Grand Jury Testimony of Stanley Johnston, August 18, 1942
National Security Archive
Stanley Johnston’s 1942 grand‑jury testimony reveals how wartime censorship turned a newspaper story about the Coral Sea into a legal showdown over press freedom.
Source: Grand Jury Testimony of Stanley Johnston, August 18, 1942 Date: Aug 18, 1942 Archive: NARA, RG-60, Case File 146-7-23-25, box 2, file: “Enclosure to Serial 8, Grand Jury Testimony, v. 5.” Collection: Secrecy And Leaks: When The U.S. Government Prosecuted The Chicago Tribune Oct 25, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A War Correspondent Caught in the Net of Censorship
Stanley Johnston’s grand‑jury testimony, taken on August 18 1942, is the raw, courtroom record of a journalist who found himself at the center of the first major post‑Pearl‑Harbor clash between a U.S. newspaper and the military‑intelligence establishment. The hearing was convened after the Chicago Tribune ran a series of stories on the Battle of the Coral Sea that the Navy claimed disclosed classified operational details. The government’s response was not a simple libel suit; it summoned a federal grand jury, a tool normally reserved for probing espionage, fraud, or violations of the Espionage Act. Johnston, the Tribune’s Pacific war correspondent, was called to testify about his movements, his contractual obligations to the Navy, and the precise wording of the contested article.
The testimony reveals the immediate circumstances that produced the document. Johnston explains that he was a “very small reporter” who had been reassigned from Europe to the Pacific after the United States entered World II. He describes the formal accreditation he received from the Navy, which required him to submit all dispatches for prior censorship and to obey the commanding officer on any vessel he boarded. The Navy’s “directions for war correspondents” that Johnston reads into evidence underscore the legal framework the military used to control battlefield reporting. By the summer of 1942, the Navy was already tightening that framework, fearing that the press could inadvertently reveal fleet movements or tactical plans.
The Coral Sea Leak and the Bigger Picture
Johnston’s testimony is a micro‑cosm of the broader episode known as the “Coral Sea leak.” In May 1942 the Tribune published a front‑page story that identified the composition of the U.S. carrier task force that had just engaged the Japanese fleet. While the article did not name the carriers, it described the number of aircraft, the types of ordnance, and the timing of the engagement—information that the Navy argued could aid the enemy. The fallout was swift: the Department of Justice convened a grand jury, and the Tribune’s editor, Robert R. McCormick, was subpoenaed. The case tested the limits of the First Amendment during wartime and set a precedent for later confrontations, such as the 1945 Pentagon Papers case.
Johnston’s statements about his “small” role and his lack of involvement in the disputed paragraph are telling. He distances himself from the editorial decision that inserted the sensitive material, suggesting that the line was added by the paper’s staff after his field reports were submitted. This distinction matters because it reflects the newspaper’s internal processes: correspondents supplied raw observations, editors shaped the narrative, and the Navy’s censorship office was supposed to review the final copy before publication. The testimony hints at a breakdown in that chain, whether through editorial overreach or inadequate coordination with the Navy’s censors.
Actors, Intentions, and What the Record Reveals
The key actors in the document are Johnston, the grand‑jury foreman, and the prosecuting attorney (identified only as “Mr. Miller”). The prosecutor’s line of questioning pushes Johnston to acknowledge the formal oath he signed—waiving immunity and accepting the jurisdiction of the grand jury. This procedural emphasis signals that the government was not merely interested in the facts of the story but in establishing a legal precedent that journalists could be compelled to testify about their sources and methods.
Johnston’s recitation of the Navy’s accreditation agreement is especially revealing. He reads aloud the clause that obliges a correspondent to submit all material for censorship and to obey the commanding officer’s orders. By placing that text on the record, the prosecution aimed to demonstrate that any breach of the agreement—intentional or not—constituted a violation of military regulations, potentially rising to the level of a criminal offense under wartime statutes.
The testimony also subtly underscores the tension between the press’s self‑perception as a watchdog and the military’s view of the press as a potential security liability. Johnston’s insistence that he was “still not” a major correspondent, coupled with his description of the Tribune’s “material on war weapons” as factual and “picked up by reports,” reflects a journalist’s desire to maintain credibility while navigating the constraints imposed by wartime censorship.
Legacy of the Grand Jury Testimony
The declassified grand‑jury transcript is more than a historical curiosity; it provides a concrete example of how the U.S. government attempted to harness legal mechanisms to enforce wartime secrecy. The case never resulted in a criminal conviction, but it sent a clear warning to newsrooms: the Navy’s accreditation was not a courtesy but a binding contract, and failure to comply could trigger federal prosecution.
In the decades that followed, the balance between national security and a free press remained contested. The Johnston episode foreshadowed the legal battles over the Pentagon Papers (1971) and, more recently, the Snowden disclosures. Each of those moments invoked the same fundamental question raised in 1942: how far may the government go in restricting the flow of information when the stakes are national survival?
For contemporary readers, the transcript reminds us that wartime press freedom is not an abstract principle but a negotiated, and often contested, space. The language of the Navy’s accreditation, the procedural rigor of the grand jury, and Johnston’s careful delineation of his role together illuminate the mechanics of state secrecy and the precarious position of journalists caught in its net.
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76716
IN THE MATTER
OF THE
INVESTIGATION
OF
THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE, INC.
BEFORE GRAND JURY,
AUGUST 18, 1942.
| WITNESSES | DIRECT EXAMINATION | CROSS EXAMINATION | RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION | RE-CROSS EXAMINATION |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Stanley Johnston, | 278 | | | |
| J. Loy Maloney, | 329 | | | FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER |
| J. Loy Maloney, (resumed) | 354 | | | |
GEORGE F FITZGERALD
COURT AND GENERAL REPORTING
DEARBORN 2770
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76716
tuhe
IN RE: )
)
INVESTIGATION OF )
CHICAGO TRIBUNE )
Tuesday, August 18th, 1942,
10:00 o'clock A.M.
The Grand Jury met pursuant to
adjournment.
Present:
Mr. Miller
--------:--------
S T A N L E Y J O H N S T O N,
called as a witness by the Grand Jury, having been
first duly sworn by the Foreman to testify the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth,
was examined and testified as follows:
E X A M I N A T I O N
By Mr. Miller:
Q You are Mr. Stanley Johnston?
A Yes, sir.
Q This grand jury has extended to you the privi-
lege of voluntarily appearing here, which is evi-
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denced by the fact that you are here now. You have signed a waiver of immunity. So you under- stand. A Yes. Q It outlines your constitutional rights. A Yes. Q You are here at the request of the grand jury for the purpose of making whatever statement you wish to make. Go right ahead and make it. A Ladies and gentlemen: I asked to come before the grand jury here to give my story. It isn't in any way very much different to the story I told -- A JUROR: Raise your voice. THE WITNESS: The story I told Admiral Wilson and Admiral Wilkinson and Mr. Mitchell when I went to Washington on two occasions. There are one or two things I want to straighten out: First, because of the Coral Sea stories there is a false idea around as to my importance. Up to the time that the Coral Sea stories were written I was a very small reporter working for my place on the paper. I joined the Chicago Tribune 279
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in 1940, in England. I did not get on the pay- roll. I began writing for the Chicago Tribune at so much per word of the copy that they accepted.
I covered the battle of Britain for them in Dover, and during the year because of the work that I had done I was put on the staff in England.
I then resigned from the Chicago Tribune in England in May, 1940, after the last air attacks on London were over, and set out to go to Australia via the United States.
My purpose in calling in the United States at that time was to see if I could get back with my old firm, Press Willis. It is a communica- tions company, in which I was manager in Amsterdam prior to Hitler taking Holland over. While here I got some opportunity on the Tribune to write some more stuff, material on war weapons. I was to write a story of the battle of Britain, which ran in series in the Chicago Sunday Tribune, and again paid so much a word.
They liked my work here. The stuff I had written was factual. It was picked up by reports 280
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coming in, information from Europe, as to how the war was going, and I was put on the staff of the Tribune again to go back to Bern and opening a communications office in Bern for the Tribune. I was waiting in New York, booked to leave on the 4th of December, last year. I was waiting in New York for passage on the Clipper when the war started, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and Germany declared war on the United States. There was no purpose of my going to Europe to open this communications office because their correspondents' telephone connection with Switzerland was then broken down. So the paper offered to send me out to the Pacific as a war correspondent for them with the fleet. That was my position with the Tribune up to the time of these stories, and not a very important reporter. The success that followed the Coral Sea stories, and I mention those things because it might have led you to believe that I was one of the big correspondents. I was not. I am still not. Regarding this story that was printed on the 7th, to which objection is taken, one part
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of the story that is objected to is the fact that it is laid to the Naval Intelligence. I think that the Tribune has made it clear that I did not write that part of the story, nor did I have anything to do with the phrasing of that section of the story at all.
When I went out with the Fleet I under- stood that anything that I gained with the Fleet -- I have a copy here of the paper dealing with that. This is directions for war correspondents, Navy Department. This is the agreement which binds you for anything that you write. In connection with authority granted by the Navy to me, the undersigned to visit -- well, wherever you visit. It may be a ship, an army camp, a factory or some- thing -- for the purpose of securing news or story material, still, or motion pictures, or en- gaged in radio broadcasting, I subscribe to the following conditions, that as a civilian accredited to the Navy -- that includes the Marine Corps, because accredited to the United States, -- I am subject to the provisions of the articles of the Government and the Navy, United States Naval Regulations, and such other instructions as may
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be in effect in the area visited; that I will govern my movements and actions in accordance with the instructions of the Navy Department and the senior officer present of the unit to which I am accredited.
I understand that means I am to obey the officers, whoever they be. It is understood that this includes the submission for the pur- pose of censorship of all written or photographic material, either private correspondence, or any- thing for publication, released with the Navy or after my return.
After my return if the news is in written form or photographic, based on my observations, that is on anything I see or anything that I am told, officially, I take it that means, made dur- ing the period, or the confidential place visited under this authority, I agree to observe the same rules in regard to the transmission of information as service. That means that my letters be sub- mitted to the censors in the same way as any man in the force. It goes a little further than that. It means the despatches I send back be sent
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back in the manner that they go through the Navy censors in the area in which I am filing from. When I went out with the fleet, my first ship was the Lexington. There were no stories sent back from the Lexington, as we went down the Coral Sea. We went into action on the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th. I lost the stories that I had written when the ship was blown up. I saved my notes; on the ship that rescued us I had the use of a typewriter, and I wrote the stories of the Coral Sea very hurriedly, and when we pulled into the port in the South Pacific I handed the stories addressed to the Navy Censor, Pearl Harbor, for transmission through Navy channels. I gave a copy of the same stories to the Executive Officer of the Lexington, who is Commander Schligman. I was transferred over to another ship. We went to another island. I had sent my stories, so I had nothing to file. We then spent, I think, from the 18th of May until the 2nd of June on a Navy Transport coming back to the West Coast. On the transport I re-wrote the stories, and having more time, expanded them and had an
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opportunity of doing a little more justice to the boys that did the fighting. We had time to talk about the battles on the ship, and when I arrived at the naval air station on the West Coast, I asked the executive officer of the Lexington how I could get those stories to Washington. He said that he would make arrangements with the Naval Censor. They notified me on the 3rd of June that if I delivered the stories to the Public Relations Office, at the Naval air station, that they would send them by -- I think it is, it is the way that Navy mail goes between the West Coast and Washington, to the censors there. Meanwhile, on my arrival at the West Coast, I telephoned the Tribune and just announced that I was back in the United States and that I wanted some money sent immediately. They asked me where I had been. I told them I couldn't tell them. Two or three times I spoke to different people. They hung up, hung back, hung up and back, and finally they asked me. He said that there had 285
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been a Naval battle. I referred them to the communique that was issued around about that time. There was a small communique then issued. I think we heard it on the radio of the ship, stating that a Naval battle had been fought, and giving very few de- tails. That was around about May 9th, I think. I referred them to that communique. I said, "It is that battle I am talking about." And they said, "What happened in that battle?" And I said, "I can't tell you", because at that time we had one secret which we were guard- ing very closely. That is the fact that the Lexington had been lost. The Japanese did not know that she had been lost, because the last they saw of her was 11:33 in the morning, and she was all right. It was eight hours later be- fore she went down. I couldn't even tell the newspaper any- thing about the battle, because I did not feel that it should be discussed on the telephone. On 286 a long distance telephone you don't know who is
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listening. So they said, "Why didn't you send your stories through on the wire?" I said, "The stories cannot be tele- graphed, because there is a number of people handling the telegraph copy. I said, "They have to go to Washington and will be handled there. Now, coming home on the transport, and while we were in the Coral Sea and while we were in Pearl Harbor, and in years before this war, I have been interested in wars and armies, the air force, and navy, is the stuff I have written and has been published. I was one of the men who was con- sidered a fool in 1939 when I said that the German army would take Paris in thirty days, not because the French were not good people, not because they would not try to fight, but because the German army was organized for war. They had weapons which the French couldn't be- lieve. You can imagine an unknown newspaper man trying to sell that story at that time. It was the
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most utterly ridiculous thing that had been said. It turned out to be true, unfortunately. Here in Chicago last year Russia was attacked by Germany, when all the news we got in the newspapers came from the experts and circles in Washington and London said that the Germans would capture Moscow in anything from two to four weeks. I wrote a story here which was pub- lished in the Tribune four days after the attack on Russia, in which I said the German Army defeat Russia in the first year. It is a fact they hoped themselves to take the part of Russia that Hitler wanted. There would be a long continuous war on the frontier between Germany and Russia that might last for years; that the Germans in the meanwhile would try to exploit the territory that they want. That is all I saw here . I had never anybody else writing or heard any government official or Admiral say they all gave Russia to the Germans in two to four weeks. My success in the newspaper business has not been gained because I ever knew anybody. 288 It has been gained because I worked, put the
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facts together, tried to study out what was happening, without any feelings in the matter one way or the other.
While I was in Pearl Harbor and on the ship coming back, we had many discussions about the Japanese Navy. I wrote a story on the Jap- anese Navy last year, in November. I pointed out that the Japanese Navy was a very powerful fight- ing force. It was up to date, well trained. The Japanese had very modern ideas of war. That story was not printed.
I asked why it was not printed.
They said because it made the picture too dark at that time. It showed the Japanese Navy to be a powerful fighting force, and the people did not want to believe that the Japanese was a powerful fighting force. Unfortunately we had to find out when we fought at war. I wrote that story in November of last year. I tried to show that the Japanese had learned to build ships from the British. They had copied the American use of aircraft carriers and developed until they are the finest in the world; that they had trained their sailors in the same form that the British
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Navy train their sailors, which is a very effi- cient method. They had also absorbed the German Army method of training. Had used what they had learned from the Russian Army, which at that time was the second most modern army in the world. That was in 1939. Germany was the first. Russia was the second, as far as modern weapons, knowledge of the use of them and train- ing of their soldiers.
The Japs had learned from everybody, and furthermore they had eight years of practice in war every day in China, operations on a big scale.
It was a natural thing that on the ship that we should discuss what the Japanese had left to fight with. None of us had any official in- formation. We were men that came off the Lexing- ton; had not been in touch with Pearl Harbor our- selves from April. It was now the 19th of May. We were coming home. We didn't know what was happening anywhere. But after the fighting that we had had in the Coral Sea with the Japs, we had learned a few things. First we knew that we sunk two Japanese aircraft carriers, the Siokaku and 290
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Zuikaku.
The trouble with Japanese spelling, there is no alphabet in Japanese, such as we have in English. The old Japanese spelling is purely phonetic. I would like somebody to show me a Japanese alphabet. I would be interested in seeing it. We had damaged another one of the Soryu class. We thought at first it was the Ryuzyo, because one of the flyers said it had no island on it at the time they attacked. Later on we found it had a small island. It was knocked off with a bomb. The island is that little big structure that sticks up and was knocked off by bombs.
We knew that the Japanese had of their nine carriers, they had six left not touched, one of them, the smallest, is a shallow draft vessel which the Japs have used in their war with China, in the rivers, and close to shore. It is not a big sea-going carrier. That left them five.
The fighting in the Coral Sea, and then followed the argument that had persisted previously as to what was the Number 1 fighting ship, aircraft carrier or battleship. In the naval warfare that
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had taken place before the United States went into the war, the battleship was still being quoted as the Number 1 fighting unit, simply because though the British have carriers, they did not have dive bombers. They never had torpedo planes which could carry the projectiles. They did not understand the use of the carrier in the same way as the United States Navy and the Japanese Navy had developed and used carriers. They used aircraft carriers in Britain, mainly to carry aircraft and to defend their con- voys against other aircraft, but not as an attack weapon. The battle of the Coral Sea proved what a destructive thing a carrier was. You could hit your enemy 200 miles away and destroy his ship, regardless of what ships they were. So, from that time on the basis of their strength is not through battleships. It is in aircraft carriers. So in making up the Japanese fleet, I had a very simple task. I had five aircraft carriers left, the two biggest ones of them was the Kaga and Akaga, the Soryu and Hiryu. Also of the biggest, one called the Hiryu was used in the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th. I will tell you how
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I know.
The Navy never said so. I don't know whether the United States Navy knows now the names of the Japanese ships that attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7th. The reason I know that the Hiryu was used in that attack was because photographs that have been published, taken from a Japanese aircraft carrier with planes taking off for that attack and the crews standing on the decks waiving to them. There was something in that picture that identified that ship as the Hiryu to me. That is the ship with a tripod mast on the side. That tripod mast was shown clearly in the picture. That small item identified to me that the Hiryu was the ship. That has never been printed anywhere. I hope that is not navy information. I recognized that from the fact the other ships have not got that tripod mast. It is a thin trellis mast put up there to make special signals.
The Japanese in their attack on the Philippines, they have some good battleships, some new ones, big ones. In their attacks on the Philippines they used battleships of the Haruna
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type or Kirishima type, which are the same ships, sister ships. We know that they used those ships in the bombardment of the Philippines because the United States Army has cited Captain Colin Kelly with the Congressional medal for bombing the Haruna. That is how we know they used that type of ship in the bombardment of the Philippines. The Navy never said they did.
You would not use your best battleships to bombard land installations, because you expect that you will lose one or two of them, either through defending submarines or from defending aircraft. And furthermore, your best battleship is no more effective throwing shells at the fortification on shore than the oldest battleship, because all you want for bombardment is the gun volume. That is why they use their old battleship for the attack. That is why I say they used their ships of the Kirishima class for the attack on Midway.
The attack on Midway was no surprise to me or the attack on the Hawaiian Islands, because in March of this year I was working in Honolulu at Pearl Harbor, and through the United States Navy office at Pearl Harbor, through the censors, I
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wrote a story, pointing out the situation of the fleet from the Pacific and the great importance to the United States of the Hawaiian Islands. The story emphasized that we should do more or even if possible to defend the Hawaiian Islands, because they were so vital to the United States. I used that as the reason which I gave in the story, they were so important to us that they were equally important to the Japanese. And, therefore, we must expect a Jap- anese attempt to capture the Hawaiian Islands in the coming months, because they are out 2,400 miles from America towards Japan. While we hold the Hawaiian Islands Japs cannot touch the main coast. That is what I based my judgment on that they would be after the Hawaiian Islands, to damage, invade and capture them before they could get anywhere with their war in Pacific, or before they could attack America. That is why I know when the radio said it was Dutch Harbor on the 7th, it was Balderdash. It was a raid. It was nothing more than a bomb raid. That is why I used battleships of the Kirishima type in my story instead of the more bigger battleships and
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the latest battleships that the Japanese have.
If the United States Navy sent our latest two battleships over to bombard some island somewhere instead of sending the oldest ones, they would be crazy. They would not do it.
I put down in my list here two cruisers of the Tone class. There is nothing very remark- able about that. The Tone class cruisers are un- like any other cruisers in the world. They have been built for a special purpose. There are no other cruisers in the world that have got all of their guns in front of the funnel, before the bridge. That is one distinction they have. They got them in four turrets of three, all at the for- ward end of the ship. All of the after end of the ship is given up to carry airplanes, and they could carry a lot of airplanes.
Q Would you care to mention the book you are referring to?
A This is Jane's Fighting Ships. It is the best publication in the world, that is in exist- ence. That is used by navies throughout the world, all Navy men, anybody who is interested in navies. 296 Every newspaper office has one, or should have
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one, I think. It comes out every year. I know the man that publishes this book, Mr. McMurtrie. He has the next office in London. I had an in- terest in Jane's Fighting Ships, and spoke to the editor and publisher. I have been able to get in a couple of photographs he wants, one of a new kind of ship, and particularly about the German warship building.
The Tone class cruiser, there are two of them. These ships are specially built for this purpose. I have two. They can go with the fleet. They have enough seaplanes to work out and be scouts for the fleet. They come in. Their armament and guns are all in front. They are not built to stand up and fight like the other ships. They are built to come in fighting. They have got their seaplanes, maybe ten or fifteen on each ship, and work a long way from them to find out what is happening, or to bomb, or there has been a cry raised as if it was something wonderful and mysterious because I said the forces would come in three groups, a striking force, support force and invasion force. Ladies and gentlemen, when a navy man in the world there is nothing mysterious about 297
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that. Any Admiral that puts his transports and troop ships with his main battle force would be foolish. The troops with transports and troop ships are very slow. He brings them separately with a light escort. He sends a supporting force that stands away from them, between them and the enemy at all times, and before them. His main striking force is his fast fleet, his hard hitting fleet, where he expects to meet the defense, fight- ing them, trying to overcome them, and holding his transports and supply ships up, which make up the invasion force, and supporting force back out of the action. It would be foolish if he sent his transports with his main battle force and slow them down to ten knots. There is nothing mysterious in that at all. I can't understand why anybody should state that was mysterious. Neither the Japanese nor the United States Navy fight in that way.
No navy ever engaged in any expedition, in other words, has been doing that, not from this year, but from long before the Romans and the Greeks and before the Phoenicans. They had navies. They did it the same way.
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The story I published, part of my con- tribution to this story was the section that deals with the probable force that the Japanese had there. That is all that I had to do with the story at any time. I think that the editor of the paper has told I had nothing to do with giving it to the Naval Intelligence or anybody else. I have listed in this story, my section, my section of the story, the striking force of four aircraft carriers. They had only five, re- member, at that time, and I put the four biggest that they had down, because that is their main fighting force. Then, I put two battleships of the Kirishima class . They are bombardment weapons, to handle any cruiser that came in close, and the force while they are attacking, to be used to help reduce the defenses after they have won control of the air. The Japanese had old battleships with their fleet in the Coral Sea, and they also had old battleships of this type because they were then going to bombard Port Moresby, we think.
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There is nothing wonderful about that. Then, I got those two cruisers of the Tone class. They are the only two in the world that we know of that are like that. They were built for this particular purpose, and have been used in the fighting in the Far East. Then, I put a dozen destroyers. I got four capital ships, that is, carriers, and two battleships, that is six ships. You want two destroyers with each carrier, one to trail along last and pick up the planes that fall in their landing, fall over the stern, and one to pile ahead for ships that miss on the take-off. You put one on each side, that is, four carriers, two battleships, a dozen destroyers. They probably had twice that many. The destroyers are only secondary stuff. In the supporting force I got one air-craft carrier. There couldn't be any more, because they only had one. I got the smallest one they have there. That is all five. That is the Ryuzyo. Then, again I got two more battleships,
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two more Kirishimas. I got four Mogamis. The four Mogamis are cruisers that the Navy has listed as ships likely to be met with. They are a par- ticular type of ship that are built for a purpose, this kind of purpose. They have used them lavish- ly since they have joined in this war. I got a light cruiser as a scout that comes between the support force and the main force, between the support force and the invasion force, to run at high speed and carry messages. They do not use their radio at sea. They maintain radio silence any time they put to sea. Only speak to one another by visual signal. Either a plane or ship will move from one and find out about another, until they get within signal distance, until they can use their lamp to give messages, because if they used their radio they can be heard.
Now the occupation force: We have got four cruisers: The Chakas, Myoko, Chitore and Choda. Now, those ships like many other Japanese ships are ships that are talked about, around and about for a long time. Nobody has ever seen them. Nobody knows what they are. Nobody knows what they consist of. The names came up in discussions. I
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asked if anybody knew how to spell them. Nobody did, for sure. I tried to find out if anybody knew what they were. Nobody seemed to know. They thought they were a special cruiser that had been secretly built for this job.
You will find the Myoko listed in Janes, listed as a ten thousand ton cruiser in Jane's fighting ships.
The discussions that went around the ship was that this Myoko was a new one. The old one was lost. This was a new one that had been given the same name. That is not unusual in navies. They thought they were about the same class, 8,000 tons. I could have just as easy put down ten thousand as 8,500 tons, and been right with Janes.
Two armored transports of the Kunikisma Maru class. That is, anything that ends in Maru means a one time merchant ship. When you find that the Navy has used this merchant ship, it is converted to naval use. They are like the British, and other nations, with these big passenger liners that have been converted in war time. They build mounts on them in addition, where they can use 302
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them as an armed merchant vessel. I do not mean the vessels which carry guns for submarines. They are armored luxury ships, things that Britain and Germany have done. The Jervis Bey that was sunk two years ago, was a notable one. She was only an ordinary freighter. They had about six guns aboard her. She was protecting a convoy. She was seen fighting a German battleship, the Deutsch- land. That is another name I don't know.
As we approached the Coast, the men on board the ship, we heard on the radio that DeWitt, General DeWitt was having blackouts on the Coast. They were talking about have a Japanese invasion of the West Coast in the United States. They be- gan to turn off their radio over there at nine o'clock, and in general they were having a nice time, trying to scare the people of the United States that lived on the West Coast that they were going to be attacked by the Japanese.
Everybody on the ship, and myself in- cluded, regarded that as an insult to the United States Navy. I don't know where they thought the Navy was, that the Japanese could get past Pearl Harbor and reach the West Coast of the United
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States. That was the stuff, a lot of publicity was done by the War Office in Washington, and by General DeWitt, who is in charge of the West Coast defenses. All of the suggestion was that at any moment the Japanese were going to be there to attack the West Coast. It was an insult to the United States Navy, to think they couldn't keep the Japanese out.
Naturally on the ship there was quite a considerable amount of discussion of that. I joined and I told them my idea, if anything was going to happen at all, if the Japanese fleet was at sea, as the news from the West Coast said, the Japanese fleet must be at sea, if it is going to attack the West Coast. That is what General DeWitt was saying. Mr. Stimson in Washington, D.C. says they must be at sea some time, because it will take any navy twenty-one days to come from Tokio to the West Coast. They have to speed at the speed of the slowest ship and fuel up at sea as they go.
If that was not telling the Japs that they knew the fleet was at sea, I don't know what it was. I wasn't doing it. Mr. Stimson in Washington was doing that, and General DeWitt on the
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West Coast of the United States was doing that. We were afraid on the ship that with this phoney scare going on, when we arrived in California, instead of being able to get around we would arrive and find everything tied up, blackouts and everything else going on. And the men of the Navy were naturally very annoyed about this situa- tion. The people of the country thought they couldn't defend it. We discussed the Japanese, what they might do, what they would have to fight with, because I had written an article in which I had stated they would some time be after the Hawaiian group some time soon. I entered the discussions. There was nothing secret about them, because nobody that sat in those cabins knew any more than I did. We dis- cussed the make-up of the Japanese fleet. I wanted to get a copy of Jane's. I never had one. I asked Lieutenant Commander Coleman, who was the gunnery officer aboard the Barnett if he had a copy. He finally got just the section out of the book which deals with the Japanese Navy only, an old book, and loaned it to me. I had it for a couple of days, and 305
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discussed the ships there. On the day that we arrived in the port, we came in on the night of the 2nd. I was told as we came in the harbor it was too late. We couldn't get the men ashore that night. So I figured we would be on the ship until the next morning. I made no preparations to go ashore. I was up in my cabin finishing up some work. As I only had one pair of pants to wear ashore, I was wearing a pair of shorts. A Marine came in and told me that Commander Seligman, to report to him in a half an hour on the pier. I had a sick man in the cabin, Lieuten- ant Commander Terry. He had been sick, and re- lieved from duty all the time across on this ship. When the Marine told me that I had to hurriedly pack, going through the papers I might have in my drawer, finding the notes that I was finished with and tearing them up and threw them in the waste paper basket. There were ten stories in all. I had material from which I had written it from, one of these pieces of scrap, and there was the names of some Japanese ships written in pencil and scratched out and re-written in and scratched out, as if some- body had been holding a discussion on the Japanese 306
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C-8
Navy.
After they had finished it was no importance, a piece of paper. It was on an ordinary scratch pad, something like the very one in my drawer when I made my own writing on loose-leaf. Somebody had been doodling on it out there, and a picture which I took to be the Lexington, with planes diving on her, and so forth, and had written all other stuff on it. What interested me was finding what papers I was using. In examining each one what I saw amongst the Japanese ships, the names of three ships I didn't know how to spell, the Choda and the Chakas. I made a hasty note of that. Underneath them was this Kunikisma Maru. I made a note of that and threw it away.
There was nothing secret about that scrap of paper. They do not leave secret signals lying about amongst something else. A secret signal is not left on a scrap and a leaflet to be doodled on. I didn't think that piece of paper was important. I still don't think it was important.
When I got ashore, as I told you, I asked how I could get my story to Washington, because I knew anything I wrote about that trip had to be
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censored. I was just as interested in getting it to the censor as anybody else. For the time being I was the keeper of the secret, and that secret was the Lexington had been sunk. To my mind that was important. I would not even tell my editor, in spite of two or three times he asked me what had happened. I just told him I couldn't tell him. He would find out in due course. He asked me, he said, "Have you got any news about the attack on Dutch Harbor?" And I said, "It is in the newspaper now." I said, "I got some idea of the attack on Dutch Harbor. Don't go overboard on it. If there is an attack it is not going to be on Dutch Harbor." I was scared at the time of two things: One, that my paper would get the wrong steer, that Dutch Harbor was the point of interest, and play that story up that was being handed out. It was nothing else but a hit and run raid. They never dropped a dozen bombs on Dutch Harbor. The news at the time made out there was a terrific attack on there. The stuff I was hearing on the radio, also from the news commentators were 308
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talking about the battle taking place out on the Pacific, as a Japanese retaliation because we had bombed Tokyo. Believe me, ladies and gentlemen, the axis don't believe in speedy retaliation. They do not risk ships or men just for to make a headline. I was incensed to think, here we are fighting, and this kind of stuff was being handed around to the people. Out there the men are fight- ing for their existence. They are not playing. After I had arranged to get my message to Mr. Maloney that I had some ideas on the subject, I am making a memo and send it to him. I was at the time busy. I made a memo and put it in my pocket. It, well, it is not important. I have told him on the 'phone not to go overboard on it. I moved back in the office in a couple of days. I forgot all about it. I had some difficulty locating my wife, because for the first time in my life the Western Union made a mistake. They told me she was in San Francisco. She had been out of the home maybe for three months. I tried to send word to her. The Western Union told me nobody of that name lived 309 there. They found out the next morning she did live
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there. The name was not on the door. They had only looked on the door instead of ringing the bell. I have confidence in the Western Union. That is the first time they made a mistake. To me it was an important mistake. I just wanted to let her know I was home. She had no word from me either. I finally got rid of my stories to the Navy Censor there in San Diego. I went up to Los Angeles. My wife and I got a plane and come up here and arrived at Chicago here eight o'clock on June 5th. I reported into the office and was im- mediately put to work. Then they said, "You got time. If you don't think the story is going to be released for some time, write your story and take as much space as you like." When we write any story we have to take into consideration how much space the paper will give us, whether they will give us a thousand words or five thousand words. As it happened they gave me fifty thousand words to write this. They said, "You got a good story. Write everything you know about it." 310 I worked all night. I have been up all
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night in the plane. It was not a sleeper, it was a sit-up from Los Angeles to here. I worked all day Friday, Friday night and Saturday. Some time during Saturday night a despatch from Ad- miral Nimitz came in saying that we had a wonder- ful victory in the Pacific. It was tremendous news. He said that the battle is not over. All returns have not been received. We know now that the battle was over 48 hours before he wrote this despatch. The battle was over, because we never saw a Japanese ship from the night of June 4th to June 6th. He said the battle was not over. It was over. Maybe he didn't know. History says it was over on the night of the 4th. We never saw a Japanese ship after that time. "All returns have not yet been received. It is with full confidence, however, that for this phase of the action the following enemy losses are claimed: "Two or three carriers and all their air- craft destroyed, in addition to one or two carriers badly damaged and most of their aircraft lost. "Three battleships damaged, at least one badly.
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"Four cruisers damaged, two heavily. "Three transports damaged. "It is possible that some of these wounded ships will not be able to reach their bases." That is the communique that Admiral Nimitz issued on the story that was going the rounds of the newspapers and radio commentators in the days it was being fought, as being a Japanese hit and run raid, as a retaliation of the attack on Tokio. The fact they had transports was proof they came to invade. You don't bring transports just for recreation of the Navy's crew. I thought immediately of the material I had made out for Mr. Maloney, in which I had stressed the fact that you do not measure a Navy's strength any more by battleships. It was aircraft carriers. I had stated on a rough idea to of my own. I never had Janes help me name what the Japanese fleet would consist of. The A.P. story came in at the same time. It was printed at the same time, and it says amongst other things that the United States fleet inter- cepted the enemy at more than a thousand miles from their objective. It means to locate the position
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for the ambush. You can't ambush anybody unless you are waiting for them. You do not intercept them a thousand miles from where they want to go, unless you know they are coming. I would like to see somebody convince the Japanese that the United States Navy didn't know they were coming. You can't move ships about. An Admiral can't find out that the Japanese are coming and have his fleet a thou- sand miles away. They can't average more than fifteen or sixteen miles an hour, steaming and fueling to get to wherever they want to go. Their top speed of thirty knots does not mean they can run day after day and night after night. No ship in the world can do it. It took them years to de- velop the big ships for the Atlantic.
When I arrived back here, as I said, I got to work on these stories. I was very tired, but this news from Admiral Nimitz, and from the A.P. was the best news I had for weeks. I went up to see Mr. Maloney, who was at that time in his desk in the local room, bringing out the paper. By the way, I was working in a room segregated in the building from anybody else, because nobody was to know what I was writing, what I was doing. That 313
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was still to be kept secret news. It had not been released. I said to Mr. Maloney, "This is a terrific thing. We won a tremendous victory here. We have beaten the entire Japanese fleet, what they have got left. It is the biggest fight. It is bigger than Jutland. I don't know anything about it, what you do with the story. You can play it up as big as you like. It is the biggest victory in years. We have won it. I made up your memorandum when I was in San Diego, to show you the strength of the Japanese fleet. I still got it in my pocket. I had forgotten about it until now. It fits in with this thing like nobody's business. It's a beauty." He said, "All right." He said, "Do your stuff on what you think of the Japanese fleet consisted of." And I went inside. Took Janes Fighting Ships with me and set out to build up the Japanese fleet as I got here. He called Mr. Wayne Thomis, I think, or some way they got together to write the story. Mr. Thomis asked me, "How do you think 314
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that we knew that the Japanese were coming?" I said, "That is a very simple thing. When I was in Pearl Harbor I had an interview with Admiral Withers, who commands the United States Submarine Fleet in the Pacific. In this interview he explained that some submarines go out and attack ships, but others go out and never fire a torpedo. Their job is to sit around outside of the enemy's naval bases and harbors and watch the shipping lanes and to report the movements of every ship they see. They radio this in. They are put together in the Naval Intelligence, and when a man is getting reports from all over the Pacific, he can follow the enemy ship movements everywhere they go. They watch also the ship lanes and harbors. That is Submarine Intelligence. I wrote a story on that to the censor, and he passed it. There is nothing secret about that. We knew it. So did the Japanese and so did the Germans. And I suppose so did the British and Italians. If they don't, they are stupid. That is true of submarines. They have another purpose other than attacking ships.
315 "Well," he said, "Do you mean that they
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would have a picture of everything that happened?" And I said, "Sure, they would." I said, "It shows what wonderful service we have got, that they know what the other guy is doing." The lead story was written, as I say, by Mr. Thomis. I started to pick out the ships. He came back to help me with these. He was wait- ing on me. We hurried those things through. They disappeared out into the editorial, local room. When it goes through this machinery, it goes to the editor, and as I thought at the time, for sure, to the cen- sor. I had no idea that you could publish any in- formation about anything without going to the cen- sor. And I was back in my head office. Therefore, any responsibility I thought for a censor, is on my office. I said to Admiral Wilson the same thing. He said, didn't I think that anything at all I wrote should have to go to the naval censor. And I said, "Yes." I said, "Whenever I was drawing up any- thing I had to get it in there. 316 He said, "How about this story?"
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I said, "Look, Admiral, two things when I am not bound by my signature to put that in, because that was not gained by observation while I was in the fleet, I still thought that story would be covered by the censor." "Naturally," I said, "When you accredited me to the United States Fleet, you never accredited Stanley Johnston. If I came to you as an individual and said I want to be attached to the United States Fleet as a correspondent, you would not take my application." He said, "No. That is true. "You accredited the Chicago Tribune." He said, "That is right." I said, "Therefore, anything that I can know my managing editor can know, in the same way with any of your junior officers, can report to you anything that they have, because I am a very, very junior officer." He agreed with me that was right as far as I was concerned. So, any responsibility for censorship or anything else does not evolve on me, and the Navy seems to agree with me when I was there, because 317
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on the two occasions when I would be there, they did not seem to have any personal fight with me. Admiral Wilson and Admiral Wilkinson always shook hands with me.
Believe me, in the way Naval officers are brought up at Anapolis, they don't have to shake hands with you if they don't like you. So, personally, I don't think the Navy -- they know my end of the explanation, and I don't think that the Navy are mad at me. They should not be.
I went on with my work that night. I knew no more about it. I worked until about five o'clock in the morning. I was very tired. I was going out of the building with Mr. Wayne Thomis. I picked a paper up in the hall, and the story was there, printed on the front page, and then I said, I said, "By the way, that was very quick to get it to the censor and back again and have it in print. And this time I said, "They must work all night down there in Washington."
He said, "I don't know whether it had to be censored or not, just about the enemy ships."
That is the first suggestion I got one 318 way or the other about the censorship. Up to that
DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 76716 Ruhe's Tk. - Radford fls. at 11:30.
moment I thought it was sent out, had to go to the censor on the night of the day it was pub- lished. I was back at work on Sunday afternoon.
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DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 76716 ew follows Ruhe at 11:30 a.m. 8-18-42 Witness Johnston
On a Sunday night, that is the night of the day this was published, I was back at work on Sunday afternoon, and on Sunday night, at 9:00 o'clock, Mr. Maxwell, who is the assistant editor, sent for me. It was Mr. Maloney's day off, on Sunday, he wasn't there.
He said, "Look, Johnston, there is some trouble in Washington about the story that was published today about the Japanese fleet."
I said, "What is the trouble?"
He said, "I don't know." He said, "But I just have instructions for you to be in Washington tomorrow morning at 9:00 o'clock to go to the Navy office, and tell them whatever there is to be told about it."
Well, at 9:00 o'clock I rang the airlines here, and the best I could do was a seat on a plane that was leaving at 10:00 o'clock for New York, they couldn't guarantee to get me through from there. So I told them it was urgent business, and that I would leave immediately for the airfield, and would they hold the plane until I got there. You know, you don't always get there in an hour from town.
I got there about a quarter past ten. They did hold the plane up, and I got to New York in the
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plane. I missed a connection with the train in New York, because I think we were late in arriving, or something, but anyhow, I wasn't able to get to Washing- ton until 10:00 o'clock in the morning.
I went over to the Navy office. At the Navy office they took me straight in to meet the Admirals, and they asked me about the story.
Up to the time that they told me the story, I didn't know what the objection was. Nobody else had told me.
So, I told them the story as I could remember it. I was asleep on my feet, because this was the fifth day that I had been running around -- the sixth day, with no more sleep than I caught for an hour at a time.
And Admiral Willson, who is Chief of Staff through Admiral King, said, "Mr. Johnston, you are very tired, I can see that. Why don't you go home and get a sleep, and come back and see me again?"
I said, "Thank you very much. I will."
That is what I did. While I was at home, I got a ring from Mr. Henning, and he said that "The Admirals seemed to think it is a little farfetched that you might have doped those ships out with some
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errors in spelling." I said, "I am going down to see them any- how," and I did, and this time I saw Admiral Willson alone, and I will stand by whatever Admiral Willson says, I have got confidence in him. And among the things I mentioned, I said, "Look, Admiral. There are only four ships in there, and I will tell you how I got their names, and where I got them," and I told him about finding this piece of paper among my stuff, on my desk, which I had made a note of the names from. I said, "I didn't mention it before because I didn't think it was important. I don't know if it is important now or not. But," I said, "that is how I got the names of those ships." So he said, "All right, now. This matter is out of our hands entirely." He said, "I will send this information on. This has no longer got anything to do with us. It is up to the White House, it will make the decision." We then talked about the War in the Pacific generally. The Admiral told me about his sons in the Navy. We talked about the Navy boys generally. He, as an Admiral, has been out of touch withthe boys that are 322
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doing the fighting for a little time, but he is entirely with them. His great interest is, how the boys are getting along. Then, when I was leaving, he came to the door and shook hands with me again. When I went down the next time, he was unable to be present, and Admiral Wilkinson was there, and Admiral Wilkinson gave me a message from Admiral Willson, to say that the Admiral was sorry he could not be along, but if I wanted to see him, he would be in his office afterwards, would I come down there and see him. And, when I was leaving then, Admiral Wilkinson shook hands with me, and I said, "I think Admiral Willson will be at lunch now." It was ten past one. He said, "Yes, I am afraid he is out with Admiral King." I said, "I will not come back after lunch. I will go back to Chicago, if you don't need me." He said, "We don't need you any more." I said, "Right-o. I will go back to Chicago," and I left. Now, I became a citizen of the United States in the last year. There was no profit motive in my becoming a citizen of the United States, and as an 323
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Australian, I could come to the United States at will, and stay here as long as I liked, and work here. I wasn't fleeing from any government that was oppres- sing me. I have worked for United States institutions for years, I like the United States form of government. The Constitution of Australia, as a matter of fact, is founded on the Constitution of the United States. There are one or two differences. Australia has one thing which I do not approve of, and that is that Australia is invisibly attached to England, and there- fore Australians have to -- they get the benefit of and pay the price for any of the weaknesses of Great Britain. They also get the benefits of being members of the Empire. But there are one or two things that do not sit very lightly on me. One of them is that I could never understand in Britain why half the population of that country have such a hard job to make their living. That is why the people come over to America and to Australia and to other countries. There are certain questions about the Empire, about imperialism, which I do not approve of. That does not mean that Britain is wrong, it does not mean that she is right. It just means that it does not fit in
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with me.
The American idea of democracy fits in with me better. This country has firms, American firms, that have employed me, I represented them overseas in responsible positions. I elected to become a citizen of this country here after she went to War. My citizen- ship papers are dated the 15th of December. That is eight days after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
I just wanted you to see that I know that some people want citizenship because it shows them a profit, or because it shows them an escape from some- thing. I didn't. I elected to become a citizen of the United States here because this was the country that suited my ideas, where everybody here has got a chance, regardless of what school he went to, and regardless of who his father was, and I knew my responsibilities at the time I took it up.
Now, when I got back here, I had, for the first time since I joined the newspaper business, a Number One success. I had the best story of a war that has been written. I wasn't a fool, I knew it. I knew that from now on, the sledding would be easy. There was nothing else that I needed to get me placed. I would no longer be a small newspaper man, fighting
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for his opinion. I knew that I had reached a point where I would be able to walk about and write my stories, and get my stuff, and there would be no further fighting.
I want to ask you a question: do you think that, in that situation -- and that was my position the night this story was written -- that I would have written anything or published anything that would break my neck, after I had just got up the ladder? And do you think I am a fool, that I wouldn't know that if I was giving information to the enemy, that it wouldn't, and also that I shouldn't? In the time that I was with the Navy, I got very fond of it. (Pausing.)
And I felt that I was -- excuse me. I felt that I was part of the Navy. I had seen these men getting killed, they were not complaining, they were doing their job, and they were glad to do it. I had hoped that when these stories were finished, that the Navy would accept me. I had promised the boys that I would come back with them, not as a newspaper man, but as one of themselves.
I have a son twenty years of age. The last word I had from my mother was that he had gone with the Australian Army to the war front. He is probably some-
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where up there now where they are fighting. If you think that I would do anything that would hurt the men in the United States Navy, or my son, there is nothing that I can do about it. If I am indicted in this case here, I know I haven't done anything -- there has been no intent, and they tell me there has to be intent. And if there is anything I have done, and I am indicted on this, it will wreck me forever. I know that in court it will be found out, it must; but that doesn't help me. Meanwhile, my son will hear it, everybody else will hear it. It is not only myself, it is the boys of the Navy themselves, that I have been with. I don't want to -- if I have done anything wrong, I should be penalized for it, but I think there is such a thing as intent.
That's all I want to say. Thank you.
THE FOREMAN: Q Mr. Johnston, you will kindly remain on the outside there for perhaps some further question- ing from the Jury? Don't leave until after we shall call you again. Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
MR. MILLER: Thank you.
(Witness retires from the Grand Jury room.)
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THE FOREMAN: We have heard the testimony of Mr. Johnston. I might suggest that we not allow ourselves to be moved away from nor toward any opinion. Suppose we allow ourselves to be governed by our own common sense and judgment, and from the evidence as presented on both sides, considering, of course, the statement as presented by Mr. Johnston.
As a Juror, we don't want to be partial one way or the other, but this is just my opinion, and I think you will agree with me if we render what we con- sider a just decision, whether it be for or against, I think there will be no complaint.
MR. MILLER: After all, Mr. Chairman, you do not sit here as a petty jury, and, as
[DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 76716]
(Whereupon, Mr. Miller and the Reporter retired from the Grand Jury room, to which they were later recalled, together with Mr. Maloney.)
THE FOREMAN: Do you think that what you have to say will consume more than half an hour? We want to adjourn for lunch.
MR. MALONEY: No. Barring cross-examination, and questions by the Jury, I think I can finish up by 12:30, maybe before that, I don't know. I don't know what ques- tions will be asked.
THE FOREMAN: We are not going to ask you any ques- tions just now.
J. LOY MALONEY, called as a witness by the Grand Jury, having been first duly sworn by the Foreman to testify the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, was examined and testified as follows:
EXAMINATION BY MR. MILLER:
Q You are Mr. J. Loy Maloney, Managing Editor of The Chicago Tribune?
A Yes, sir.
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