FBI Evidence re USS Barnett, July 1, 1942

Source: FBI Evidence re USS Barnett, July 1, 1942 Date: Jul 1, 1942 Archive: NARA, RG-60, Case File 146-7-23-25, box 1, file: “Serial 7, August 14, 1942 (2 of 2).” Collection: Secrecy And Leaks: When The U.S. Government Prosecuted The Chicago Tribune Oct 25, 2017

Editorial Analysis

Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.

A Leaked Dispatch and a Journalist’s Reputation

The FBI file dated July 1 1942 is a routine counter‑intelligence interview, but its context places it at the heart of the first major American press‑military clash of World War II. Lieutenant C. J. Van Arsdall, a former assistant gunnery officer of the destroyer USS Barnett, was questioned in Norman, Oklahoma, after a sensational article by Chicago Tribune reporter Stanley Johnston claimed that U.S. intelligence had foreknowledge of Japanese moves toward Alaska and Midway. The “secret dispatch” Van Arsdall references was a classified radio message transmitted to the Barnett on May 31, 1942—just weeks before the Battle of Midway. The FBI’s concern was not that the dispatch itself had been compromised, but that a civilian journalist appeared to have obtained its contents without any obvious chain of custody.

The interview reveals the FBI’s investigative logic. Van Arsdall is asked to identify every officer who might have seen the message, and he repeatedly insists that Johnston was never present in the radio or code rooms where such material was handled. He also notes that a silhouette book of Japanese warships—another piece of classified material—was handed to an officer of the USS Lexington, apparently at the request of its executive officer. The report records a rumor that Johnston claimed to have seen the message “lying on a table aboard the U.S.S. Barnett,” a statement that Van Arsdall could not corroborate. By documenting these denials, the FBI built a paper trail showing that no direct link between the ship’s code rooms and the journalist could be established.

The Broader Espionage Narrative

The incident sits within a larger wartime pattern of heightened sensitivity to leaks. After Pearl Harbor, the U.S. government instituted strict controls over operational intelligence, especially signals intelligence (SIGINT) derived from the newly established “Magic” decryption effort. Any suggestion that such secrets were reaching the press threatened both morale and operational security. The Johnston case thus became a test of how aggressively the FBI would pursue alleged leaks, even when the evidence was circumstantial.

Johnston’s article, published in late June 1942, warned that Japanese forces were likely to strike Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands—predictions that proved prescient with the Battle of the Aleutian Islands later that summer. While the Tribune’s reporting was praised for its foresight, the Navy and War Department feared that the source of the information could be a breach of cryptographic security. The FBI’s file shows that the investigation was not limited to the Navy; copies were sent to field offices in Seattle, Norfolk, Washington, San Diego, Oklahoma City, and San Francisco, indicating a coordinated inter‑service effort to locate the leak.

What the File Reveals Beyond the Words

The document’s language—particularly the repeated emphasis that Van Arsdall “does not remember” certain officers and “never saw” Johnston—suggests a cautious approach. The FBI was aware that an over‑zealous accusation could damage a reputable journalist’s career and provoke a press backlash. By focusing on the absence of direct contact, the agents created a factual baseline that could later be used either to exonerate Johnston or to justify further surveillance if new evidence emerged.

The mention of the “silhouette book of Japanese naval craft” is also telling. Such visual identification aids were classified because they revealed what the Navy knew about enemy ship classes, information that could be inferred from intercepted communications. The fact that an officer from the Lexington requested it, and that Van Arsdall complied, hints at a routine internal exchange of intelligence among fleet units—an exchange that, if observed by an outsider, could appear as a leak.

Legacy and Contemporary Relevance

The Johnston episode foreshadowed later, more famous confrontations between the press and the intelligence community, such as the Pentagon Papers and the WikiLeaks disclosures. It illustrates an early instance of the government’s willingness to mobilize the FBI to protect wartime secrets, a practice that would become institutionalized during the Cold War. Moreover, the file’s declassification in the 1970s, and its resurfacing in the National Security Archive’s 2017 collection, underscores how archival releases continue to shape our understanding of the balance between national security and a free press.

For modern readers, the Van Arsdall interview is a reminder that the line between legitimate reporting and perceived espionage has long been contested. The FBI’s meticulous documentation of who was where, and who said what, provides a rare glimpse into the procedural side of wartime counter‑intelligence—an aspect often obscured by the dramatic headlines of the era.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76716

STANLEY JOHNSTON                                       O.C. 65-692

VAN ARSDALL was questioned closely as to the persons that
were present at the time of his discussion of the contents of this secret
message. VAN ARSDALL stated that he was positive that STANLEY JOHNSTON
was not present.

VAN ARSDALL further stated that he and other officers of both
the U.S.S. Barnett and the U.S.S. Lexington after the publication of the
article written by STANLEY JOHNSTON of the impending Japanese action at
Alaska and Midway often discussed among themselves how JOHNSTON could have
obtained this information but all were unable to figure it out.

VAN ARSDALL also stated that at no time during the cruise did
he see STANLEY JOHNSTON near the radio room or code room of the U.S.S. Barnett
where all confidential and secret matters are kept.

VAN ARSDALL stated that he did hear a rumor that JOHNSTON
made a statement to some unknown person that he, JOHNSTON, saw the message
lying on a table aboard the U.S.S. Barnett.

VAN ARSDALL stated that he does not remember the name of the
Officer of the U.S.S. Lexington who obtained from him the silhouette book of
the Japanese naval craft, but he went on to state that Lieutenant
DANIEL BONTECOU was with the U.S.S. Lexington Officer when BONTECOU and the
Officer came to VAN ARSDALL'S quarters and asked for the silhouette book of
the Japanese naval craft, and the U.S.S. Lexington Officer told VAN ARSDALL
that the executive officer of the U.S.S. Lexington wanted this book.

Lieutenant VAN ARSDALL stated that he was never in the
quarters of Commander SELIGMAN all during the cruise.

REFERRED UPON COMPLETION TO THE OFFICE OF ORIGIN

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