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Department of the Navy, OPNAV Notice 5400: Realignment of Administrative Command of US Fleet Cyber Command Subordinate Activities , September 2014. Unclassified.

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National Security Archive

May 25, 202610 min read

A 2014 Navy memo quietly reshuffled dozens of cyber units under a new Information Dominance Force, marking a turning point in how the service organized its digital warfighting assets.

Source: Department of the Navy, OPNAV Notice 5400: Realignment of Administrative Command of US Fleet Cyber Command Subordinate Activities , September 2014. Unclassified. Date: Sep 1, 2014 Archive: Cryptome Collection: Cyber Vault: Costs of a NYC Blackout Oct 18, 2017


Editorial Analysis

Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.

Realigning the Navy’s Cyber Backbone

In September 2014 the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations issued OPNAV Notice 5400, a terse administrative memo that re‑channeled the administrative control (ADCON) of a sprawling list of cyber‑related units from U.S. Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM) to the newly christened Navy Information Dominance Force (NAVIDFOR). The notice was not a policy declaration so much as a bureaucratic implementation of a decision already approved by the Secretary of the Navy earlier that year. Its immediate purpose was to shift responsibility for manning, training, and equipping the nation’s maritime information‑warfare assets onto a single “information dominance” type commander, while leaving operational command untouched.

The memo arrived at a moment when the Navy was grappling with how to integrate its growing cyber capabilities into a traditional force‑structure that still revolved around ships, submarines, and aviation. The 2013 creation of U.S. Fleet Cyber Command, co‑located with U.S. Tenth Fleet, had given the service an operational headquarters for offensive and defensive cyber missions, but the administrative side—budget, personnel, and logistics—remained scattered across a patchwork of commands: Naval Network Warfare Command, the Naval Satellite Operations Center, dozens of Navy Information Operations Centers (NIOCs) around the globe, and a constellation of Naval Computer and Telecommunications stations. The OPNAV notice simply consolidated that administrative mess under NAVIDFOR, a re‑branding of the former Navy Cyber Forces.

The Broader Cyber‑Era Re‑Organization

The realignment is part of a larger, Navy‑wide effort that began in 2013 to rename “Cyber Forces” as “Information Dominance Force.” The terminology shift reflects a doctrinal evolution: rather than viewing cyber as a niche specialty, the Navy sought to embed information superiority—encompassing cyber, electronic warfare, signals intelligence, and network operations—into the core of its warfighting concept. This mirrors the 2011 Joint Chiefs of Staff publication “Joint Vision 2020,” which called for dominance in the information environment as a prerequisite for future conflict. By moving ADCON to NAVIDFOR, the Navy aimed to ensure that the same headquarters that planned, trained, and equipped information‑dominance forces would also have a clear line of authority over the myriad shore‑based units that sustain those forces.

The notice lists more than forty subordinate activities, ranging from the Global Network Operations Center in Suffolk, Va., to satellite stations in Bahrain and Japan, and from NIOCs in the United Kingdom to detachments in Australia and South Korea. The geographic spread underscores how the Navy’s information‑dominance posture is truly global, supporting fleet operations from the Atlantic to the Pacific and even in forward‑deployed sites such as Guantanamo Bay and Diego Garcia. The document’s dry enumeration of units hides a strategic reality: each of those commands is a node in a network that provides the data, communications, and cyber‑defensive services essential to modern naval operations.

What the Memo Reveals About Decision‑Making

Although the notice is procedural, its language hints at the power dynamics within the Navy’s staff. The signature of S. H. Swift, Director of Navy Staff, signals that the realignment was driven from the highest echelons of the CNO’s office, bypassing the traditional chain that would have involved the Fleet Forces Command and the Tenth Fleet in a more consultative fashion. The memo also explicitly states that there are “no infrastructure changes,” suggesting that the move was intended to be a paper re‑assignment rather than a physical relocation of assets—an efficient way to align budgetary and personnel processes without disrupting ongoing operations.

By retaining operational responsibility with FLTCYBERCOM, the Navy preserved the combat‑ready command that could task those units for missions, while NAVIDFOR took on the “supporting commander” role for readiness and sustainment. This bifurcated model reflects a compromise: operational commanders need rapid, flexible control of cyber assets, but the bureaucratic apparatus that fields and maintains those assets benefits from a single, unified authority.

Legacy and Contemporary Relevance

The 2014 realignment set the administrative foundation for the Navy’s later creation of the Information Warfare Community (IWC) and the 2021 establishment of the Navy Information Warfare Command (NAVWAR). Those later reforms built on the premise that information dominance is a single, integrated enterprise rather than a collection of siloed programs. The OPNAV notice, therefore, is a key procedural link in the chain that led to today’s NAVWAR, which now oversees everything from cyber operations to space‑based communications.

For scholars of military bureaucracy, the document illustrates how strategic shifts often begin with modest administrative orders. It also reminds us that the evolution of cyber power in the U.S. armed forces is as much about reshaping organizational charts as it is about developing new technologies. As the Navy continues to confront contested cyber and space domains, the 2014 realignment remains a reference point for how the service translates doctrinal ambition into concrete, if paperwork‑heavy, institutional change.


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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

Canc frp: Sep 2014

OPNAVNOTE 5400
Ser DNS-33/14U102316
29 Sep 2014

OPNAV NOTICE 5400

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: REALIGNMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE COMMAND OF U.S. FLEET CYBER
COMMAND SUBORDINATE ACTIVITIES

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5400.44A
     (b) OPNAVINST 5400.45

1. Purpose. To implement Secretary of the Navy approval of the
realignment of administrative control (ADCON) of U.S. Fleet
Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM) subordinate activities, per
reference (a).

2. Background. This action is part of a larger request to
rename Navy Cyber Forces to Navy Information Dominance Force
(NAVIDFOR) and to realign the ADCON of all FLTCYBERCOM and
Office of Naval Intelligence subordinate commands under NAVIDFOR
as an information dominance type commander. There are no
infrastructure changes as a result of this action, but NAVIDFOR
will assume responsibility for all manning, training and
equipping of information dominance forces. A support
relationship between FLTCYBERCOM (supported commander) and
NAVIDFOR (supporting commander) is established by this action.
NAVIDFOR provides ADCON support for these activities assigned
"mission support" to FLTCYBERCOM. FLTCYBERCOM has operational
responsibility for these activities, including immediate
superior in command and reporting senior responsibilities.
NAVIDFOR and FLTCYBERCOM will work integrated solutions to
achieve unit readiness to meet mission requirements.

3. Organizational Changes. The ADCON of the following
activities will move from FLTCYBERCOM to NAVIDFOR effective 1
October 2014:

     Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command, Suffolk, VA
     (69235)
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OPNAVNOTE 5400 29 Sep 2014

(Officer in Charge, Naval Network Warfare Command Global Network Operations Center Detachment, Suffolk, VA (4278A) Commanding Officer, Naval Satellite Operations Center, Point Mugu, CA (63200) (Officer in Charge, NAVSOC Det ALPHA, Prospect Harbor, (ME) (30316) (Officer in Charge, NAVSOC Det CHARLIE, Finegayan, Guam) (30312) (Officer in Charge, NAVSOC Det DELTA, Boulder, CO) (46458) Commanding Officer, Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command, Suffolk, VA (3029A) Commanding Officer, Navy Information Operations Command (NIOC) Sugar Grove, Sugar Grove, WV (31188) (Disest 30 Sep 15) Commanding Officer, NIOC Pensacola, Pensacola, FL (46828) Commanding Officer, U.S. NIOC, Menwith Hill, UK (41725) (Officer in Charge, U.S. Navy Information Operation Detachment (NIOD), Digby, UK) (39899) Commanding Officer, NIOC Colorado, Aurora, CO (49763) Commanding Officer, NIOC Georgia, Fort Gordon, GA (41246) Commanding Officer, NIOC Maryland, Fort George G. Meade, MD (62936) (Officer in Charge, U.S. NIOD Alice Springs, NT (Australia) (32224) Commanding Officer, U.S. NIOC, Yokosuka, Japan (69027) Commanding Officer, NIOC Texas, San Antonio, TX (49721) Commanding Officer, U.S. NIOC, Misawa, Japan (66752) (Officer in Charge, U.S. NIOD, Seoul, Korea) (46452) Commanding Officer, NIOC, Norfolk, VA (55722) (Officer in Charge, NIOD Groton, Groton, CT) (65991) (Officer in Charge, NIOD Dam Neck, Virginia Beach, VA) (47889) Commanding Officer, NIOC Whidbey Island, Oak Harbor, WA (30574) Commanding Officer, NIOC, San Diego, CA (55721) Commanding Officer, NIOC Hawaii, Schofield Barracks, HI (43456) (Officer in Charge, NIOD, Marine Corps Base Kaneohe Bay, (HI) (44594) Commanding Officer, U.S. NIOC, Bahrain (48035) Commanding Officer, Navy Cyber Warfare Development Group, Washington, DC (46439) Commanding Officer, Naval Computer and Telecommunications

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OPNAVNOTE 5400 29 Sep 2014

Area Master Station (NCTAMS) Atlantic, Norfolk, VA (70272) (Director, U.S. NCTAMS LANT Det, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) (31542) (Officer in Charge, NCTAMS LANT Det Hampton Roads, Norfolk, VA) (39146) (Director, NCTAMS LANT Det, Cutler, ME) (63038) (Officer in Charge, U.S. NCTAMS LANT Det Keflavik, Iceland) (63143) (Officer in Charge, U.S. NCTAMS Atlantic Det, Rota, Spain) (63182) (Officer in Charge, U.S NCTAMS Atlantic Det, Souda Bay, Greece) (32526) (Officer in Charge, NCTAMS LANT Navy Marine Corps (Intranet Det, Norfolk, VA) (4139A) Director, Forces Surveillance Support Center, Chesapeake, VA (45854) Commanding Officer, Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station (NAVCOMTELSTA), Jacksonville, FL (68734) (Officer in Charge, NAVCOMTELSTA Jacksonville Det, Key West, FL) (63425) Commanding Officer, U.S. NAVCOMTELSTA Sicily, Sigonella, IT (68893) Commanding Officer, U.S. NAVCOMTELSTA, Bahrain (49957) Commanding Officer, U.S. NAVCOMTELSTA, Naples, Italy (70294) Commanding Officer, NCTAMS Pacific, Honolulu, HI (00950) (Officer in Charge, NCTAMS Pacific Det Puget Sound, Silverdale, WA) (68660) Commanding Officer, NAVCOMTELSTA, San Diego, CA (70240) (Officer in Charge, NAVCOMTELSTA San Diego Det Naval Strategic Communications Unit (STRATCOMMU), Tinker AFB, Oklahoma City, OK) (49658) (Petty Officer in Charge, NAVCOMTELSTA San Diego Det Naval STRATCOMMU, Fairfield, CA) (49657) (Petty Officer in Charge, NAVCOMTELSTA San Diego Det Naval STRATCOMMU, Patuxent River, MD) (49659) Commanding Officer, U.S. NAVCOMTELSTA, Guam, Marianas Islands (70243) Commanding Officer, U.S. NAVCOMTELSTA Far East, Yokosuka, Japan (70278) (Officer in Charge, U.S. NAVCOMTELSTA Far East Det Diego Garcia British Indian Ocean Territory) (68073) (Officer in Charge, U.S. NAVCOMTELSTA Far East Det, Misawa, JA) (42211)

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OPNAVNOTE 5400 29 Sep 2014

(Officer in Charge, U.S. NAVCOMTELSTA Far East Det, Atsugi, JA) (33217) (Officer in Charge, U.S. NAVCOMTELSTA Far East Det, Okinawa, JA) (33261) (Officer in Charge, U.S. NAVCOMTELSTA Far East Det, Sasebo, JA) (48542) (Officer in Charge, U.S. NAVCOMTELSTA Far East Det, Chinhae, KOR) (41231)

  1. Action a. Commander, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command and Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command will take appropriate action, consistent with reference (a), to realign the ADCON of the commands listed above to NAVIDFOR.

    b. Director, Navy Staff Organization and Management Branch (DNS-33) will revise reference (b) per the realignment shown in this notice.

  2. Records Management. Records created as a result of this notice, regardless of media or format, shall be managed per Secretary of the Navy Manual 5210.1 of January 2012.

  3. Cancellation Contingency. This notice will remain in effect for 1 year or until superseded, whichever occurs first. The organization action will remain effective until changed by Director, Navy Staff.

S. H. SWIFT Director, Navy Staff

Distribution: Electronic only, via Department of the Navy Issuances Web site http://doni.documentservices.dla.mil

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NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE

National Security Archive, Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University, 2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037, Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu

Keywords

declassifiedNational Security ArchiveCyber Vault: Costs of a NYC Blackout Oct 182017

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