Title page, table of Contents and introduction.
National Security Archive
The 1959 Atomic Weapon Requirements Study lays out SAC’s two‑phase strike plan, exposing Cold War anxieties about time‑compressed nuclear decision‑making.
Source: Title page, table of Contents and introduction. Date: Jun 15, 1956 Collection: U.S. Cold War Nuclear Target Lists Declassified for First Time Dec 22, 2015
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
Atomic Weapon Requirements Study, 1959: A Window into Cold War Target Planning
The declassified “Atomic Weapon Requirements Study for 1959” is a bureaucratic artifact that reveals how the United States translated strategic anxieties into concrete targeting tables during the height of the nuclear arms race. Issued by the Strategic Air Command (SAC) under the authority of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive SK 129‑56 (February 1956) and a March 1956 JCS message, the study was prepared in mid‑1958 and circulated in twenty‑two copies to senior planners. Its purpose was to enumerate every atomic weapon the Air Force would need to execute a two‑phase strategic air campaign against the Soviet bloc in a full‑scale nuclear war.
The document emerged at a moment when the Eisenhower administration was wrestling with two contradictory pressures. On the one hand, the Soviet Union had demonstrated a credible intercontinental bomber capability and was accelerating its own nuclear arsenal; on the other, the United States was beginning to rely more heavily on the nascent ICBM force and on the doctrine of “massive retaliation.” Within this strategic cross‑currents, SAC’s leadership—embodied by Colonel Robert N. Smith, Director of Intelligence—sought to codify a “win‑the‑air‑power‑battle” first‑strike plan that would cripple Soviet air forces, airfields, and nuclear stockpiles before any retaliatory strike could be launched.
From Doctrine to Target Lists
The study’s table of contents reads like a blueprint for a massive, pre‑emptive bombing campaign. Sections on “Mission and Tasks,” “Targeting,” and “Target Selection” lay out a hierarchy: first, destroy Soviet air power (BRAVO, ROMEO, DELTA objectives), then systematically dismantle the broader war‑making capacity of the USSR and its satellites. The language is stark—“win the Air Power Battle by Destroying SovBloc Air Power,” followed by a list that includes “Atomic forces, Defense forces, Tactical forces, air bases, launching sites, depots, atomic stockpile sites, military and government control centers, and air‑industry resources.” This reflects a doctrinal shift from the earlier, more limited “counterforce” focus to a broader “countervalue” approach that blended military and economic targets.
What the study does not say outright, but which can be read between the lines, is the urgency imposed by a compressed decision‑making timeline. The introduction stresses a “greatly compressed time factor” that would affect the attainment of the three basic objectives. This mirrors contemporary concerns about Soviet missile‑flight times and the need for a rapid, overwhelming first strike. The inclusion of detailed sections on weapon selection, fuzing data, height of burst, and multiple‑weapon configurations shows that planners were already wrestling with the technical challenges of delivering a coordinated, high‑yield strike across thousands of targets.
Actors and Institutional Voice
Colonel Robert N. Smith’s signature anchors the document in the intelligence community, suggesting that the target list was derived from the best available Soviet order‑of‑battle assessments. The study’s reliance on JCS directives underscores its top‑down nature; it was not a product of field commanders but of a centralized strategic planning apparatus. The repeated use of the term “SovBloc” instead of “Soviet Union” reflects the era’s view of the USSR as a monolithic bloc, encompassing satellite states and even Communist China—a hint at the geopolitical breadth of the intended campaign.
The granular breakdown of “Unrestricted Allocation” versus “Restricted Allocation” (the latter limited to 1,209 DGZ’s, a code for weapon groups) reveals internal debates about how many weapons could be openly assigned to specific targets versus held in reserve for contingencies. This compartmentalization points to an awareness of both operational security and the need for flexibility in the face of uncertain Soviet defenses.
Legacy and Contemporary Relevance
The study is a rare, concrete illustration of how Cold War strategists operationalized the abstract doctrine of deterrence. It shows that deterrence was not merely a rhetorical stance but a detailed, weaponized plan that counted on the ability to execute a massive, coordinated strike within minutes. The document’s declassification in 2015 allows historians to trace the evolution of U.S. nuclear targeting from the early “massive retaliation” era to the later “counterforce” emphasis of the 1970s.
Understanding this study helps explain why later arms‑control negotiations, such as the 1972 SALT I treaty, focused heavily on limiting the number of strategic delivery systems and on verification mechanisms: both sides recognized that the sheer scale of these target lists made accidental or unauthorized use a catastrophic risk. Moreover, the study’s emphasis on rapid decision‑making foreshadows contemporary concerns about “launch‑on‑warning” postures and the narrowing of crisis decision windows.
In sum, the 1959 Atomic Weapon Requirements Study is more than a bureaucratic inventory; it is a snapshot of the United States’ strategic mindset at a pivotal moment in the Cold War, revealing how doctrinal imperatives, technical constraints, and geopolitical anxieties coalesced into a detailed plan to annihilate an adversary’s air power and, ultimately, its capacity to wage war.
DECLASSIFIED Authority 27386. SHL ATOMIC WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS STUDY FOR 1959.....SM 129-58 15 JUNE 1958 NWH: 27386 DocId: 32003785 TOP SECRET Declassified Authority: 27386 By: Laurie Madsen Date: 06-26-2014
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STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND (U) ATOMIC WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS STUDY FOR 1959 (SU 129-56)
THIS DOCUMENT IS CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 30a(2)(3), AFR 205-1.
[Robert N. Smith] ROBERT N. SMITH Colonel, USAF Director of Intelligence
This page is not included in the page count of basic document.
Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited without the permission of the office of origin.
THIS document consists of [illegible] Copy No 29
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page I - INTRODUCTION
- Authority 1
- SAC Concept 1 a. Mission and Tasks 1 b. Targeting 1 c. Target Selection 2
- Scope of Target System and Justification of Targeting 2 a. Scope 2
- Part I 2
- Part II 3 b. Justification 3 (1) SAC Targets 3 (2) Duplicated Targets 3
- Factors 3 a. Force Structure 3 b. Operational Factors 4 c. CEP 5 d. Reserves 6
- Weapons 6 a. Selection 6 b. Application 6 c. Damage Criteria 7
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Page d. Fuzing Data 7 e. Height of Burst 7 f. Multiple Weapons 8 g. Missiles 8 h. Alternate Weapons 8 i. Weapon Requirement 9 Part I - Section 1 - Actual DGZ's 10 Part I - Section 2 - Reserve DGZ's 11 Part II - Desired Composition of SAC Stockpile 12 Part II - Actual and Reserve DGZ's 14 6. Format 15 a. General 15 b. Description of Listings (Cross-Reference, Category Code, etc.) 15 II - PART I - UNRESTRICTED ALLOCATION
- Cross-Reference List (Same for Part II, below) 17
- Category Code List (Same for Part II, below) 154
- Airfield List, with Weapons 158
- Complex List, with Weapons 200 III - PART II - RESTRICTED ALLOCATION (1209 DGZ's)
- Airfield List, with Weapons 505
- Complex List, with Weapons 547 IV - TABULAR PRESENTATIONS (as outlined in Annex "C", Appendix, SN 129-56)
- Part I - Atomic Weapon Requirements and Summary 836
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Page 2. Part II - Desired Stockpile Composition 840 3. Part I - Telescoped Summary 844 4. Part II - Telescoped Summary 845
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I. INTRODUCTION
- Authority. This "Atomic Weapon Requirement Study" for 1959 (in 22 copies) is submitted pursuant to JCS Directive SK 129-56, dated 15 February 1956 and JCS Message 995995, 121849 March 1956.
- SAC Concept. a. Mission and Tasks. In the event of general war, the mission of the Strategic Air Command is to conduct global strategic air warfare in support of US national and military objectives utilizing atomic and nuclear weapons. In view of the growing Soviet threat to the US and its Allies, as well as the increasing Soviet capability to launch an airstrike offensive against them, the accomplishment of the SAC mission must be realized through the execution of the following tasks, in the order indicated. (1) Win the Air Power Battle by Destroying SovBloc Air Power. (2) Destroy Systematically SovBloc War-Supporting Resources. b. Targeting. As currently defined by the JCS, strategic air warfare includes, among others, the BRAVO, ROMEO and DELTA objectives. These objectives are basic and valid. However, they influence the selection of targets to the extent that one might infer a compartmented and sequential approach toward targeting. In view of the rapid, ever-increasing Soviet threat and capability to wage atomic warfare against the UNITED STATES, a re-orientation in thinking and planning is required, particularly in terms of the greatly compressed time factor which vitally affects the attainment of these three basic objectives. The SAC targeting philosophy for the Air Power Battle, recognizing this compression in time, encompasses all targets that support directly the enemy's Air Power capability, i. e.: (1) SovBloc Air Forces in being on the ground, and if possible, in the air, including: (a) Atomic forces. (b) Defense forces. (c) Tactical forces. (2) SovBloc air bases, launching sites and depots. (3) Atomic stockpile sites. (4) Military and government control centers. (5) SovBloc air industry and resources that directly support the enemy's air capability. It will be noted that all three of the basic objectives - ROMEO, BRAVO and certain elements of DELTA - included in these Air Power Battle Categories. Once the Air Power Battle has been won, then and only then can the emphasis be shifted to the second objective - Systematic Destruction of the remaining SovBloc War-making potential. This is accomplished by attacking a selected series of the remaining DELTA targets and target complexes which contribute most to the enemy's war-making capability and industries to the greatest degree his ability or will to wage war. It is here that the enemy's basic industries are brought [illegible]
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attack, and the final blows are brought to bear against his economic base and his remaining government structure, with attendant physical, sociological and psychological effects.
c. Target Selection. The SAC Concept of targeting establishes the general priorities of selected targets within the system. In the Air Power phase of the campaign, all important airfields or launching sites and all other air power categories of targets are brought under direct attack. Those targets or target complexes that do not have a direct bearing on the Destruction of Soviet Air Power objective are part of the Systematic Destruction objective. The importance of the latter is not minimized, although emphasis on it is only secondary during the opening phases of the war.
In consonance with the general precedence established by the tasks enumerated above, the considerations governing the selection of targets and further refinement of their importance are based on the following criteria:
(1) Nullification of USSR-Communist CHINA targets responsive to the task of destroying the enemy's air power.
(2) Nomination of targets in the Soviet Satellites, that are responsive to the task cited above.
(3) Nomination of USSR-Communist CHINA targets responsive to the task of systematic destruction of the enemy's war-making potential. These targets are those that are basic to the functioning of the enemy's economy and industry.
(4) Nomination of targets in the Soviet-Satellite areas, that are responsive to the task mentioned in the preceding sub-paragraph.
The priorities within each of these groups vary according to the latest intelligence data. However, current war plans of this command reflect current priorities for attack, in consonance with the basic SAC mission, concept and priority groupings mentioned above.
Within the scope of the targeting philosophy outlined above, this command's grouping of targets differs from the divisions listed in paragraph 9 of the Appendix to SM-129-56. This is based primarily on the consideration that the most important task for the 1959 conflict -the winning of the Air Power Battle- encompasses many categories of targets other than aircraft and airfields. For example, key control centers, atomic stockpile sites, POL storage sites, and air depots are all considered to fall in the priority category of air power battle targets.
For the purpose of this study, however, the SAC target system has been broken out in the tabular presentations according to the target divisions listed in paragraph 9 of SM-129-56. This breakdown was impossible in the target listings, due to their unwieldy size as well as to SAC limitations; however, a category code listing has been included, by means of which the category of any target in question may be readily determined.
- Scope of Target System and Justification of Targets.
a. Scope. The target system presented in this study is in line with previous SAC estimates and within the bounds of the size of the target system anticipated by AIE 10-2 (proportioned from 1961).
FOR PART I of this study:
(1) AIS 10-2 estimates (1959):
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4500 target areas 5575 targets, of which 1802 are GRAVC, 438 DECRA
(2) SAC Target System
2345 DZG's (actual) 1255 DZG's (on basis of projected intelligence) 3600 DZG's total
The SAC system allows for SAM sites, radar sites (which are not included in AIS 10-2), and on-call targets, as well as some NORAD targets from the AIS 10-2 system. A breakdown of the Part I target system and DZG's appears on page 10-11.
FOR PART II of this study: [TOTAL(S) (S) - 44 ISC 2.42.41 - RD A breakdown of the Part II target system and DZG's appears on page 12.]
b. Justification.
(1) SAC Targets. All targets, the nature of which may be described by any of the Category Codes listed on page 104, and which are responsive to either of the two tasks cited in paragraph 2a, above, are included in this study and constitute the SAC target system.
The great majority of targets will be programmed for strike by SAC in accordance with mission objectives and operational considerations. Most of these targets lie in areas accessible only to SAC. Additionally, other targets may be struck by SAC for another commander whose delivery capability during the time period may not be adequate in terms of range.
Justification of each individual target is based on its priority number; this, in turn, tempered by some operational considerations, determines the type of weapon applied. It is to be noted that some low-priority targets have weapons allocated to them only because of the expressed desire of other commands.
(2) Duplicated Targets. During coordination of this study with the other JCS unified and specified commands, it was mutually agreed by all the command representatives that some duplication of effort on high priority Air Power Battle targets would be both desirable and necessary. Such duplication increases the assurance that the target will be destroyed if one command is unable to strike or if the degree of damage on the first strike is less than expected. Every effort was made during the coordination conference to keep such duplications at a minimum and to restrict them to high priority air power battle targets. These duplications are clearly indicated in the target lists, and it will be noted that they are largely confined to high priority airfields.
- Factors.
a. Force Structure. Size and composition of the force considered for 1 July 1959 is in accordance with the Joint Mid-Range War Plan for 1 July 1957 (JCS 344/56), as revised by data included in JCS 58/59-2 of 15 February 1956. Although there have been recent further revisions to this force structure, these revisions will not materially change the general requirements of this study. The force consists of:
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AIRCRAFT TYPE NUMBER B-47 1260 RB-47 225 B-52 695 F-101 150 Sub-Total 2130
MISSILES SNARK 64 REGULUS 60 CRUISE 72 IREM* 182 Sub-Total 378 TOTAL 2508
*Although the IREM is not included in SN 344-56 or WIR 58/59-2, it has been assigned to SAC on a priority basis since the publication of these documents, and will be available in the time period of this study.
b. Operational factors. Those factors are based on a close analysis of aircraft performance reliability over a period of time, validity and accuracy of target intelligence, vulnerability, weapon yield, and certain assumptions concerning date, attrition, aborts and reliability (missiles). Judgment based on these data and experience led to the following factors:
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OPERATIONAL FACTORS
(1) For BRL Computations
| AIRCRAFT | MISSILES | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| POINT TARGET | AREA TARGET | CROSSBOW | |
| Weapon Yield and CEP |
PG1A7(b)-(3) - .52 USC 2154(a)(1)(C) - FRD
(2) For Total Requirement Computations
| AIRCRAFT | MISSILES | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| CROSSBOW | RASCAL | ||
| Gross Error | |||
| Duds | |||
| Pre-Target Attrition | |||
| Aborts | |||
| Reliability | |||
| Base Loss | |||
| Average Factor |
PG1A7(b)-(3) - 62 USC 2154(a)(1)(C) - FRD
*Based on performance similar to B-47.
c. CEP. (1) Manned Bombers: 3000' All-weather (2) Fighter : 600' Visual (3) CROSSBOW : 580' (4) RASCAL : 2 NM
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(5) IRBM : 2 NM (6) SNARK : 2 NM
d. Reserves. This command maintains no "reserve" weapons purely as such. The reserve weapon requirement shown in this study (see pages 11-14) is for actual programming against "Projected DZ's" which cannot be programmed today. In this category, some DZ's are projections based on intelligence estimates, while others are currently existing DZ's which are not yet precisely located. Neither in Part I nor in Part II are specific reserve weapons assigned to specific targets or aims places.
- Weapons
a. Selection. The following stockpile configuration is compatible with the force structure envisaged for 1959 on the basis of information in Annex "B" to Appendix of SI 129-56 and WPR 58/59 (Joint Mid-Range War Plan - 1957):
| WEAPON | B-47 | RB-47 | B-52 | F-101 | SNARK | MATADOR | CROSSBOW | IRBM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MK 6 B | X | (X) | ||||||
| MK 6 C | X | (X) | ||||||
| MK 28 | X | X | ||||||
| MK 27 | X | (X) | (X) | (X) | X | |||
| MK 15 | X | (X) | X | |||||
| MK 36 | (X) | X | ||||||
| W-35 | X | |||||||
| W-37 | X |
X = Primary Carrier (X) = Alternate Carrier
b. Application. Every effort has been made to adhere to the following general guide lines in applying the most appropriate weapon to a given target:
(1) Highest yield weapons are programmed for Air Power Battle targets to assure satisfaction of damage criteria, to provide for economy of force, and to reduce operational requirements (i. e. sorties) to a minimum. Among these Air Power Battle targets are: airfields, launching sites, controls, air industry, atomic industry and stockpiles, missile sites.
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(2) In the situation above, every effort has been made to restrict the use of high yield weapons on Air Power Battle targets in the European Satellites in consideration of political, psychological and offensive-defensive implications, provided damage criteria and economy of force are maintained. To this end, high yield weapons have been applied only against airfields in the European Satellites.
(3) Generally, atomic weapons are assigned to Satellite targets.
(4) Multiple weapons and compound effects are desired only to the extent that damage criteria are satisfied.
(5) Generally, each airfield target constitutes one DGZ.
(6) Atomic weapons generally are assigned to targets in the Systematic Destruction category.
c. Damage Criteria. The SAC targeting concept is based on the well-accepted probability that the Air Power Battle will be so compressed in time that a favorable decision may be reached in the initial stages. This dictates maximum effectiveness (mass and concentration of fire power), economy of force (minimum sorties), flexibility (action in excess of the minimum to be used in coping with unusual developments), and maximum assurance that very few targets require restrikes. This implies use of the highest yield weapon commensurate with priority, stockpile configuration, operational considerations, and to a degree that will insure target destruction. If operational or combat considerations preclude the full realization of these general objectives, then the potential usefulness of the target must be denied the enemy during the decisive phase.
In keeping with the above, the following damage criteria are established:
(1) Cratering of runways, if fusing permits.
(2) Cratering of underground targets desired.
(3) A 90% probability of collapse of all above-ground structures, whether on airfields or in areas containing Air Power Battle targets.
(4) A 70% probability of damage on individual targets if the total average for any complex amounts to 90%, although the 90% probability of damage is desired.
(5) The criteria in the preceding sub-paragraph are less in Satellite areas (50% - 70%).
(6) Collapse vulnerability numbers assigned to all Air Power Battle and industrial structures.
d. Fusing Data.
WEAPON VN HEIGHT OF BURST All All Contact Atomics All 1200 feet
e. Height of Burst. As low a height of burst as possible, contact burst being the desired goal, is stipulated for all TN weapons in order to provide for collapse of important targets, the majority of which bear a VN higher than 12, through pressure effect of these types of weapons. An air burst would result in decrease of blast effect on high VN's and consequent
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Securing of the collapse objective. This objective must be retained in the case of Air Power Battle targets, particularly airfields where cratering is required to preclude any possibility of recuperation during the decisive phase of the conflict.
Since time is of the essence in the winning of the Air Power Battle, primary reliance must, of necessity, be placed on blast effects in order to assure target destruction within this limited time period. Primary reliance cannot be placed on thermal or radiation effects since both are relatively ineffective compared with blast. Radiation effects are particularly ineffective in terms of time, due to their delayed arrival and subsequent decay.
The full implications of surface bursts for nuclear weapons have been carefully weighed. While the objectives to surface burst and the probability of radio active fall-outs affecting friendly forces and peoples have been considered, the requirement to win the Air Power Battle is paramount to all other considerations. If the Air Power Battle is not won, the consequences to the friendly world will be far more disastrous than the expected effects of fall-out contamination in the peripheral areas. With regard to friendly forces and peoples, as noted previously, every effort has been made to hold to a minimum the number of nuclear weapons programmed for targets in Satellite countries. Although surface bursts for airfield targets are considered desirable, this rule can and will be waived in specific instances where friendly forces may be seriously threatened by fall-out hazards from such bursts. However, it must be borne in mind that the weight of the SAC attack will probably be such that blast, radiation effects and fires will have preceded fall-out in many areas. Further, the fact cannot be ignored that Allied forces and countries will undoubtedly be subject to atomic and nuclear attacks by Soviet Forces. In such circumstances, the direct and fall-out effects of these enemy weapons may well render academic the problem of fall-out from our own weapons. Finally, although localized fall-out hazards from surface-burst nuclear weapons are greater, world-wide contamination is minimized when the surface burst is utilized.
Height of burst for atomic weapons is as stated in the preceding sub-paragraph d. These weapons are primarily for use in the Satellites and for employment against low VN targets. Aircraft survival is not a major consideration.
f. Multiple Weapons. Multiple weapons on some targets are dictated by the worth of the target, its size, type of weapon employed, and damage criteria. Also it must be appreciated that some aircraft will abort, others will be stricken, some weapons will be duds, and some gross errors will occur. In the case of a target whose priority demands its immediate destruction in support of the Air Power Battle objective, it is mandatory that all of these factors be considered. The commitment of one aircraft and weapon to such a target would provide an unacceptably low probability of target destruction. The time element of the Air Power Battle is such as to prohibit dependence on re-attack after assessment of the initial attack. Sufficient weapons must be launched on the initial attack to provide a target destruction probability approaching certainty.
g. Missiles. Due to the low single weapon destruction probability of missiles, they will be used generally to augment and support, but not to replace, the manned bomber force. They may play a useful role to aid the bomber force in penetrating a target area by saturating it, by diverting some of the enemy's defensive force, and possibly, by neutralizing specific targets pending a bomber strike. SNARK may be utilized in this manner throughout the target system, although its vulnerability will seriously limit the amount of dependence which can be placed on its effects. IRBM, because of limited range, may play the same role in peripheral areas. RASCAL may be used in penetration of immediate defenses. SNARK will be used against pop centers
h. Alternate Weapons. The probable carrier-weapon combination, together with alternate weapons for each type of aircraft, is depicted on page 6. In addition, this command has stated a requirement for a 60 Weapon System. The 60 Air weapon has not been programmed against the target system outlined in this study, since the basic directive specifically restricts weapons to those listed in Annex "B" of the appendix to SN-129-56. This weapon represents an additional
TOTAL: 12 - 42 USC 2183(a)(1)(C) - FRD
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requirement to this command, over and above the stockpile requirement for Part I of the study. The 50 MT weapon is considered essential, not only as a deterrent, but also to assure significant results even with a greatly reduced force in the event of a surprise attack by the Soviets.
- Weapon Requirement. The spectrum of weapon application and requirement by types of targets is indicated on the following pages. Computations and factors used in arriving at the stockpile composition for Part I and Part II are included in paragraph 6 above, "Factors."
(1) (2)
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WEAPON APPLICATION AND REQUIREMENT - PART I ORGANIZATION & ALLOCATION Section I
CATEGORY A. AIR POWER BATTLE I - Atomic Forces Airfields Headquarters Depots II - Defense Forces Airfields Controls Missile Sites III - Atomic Industry IV - Control Centers V - Air Industry B. SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION I - War Supporting Resources Sub-Total DOD's Sub-Total BRL Sub-Total Requirement
TOTAL(1) (3) - 42 USC 2144(a) (1) (2) - FRD
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CAPABILITY UTILIZATION AND REQUIREMENT - PART I (Continued) UNRESTRICTED ALLOCATION Section 2
CATEGORY
A. AIR POWER BATTLE I - Atomic Forces Stockpile Sites II - Defense Forces Controls Missile Sites
C. OTHER I - AIR POWER BATTLE SAM Sites SSM Storage Sites ICBM Sites Regroup Airfields Radar Sites II - SURF TGT On-Call Targets AC&B, Misc Targets (Mil Sites, Bridges, Troop Concentrations) Sub-Total D2's Sub-Total BRL Sub-Total Requirement
SAC TOTAL D2's SAC TOTAL BRL WEAPONS TOTAL SAC REQUIREMENT
TOTAL (N) (3) - 42 USC 2164 (a) (1) (C) - 663
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- Weapon Requirements. (Continued) WEAPON APPLICATION AND REQUIREMENT - PART II RESTRICTED ALLOCATION
(3) FGA/AF(3) - 47 USC 2162(a) - RD This desired composition has been tailored to the size of the 1959 force, and proportioned to the 3200 DOD target system outlined for Part II
TYPE & NUMBER OF WEAPONS TOTAL DELIVERY BY (%) MK 6-B MK 6-C MK 28 MK 15 MK 36 MK 27 M-35 M-37
FGA/AF(3) - 42 USC 2162(a) - RD
(4) The following table also shows the number of DMZ's that can be attacked both with and without consideration for base loss;
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| WEAPON |
|---|
| MK 6-B |
| MK 6-C |
| MK 28 |
| MK 15 |
| MK 15 |
| MK 36 |
| MK 27 |
| MK 27 |
| W-35 |
| W-37 |
| TOTAL |
PGJA(n) (3) - 42 DEC 2162:4) - RD
Even assuming no base loss, destruction of only 1209 DM's can be assured. Under these conditions, this command has elected to ignore the base loss factor, on the assumption that JCS reserves will be made available to SAC as required. Accordingly, the application of weapons to targets for Part II has been based on a 1209 DM's configuration.
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WEAPON APPLICATION AND REQUIREMENTS - PART II RESTRICTED ALLOCATION ICBM DZ's
CATEGORY A. AIR POWER BATTLE I - Atomic Forces Airfields Headquarters Depots II - Defense Forces Airfields Controls Missile Sites III - Atomic Industry IV - Control Centers V - Air Industry B. SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION I - War Supporting Resources Sub-Total
A.E. Stockpile Sites SAM Sites ICBM Sites Radars Sub-Total TOTAL DZ's TOTAL BRL WEAPONS TOTAL SAC REQUIREMENT
YPA/M 121 - 62 USC 2154(a)(1)(C) - FRC
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- Format. a. General. The principal parts of this document are: (1) Cross-reference list, for ease in identifying names with different spellings. (2) Category Code list, for ease in determining the nature of targets. (3) Part I target list, wherein weapons are programmed against targets on the basis of unrestricted allocation. (4) Part II target list, wherein weapons are programmed against targets on the basis of 69,000 Kg of celloy equivalent. (5) Tabular presentations of: Part I - Atomic Weapon Requirements Part II- Desired Stockpile Composition Part I - Telescoped Summary Part II- Telescoped Summary
b. Description of Listings. (1) The cross-reference list is an alphabetical and sequential reference number listing of name places. Opposite each one of them a reference is made to the major complex name under which the place is grouped in the main body of target listings (Part I and Part II). Airfields are clearly designated as such. (See page 17). (2) The Category Code List gives a translation of the three-digit figures appearing under each complex name, and thereby serves as a means of describing the nature of the target. This numerical code, like others in the body of the listings, was designed for adaptation to IBM processing methods. (See page 15). (3) Part I is sub-divided into an Airfield List and a Complex List. (a) In the Airfield List, the information is presented alphabetically; each column, from left to right, pertains to the following: priority number, reference number, name, DGS, weapon types, command interest. Since all airfield weapons are surface-burst, no columns to indicate air or surface burst are included. (b) In the Industrial Complex List, the format is similar (see page 16 for sample format). (4) Part II follows the same format as in Part I. (5) All target duplications with other commands are clearly indicated in the columns at the right side of each page. (6) Tabular Presentations for Parts I and II follow the format of Annex C, SM 129-56.
NW#: 27386 DocId: 32003765 TOP SECRET RESTRICTED DATA ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954
Authority [handwritten: 27386.]
TOP SECRET B-54300
SAMPLE PAGE - TUCUMCARI COMPLEX (See page 200)
| PRI REF No. | NAME | COORDINATES | POS | Ex. A. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 102 | 5430 MERIMACK | 68 58N 033 05W | Δ | |
| 258 0051 0013 | ||||
| 280 0051 0022 | ||||
| 227 0051 0048 | ||||
| 208 0051 0067 | ||||
| 246 0051 0095 | 68 49N 032 48Z |
| TULOMA | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 114 0051 9981 | ||||
| 272 0051 9981 |
SCHEMA
[illegible] (3) - 42 08C 2168 (m)(1)(C) - TBD
Brought by AFD
- Major Complex Name (Plus country name, if in satellite)
- Sub-Complex Name
- Bombing Encyclopedia Numbers - First 4 digits indicate WAC on which target is located; second 4 digits indicate installation or complex number within the WAC area.
- Category Code Number (See Page 194)
* # Represents target on which SAC is to deliver weapon for that particular command and for which that command has weapon programmed. X Represents target duplicated with command indicated.
NW#: 27386 DocId: 32003765 TOP SECRET RESTRICTED DATA ATOMIC ENERGY ACT [illegible]