U.S.S. Barnett Report to Commander, Western Sea Frontier, re Conveyance of Survivors from U.S.S. Lexington, June 9, 1942
National Security Archive
A 1942 Navy memo links a Chicago Tribune reporter’s Coral Sea story to a lax decoding watch aboard USS Barnett, exposing how wartime staff shortages bred a security breach.
Source: U.S.S. Barnett Report to Commander, Western Sea Frontier, re Conveyance of Survivors from U.S.S. Lexington, June 9, 1942 Date: Jun 9, 1942 Archive: NARA, RG-60, Case File 146-7-23-25, box 1, folder: “Serial 5: June 24-June 30, 1942.” Collection: Secrecy And Leaks: When The U.S. Government Prosecuted The Chicago Tribune Oct 25, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A Shipboard Leak in the Aftermath of the Coral Sea
The report dated 9 June 1942 is a terse, internally‑circulated memorandum from the commanding officer of USS Barnett to the commander of the Western Sea Frontier. Its purpose was to document an inquiry into how a highly classified Pacific Fleet dispatch—identified only as “311221 of May 1942”—may have been exposed to civilian journalist Stanley Johnston of the Chicago Tribune. The inquiry was triggered by the Tribune’s sensational story on 15 May 1942, which described the rescue of Lexington survivors and hinted at details of the Battle of the Coral Sea that had not yet been released to the public.
The memorandum reveals the chain of events that allowed Lexington’s decoding staff, temporarily transferred to Barnett to assist with survivor transport, to read and possibly share the secret dispatch. Because of a shortage of qualified cryptographers, Barnett had not been decoding “Fox Schedule” messages that were not addressed to her. When Lexington officers came aboard, Executive Officer Lt. Cmdr. M.T. Seligman asked Barnett’s captain to let the five Lexington decoding officers run a watch and decode the same fleet‑wide traffic they were accustomed to handling. The request was granted, and the Lexington officers—including Lt.(jg) P.C. Brewer and several ensigns—were given access to the locked decoding room, the secret folder, and the routine of showing decoded messages to department heads.
The report’s most damning paragraph records Seligman’s own admission that he had been authorized on Lexington to show “all secret messages and letters” to Mr. Johnston. The Barnett commander notes that he did not treat the comment seriously at the time, but the internal investigation now concludes that it is “probable that the subject named despatch was shown to Mr. Johnston by a member of the USS Lexington organization.” The language is careful: the document does not claim definitive proof, but it links the journalist’s presence on board, the relaxed security procedures, and Seligman’s casual statement to the leak.
The Broader Context: Information Warfare in the Early Pacific War
The incident sits at the intersection of two crucial wartime dynamics. First, the Battle of the Coral Sea (4–8 May 1942) was the first carrier‑versus‑carrier engagement and a strategic turning point; the U.S. Navy’s success halted Japanese expansion toward Port Moresby. The Admiralty’s desire to keep operational details secret was acute, both to protect future tactics and to manage public morale. Second, the U.S. press, still largely self‑censoring under the “code of the war,” was beginning to test the limits of that restraint. Stanley Johnston, a war correspondent with a reputation for aggressive reporting, was embedded on the rescue ship to obtain a human‑interest story, but he also sought the operational narrative that would sell papers.
The Barnett report illustrates how wartime personnel shortages forced improvisation that compromised security. The Navy’s reliance on a handful of qualified cryptographers meant that when Lexington’s crew was reassigned, the usual segregation of “need‑to‑know” information collapsed. The document’s description of the decoding room—locked safes, limited access, and the practice of burning tapes after use—shows that standard protocols existed, yet they were overridden by an ad‑hoc decision to accommodate the Lexington officers. The report implicitly acknowledges a cultural tension: senior officers like Seligman viewed the sharing of decoded traffic with department heads as “customary,” while the higher‑level command saw it as a breach.
Legacy and Why It Still Matters
Declassified in the 1970s, the Barnett memorandum became part of the National Security Archive’s collection on press‑military relations, and it resurfaced in the 2017 “Secrecy and Leaks” exhibition that examined the 1945 prosecution of the Chicago Tribune for publishing the “Trinity” nuclear test story. The Lexington leak is a lesser‑known antecedent that demonstrates how even well‑intentioned information sharing can undermine operational security.
For contemporary readers, the document offers a cautionary tale about the fragility of classified information in coalition or joint‑operation environments. Modern cyber‑warfare and open‑source intelligence amplify the same risk: a single journalist embedded with a unit can, through informal conversations, obtain insights that were meant to be confined to a handful of analysts. The Barnett report reminds us that the balance between transparency and secrecy has always been negotiated on the deck of a ship, and that the human element—casual remarks, assumptions of “custom”—often proves the weakest link.
In sum, the Barnett report is not merely a bureaucratic footnote; it is a window onto the early Pacific war’s information battles, the Navy’s internal security culture, and the enduring challenge of protecting secrets in a media‑saturated age.
DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 76716
U. S. S. BARNETT
June 9, 1942.
AP11/ Serial
From: The Commanding Officer. To: Commander Western Sea Frontier. Subject: Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet Secret despatch 311221 of May 1942; Report of Investigation Regarding Compromising and Decoding of.
In accordance with verbal instructions of Commander Western Sea Frontier an investigation of the subject matter has been conducted by the commanding officer and a report of this investigation is contained in the following paragraphs.
Stanley Johnston of the Chicago Tribune reported on board the U.S.S. BARNETT on May 15, 1942, with the officers and men of the U.S.S. LEXINGTON. Mr. Johnston was assigned to a room with Commander M.T. SELIGMAN, USN., the Executive Officer of the U.S.S. LEXINGTON and Commander H.S. DUCKWORTH, USN., the Air Officer of the U.S.S. LEXINGTON.
The Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. BARNETT did not see or speak to Mr. Johnston during the period he was on board and the Executive Officer and Communication Officer of the U.S.S. BARNETT only had slight conversations with him and gave him no information.
Due to the shortage of qualified officer personnel it has not been the practice of the ship to decode Fox Schedule messages which were not addressed to the ship. After the U.S.S. LEXINGTON officers reported on board the Executive Officer of the LEXINGTON, Commander SELIGMAN, proposed to the Commanding Officer that he utilize the five qualified decoding officers of the U.S.S. LEXINGTON for a communication decoding watch and that they be permitted to decode Fox Schedule messages concerning impending fleet action in the Pacific as was customary on the U.S.S. LEXINGTON. The Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. BARNETT then established a decoding watch composed of the five qualified LEXINGTON decoding officers.
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DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 76716
U.S.S. BARNETT
SECRET Subject: Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet Secret despatch 311221 of May 1942; Report of Investigation Regarding Compromising and Decoding of.
Commander SELIGMAN stated that it was customary on the U.S.S. LEXINGTON for the Executive Officer and department heads to see all decoded Fox Schedule messages and requested that this same arrangement be permitted on the U.S.S. BARNETT. This was agreed to as it was proposed by a responsible officer.
The following U.S.S. LEXINGTON officers were assigned to the decoding watch:
Lt(jg) P.C. BREWER, NR Ens. J.B. JOHNSON, NR Ens. GY. McKINNON, NR Ens. R.E. HEINLER, NR Ens. E.H. RAILSBACK, NR
One or more of the above officers decoded the subject named despatch and all probably read it. This despatch was also seen by the Captain of the U.S.S. BARNETT, the Executive Officer, the Communication Officer and possibly the Assistant Gunnery Officer of the U.S.S. BARNETT, as well as the following officers from the U.S.S. LEXINGTON: Comdr. M.T. SELIGMAN, USN Lt Comdr A.F. JUNKIN, USN Comdr. H.S. DUCKWORTH, USN
- The security measures on the U.S.S. BARNETT for the handling of secret messages of this character consist of: (a) A locked decoding room containing a ECM decoding machine in a Type 8 Safe and a three-combination lock safe to which only [illegible] designated decoding officers and the ship's Communication Officer have access. (b) The decoded messages are not copied but the tape is pasted on a sheet of paper and placed in a secret folder. (c) The secret folder containing the messages was then delivered to the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. BARNETT by the Communication Officer, who also showed it to the Executive Officer of the U.S.S. BARNETT. The secret folder was then turned over to Lieut(jg) P.C. BREWER, NR, the senior U.S.S. LEXINGTON decoding officer, who in turn was to show it to the Executive Officer and heads of departments of the U.S.S. LEXINGTON.
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[DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 76716]
U. S. S. BARNETT
Subject: Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet Secret despatch 311221 of May 1942; Report of Investigation Regarding Compromising and Decoding of.
(cont) (d) It was thoroughly understood by the Executive Officer of the U.S.S. LEXINGTON that the LEXINGTON officers to whom these messages would be shown were himself and the three heads of departments. (e) When the messages had served their purpose they were burned by the Communication Officer of the U.S.S. BARNETT.
It has come to the attention of the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. BARNETT that Commander M.T. SELIGMAN, USN., the Executive Officer of the U.S.S. LEXINGTON made a statement in substance as follows: to Lieut(jg) D. BONTECOU, NR, the Communication Officer of the U.S.S. BARNETT that he had been authorized on the U.S.S. LEXINGTON to show all secret messages and letters to Mr. Johnston." The Communication Officer of the U.S.S. BARNETT did not pay much attention to this statement at the time as it came out in a general conversation being conducted. In view of the above it seems probable that the subject named despatch was shown to Mr. Johnston by a member of the U.S.S. LEXINGTON organization. The U.S.S. LEXINGTON officers would appear to have justified such a disclosure in view of the fact that Mr. Johnston had been permitted to witness a large sea battle and become familiar with the details of the naval operations connected therewith.
Commander M.T. SELIGMAN, the Executive Officer of the U.S.S. LEXINGTON, had in his possession a copy of the secret report of the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. LEXINGTON regarding the loss of his ship, and while on board prepared a complete tracing of the Coral Sea Battle and its attended operation. If Mr. Johnston was shown the subject named despatch he was probably also shown the above reports and tracings.
W. B. PHILLIPS
NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
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