CIA Inspector General, "Handling of Raw Intelligence Information During Cuban Arms Build-up," 12 November 1962, Top Secret, with comments by Director of Central Intelligence John McCone, excised copy
National Security Archive
A 1962 CIA Inspector General audit reveals how internal bans and procedural bottlenecks may have slowed the flow of raw intelligence during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Source: CIA Inspector General, "Handling of Raw Intelligence Information During Cuban Arms Build-up," 12 November 1962, Top Secret, with comments by Director of Central Intelligence John McCone, excised copy Date: Nov 12, 1962 Archive: CIA MDR release, under appeal Collection: The Cuban Missile Crisis at 55 Oct 16, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
Inspector General Scrutiny in the Heat of the Crisis
On 5 November 1962, as the world teetered on the brink of nuclear war, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone summoned the CIA’s Inspector General, J.S. Earman, to audit how raw intelligence on Cuba’s burgeoning Soviet‑supplied armament was being handled. The resulting report, dated 12 November, and the accompanying set of McCone’s marginal comments reveal a bureaucratic struggle that ran parallel to the public drama of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The memo is not a narrative of missile sites; it is a procedural audit. Earman’s task was to trace the flow of “raw” data—from U‑2 overflights and early photographic analysis to the internal distribution of clandestine reports—during the critical window from early August through mid‑October 1962. McCone’s annotations expose his concern that the agency’s own internal controls—particularly a “publications ban” that required presidential clearance before any analysis of offensive weapons could be circulated—might have delayed or muted warning signals about medium‑range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) on the island.
The Wider Episode: From Covert Surveillance to Open Confrontation
The document belongs to the broader episode of the Cuban Missile Crisis, a 13‑day confrontation that forced the United States to confront the reality of Soviet strategic rockets just 90 miles from Florida. While the crisis is usually framed in terms of presidential decision‑making and diplomatic brinkmanship, the IG’s review reminds us that the crisis was first detected through a series of technical intelligence operations: U‑2 flights (the “29 August mission”), photographic interpretation by the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), and clandestine reports from the CIA’s Clandestine Services.
Earman’s inventory of missions flown between 29 August and 14 October, and his note that a September overflight was “blocked” by procedural restrictions, hint at a tension between the need for rapid, unfiltered intelligence and the agency’s habit of filtering that intelligence through inter‑agency coordination mechanisms. McCone’s comments—probing why the original flight plan was proposed, whether the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was involved, and why overflights did not target known SAM sites—suggest that the IG’s findings were being used to assess whether procedural inertia contributed to the delayed public acknowledgment of missile installations.
What the Margins Reveal About Decision‑Making
McCone’s marginalia are terse but telling. When he asks, “What ban?” about the “publications ban,” he is challenging the IG’s implication that a top‑down restriction on reporting may have suppressed critical analysis. His note that the ban “sounds like an excuse” underscores a defensive posture: the Director wants to ensure that the agency is not portrayed as having deliberately hidden information from the President.
Other comments expose uncertainty about the nature of the sites under surveillance. For example, Earman’s suggestion that the “Banes site” might have been an offensive missile installation is rebuffed with “Banes always was considered a coastal defense site.” This indicates that even within the CIA, there was disagreement over the interpretation of raw imagery—a disagreement that could have shaped the timing of the President’s briefings.
The Director’s repeated requests for clarification—such as “Did any in‑house CIA reports on MRBM offensive weapons withheld?” and “Did CIA have anything in hand which might have caused us to go to the President with an oral statement that we thought MRBM missiles were there?”—signal an acute awareness that the agency’s internal vetting process could have practical consequences for national security policy. The fact that these questions are posed after the crisis had already been resolved (the memorandum is dated 20 November, weeks after the October 28 agreement) suggests a post‑mortem effort to learn lessons and perhaps to shield senior officials from blame.
Legacy: A Window into the Agency’s Self‑Policing
The IG report and McCone’s comments were classified for decades, only surfacing in the 2010s as part of the National Security Archive’s declassification push. Their release adds nuance to the conventional narrative that the crisis was a straightforward case of U.S. detection followed by decisive presidential action. Instead, it shows that within the CIA there was a contested process of interpreting raw data, a bureaucratic culture that could both expedite and impede the flow of intelligence, and a leadership keenly aware of the political ramifications of what was or was not reported.
In contemporary debates over intelligence transparency and the balance between secrecy and timely warning, this 1962 audit serves as a cautionary exemplar. It reminds policymakers that the speed of raw data collection is only half the battle; the internal pathways that turn pixels into policy judgments are equally critical. The document’s lingering relevance lies in its illustration of how institutional checks—intended to prevent premature alarm—can become, in hindsight, sources of delay. As modern analysts grapple with fast‑moving threats—from cyber‑weapons to hypersonic missiles—the lessons embedded in this Cold‑War audit remain strikingly applicable.
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All redactions in this document based on sections 3.3(b)(1) and 3.5(c) of EO 13526.
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C03054547 Approved for Release: 2015/03/24 C03054547 1 INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY OF HANDLING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DURING THE CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP August to mid-October 1962 Approved for Release: 2015/03/24 C03054547 1281-21
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THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL
This document contains information referring to Project IDEALIST
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20 November 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT : Handling of Intelligence Information During the Cuban Arms Build-up
On 5 November 1962, you asked me to investigate the input of raw information during the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba with particular reference to reporting that suggested installation of weapons of offensive capability. My report of investigation was submitted on 12 November 1962.
You asked that certain points be clarified or expanded and that certain additional information be included. A copy of the report of investigation (revised) is attached.
Also attached is a list of the questions you asked and the comments you made regarding the original report of investigation. These questions and comments are numbered consecutively on the list. The numbered tags that are clipped to various of the pages of the revised report correspond to the numbered questions and comments on the list.
J. S. Earman Inspector General
Attachments cc: DDCI Executive Director
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Director's Comments Regarding the IG Report of 12 November
- The original report listed a ban on publication of intelligence on offensive weapons in Cuba without express permission of the President.
DCI COMMENT: What ban?
- This section of the original report dealt with an order by the Director in mid-August to make sure that reports were checked with NPIC.
DCI COMMENT: This sounds like an excuse. What DCI ordered was a check by NPIC of reported missiles in Cuba. The check to be either careful review of recent photographs of particular areas or new photography. Do not understand that this involved "no reports until NPIC check."
- Our original report said that on 6 September analysis of the results of the 29 August mission had led to suspicion that the Banes site was offensive in nature.
DCI COMMENT: This is overdrawn as Banes always was considered a coastal defense site. Wording indicates suspicion of MRBM's and this not so.
- This section of our original report dealt with "The Publications Ban."
DCI COMMENT: a. Were any in-house CIA reports on MRBM offensive weapons withheld?
b. Did our Checklist carry any reference to actual, probable, or possible MRBM's from August 29 until October 14?
c. Did CIA have anything in hand which might have caused us to go to the President with an oral statement that we thought MRBM missiles were there?
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d. I think our right to publish in the Checklist pretty well extinguishes this point. Do not believe we were seriously hurt nor any conviction re MRBM's suppressed because of this.
e. Better document whatever is said.
- The last sentence in our original report read: [illegible] chief of the Current Support Staff of ORR, notes that CIA was most effectively blocked in attempts to impure some significance to the arms deliveries.
DCI COMMENT: By whom? What is CI procedure of coordination?
- These paragraphs of our original report concerned the restrictions on the September overflights.
DCI COMMENT: a. Why was the original flight plan of September proposed?
b. Did NRO participate?
c. Was any consideration given to flying over known SAM sites to find out what they were protecting?
d. Was any consideration given to DCI September 7 request for "frequent coverage"?
- Our original report listed the missions flown from 29 August through 14 October and summarized the results.
DCI COMMENT: But say what kind of missiles.
- Our original report said: [illegible] series of Clandestine Services reports, in addition to a selected DD/P distribution, went to standard addressees outside of the Clandestine Services."
DCI COMMENT: How many?
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- This paragraph of our original report read in part: "The distribution of [redaction] is typical of that made of reports in the [redaction] series. That message distributed on 2 October, reported the observation on 19 September of SSM's being unloaded at the port of Mariel."
DCI COMMENT: "SSM's" underlined. Marginal note: "This not clear.
- Our original paragraph begins: "Taking as an example the message whose distribution is discussed above, [redaction] this is the sequence of processing between date of observation and date of receipt by the user."
DCI COMMENT: What did this contain?
- This paragraph in our original report concerned the PSAIM system.
DCI COMMENT: Question mark in the margin alongside the paragraph.
- Our original paragraph read in part: "But at the time SNIE 85-3-62 was under discussion there were as yet no valid reports of an offensive build-up."
DCI COMMENT: ". . .no valid reports of an offensive build-up" is underlined. Question mark in the margin.
- The first sentence of our paragraph read: "Mr. Sheldon stressed the lack of credibility in Clandestine Services reporting."
DCI COMMENT: "Clandestine" is underlined. Marginal note: "or refugee?"
- Our original paragraph read: "However, we do think that the publishing ban had the effect of prolonging this skepticism until the eleventh hour. If the ban had not existed an item on the possible presence of MRBM's in Cuba could have appeared in the CIB in the last days of September, providing it could have survived the coordination process, and it might have changed some people's minds."
DCI COMMENT: Did this item appear in the Checklist?
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- Our original paragraph read in part: ". . .there was little excuse for demeaning the validity of CIA reporting indicating a shift to offensive weapons."
DCI COMMENT: What such CIA reporting?
- This section of the original report dealt with the preparing of SNIE 85-3-62.
DCI COMMENT: Marginal note between paragraphs dealing with the situation as of 19 September when the USIB approved SNIE 85-3-62 and the first reports suggesting offensive missile activity: "DCI views on 85-3-62."
- This section of the original report dealt with the views of the Director of Central Intelligence.
DCI COMMENT: Did you find any analytical effort as contrasted with philosophical conclusions?
You asked whether, once the SAM sites had been established, anyone sat down and asked why; for what purpose; were they given to the Cubans just to keep the U-2's away?
This paragraph of the original report listed the Current Intelligence publications..
DCI COMMENT: President's Checklist.
- This section of our original report dealt with "Restrictions on Overflights."
DCI COMMENT: Why and under what circumstances were CIA September flights--two over eastern coastal area--changed to four covering about the same area?
- Our original Annex B listed abstracts from the CIB.
DCI COMMENT: What was in the Checklist?
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- This section of our original report dealt with the 22 August Current Intelligence Memorandum summarizing recent Soviet military assistance to Cuba.
DCI COMMENT: Suggest full wording of the report be included.
- Our original paragraph dealt with a CIB draft concerning arrival of MIG-21's. We said: "DIA refused either to coordinate it or to insert a footnote."
DCI COMMENT: Why?
- Our original paragraph said: "But until 10 October CIA and DIA were in disagreement over interpretations of specific pieces of information."
DCI COMMENT: Examples. Chronology of differing reports.
You asked for the names of the ships in Mariel on 19 and 23 September. Were they missile carrying ships in light of information we now have?
You asked if there was any evidence that our analysts ran a computation on what the Soviet ships could have been carrying other than SAM equipment, and whether any thought or analysis was given to what other cargo the ships might have been carrying. I realize that this annex does not fully answer your question, but it makes clear that our information on Soviet shipping was incomplete and that no precise analysis was possible.
You asked whether any thought was given to a quantitative estimate during the critical period based on the mass of shipping which had been reported. This annex, again, reveals more than anything else the incompleteness of information available to us. Navy simply has been unable thus far to provide information on all Soviet shipping.
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HANDLING OF RAW INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DURING CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page The NPIC Caution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Publication Ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Coordination Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Restrictions on Overflights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 The PSAIM System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 The 22 August Memorandum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Increase in Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 The Missile Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 How the Reports Were Selected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Distribution of Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Speed of Dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Mistrust of Clandestine Services and OO Reporting. . 28 Analyses and Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Action Taken on the Views of the Director of Central Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Publishing the Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 The Mechanics of Putting Together the CIB . . . . . 38 The President's Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
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Handling of Raw Intelligence Information
During Cuban Arms Build-up
This paper will discuss the movement and use of raw intelligence information during the intensive Soviet arms build-up in Cuba from mid-July to mid-October 1962, with particular emphasis on the period beginning in late August. Except during a few days at the end of the period when the PSAM System was in force, the flow of intelligence reports was normal. They were delivered to all officers at all levels who needed them, both in CIA and elsewhere in the intelligence community.
However, there were certain limitations on the formal publication of this material in community-coordinated publications which may have diluted the impact of this information upon the community at large. These limitations were:
a. A caution on publishing information about Soviet military preparations in Cuba before determining whether or not it was contrary to photographic evidence in the possession of NPIC.
b. A ban beginning on 6 September on publication, other than in the President's Checklist, of intelligence on offensive weapons in Cuba without express permission of the President.
c. Difficulties in inter-agency coordination.
d. Restrictions on reconnaissance overflights, as well as delays caused by weather, which hindered verification of information and delayed acquisition of additional information.
In a recent memorandum to the DCI, Mr. Richard Lehman has discussed in detail the broader aspects of CIA action during this period.
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The NPIC Caution
- Beginning in May 1962, the analysts began the practice of checking out with NPIC any report that was susceptible to photo-graphic verification. The following, which we have confirmed, appears in Mr. Lehman's memorandum:
"In May 1962, NPIC began publishing a series of formal reports (Photographic Evaluation of Information on Cuba) in which the reports referred to NPIC were evaluated in the light of photographic coverage. In the seven issues of this publication, published between 31 May and 5 October, NPIC examined 138 reports referred to it for comment. Of this total, only three cited missile activity which could not be directly linked to the SAM and cruise missile deployments. NPIC's evidence negated these three."
According to Mr. Walter Elder, in mid-August the Director briefed the President on the increasing volume of refugee and agent reports on the Soviet build-up in Cuba. The President directed that every effort be made to check out these continuing reports. The Director instructed the DD/I to check every available source, particularly including NPIC. This instruction from the Director was passed onward orally.
[illegible] Chief, Middle America Branch, Latin America Division, OCI, is the "chief OCI analyst" on Cuba. He was one of the ultimate recipients of the instruction and one of the persons required to take it into account. [illegible] received the instruction orally. He says that, however the instruction to use NPIC to check informant reporting was intended, he received it, or at least interpreted it, as an outright ban on publishing anything that could not be verified by NPIC--and that, in fact, nothing susceptible to photographic verification was published which had not been verified. Although we can offer no written evidence in proof, we believe that this "instruction to check" became a "ban" through a combination of the following:
a. Distortion of the Director's instruction as it passed from mouth to mouth.
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b. The weight the Director's word carries within the Agency is such that the ultimate recipient of it "leans over backward" to comply. In this case, if the ultimate recipients received the instruction as it was originally worded, they read into it a meaning that was not intended at all.
c. A procedure for checking reports with NPIC had been in effect since May. When the Director's instruction of mid-August reached the analysts, it is reasonable to assume that they concluded that the existing procedures were inadequate and that a more positive and all-inclusive check was desired.
- There is other evidence that the Director's instruction came to be considered a restriction. Mr. Lehman is a senior officer in OCI. His memorandum of 7 November on the arms build-up was well researched. A quotation from his memorandum is illustrative of the views he found in OCI at the time he conducted his research.
"At some point, probably just after 27 September, an item on the subject (the arrival of SSM's) might have been written for CIA current intelligence publications. It could not be written because the analytic level was under the injunction not to publish anything on missile sites without NPIC corroboration."
It should be noted that an item could have been written for the President's Checklist, but none was. Further, when we first discussed this subject with Mr. Sheldon, he said that there had been an outright ban issued in mid-August on publishing anything that could not be verified by photography and that this ban had come from the President. Mr. Sheldon later came to realize that his earlier recollection was wrong, but it is probable that his first impression was a fairly accurate reflection of views widely held within the DD/I complex.
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The Publication Ban
The ban on publication of intelligence on offensive weapons has the following history.
On 29 August a U-2 flight confirmed establishment of a missile defense of western Cuba and found a missile site at Banes in Oriente Province. On 31 August the President ordered General Carter not to allow publication of this information pending clarification of U.S. policy. General Carter relayed this order to the USIB. The information on the SAM sites was released for publication on 5 September. In a memorandum to the DD/I, dated 6 September, the AD/SI reported that:
"A preliminary analysis of the technical parameters of the facility indicate that the missile system present is a surface-to-surface cruise type system. . . . P.I. analyses of the additional photographic coverage should be available on 7 September. . . ."
On 7 September the Director of NPIC and the Chief of the Offensive Systems Division of OSI jointly addressed a memorandum to the DD/I. It read, in part:
"The Banes installation is assessed as a surface-to-surface tactical missile site most likely for cruise-type missiles. The purpose of the system and the effective range of the missile cannot be conclusively determined from the available data. . . . It must be emphasized that, while we cannot definitely exclude the possibility of this missile installation being for offensive purposes, i.e., attack on Guantanamo Naval Base or possibly the Florida mainland, we believe the evidence is much stronger for the coastal defense role."
The President was informed that the precise nature of the Banes installation had not been conclusively determined. He ordered General Carter to put a complete freeze on publication of information on the Banes site. A Current Intelligence Memorandum of 14 September, based on a full readout of the 5 September photography, says: "We conclude that there is no longer any reason to doubt that the Banes site has a coastal defense mission." The information was released for publication.
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Following his conversation with the President, General Carter received approval from Mr. McGeorge Bundy to allow analysts access to such information and provide the results of their analysis to policy-makers on a need-to-know basis.
The minutes of an executive session of USIB on 7 September imply a publication ban on all types of intelligence pertaining to offensive weapons in Cuba. There is, however, no explicit written record of the ban's imposition. The DD/I gave the AD/CI orders to this effect, on or about 6 September. The ban was further discussed at an executive session of USIB on 13 September.
On 14 September the AD/CI issued the following instruction to certain members of his staff:
"This is to remind everyone that we are under a White House injunction not to print in any publication which goes outside CIA any intelligence bearing on Cuban offensive military weapons. At the same time we are enjoined by the DD/I to insure that normal distribution is made of all material bearing on Cuban military capabilities so that analysis of this intelligence may continue. This prohibition need not apply to the President's Intelligence Checklist but it does apply to all other publications. Any material which might ordinarily be thought to be publishable on this forbidden subject should be brought to the attention of the AD/CI or the DAD/CI."
This restriction, as was intended, resulted in a virtual blackout from intelligence publications of information on offensive weapons. The only exception was publication of information on the arrival of IL-28 bombers in Cuba. General Carter asked Mr. McGeorge Bundy for permission to publish. The request was refused. General Carter then referred the matter to the Director, pointing out that the information had already appeared in Department of Navy publications. The Director himself then called Mr. Bundy and got approval for publication. The information appeared in the CIB and in the Cuban Daily Summary on 11 October.
Certain observations are in order as to the probable effect of this publication ban.
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No CIA reports on offensive weapons were withheld from dissemination. All received full dissemination within CIA and to all other components of the intelligence community. In the case of Clandestine Services reports, this runs to some 200 copies. None of the reports found their way into intelligence publications because of the ban on publishing reports on offensive weapons.
This ban, of course, did not apply to the President's Checklist, but none appeared there either. We have compared items appearing in the Checklist with those appearing in the CIB and the Cuban Daily Summary. Nothing of any significance appears in the Checklist that does not appear in the other publications. None of them makes mention of the offensive build-up.
CIA did have reports in hand which might have caused us to go to the President with an oral statement that we thought MRBM missiles were being installed. There are eight reports that are quoted in the section on "The Missile Reporting." Four were disseminated between 20 and 23 September, inclusive. The other four were disseminated between 1 and 8 October, inclusive. Mr. Lehman noted in his memorandum that an item could have been written in late September had it not been for the publications ban. We asked Mr. Cline if an oral report had been given to the President. He told us that none had.
It can be argued that there were no restrictions on publishing in the Checklist. Regardless of the original intent of the Checklist, we found substantial agreement within the DD/I complex that the Checklist has been used primarily to call to the attention of the President those particularly significant, solid items of intelligence appearing in the various intelligence publications for the day. The concept of it being a vehicle for passing to the President and a few other senior officials information not included in formal intelligence publications has largely been lost. The evidence strongly suggests that the practice of orienting the Checklist to solid information did hurt us in this situation. There were reports on the introduction of offensive weapons that were not suitable for use in normal Current Intelligence publications. This information could have been included in the Checklist, but it was not because the Checklist was too closely tied to other publications.
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- This is the evidence on which we base our conclusions as to the effect of the publications ban:
a. With respect to possible in-house CIA reports being withheld, we can report that we found nothing worth disseminating that was not disseminated.
b. With respect to our conclusion that the Checklist carried nothing on the offensive build-up, we have attached as annexes to this report extracts from the Checklist, the CIB and the Cuban Daily Summary. We have checked the three publications. Nothing on offensive weapons appears in any of them.
c. With respect to CIA having reports in hand upon which to base oral briefing of the President, we have cited the specific reports and have quoted from them in the section on "The Missile Reporting." Copies of the actual reports are in our hands.
d. Our conclusion that the Checklist is little used for passing to the President information not suitable for including in other intelligence publications is based on conversations with many officers, including:
Mr. Ray Cline, DD/I Mr. Huntington Sheldon, Assistant DD/I Assistant to the DD/I (Planning) Mr. R. J. Smith, AD/CI Mr. Richard Lehman, Special Assistant to the AD/CI Chief, Latin America Division, OCI Chief, Middle America Branch, Latin America Division Officer in Charge of getting out the Cuban Daily Summary
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Coordination Problems
On 3 August CIA made its first attempt to place an item on the build-up in the Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), noting an unusual number of suspected arms carriers enroute to Cuba. Both NSA and DIA objected to the item because of an NSA intercept [illegible] that the increased Soviet ship traffic was due to [illegible]. The item, as [illegible] in the process as were four other CIB items in August. [illegible] chief of the Current Support Staff of ORR, notes that CIA was most effectively blocked by DIA in attempts to impute some significance to the arms deliveries. It should be noted that over the years the concept of the CIB being a fully coordinated and agreed upon publication has developed. In the past, higher authority would not tolerate "split" items presenting differing views. The procedure for coordinating items for the CIB is outlined in the section entitled "The Mechanics of Putting Together the CIB."
The 29 August President's Intelligence Checklist stated "many Soviet ships are involved in hauling military gear (to Cuba)." The CIA officer who delivered the Checklist to the White House on that date reported that General Maxwell Taylor challenged the statement. According to this officer, he cited this statement from the DIA Intelligence Summary of the same date: "The high volume of shipping probably reflects planned increases in trade between the USSR and Cuba."
General Taylor was further quoted as saying that he had seen no hard evidence of armaments going into Cuba, that equipment like trucks and tractors could be used for military purposes but that he did not think this was the case in Cuba, and that in his opinion the Soviet aid to Cuba was purely economic.
This was the day of the U-2 mission which confirmed SAM sites in western Cuba. According to [illegible] he was informed on or about this time by Mr. Joseph W. Neubert of Mr. Roger Hilsmar's office in the State Department that General Taylor had requested State's INR to withdraw a memorandum which noted an upsurge in Bloc vessels traveling to Cuba under conditions suggesting increasing deliveries of arms. The same source said General Taylor had made this request after consultation with Admiral Dennison.
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These incidents illustrate the disagreement which prevailed throughout August between CIA and the Defense establishment over interpretation of intelligence on the movement of shipping to Cuba. We have reviewed DIA intelligence publications for August and September and can confirm that DIA did indeed insist throughout August that the increased shipping reflected an increased flow of economic aid.
The USIB Watch Committee placed Cuba on its agenda in late August. This action followed submission to Watch Committee members of an urgently worded 22 August Current Intelligence Memorandum (OCI No. 3047/62) from CIA. (Distribution of this paper was as follows: DD/I, 1; A/DCI, 1; OCI, 7; Watch Committee, 25.) Items on the Cuban build-up began to appear in the Combined Watch Report with the 29 August issue.
After the U-2 missions of 29 August and 5 September, coordination of material relating to the speed-up of arms deliveries to Cuba became less difficult. But until 10 October CIA and DIA were in disagreement over interpretations of specific pieces of information. Attached as Annex H is a copy of a memorandum spelling out coordination difficulties. It was prepared by [illegible] an ORR officer intimately involved with these problems at the time. We drew heavily from this memorandum in preparing our report. The full memorandum gives the sequence of reports and the coordination difficulties encountered.
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Restrictions on Overflights
On 10 September at a meeting in the office of Mr. McGeorge Bundy (For other details about this meeting see Annex D, Page 3.) CIA sought approval for a single reconnaissance flight along the south coast of Cuba, across Guantanamo and Banes, and along the northern coast. The Secretary of State objected to the CIA proposal (Annex L). He said he considered it unwise to overfly international waters and Cuban territory during the same mission. He said that if the aircraft fell into enemy hands during such a mission the U.S. would be in a very poor position to defend its rights to overfly international waters. The result of this concern was that the meeting (a) rejected CIA's specific proposal but (b) gave CIA approximately the coverage it asked for by authorizing three U-2 flights for the month of September in addition to the one remaining in the normal September allocation of two. Of these four, two were to be overflights, two peripheral flights. Because of bad weather (and one mechanical abortion) the program was not completed until 7 October. Thus it took nearly a month to get the coverage CIA had sought to get in a single mission. This coverage, as requested on 9 September by the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) (see Para.33. below), did not include the western end of the island where SAM sites had already been discovered.
We now know that SAM sites in western Cuba were defending sites which were being prepared for the installation of offensive missiles. The four missions approved on 10 September were confined to the eastern part of the island and therefore did not detect these preparations. We do not know whether U-2 photography would have detected offensive preparations in Western Cuba by 7 October when the four-flight program was completed. Nor do we know for sure whether the weather conditions would have permitted such detection. In any case, there was no photographic corroboration of agent and refugee reports suggesting offensive missile activity during late September and early October. Confirmation had to wait for the 14 October U-2 flight. A fuller explanation of the planning of the four-flight program follows.
On 4 September the Chairman of the COMOR addressed a memorandum to the Acting Director of Central Intelligence. It is quoted below in its entirety:
"1. Your approval of paragraph 4 is requested.
- The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance reviewed the results of the latest mission on Cuba (No. 3088) flown on 29 August and concluded as follows:
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a. That in view of finding SAM sites on the western end of the island on 3088, it is particularly important that as soon as weather permits the next authorized mission should cover those areas of the island which were not photographed because of weather or because the range did not permit.
b. That priority areas of interest should be the areas referenced in a above and to include other targets on a second priority basis which might require coverage.
c. That the complex at the eastern end of the island should be photographed again, but there is no requirement at this time for recoverage of the SAM sites. (Underlining supplied by IG.)
The targets for operational planning will be prepared by the COMOR Working Group in pursuance of the above and forwarded directly to the Intelligence Officer/OSA/DDR for use in operational planning.
Recommendation: That the foregoing be taken into account in determination of when the next Cuban mission will be flown."
The recommendation in paragraph 4 was approved by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence.
- On 3 September the COMOR approved a paper on "Requirements and Targets Applicable for Tactical-Type Aerial Reconnaissance over Cuba." The paper was forwarded to the Acting Director of Central Intelligence. Significant extracts follow:
"1. In pursuance of your request that the COMOR examine the kind of information which could be obtained through the use of RF-101/F8U-type of aircraft to complement the present U-2 reconnaissance of Cuba and to indicate in order of priority the information and the targets which have been submitted to COMOR, the following is reported:
a. Tactical-type reconnaissance aircraft could acquire information on the identified SAM sites which would permit more reliable estimates of the operational status."
- On 9 September 1962, the Chairman of COMOR addressed a memorandum to the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, subject: "Next U-2 Mission Over Cuba." The text follows:
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"1. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has now reviewed the information obtained from the last U-2 reconnaissance of Cuba (on 5 September). Unfortunately weather precluded photography of the possible Surface-to-Surface Missile Site at Banes on the eastern end of the Island as well as a portion of the Guantanamo area. The Mission also did not cover the Isle of Pines (to check on SAM deployment) and other areas in the eastern half of the Island which should be searched for SAM and possible SSM deployment.
- The Committee recommends that another U-2 mission be flown as soon as weather permits to cover Banes and the other targets mentioned above and identified on the attached map."
IG comment: The use of "SSM" as the next to the last word of paragraph 1 of the memorandum quoted immediately above raises the interesting possibility that the COMOR might have been proposing a search of MRBM's or IRBM's. Rather than relying on the memories of those involved in preparing the memorandum, we have checked the map on which the targets are identified. It is clear that the SSM reference is to possible coastal cruise missile sites.
- We have in our possession the referenced map of Cuba with an acetate overlay showing the tracks desired by CIA and the tracks approved in the 10 September meeting in Mr. Bundy's office. CIA proposed coverage of the southern coastline of Cuba from about 82½ degrees eastward to the Guantanamo area at about 75 degrees, and coverage of the northern coastline from Banes at about 75½ degrees westward to the Sagua la Grande area at about 80 degrees. The targets to be covered are indicated thus:
Isle of Pines (missile search) Bay of Batabano Coastline (missile search) Zapata Swamp (missile search) Coastline, Zapata Swamp to Guantanamo Bay (missile search) Guantanamo Area (troop build-up) Banes Area (suspect SSM installation) (coastal cruise missile) Coastline, Banes to Sagua la Grande (missile search)
This evidence strongly suggests that, with the exception of the Guantanamo and Banes areas, the September flights were proposed for the purpose of finding new missile sites.
- According to Mr. James Reber, Chairman of the COMOR, and Mr. James Cunningham, Deputy Assistant Director of the Office for Special Activities of DDR, the NRO does not participate in the planning phase of overflights.
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We have examined the written evidence to see if any consideration was given to flying over known SAM sites to find out what they were protecting. We find nothing suggesting that any such consideration was given.
On 7 September the Director cabled [redacted] urging frequent reconnaissance coverage. We find no specific mention of this request in any of the documents we have examined. There is a series of documents prepared by the COMOR urging tactical reconnaissance by RF-101 or F8U aircraft so that better photography could be gotten of known sites; however, the first of these documents resulted from a COMOR meeting on 3 September, prior to receipt of the Director's cable. It is possible that the urgency the Agency attached to getting this tactical reconnaissance resulted from the Director's cable, but we have found no proof of this.
Attached as Annex D is a chronology of Cuban overflights from 5 August through 14 October.
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The PSAIM System
An actual restriction on the flow of information existed only during the last few days of the period under discussion. This was the PSAIM system, and its imposition came about as follows:
The 11 October CIB item on arrival of IL-28's in Cuba required Presidential approval because of the offensive capability of this medium bomber. The DCI requested such approval because the photographs of the IL-28 crates were already widely available in the intelligence community. When the President gave the DCI permission to publish the item he also instructed him to put into effect immediately a formal system whereby such information could be fully controlled.
A special USIB meeting on 11 October put this order into effect as of the close of 12 October. The order provided that information or intelligence on offensive capabilities in Cuba "will be disseminated outside each USIB intelligence component only to specific individuals on an EYES ONLY basis who by virtue of their responsibilities as advisers to the President have a need to know" and that "there is no intent hereby, however, to inhibit the essential analytic process."
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The 22 August Memorandum
Intelligence received through the third week of August 1962 on recent Soviet military assistance to Cuba was summarized in the Current Intelligence Memorandum of 22 August mentioned in paragraph 25 above.
It described the arrival, in a period of a few weeks, of several thousand Bloc personnel and of an unusually large number of Soviet ships carrying military cargoes. It described the unusual security precautions observed in the unloading of these cargoes and in their transportation to construction sites, from which Cuban residents had been evacuated. It observed: "The speed and magnitude of this influx of Bloc personnel and equipment into a non-Bloc country is unprecedented in Soviet military aid activities; clearly something new and different is taking place." A copy of the Current Intelligence Memorandum is attached as Annex G.
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Increase in Reports
How new and how different soon became apparent in the rapid increase in reports--from [illegible] refugees as well as other sources--suggesting missile activity in Cuba. In the 30 days up to and including 22 August there had been only seven such reports. In the next 30 days, up to 21 September, inclusive, there were 43. Thereafter, until 14 October, the day the U-2 proved the existence of offensive missile sites, there were 42, making a total of 85 for the period 23 August through 14 October. Our discussion of reports and what was done with them will be limited to these 85, concerning suspected missile activity. In the same period there were also six reports relating to IL-28's and four relating to MIG-21's.
There were, of course, many other reports relating to other phases of the Soviet military program in Cuba: deliveries of conventional aircraft and other military gear, electronic devices, transport vehicles, and construction materials; Soviet transport convoys; Soviet encampments and personnel, including the imported labor force, many of them reportedly Negroes; and military airfields and operations.
In four months the over-all reporting on Cuba increased between three and four times. In July Task Force W disseminated 76 reports; in August, 193; in September, 223; in October, 271.
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The Missile Reporting
The 85 reports concerning suspected missile activity in Cuba which were disseminated between 23 August and 14 October were all distributed to USIB members and to all elements of CIA having known requirements for them. In addition, 41 were referred to NPIC, 36 were sent to the CIA representative with CINCLANT, 25 to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 10 to the Executive Office of the President, and 9 to CINCARIB. Detailed dissemination will be discussed below.
Eight of these are considered by DD/P and OCI analysts to have been especially significant as indicating the possible existence of offensive missile activity. At least two of them (marked by double asterisk in the sub-paragraphs below), taken together, were so suggestive as to pinpoint San Cristobal, in Pinar del Rio Province, as a target for overflight reconnaissance. These eight reports are summarized in the order in which they were issued:
a. On 20 September [illegible] was quoted as having said on 9 September: "We have 40-mile range guided missiles, both surface-to-surface and air-to-air, and we have a radar system which covers, sector by sector, all of the Cuban air space and (beyond) as far as Florida. There are also many mobile ramps for intermediate range rockets. They don't know what is awaiting them." [illegible]
b. On 21 September [illegible] was quoted as saying: "We will fight to the death and perhaps we can win because we have everything including atomic weapons." The same report quoted [illegible] as saying that about 1,000 Soviet technicians were constructing a nuclear weapons base in western Cuba. Headquarters commented that the source might be referring to Mariel Naval Area, where another source had reported construction of a missile base, and observed that there had been no previous reports of nuclear weapons in Cuba. [illegible]
** c. Also on 21 September a refugee was quoted as having observed in Havana, on the night of 12 September, a convoy of 20 Soviet trucks driven by Soviets and pulling trailers 65 to 70 feet long carrying canvas-covered objects which looked like missiles. The source's descriptions and sketches matched photographs of Guided Missile, Surface-to-Surface, SS-4, "Shyster".
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d. On 23 September a refugee at Port Isabela was reported as having observed there, on 2 September, 20 metal cylinders, 45 to 50 feet long and about five feet in diameter, and having later seen five of them being carried toward Santa Clara on trailers.
** e. Another refugee report dated 1 October concerned the sighting, on the night of 17 September, of a military-escorted convoy of Soviet trucks. The source said the convoy, which was on the road leading to San Cristobal, included seven 32-foot trailers carrying huge tubes covered with canvas.
f. A source in Cuba reported on 2 October that "large intercontinental rockets more than 20 meters long" were unloaded by Soviet personnel the night of 19 September in Mariel. Head- quarters commented: "It is more likely that source observed SA-2 missiles being offloaded."
g. Another 2 October report described a refugee's obser- vations at Mariel on 23 September. The source observed two Soviet ships unloading and two more waiting their turn and was told 14 Soviet ships had been in the harbor in the past week. He also observed a convoy of 20 trucks carrying metal tanks 12 feet in diameter and ten feet high.
h. An 8 October dissemination from Oriente Province described intensive military construction in that area, the setting up of a restricted military zone occupied by Soviet personnel and equipment, and convoys passing through Santiago de Cuba which "consisted primarily of large, covered trailer trucks and included two missile launchers."
- The other reports, dated 23 August through 14 October and dealing with suspected missile activity, are summarized in Annex A.
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How the Reports Were Selected
The 85 reports that have been mentioned are among a total of 123 for a broader period extending to 26 October 1962. These were selected, at the request of the DCI, by Mr. William K. Harvey, Chief of Task Force W. A three-man team from the DD/P Intelligence Group screened Clandestine Services reporting back through January 1962, Office of Operations (OO) reporting back through early May 1962, and Special Intelligence reporting back through early June 1962.
In addition to the 123 reports which Mr. Harvey considered to have definite or highly probable references to Soviet missile activity in Cuba, there were 8 referring to delivery of the MIG-21 and 7 on the IL-28. Of the total of 138, 60 came from Clandestine Services sources, 67 from OO's exploitation of refugees, and 11 from Special Intelligence. Thirty-seven of the total were referred to NPIC with a request for either immediate photographic interpretation or additional overflight reconnaissance to clarify or confirm the reported activities.
The searchers reviewed about 1,700 Clandestine Services reports, 1,800 Office of Operations reports, and some 6,000 entries on 150 teletype strips of Special Intelligence material.
The above reports came from every province of Cuba. They varied in content appraisal and source evaluation. Many of them came from untested ultimate sources and unskilled observers. But, allowing for inconsistencies, or distortions in individual reports, the mosaic picture that emerged was remarkably consistent: a) widespread and large-scale construction activity; b) many convoys of Soviet trucks, frequently moving by night and with trailers carrying massive tubular objects; c) new restricted military areas, from which Cuban residents have been evacuated; d) Soviet personnel supervising the unloading of ships and the land transport of their cargoes; e) frequent specific references to surface-to-air missiles and their accoutrements, to cruise missiles, and to the construction of missile sites; and f) evidence of almost exclusive Soviet or Bloc occupancy and control of new military sites.
Many other reports, including communications intercepts, which contained no reference to actual or suspected missile activity, added breadth and perspective to the picture of a massive and unprecedented build-up of Soviet-manned military installations in
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excess of the actual defense needs of the island of Cuba. Among the most intriguing of these were several NSA intercepts of Soviet military radio traffic in Eastern Europe calling for volunteers to serve in Cuba.
- Confirmatory evidence, and new evidence, was supplied by interpretation of the results of the U-2 missions, as follows:
29 August--Confirmed establishment of a missile defense of western Cuba (seven SA-2 sites); the coastal defense cruise missile site at Banes was discovered but not positively identified as to type; found unidentifiable construction at Guanajay.
5 September--Found three more SA-2 sites, bringing the total to ten; proved that the Banes site was intended for short-range coast missiles; found a MIG-21 and several others still in crates at Santa Clara airfield.
26 September--Three additional SA-2 sites discovered. bringing the total to 13.
29 September--One more SA-2 site found, bringing the total to 14; another coastal defense cruise missile site was identified.
5 October--One more SA-2 site was discovered, bringing the total to 15.
7 October--Four more SA-2 sites were discovered, bringing the total to 19.
14 October--Identification of MRBM site in the San Cristobal area.
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Distribution of Reports
There was a standard distribution of each series of raw information reports on the Cuban arms build-up. The standard distribution itself was wide. Each report received a supplemental distribution based upon the known interests of various components of Government.
The advance teletype distribution of OO reports based on interrogations of refugees went to these addressees: OCI, ORR, OSI, OCR, [illegible] (a DD/P element), TFW, Department of State, ACSI, AFSO, QNO, JCS, DIA/CIIC, and AEC. The follow-up hard-copy distribution went to these same addressees plus other components of the intelligence community having use for the information.
The [illegible] series of Clandestine Services reports, in addition to a selected DD/P distribution, went to a standard list of 20 addressees outside of the Clandestine Services. The addressees on the particularly significant [illegible] reports disseminated after mid-September were: Department of State, DIA, ACSI, Navy, Air, JCS, Secretary of Defense, NSA, NIC, USIA, OCI, ONE, OCR, ORR, OBI, OO, NPIC, FBI, I&NS, and CINCLANT through the Agency's representative to the command. The Cable Secretariat made direct distribution to each of these named addressees except DIA, ACSI, Navy, Air, JCS, and the Secretary of Defense.
After the offset master had been run by the Cable Secretariat, yielding the copies needed for direct distribution, the master was taken by courier to the Army Staff Communications Center in the Pentagon. Army Staff Communications then re-ran the master, reproducing enough copies to allow distribution to the standard Department of Defense addressees (ACSI, Navy, Air, JCS, and the Secretary of Defense) to which CIA did not make direct distribution--plus other Department of Defense elements having an interest in the report.
The Cable Secretariat distributed six copies of each report to the Office of Central Reference (OCR). Based on known requirements, OCR then distributed these six copies to offices, other than standard addressees, having an interest in the particular report.
61 The distribution of [illegible] is typical of that made of reports in the [illegible] series. That message, distributed on 2 October, reported the observation on 19 September of "large
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intercontinental rockets" being unloaded at the port of Mariel. Thirty-eight copies of the raw cable from the Task Force W on which that was based had already been distributed within CIA by the Cable Secretariat. The recipients of the raw cable were:
- After the report had been prepared from the raw cable, the was distributed in 199 copies, as follows:
No. of Copies Recipient 12 Task Force W 30 Other elements of the Clandestine Services and miscellaneous CIA addressees who were not standard addressees and whose interests were not served by OCR. These included DCI, DD/P, A/DD/P, and the Office of Security. 10 OCI 1 ONE 1 OCR/Liaison Staff 1 OCR/Industrial Register 1 OCR/Biographic Register 1 DD/I/Assistant to DD/I (Planning) 1 OSI 1 DD/R/Office of Special Activities 8 ORR 2 OO 1 OBI 22 Department of State 1 NPIC 1 I&NS 1 FBI 1 CINCLANT 8 NSA 1 NIC 3 USIA 89 Reproduced by the Army Staff Communications Center and distributed to ACSI, Navy, Air, JCS, and the Secretary of Defense, plus other interested elements in the Department of Defense. 2 DIA
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Speed of Dissemination
Many of the Clandestine Services reports on the arms build-up in Cuba were based on information [illegible] from the island [illegible] and there was an inevitable delay between the date of observation and the date of receipt of the information by CIA. Reports based on interrogations of refugees at Opa-locka suffered a similar time lag in that the information could not be gotten until the refugee had managed to escape from Cuba.
Where measurable, the time lag between the date of an observation on the ground in Cuba and the date a report was issued in Washington was as short as six days, as long as 40 days. The average was around 19 days.
Taking as an example the message whose distribution is discussed in paragraph 61 above [illegible] this is the sequence of processing between date of observation and date of receipt by the user.
19 September Date that unloading of missiles at Mariel was observed.
23 September Date that the information was forwarded [illegible]
1 October Date [illegible] received at JMWAVE in Miami.
1 October Date that the information report was cabled to Headquarters from JMWAVE.
1 October 2120 Date/time of receipt of cabled information report by the Cable Secretariat.
1 October 2156 Date/time of receipt of the cabled information report by the [illegible] Intelligence Watch. The Intelligence Watch is responsible for disseminating cabled information reports. In this case the report was referred to Task Force W for dissemination because the
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Intelligence Watch had reservations as to the appropriateness of JMWAVE's appraisal of "possibly true."
2 October 1439 Date/time Task Force W delivered the finished report to the Cable Secretariat for reproduction and distribution.
2 October Date of delivery of reproduced report to the customers. The exact time of delivery cannot now be readily deter- mined. Cable Secretariat records show only that the report was picked up by the courier who was on duty after the normal close of business. In any event, delivery was completed in time for the report to be available to the customers at the opening of business on 3 October.
This report carried a ROUTINE precedence designation and presumably received no unusual "expedite" treatment. Were it not for the fact that the Intelligence Watch had doubts as to the proper appraisal of this information it is probable that the report could have been in the hands of the customers 24 hours earlier.
We found no evidence that the President's ban on publishing information concerning offensive Soviet preparation in Cuba hindered the normal dissemination and analysis of raw intelligence. The PSAIM system, which was in effect from 12 to 22 October, did limit distribution, as it was designed to do; but it imposed no limitation on analysis of the material, and in any case, it affected only two or three days of the period prior to 14 October.
There was close and rapid communication between OCI analysts and Task Force W personnel, with the former performing on-the-spot evaluations for the latter as they scanned incoming raw reports for inclusion in the Cuban Daily Summary. The working relationship between Task Force W, OCI, the COMOR Targeting Working Committee, NRO, and NPIC was such as to facilitate rapid and effective action on raw information meriting such attention. Coordination on require- ments with DIA was swift and smooth (in marked contrast with publication coordination difficulties).
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Task Force W officers took part in the deliberations which led to the 19 September publication of SNIE 85-3-62 which concluded, inter alia that the Soviets might be tempted to establish offensive weapons in Cuba but that such a development "would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy" as currently estimated.
The estimators received and studied the raw traffic and discussed it with analysts and operators. But at the time SNIE 85-3-62 was under discussion there were as yet no valid reports of an offensive build-up. The first of the significant and valid reports on offensive missiles was disseminated on 20 September, one day after SNIE 85-3-62 was approved by the USIB. It reads: "1. 'we have 40-mile range guided missiles, both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air, and we have a radar system which covers, sector by sector, all of the Cuban air space and (beyond) as far as Florida. There are also many mobile ramps for intermediate range rockets. They don't know what is awaiting them.'"
The first report that concerned possible offensive weapons and which suggested an area where they might be found was not disseminated until 21 September, two days after approval of the estimate. The estimators were unable to sense that the Soviets were departing radically from past patterns and practices. Nor could they sense that the Soviets themselves were victims of a gross misestimate of their own, i.e., that they were miscalculating U.S. ability to detect their mischief and to take prompt and vigorous action to counter it.
As of 19 September, the date USIB approved SNIE 85-3-62, coordinated intelligence publications of wide community distribution had stated that there were in Cuba at least nine SAM sites, one coastal defense missile site, and eight KOMAR-class guided missile patrol boats and that 4,200 Soviet military technicians had arrived since mid-July. The intercept information that the Soviets were seeking volunteers for Cuba from military units in East Europe had also been published.
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The first reports which definitely suggested offensive missile activity, and which started the targeting process that led to production of photographic evidence, began to come in two days after the estimate was printed.
The facts show that the raw information flowed as it should have done and was discussed by the officers in CIA whose business it is to analyze and use it. Whether or not the publishing ban veiled its importance is a matter of speculation. We have gathered opinions on both sides. It is possible that the restriction against publishing information about offensive weapons in Cuba may have served to draw the attention of analysts to reports of such activity and to ensure that they briefed their superiors on them.
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Mistrust of Clandestine Services and OO Reporting
- Mr. Lehman's memorandum deals with the mistrust of CIA reporting on the arms build-up in Cuba. He says:
"CIA's files contain 282 intelligence reports, not including press items, on missile and missile-associated activity in Cuba before 1 July 1962. All of these were either totally false or misinterpretations by the observer of other kinds of activity. CIA analysts had naturally come to view all such reports with a high degree of suspicion."
Our conversations with officers in DD/I components confirm Mr. Lehman's statement that a resistance had built up to CIA reporting on Cuba.
Mr. Sheldon stressed the lack of credibility in CIA reporting. He specifically cited Clandestine Services reports of Africans in Cuba with "bones in their noses and rings in their ears." Mr. R. J. Smith, in commenting on failure to use CIA reporting, cited two factors. The first was its unreliability, which he rated as "ranging between the ridiculous and the inane," specifically referring to reports of Negroes with rings in their noses. The second factor was the lack of sufficient overflights to confirm reporting.
We have identified three reports with references to Negroes being in Cuba. There may be others that have escaped our attention. These Clandestine Services reports came from three separate untested sources, none of whom was reporting from direct observation. Dates of information ranged from 30 July to about mid-August. Two of the reports were disseminated on 31 August and the third on 1 September. One of the 31 August reports mentioned the arrival of Mongolians, Negroes, or Congolese, some wearing earrings. The other 31 August report mentioned Congolese having arrived at Mariel and Congolese being camped at Guanajay. The 1 September report said that among foreigners arriving in Cuba in early August were numerous Africans. comment inserted in the 1 September report says: "The Africans frequently reported as having recently arrived in Cuba may possibly be Bantus who were in the Soviet Union as students or laborers."
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At least one officer told us that this touch of the bizarre had the ring of circumstantial truth and tended to make the reporting more credible.
As late as the second week of October, shortly before the U-2 produced hard evidence, some officers remained unconvinced of the offensive nature of the preparations. The eight reports previously referred to had, of course, come to their attention, and several of them were even then getting meticulous attention from the targeters. But the reports were individually not of high quality, and an officer who thought them useless, as some did, could scarcely be blamed. It should be emphasized that this skeptical attitude was not due to any impediment in the flow of raw information--there was none until the PRAIM system was imposed--nor did it, as far as we can determine, in any way hamper swift action on the information.
However, we do think that the publishing ban had the effect of prolonging this skepticism until the eleventh hour. If the ban had not existed an item on the possible presence of MRBM's in Cuba could have appeared in the Central Intelligence Bulletin in the last days of September, providing it could have survived the coordination process, and it might have changed some people's minds. Such an item, of course, could have appeared in the President's Checklist, but it did not.
Attached are three graphs showing:
a. Clandestine Services and OO reporting on missile activity from January through September 1962.
b. All Clandestine Services reporting on Cuba from January through September 1962.
c. All OO reporting on Cuba from March through September 1962.
From these charts it can be seen that the level of total OO reporting on Cuba fluctuated widely; however, beginning in August, there was a dramatic upsurge both in total Clandestine Services reporting on Cuba plus OO reporting on missile activity. From Mr. Lehman's report one might infer that the volume of reporting, combined with the earlier false reporting on missile activity, was such that the analysts could not have been expected to recognize the significance of the August and September reporting on missile activity.
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C03054547 Approved for Release: 2015/03/24 C03054547 EUGENE DIETZGEN CO. MADE IN U.S.A. NO. 341-10 DIETZGEN GRAPH PAPER 10 X 10 PER INCH CIA (CS and OD) information reports dealing with missile activity January through September 1962 Number of Disseminations 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP Approved for Release: 2015/03/24 C03054547
C03054547 Approved for Release: 2015/03/24 C03054547 Total OO production on Cuba from March through September 1962 900 800 700 600 500 Number of Disseminations MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP NO. 341-10 DIETZGEN GRAPH PAPER 10 X 10 PER INCH EUGENE DIETZGEN CO. MADE IN U.S.A. Approved for Release: 2015/03/24 C03054547
C03054547 Approved for Release: 2015/03/24 C03054547 Total CB production on Cuba from January through September 1962 225 200 175 150 125 100 75 50 25 Number of Disseminations JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP EUGENE DIETZGEN CO. MADE IN U.S.A. NO. 341-10 DIETZGEN GRAPH PAPER 10 X 10 PER INCH Approved for Release: 2015/03/24 C03054547
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- The evidence suggests that, in fact, CIA analysts were concerned about the meaning of this reporting but that DIA remained unconvinced. The belittling of the contribution made by CIA reporting seems to derive from the need for an explanation as to why this concern was not filtered upward to the policy-making levels. Even if one were to concede that the abrupt upsurge in missile-associated reporting in August was not necessarily a valid indicator of something new afoot, the aerial photography of 29 August confirmed the truth of much of this August reporting; and, thereafter, there was little excuse for demeaning the validity of CIA reporting, examples of which appear in paragraph 48, indicating a shift to offensive weapons.
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Analyses and Estimates
We found little agreement among the several officers interviewed as to the probable effect of SNIE 85-3-62 on the work of the analysts. Some officers felt that the analysts would not be appreciably influenced by an estimate--that they might, in fact, take delight in uncovering evidence of its inaccuracy. Others felt that the analysts would be wary of information that ran counter to estimates based on solid evidence then existing.
Although proof is lacking and evidence is scanty, we believe that SNIE 85-3 and the political and operational climate from which it grew did have a significant effect on the use made of raw information during late September and early October. Not only do we believe that the estimators influenced the analysts, but that the analysts influenced the reporters.
We can cite only one example of influence on reporting, but it is significant. There was extremely close coordination between the reporters in Task Force W and the users in the DD/I components. Reports often were checked out with the analysts before being disseminated. In the main, we think that seeking assistance from the experts was and is a desirable procedure, as long as that assistance is limited to help in accurately presenting the facts. We think it of doubtful wisdom, however, to intrude this expert (and analytical) assistance into the realm of interpretation at the reporting level.
The particular report that illustrates our point is [illegible] summarized in paragraph 48 above, which reports large intercontinental rockets being unloaded in Mariel on 19 September. A Headquarters comment, made with assistance from the analysts, was added to the effect that it was more likely that the source observed SA-2 missiles being offloaded.
Admittedly, we are speaking from present knowledge that the report as written was probably accurate and that the Headquarters comment was wrong. There were SSM's in Cuba on 19 September; Mariel is a port that served the San Cristobal and Guanajay sites; and the SSM's are about 20 meters long. Why then the Headquarters comment that it is more likely that the missiles were SA-2's, which are only about 10 meters long? Did Headquarters have any evidence not available to the field upon which to base such a comment?
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The answer, of course, is no. Headquarters did, however, have the benefit of an estimative judgment that the Soviets probably would not put offensive weapons in Cuba, plus photographic evidence that as of 29 August they had not done so.
Thus, we find prevailing opinion and invalid evidence filtering into the processing of a current report with the result that the significance of new and, in retrospect, valid information was lessened. We recognize that, even if this comment had not been added at the reporting level, it is probable that it would have been added, at least tacitly, at the analytical level. However, this gratuitous comment was made a part of the basic report, and each of the perhaps hundreds of persons who read it would be inclined to interpret the facts as they were presented to him. The presentation said, in effect: "This is what our source says he saw. We do not believe him."
In fairness to the reporters, we should point out that this is the only evidence we found of possible distortion of reporting. Considering the volume of reporting on the arms build-up and the admitted unlikeliness of the Soviets doing what they did, we think the reporters were remarkably objective in their treatment of seemingly doubtful information.
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Action Taken on the Views of the Director of Central Intelligence
Throughout the period of the Cuban arms build-up the Director of Central Intelligence urged an interpretation of its significance that received little or no acceptance elsewhere in the community. Everyone of the several senior CIA officers whom we interviewed said that he could not at this point claim to have recognized the significance of the information being received on Cuba. Mr. Sherman Kent, for example, told us that on 13 October he personally reviewed a selection of significant recent information reports on Cuba and found no justification for revising his thinking.
We looked for evidence of any information existing in CIA on the Cuban build-up to which the Director had access and to which other officers or other members of the intelligence community did not. We found none. The fact remains, however, that the Director did correctly assess the Soviet threat, and he made his views known repeatedly.
On 10 August at a meeting in Secretary Rusk's conference room attended by Secretary Rusk, Mr. Johnson, Secretary McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Bundy, General Taylor and a number of others for the purpose of discussing General Lansdale's Phase II activities, the Director reported on the sudden importation of material--at that time the characteristic of which was unidentified--and Soviet personnel, and at that meeting speculated that this could be electronic equipment for use against Canaveral and/or military equipment including medium range ballistic missiles.
On 21 August at a meeting in Secretary Rusk's office attended by the same group, the Director again reviewed the situation as it developed since 10 August, reported definite information on surface-to-air missiles, and again speculated on the probability of medium range ballistic missiles.
On 22 August, the Director gave the same information to the President, adding certain details concerning the number of Soviet and Chinese personnel who had recently entered Cuba as reported by
On 23 August, in a meeting with the President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Taylor, Mr. Bundy
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and others, the Director again reviewed the situation and questioned the need for the extensive SAM installations unless they were to make possible the concealment of MRBM's.
The same reasoning was applied in discussions with Senator Russell's Subcommittee (CIA Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee), Chairman Vinson's Subcommittee (CIA Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee), and in a private talk with Chairman Cannon (Chairman of the CIA Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee) prior to the Director's departure on 23 August.
On Saturday, 25 August, the Director urged General Carter, Acting DCI, to propose low-level RF-101 flights over certain Soviet-Cuban installations in order to obtain detailed technical information.
The Acting DCI initiated a series of actions designed to get low-level photographic coverage.
At a COMOR meeting on 1 September, the JCS representative indicated that he needed advice on what requirements in Cuba could be met by the tactical type reconnaissance aircraft which the U-2 could not meet (COMOR-D-24/15).
At a COMOR meeting on 3 September, in further pursuance of the request of the Acting DCI, it was agreed that: "Tactical type reconnaissance aircraft could acquire information on the identified SAM sites which would permit more reliable estimates of the operational status." (COMOR-D-24/15)
On 9 September, the Chairman of COMOR was informed by the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, that the Secretary of State had raised a question whether the information on Banes could be obtained by peripheral reconnaissance means. The COMOR met on the morning of 10 September to answer this question. The COMOR concluded that: "Peripheral photography could satisfy some of the objectives planned for coverage in the current proposed U-2 mission; i.e., those objectives on the north and south coast and some of the Isle of Pines. It could not satisfy requirements in the Guantanamo area nor search which may be required later for SAM's further inland nor for future MIG-21 count on inland bases nor for technical intelligence which may be required on already known or yet to be found missile sites."
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On 10 September, the Acting DCI addressed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense (COMOR-D-24/16) in which: "It is recommended that you initiate the necessary action (including Special Group approval) to provide for the employment, when directed by higher authority, of tactical-type reconnaissance against Banes or other targets as are identified in COMOR-D-24/15, which was made available to DIA on 1 September 1962."
The minutes of the Special Group meeting of 14 September reveal the outcome of these efforts: "A JCS representative outlined the capabilities for low-level coverage of certain targets in Cuba. It was noted that the Secretary of Defense did not wish this operation considered further until the results of Agency reconnaissance in the same area became available. General Carter said that special efforts will be required to identify certain installations, the nature of which is not clear at present."
During September, the Director forwarded a series of cables [redacted] in which he repeated his belief that offensive weapons would be installed; urged frequent repeat reconnaissance missions; suggested that the Board of National Estimates study the motives behind the defensive measures; and finally expressed a reservation regarding SNIE 85-3-62, the substance of which had been cabled to him. These cables from the Director initially were distributed by the Cable Secretariat to the office of the DCI and pertinent portions were passed to the DD/I and the AD/NE by General Carter. *
As noted above, General Carter's efforts to get tactical reconnaissance of Cuba were resisted by the Secretary of Defense, pending the results of further Agency reconnaissance. Elsewhere in this paper (in the section on the September overflights) we describe the resistance of Secretary Rusk and others to any U-2 missions that would run any risk of being shot down.
It should be noted that, throughout this period, the analytical level continued the analysis of incoming information. There was particularly significant analytic effort carried on among operational elements. Task Force W, for example, dealt directly with the COMOR. We conclude, though, that the intelligence analysts and the estimators never carried their analyses and estimates to the point of asking themselves: "Is it reasonable to believe that so costly a defensive apparatus would be constructed against a nebulous invasion threat, particularly since the defensive structure would not halt a determined invader?"
- The full account of the views of the Director of Central Intelligence is the subject of a separate report.
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- From our discussions with the estimators, it is evident that they were unprepared to believe that the Soviets might install offensive weapons in Cuba or that the Soviets would grossly under- estimate United States ability to detect an offensive build-up and to react to it with forthright resolution.
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Publishing the Information
Coordinated items from the reports were printed in the Cuban Daily Summary, with round-ups in the Cuban Weekly Summary and its limited-distribution counterpart, the Cuban Weekly Report. Less detailed coordinated information appeared in the Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB) and the Current Intelligence Digest, the OCI Night Journal, and the Current Intelligence Weekly Review. The President's Checklist was not confined to coordinated items, but it contained little that did not appear in the coordinated publications.
The principal vehicles, especially for high-level policy makers, were the CIB and the Daily Summary. Of these two, the CIB has the larger circulation; more than 300 copies a day are printed, half of them going to 30 recipients outside the Agency, and there is also a very wide circulation to CIA and Defense installations of partial or complete contents by electronic means. The Daily Summary is printed in about 75 copies, with about 20 going to high-level subscribers outside the Agency. Brief abstracts from the CIB and the Daily Summary appear as Annex B and Annex C, respectively.
In a 26 October memorandum to General Carter, Mr. Harvey described "information on Soviet missiles, MIG-21's, and IL-28's in Cuba as reflected in current intelligence publications", and he attached abstracts of such items from the Cuban Daily Summary, the Night Journal, the Weekly Review, and the CIB. In it he stated:
"The Cuban summaries through 19 October 1962 were found to contain no references to any medium-range or long-range missile activity. The earliest positive acceptance of the possibility of introduction of SAM systems into Cuba appeared in the 17 August 1962 Cuban Daily Summary. The possibility of eventual delivery of MIG-21's to Cuba was implied in the issue of 5 March 1962. Future delivery of the IL-28 was first mentioned in the 1 August 1962 Daily Summary, but was not accepted as probable until an entry in the 11 October issue."
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The Mechanics of Putting Together the CIB
The Central Intelligence Bulletin is an all-source intelligence publication that is issued every day but Sunday. OCI is responsible for getting it out. The CIB for the day normally goes to press about 0400 hours. Reproduction can be delayed for an hour or so to accommodate a very urgent, last minute report, but it usually begins at about 0400.
The content of the day's CIB has begun to take shape by about noon of the preceding day. By then a tentative selection of items to be included has been made from information then available. The submissions have been prepared in draft form. Normally, between noon and 1300 the tentative draft is teletyped to DIA and to the Department of State, so that analysts in those agencies may review the items.
At 1515 hours each afternoon except Saturday the CIB panel meets to agree on the content of the CIB for the following day. The CIB panel consists of representatives from OCI, DIA, the Department of State, and the Clandestine Services. The panel considers the items that should be included and the information that each should contain.
When the panel has agreed on the content, the items are typed on offset masters which are retained in the OCI Watch Office throughout the night. Although an item may have been fully coordinated in the panel meeting, its contents need not remain static. If information received after the close of the panel meeting dictates need for change, OCI may amend items at any time prior to actual printing.
Information that is received too late for coordination in the panel meeting is inserted in the CIB by OCI as an uncoordinated item. The fact that it has not been coordinated is indicated by an asterisk.
Entries that are available for consideration at the time of the panel meeting normally appear in the CIB as coordinated items. Either State or DIA or both may not completely agree with a particular submission, but if the reservations are not so serious as to require outright non-concurrence, the item appears in the CIB as a coordinated entry. If there is marked disagreement on a particular item and its
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urgency is such that it must not be delayed in publication, two courses are open. A footnote may be inserted setting forth the views of the non-concurring agency, or the item may appear with an asterisk falsely indicating that it has not been subjected to coordination. In either case, the CIA submission appears as the basic entry in the CIB.
- The footnote or the false asterisk appear very rarely. OCI can recall only one case of a footnote and one case of a false asterisk in recent months. The item with a false asterisk was the previously mentioned submission of 27 September in which DIA refused to go along with CIA's conclusion that at least 22 and possibly 25 to 30 MIG-21's had been delivered to Cuba.
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The President's Checklist
Another important reporting medium was the daily President's Intelligence Checklist of which only ten copies are printed and which goes to the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, General Maxwell Taylor, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy. None of the bans on publication of information on offensive weapons in Cuba applied to this publication, and it was not subject to inter-agency coordination. It was a private communication from the Director of Central Intelligence to the President and a very few of his closest advisors.
Therefore there was no requirement that the Checklist writers limit themselves to material which could be published in the Central Intelligence Bulletin or the Cuban Daily Summary. Nevertheless, the Checklist reporting almost exactly parallels that of the other two much more widely distributed publications. The defensive build-up is covered in much the same fashion. There is nothing, in the period under consideration, which even hints at the offensive build-up.
As noted earlier, there were at least eight widely disseminated reports in September and early October which might have found their way into publications had it not been for the ban. However, these suggestive scraps of information did not even get into the uninhibited Checklist. But they were by no means ignored. Two of them, those mentioned in paragraphs 48.c. and 48.e. above, came to the surface in the analytic process as indicative of surface-to-surface missile activity and led to the 14 October U-2 mission over San Cristobal.
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Conclusions
- On the basis of this investigation we conclude:
a. That, with a few minor exceptions, intelligence information on the Cuban arms build-up moved rapidly to those officers who needed it;
b. That limited use was made of the information available because of publication restrictions, which were aggravated by coordination problems, and, because officers, in CIA as well as other agencies, were skeptical of refugee and agent reporting, that this skepticism may have delayed the community's realization of the true significance of the Cuban arms build-up;
c. That the estimative process failed because the estimators were unprepared to believe that the Soviets might install offensive weapons in Cuba or that they would grossly underestimate United States ability to detect an offensive build-up and to react to it with forthright resolution; and
d. That extreme caution with regard to U-2 flights, following the incidents in Sakhalin and China, affected the planning of Cuban reconnaissance flights during September 1962.
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ANNEX G
OCI No. 3047/62 22 August 1962
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Recent Soviet Military Aid to Cuba
Intelligence on recent Soviet military assistance to Cuba indicates that an unusually large number of Soviet ships have delivered military cargoes to Cuba since late July and that some form of military construction is underway at several locations in Cuba by Soviet bloc personnel who arrived on some of these ships and are utilizing material delivered by the vessels. During the period at least 1,500 passengers have debarked from four ships under security conditions suggesting that their mission is related to the construction and military activity; another 1,500 arrived during the period and were greeted with considerable publicity as economic specialists and students. Some still unconfirmed reports suggest that recently arrived Soviet bloc personnel number as many as 5,000. The speed and magnitude of this influx of bloc personnel and equipment into a non-bloc country is unprecedented in Soviet military aid activities; clearly something new and different is taking place. As yet limited evidence suggests that present activities may include the augmentation of Cuba's air defense system, possibly including the establishment of surface-to-air missile sites or the setting up of facilities for electronic and communications intelligence.
As many as 20 Soviet vessels may have already arrived in Cuba since late July with military cargoes. Five more Soviet vessels have left Black Sea ports under conditions suggesting that they are en route to Cuba with additional military equipment. Most reports on these shipments have referred to large quantities of transportation, electronic, and construction equipment, such as communications and radar vans, trucks of many varieties, mobile generator units, tracked and wheeled prime movers, cranes, trailers, and fuel tanks. Eyewitnesses who saw the material being transported from the port areas report that much of the transportation was done at night and even that town street lights were turned off as the convoys passed through.
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Personnel who arrived on the four Soviet passenger vessels--each of which has a normal passenger capacity of 340, though one of them declared 365 passengers when leaving the Black Sea--have been described variously by Cubans who have seen them. Most agree that they were obviously non-Cuban in appearance and were dressed in civilian clothing. A number of independent sources report that the foreign personnel were dressed in dirty, dusty, slept-in, red-checkered shirts and faded blue trousers. The foreign personnel unloaded the vessels themselves; usually Cuban militiamen have been charged with this work even when it was a military cargo. There is no hard evidence that any of these people are in combat military units. There is strong evidence that their mission is related to unidentified military construction.
At least a dozen refugees from the area of Matanzas have reported independently on military construction at two sites near that north coast city. Two and possibly more ships arrived in the port of Matanzas and unloaded cargoes under tight security precautions. Cargoes were taken to at least two general areas where construction is underway. Initial construction, according to one of the eyewitnesses, involved the grading and leveling of a naturally level portion of the western slope of a hill by Soviet personnel using heavy equipment. This was taking place at a site just east of Matanzas at a place called El Bongo. Other sources confirmed that material was leaving the docks in the direction of El Bongo. Another source, who left Cuba more recently, reported that by 4 August foreign personnel were assembling what appeared to be a prefabricated curved-roofed structure at El Bongo. The other site of construction activity near Matanzas is apparently just across the provincial border in Havana province at Santa Cruz del Norte, near the former Hershey sugar mill. In this place, too, construction activity initially involved the leveling of a portion of a hill near the coast. Cuban residents had been cleared from the area.
There are as yet no confirmed report of construction activity underway in other parts of Cuba. However, there is considerable reason to presume that such activity is underway or is to be initiated shortly in a number of other locations in Cuba, ranging from Oriente province in the east to Pinar del Rio in the west. reported that a Soviet ship unloaded in late July at nearby Nicaro. The material unloaded, including electronic vans, tracked prime movers, and trailers, was moved through Antilla toward the Peninsula de Ramon, an area where he reported construction work had
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been underway for some time. Another ship is reported to have discharged a similar cargo as well as foreign personnel in the port of Casilda, in southern Las Villas province. In northern Las Villas, Cayo Esquivel, an island off the coast, has reportedly been evacuated. In the area just south of Havana city, we have numerous independent reports that a number of farms have been evacuated and that the boys' reformatory at nearby Torrens has been converted for living quarters for numbers of foreign personnel. Information from individuals who live near the reformatory indicate that the numerous Soviet personnel who moved in early this month wore "casual, dirty, civilian clothes". Other reports indicate that quantities of equipment such as has been reported elsewhere have been seen on the confiscated farms near the reformatory. Other reports from other parts of the island indicate that Cuban families have been evacuated from an island near Mariel, the port in Pinar del Rio province where much of the equipment was unloaded, and from a farming area near Guatana, Pinar del Rio province.
What the construction activity involves is not yet known. The activity in the Matanzas area could be the initial phases of construction of a SAM-equipped air defense system, erection of electronic and communications intelligence facilities aimed at Canaveral and other US installations, or an ECM system aimed at US space, missile, and/or other operational electronic systems. The kinds of equipment described could fit with any of these objectives; the evidence thus far, as well as Soviet practice in other countries receiving bloc military assistance, would suggest, at least tentatively, construction of an air defense system based on the GUIDELINE missile. Information to confirm or refute this should become available within a week.
The step-up in military shipments and the construction activity once again provide strong evidence of the magnitude of the USSR's support for the Castro regime. Together with the extraordinary Soviet bloc economic commitments made to Cuba in recent months, these developments amount to the most extensive campaign to bolster a non-bloc country ever undertaken by the USSR.
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IG Comment: This memorandum was distributed as follows:
DD/I
AD/CI
Senior Intelligence Duty Officer/OCI
President's Checklist Staff/OCI
Production Assistant/Western Areas/OCI
Latin America Division/OCI
Watch Officer/OCI
Indications Officer/OCI
Current Support Staff/ORR
USIB Watch Committee (25 copies)
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ANNEX H 29 October 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: ODDI
ATTENTION : Mr. Lehman
SUBJECT : Difficulties in Coordination with CIB on Cuban Military Build-up
The Current Support Staff of the Office of Research and Reports, in support of the Office of Current Intelligence, has prepared much of the material on Soviet Bloc delivery of arms to non-bloc countries since that program began in 1954/1955. Coordination of Central Intelligence Bulletin submissions on this subject has always been difficult. Prior to 5 September, coordination of material relating to the speed up of deliveries to Cuba was extremely difficult, especially with DIA. Coordination remained difficult until 10 October. After much effort by members of the staff and others, excellent cooperation was initially attained on 10 October, when DIA agreed that an IL-28 crate was a clearly identifiable object.
In summary, it was very difficult--to the point of direct confrontation on 6 October between the AD/CI and the Director CIIC, DIA--to get coordination of that which was published. It is respectfully asserted that had we attempted to go further still--which unfortunately we did not attempt--coordination would have been impossible.
The first St/CS submission dealing with the Cuban military build-up, made on 17 August, did not involve coordination, since it was submitted after the CIB panel for the 18th had met. This article stated, "...limited information available thus far suggests it may include initial work on SAM sites to augment Cuba's air defense system." No coordinated publication carried such a statement until photography on 28 August and 5 September indicated the installation of such a system.
The first CIB submission on the build-up to undergo coordination, which was submitted on 3 August, noted an unusual number (11) of suspected arms carriers en route to Cuba.
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Documentary evidence of the NSA objection remains in St/CS.
In addition, CIB items appeared on 9, 23 and 29 August dealing essentially with shipping developments. Each of these was in various degrees watered down in the coordination process. We were most effectively blocked in attempts to impute some significance to the deliveries. Through late August DIA continued to publish that these arrivals were largely additional economic aid goods.
On 27 September, this office submitted a CIB draft based on deck-borne crates which concluded that at least 22 and possibly 25 to 30 MIG-21s had been delivered to Cuba. This draft also concluded that of some 100 Soviet dry cargo vessel voyages to Cuba since mid-July about 85 probably involved deliveries of military and related equipment. This item was submitted by cable to DIA in advance of the CIB panel. DIA refused to either coordinate or insert a footnote and, after involvement of the OAD/CI, the item was run with an asterisk--normally indicating late submissions.
A fairly major dispute, eventually involving the AD/CI and the Director, CIIC/DIA (Col. Gillis) occurred on 5 October. This article noted that crates observed on the Alatyrtles in late September probably contained IL-14 piston transports and did not contain IL-28s. DIA would neither accept our evaluation or make one of their own. This resulted in a DIA attempt to have Mr. R.J. Smith withdraw the piece or "asterisk" it as uncoordinated. Mr. Smith resolved the dispute at a late hour by offering DIA the choice of a footnote stating their lack of concurrence, and the reason therefore, or agreement. DIA eventually accepted the latter choice.
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The same problems in coordination experience in preparing materials for the CIB were evident in other forms, chiefly from the point of view of this staff in the Watch Committee. Mr. H. Sheldon, D/DDI, would be the better authority on this area.
Y-1 of ONI, the Navy Comint shop at NSA, has been extremely cooperative through the build-up in Cuba as in earlier Soviet Bloc arms movements by water despite minor differences over the turn around on 23 October of the ships en route to Cuba. Should expressions of appreciation be in order, this unit should receive them. On the other hand, it is respectfully suggested that DIA not be charged with its faults unless a defense of this Agency absolutely requires such action. Such an action would not particularly facilitate the necessary cooperation which will be required in future developments and as of the moment the concerned DIA personnel are more cooperative than at any time in the past.
As a final note, it should be pointed out that on about 29 August, Mr. Neubert of Mr. Hilsman's office called Ch/RR/St/CS for support. Mr. Hilsman was under the same pressures to withdraw an INR memorandum which noted an upsurge in Bloc vessels traveling to Cuba under conditions suggesting increasing deliveries of arms--no more than that. The request for withdrawal came from Gen. M. Taylor after consultation with Adm. Dennison, Commander of GITMO, who saw no unusual developments. Mr. Neubert was offered some assistance that afternoon. Publication on about 30 August of the "Situation Summary for Cuba on 28 August" eliminated the need for further support to INR.
RR/St/CS 29 October 1962
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C03054547 Approved for Release: 2015/03/24 C03054547 TOP SECRET ANNEX [ 15 November 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR: (O/IG) SUBJECT: Soviet Ships in Mariel Harbor on 19 and 23 September 1962
Our information on specific ships in specific places in Cuba is sketchy because of Soviet communications security procedures (i. e., lack of intercepts). A careful review of the evidence, however, indicates the following ships probably were in Mariel on the following dates:
19 September
KIROVSK - - Probably arrived at Mariel about 18 September from a Baltic port and with a military cargo. Cargo details are not known. The deck cargo not known to have been photographed.
POLTAVA - - Probably arrived at Mariel about 15 September and had left by 24 September. No cargo information available, but this ship probably delivered MRBMs and associated equipment. She has hatches of a size sufficient to put such equipment below deck. Deck cargo included miscellaneous crates and probable military trucks.
FREDERIK Z. KYURI - - Arrived at an unidentified Cuban port about 14 September; may have been Mariel. Was outbound by 20 September. Ship delivered a military cargo, but details are lacking. The deck cargo is not known to have been photographed.
23 September
ALATYRLES - - Probably was still in Mariel on 23 September after delivering a cargo which included three deck loaded probable twin-engine CAB transport aircraft.
LENINOGORSK - May have arrived in Mariel about 21 September with an unidentified military cargo. Deck cargo photography shows probably military vans.
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16 November 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
SUBJECT : Total Cargo Tonnage Moved to Cuba by Soviet Ships, 26 July - 30 September
Our information on tonnage moved to Cuba in this period is extremely limited. Ships carrying military cargoes almost always carry light loads relative to their capacities. We have declarations of tonnage for most of the Soviet ships leaving from the Black Sea, some of which could be checked later during their unloadings. Such declarations are not available on ships from the Baltic, however, and tonnage has been estimated.
During the period 26 July through 30 September, Soviet dry-cargo ships (excluding 15 passenger ship voyages) made about 95 voyages to Cuba carrying an estimated 135,000 tons of cargo. About 90 of these voyages involved deliveries of military or military-related equipment, totaling about 115,000 tons.
/s/
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16 November 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: (O/IG)
SUBJECT: Ballistic Missile Shipments to Cuba
This memorandum partially answers the questions asked in paragraph 2B of your memorandum of 15 November. It gives as much information on the activities of ships suspected of carrier missiles as we have gathered together so far. We do not have and can not obtain precise information to answer most questions dealing with cargoes carried to Cuba and ports in the USSR where the ships were loaded. We have not included the information requested on what these ships did in Cuba after unloading their cargoes; that is, what was loaded and taken back to the USSR. In almost every instance these ships returned immediately in ballast in order to make a return voyage. However, to verify this in detail would take many hours of painstaking effort which would preclude answering your question for some days.
We have identified seven--possibly ten--Soviet ships which have made calls at Cuban ports and could have carried MRBMs below deck. Seven of the ships have a hatch about 70 feet long which could accommodate about 6 missiles on transporters; the other three have a hatch about 60 feet long and it is far less likely they carried missiles, although they may well have carried missile equipment, such as erectors and oxidizer trailers, some of which also requires an extra large hatch.
Our information on the activities of these ships is sketchy, but in retrospect, we can identify 7 voyages which probably account for the delivery of 42 ballistic missiles to Cuba. These voyages have been checked by every available means--including intercepts, photography, and ports of entry. They also have been plugged into a time chart of the construction of the missile bases in Cuba. By using both collateral reports, many of which became available after the sites were identified, and the aerial photography, a good estimate of the timing of activities at the MRBM and IRBM sites can be made. The seven voyages mentioned above fit almost precisely into the chart where deliveries of missiles should have occured. Many other voyages by these ships involved military equipment, but probably not ballistic missiles.
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| Ship | Voyage Number and Details |
|---|---|
| BELORETSK | 1. May have arrived in Mariel about 25 August. Photography shows trucks and cranes on deck. Probably carried missile equipment but no missiles. Ship loaded in an unidentified Black Sea port. 2. Arrived in the Mariel area about 13-14 October with an unidentified military cargo from the Black Sea. |
| BELOVODSK | 1. Was on maiden voyage from the Baltic at the time the US quarantine was announced. The ship carried a civil cargo, including 12 MI-4 helicopters, grain, and flour, and arrived in Havana about 3 November. |
| KASIMOV | 1. On its maiden voyage to Cuba in September, this ship delivered 10 IL-28 bombers carried as deck cargo. It probably did not carry missile equipment. Arrived in the Mariel/Havana area about 30 September. 2. Turned back from a voyage to Cuba on 23 October when the US quarantine was announced. Had departed from the Baltic. |
| KIMOVSK | 1. Arrived in Cuba from the Baltic on 10 August on its maiden voyage. Port of arrival unknown. Probably carried military equipment but no ballistic missiles. Photography shows a large number of trucks and cranes on deck, suggesting the ship may have carried an advanced unit of missile personnel and equipment involved primarily with construction. |
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Arrived Casilda about 22 September from the Black Sea. No definite information available, but in all probability the ship delivered a cargo which included ballistic missiles, some of which were loaded in Casilda when they were returned to the USSR. Photography of the ship shows no piece of equipment which can be traced to ballistic missile systems, but the crates on deck are similar in size and construction to those seen on several other ships believed to have delivered missiles.
Ship turned back on 23 October when it was approaching the area of the US quarantine on a voyage from the Baltic.
KRASNOGRAD
Arrived Mariel on 21 August from the Baltic. Photography shows a large number of trucks and construction equipment on deck. This delivery probably involved equipment for missile units but not the missiles themselves.
Probably arrived in Mariel about 2 October from the Black Sea. Photography shows large number of trucks and crates on deck. The crates are similar to those seen on other suspect missile carriers. Ship probably delivered missiles.
OKHOTSK
- Arrived Havana on 20 September with agricultural equipment from the Soviet Far East port of Vladivostok. Photography of the ship as it went through the Panama Canal indicates it did carry rice harvesters on deck. Probably did not carry any military equipment.
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OMSK
Apparently loaded military equipment in the Black Sea port of Nikolaev in mid-June and arrived in Cuba--probably in the Mariel area--on 28 July. No photography is available, but this shipment probably did not involve ballistic missiles.
Arrived at an unknown Cuban port from the Black Sea by 9 September, probably in the Mariel area. This may have been the first shipment of ballistic missiles to arrive in this area and would account for at least one collateral report shortly after this. No photography for this voyage is available.
Arrived in Cuba--probably in the Mariel area--about 16 October, from the Black Sea. No photography for the voyage is available but it appears likely that it involved the delivery of additional missiles.
ORENBURG
Entered the Cuban port of Casilda on 29 August from the Black Sea. This may have been the first shipment of missiles to arrive in Cuba. Photography of the ship again shows the same type of crates observed on other suspect missile carriers.
Probably arrived in the Mariel area about 6 October from the Black Sea. No photography of the ship is available, but we believe it probably delivered ballistic missiles.
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POLTAVA
Arrived at an unknown port in Cuba about 2 August from the Black Sea. No photography is available, but because of the date of arrival it seems likely this voyage did not involve delivery of missiles.
Arrived in Cuba--probably in the Mariel area--about 15 September from the Black Sea. Photography of the ship shows the same type of crates observed on other suspect missile carriers. Ship probably was among the first to deliver MRBMs to Cuba.
Turned back from a voyage to Cuba on 23 October after President Kennedy's speech. In all probability the ship was carrying a cargo which included ballistic missiles, possibly the first IRBMs. Photography of the ship shows the same type of crates seen on several other suspect missile carriers and one probable IRBM launch ring can be observed on deck.
SIMFEROPOL
- Arrived in Havana about 17 October on its maiden voyage from the Baltic. No cargo information is available but we do not believe the ship carried ballistic missiles on this voyage.
/s/
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HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP 11 September 1962
SUBJECT: Reconnaissance of Cuba.
At a meeting in Mr. Bundy's office yesterday, attended by the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence and others, the Secretary expressed concern at the Agency's planned coverage of Cuba, involving extensive peripheral coverage as well as two legs directly over Cuban air space, all in one flight. He said that he had no objection to the peripheral parts and, in fact, thought it useful to continue to establish our right to fly over international waters. On the other hand, he recognized the necessity of obtaining vertical coverage of the Isle of Pines and the eastern portion of Cuba at this time. He felt, however, that it is unwise to combine extensive overflying of international waters, with actual overflights. He pointed out that the long peripheral flight would draw undue attention to the mission and further that should the aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight had occurred, this would put the U.S. in a very poor position for standing on its rights to overfly international waters.
Taking these views into account, the Agency plans to break this proposed coverage into four parts - the Isle of Pines, the area roughly east of longitude 77 west, and two legs along the coast - one north and one south.
Within this framework, higher authority gave approval this morning for two additional missions to be added to the one for which authority is currently outstanding. (Priority will be given to the two overflights.)
/s/ Thomas A. Parrott
Distribution Mr. Johnson Mr. Gilpatric General Carter Mr. Bundy
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BYE-3729/62
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION REFERRING TO IDEALIST.
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13 September 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP SUBJECT: Reconnaissance of Cuba. REFERENCE: BYE-3729/62, Memorandum for the Special Group, dated 11 September 1962, same subject.
Please add the following footnote to ref. document:
N.B. Mr. Bundy said, on 13 September 1962, that he thought the intent of higher authority's approval was such that the entire number of four missions could be considered as being approved. This thus extends the outstanding authorizations from three to four.
/s/ Thomas A. Parrott
Distribution Mr. Johnson Mr. Gilpatric General Carter Mr. Bundy
This document contains information referring to IDEALIST.
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BYE-3769/62 Cy 1 of 5 Cy:
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