not only in high‑level strategy rooms but also in the minutiae of inter‑agency scheduling. The very shape of the U.S. nuclear stockpile in the late 1950s—and consequently the credibility of deterrence during the Cuban Missile Crisis and beyond—was contingent on such procedural adjustments. Moreover, the document foreshadows later debates over “budget‑ary” versus “capability‑ary” priorities that resurfaced during the 1970s SALT negotiations and the 1980s Strategic Defense Initiative.

Understanding this bureaucratic negotiation enriches our comprehension of Cold‑War nuclear escalation. It reminds us that the massive arsenals that defined the era were as much the product of paperwork, deadline extensions, and inter‑service lobbying as of technological breakthroughs. The declassification of this note in 1977, and its recent public release, provides scholars with a concrete illustration of the administrative machinery that underpinned one of the most consequential periods of American security policy.

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