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U.S.S. Barnett Report to Commander, Western Sea Frontier, re Decoding of May 31 Midway Message, June 8, 1942

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National Security Archive

May 25, 20266 min read

A 1942 Navy memo reveals how a secret Midway dispatch was decoded on the USS Lexington and shown to a reporter, exposing the informal chain of authorization that sparked a landmark press‑military showdown.

Source: U.S.S. Barnett Report to Commander, Western Sea Frontier, re Decoding of May 31 Midway Message, June 8, 1942 Date: Jun 8, 1942 Archive: NARA, RG-60, Case File 146-7-23-25, box 1, folder: “Serial 5, June 24-June 30, 1942.” Collection: Secrecy And Leaks: When The U.S. Government Prosecuted The Chicago Tribune Oct 25, 2017


Editorial Analysis

Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.

Decoding a Secret Dispatch: The USS Barnett’s Role in the Midway Leak

The memorandum dated 8 June 1942 is a routine‑looking after‑action report from the destroyer USS Barnett to the commander of the Western Sea Frontier. Its purpose was to document how a classified CINCPAC dispatch—later identified as the May 31 Midway message—was decoded aboard the carrier USS Lexington and shown to civilian reporter Stanley Johnston of the Chicago Tribune. The report was generated in the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Midway, when the U.S. Navy was still scrambling to understand how the Japanese plan had been foiled and how sensitive operational details were reaching the press.

The document belongs to the broader episode of wartime press‑military relations that erupted after the Tribune published a front‑page story on 5 June 1942 describing the Japanese attack on Midway before the Navy had officially released any account. The story, based on Johnston’s observations while embedded on the Lexington, contained details that the Navy considered “secret” because they revealed the timing and disposition of forces. The Navy’s response was swift: a series of investigations, court‑martial proceedings, and a high‑profile trial that ended with Johnston’s conviction for violating the Espionage Act. The Barnett report is a small but crucial piece of that investigative puzzle, showing how the Navy internally justified the exposure of a classified dispatch to a civilian journalist.

Key actors emerge clearly. Commander M.T. Seligman, the Lexington’s executive officer, is portrayed as the catalyst who “authorized” the showing of the secret dispatch to Johnston, a claim that the report attempts to couch in procedural language (“it was generally known to be the practice on vessels during the time important operations affecting the whole fleet”). Lieutenant‑junior grade D. Bontecou, the ship’s communications officer, records Seligman’s statement verbatim, underscoring the chain of consent that the Navy later used to argue that the leak was not a rogue act but an authorized briefing. The report also lists the Lexington officers who actually performed the decoding—Lt (jg) F.C. Brewer, Ens J.B. Johnson, Ens G.Y. McKinnon, and Ens R.E. Hebbler—providing a paper trail that could be used to attribute responsibility.

Reading between the lines, the memorandum reveals a tension between operational security and the Navy’s desire to keep its officers occupied during a period of intense media scrutiny. Paragraph 4 notes that Seligman’s proposal to let Lexington communications officers handle the decoding “would keep the passenger officers busy,” suggesting a pragmatic, perhaps careless, attitude toward secrecy. Moreover, the report’s emphasis on the commanding officer’s “consent” and the claim that the practice was “generally known” hints at an attempt to retroactively legitimize a breach that, in hindsight, proved costly.

The significance of the Barnett report extends beyond the immediate scandal. It illustrates how wartime information control relied on informal understandings among senior officers, a system vulnerable to individual judgment calls. The document also foreshadows the post‑war legal battles over press freedom and national security that would shape the First Amendment jurisprudence of the Cold War era. By documenting the chain of authorization, the Navy created a paper record that would be cited in the prosecution’s case against Johnston, reinforcing the narrative that the leak was not a spontaneous act of a rogue journalist but the result of an authorized, albeit poorly managed, briefing.

Legacy-wise, the Barnett memorandum is a reminder that the line between transparent reporting and operational compromise is often drawn in the sand of internal memos and after‑action reports. Its declassification allows historians to trace the procedural logic that underpinned the Navy’s response to the Tribune leak, offering insight into how military institutions balance the demands of the press with the imperatives of secrecy—a balance still contested in today’s digital age.


Page 1

DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 76716 SECRET File No. U. S. S. BARNETT % Postmaster New York City, N. Y. 8 JUNE 1942 MEMORANDUM TO THE COMMANDER WESTERN SEA FRONTIER: SUBJECT: CINCPAC SECRET DISPATCH 311221 OF MAY ; DECODING OF. 1 . Stanley Johnston of Chicago Tribune reported on board May 15,1942 and was assigned to a room with Commander M.T. Seligman and Commander H.S.Duckworth USN ,Lexington Officers. 2 . Since the detachment of Comtransemphibforlant and later Comtransdiv 17 , it has not been the practice to decode fox schedule messages not addressed the ship and force to which attached. 3 . When Lexington Officers including communication personell reported on board, it was proposed by Executive Officer of that ship ,Commander M.T.Seligman USN,that the Lexington communication Officers take over the communication decoding which duties they had been performing on the Lexington. This was agreed to by the Commanding Officer, as it would keep the passenger Officers busy. 4. The following Lexington Officers were assigned this duty.Lt(jg) F.C.Brewer ,NR Ens J.B.Johnson ,NR Ens G.Y. McKinnon, NR Ens R.E. Hebbler,NR One of the above Officers decoded the subject named dispatch. 5.At the specific request of Commander Seligman this dispatch was shown to Lexington heads of departments consisting ofL Lt Cmdr A.F.Junker USN Commander H.S.Duckworth USN The ships Officers who saw this message were Captain ,Executive Officer ,and Communication Officer. 6. The Commanding Officer consented to the decoding of this message and its being shown to these Officers as he was assured by Commander Seligman that this was the practice on the Lexington and is generally known to be the practice on vessels during the time important operations affecting the whole fleet

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DECLASSIFIED Authority NWD 76716

(PAGE 2)

U.S.S. BARNETT % Postmaster New York City, N. Y.

File No.

  1. The Commanding Officer did not see or speak to Mr. Stanley Johnston and the Executive Officer and Communication Officer only had very meager conversation with him and gave him no information.

  2. The Communication Officer of this ship Lt(jg)D.Bontecou USNR states that Commander M.T.Seligman USN made the following statement to him ,the substance of which is about as follows: " That he had been authorized to show secret messages and letters to Mr Johnston". The Communication Officer [illegible] did not pay much attention to the statement at the time and of course does not know what Commander Seligman told Mr Johnston.

  3. The messgge was never out of the hands of [illegible] an Officer.

Page 3

NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE

National Security Archive, Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University, 2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037, Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu

Keywords

declassifiedNational Security ArchiveSecrecy And Leaks: When The U.S. Government Prosecuted The Chicago Tribune Oct 252017

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