Telegram 2997 from American Embassy in Jakarta to Secretary of State in Washington, Confidential
National Security Archive
A 1967 Jakarta‑Washington telegram reveals U.S. diplomats’ uneasy appraisal of Suharto’s blend of military power, traditional mysticism, and co‑opted nationalist elites.
Source: Telegram 2997 from American Embassy in Jakarta to Secretary of State in Washington, Confidential Date: Jun 20, 1967 Archive: RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 38 (Dummy Box), Folder 5 Collection: U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder 1965 Oct 17, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
Shadows Behind the New Order’s Diplomatic Facade
The June 20, 1967 telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta to Secretary of State William Rogers offers a rare, candid glimpse into Washington’s backstage assessment of President Suharto’s nascent regime. Drafted by the embassy’s political officer after a debrief with Indonesian diplomat Ali Malik, the cable records Malik’s “bitterness” over Suharto’s appointment of Ruslan Abdulgani as Indonesia’s permanent UN delegate. Abdulgani, a former close associate of ousted President Sukarno and a leading figure in the nationalist PNI party, had been promised the post a year earlier. Suharto’s insistence on honoring that promise—despite opposition from military hard‑liners—reveals a calculated attempt to co‑opt the old political elite and legitimize the New Order on the international stage.
The telegram situates this personnel decision within a broader strategic calculus: Suharto’s reliance on the PNI as a bulwark against “Moslem groups” he feared might push for an Islamic state. Malik, echoing U.S. concerns, describes these fears as “unfounded” yet acknowledges they dominate Suharto’s thinking. The cable also notes Suharto’s personal reliance on a “Dukun” (Javanese soothsayer), a detail that, while anecdotal, underscores the president’s blend of modern military authority with traditional mysticism—a combination that puzzled both Jakarta’s elite and Washington’s analysts.
The Embassy’s Insider Portrait of Suharto’s Inner Circle
Beyond the high‑level political analysis, the telegram provides a roster of Suharto’s close aides, each annotated with terse judgments. Names such as Alamsjah, described as “the man whom no one trusts,” and Murtopo, labeled “smart but corrupt,” offer a window into the factional dynamics shaping policy decisions. The embassy’s assessment that “Slamet” represented the “best hope amongst men on Suharto’s staff” suggests U.S. officials were already scouting potential allies for future cooperation. By cataloguing both competence and corruption, the cable reflects Washington’s pragmatic approach: while wary of the regime’s authoritarian tendencies, the State Department was eager to identify reliable partners for anti‑communist objectives in Southeast Asia.
These observations must be read against the backdrop of the 1965‑66 anti‑communist purge that brought Suharto to power. The mass killings—targeting alleged communists, ethnic Chinese, and Sukarno loyalists—left Indonesia politically destabilized and socially traumatized. By mid‑1967, the United States was shifting from covert support for the coup to overt diplomatic engagement, seeking to solidify a pro‑Western bulwark in the archipelago. The telegram’s emphasis on “restructuring the political party system” and the warning that “elections before 1970” were unlikely reveal U.S. anxieties about the regime’s long‑term legitimacy.
Why This Cable Still Matters
The document’s withdrawal from public access in 2005, under Executive Order 13526, signals its sensitivity: it contains candid appraisals of a foreign leader’s reliance on occult counsel and exposes internal dissent among Indonesia’s military‑political elite. For historians, the telegram is a primary source that corroborates other accounts of Suharto’s early attempts to balance traditional Javanese authority with modern statecraft. It also illustrates how U.S. diplomats navigated the moral ambiguities of supporting a regime born of mass murder while pursuing strategic anti‑communist goals.
In contemporary debates over U.S. foreign policy ethics, the telegram serves as a cautionary artifact. It shows that even in the midst of Cold War exigencies, American officials were aware of the “unpalatable” nature of certain appointments and the potential for political backlash from both the military and civilian sectors. The nuanced portrait of Suharto’s inner circle—mixing competence, corruption, and mysticism—remains relevant for scholars examining how personal networks and cultural beliefs shape authoritarian governance.
Legacy of the “Shadows” Narrative
The phrase “Shadows Behind Appointment of Ruslan Abdulgani” captures the duality of Suharto’s rule: a visible veneer of order masking the lingering influence of Sukarno’s nationalist legacy and the opaque power of traditional Javanese belief systems. By documenting these shadows, the Jakarta embassy cable enriches our understanding of the New Order’s early consolidation phase and underscores the importance of diplomatic cables as lenses into the lived realities of foreign policy decision‑making.
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 84 - Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State Box: 00299 Withhold Box: 0 Withhold Folder: 0 Document: 20 HMS REID: Entry: Series: State Department Lot Files Total Pages: 4
ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
Document Date: 06-20-1967 Document Type: Telegram Special Media: File Number:
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. This document is being withheld under Section 3.3b of EO 13526 and/or NARA's discretionary withholdings outlined in 36 CFR 1256.
NND: 37770 Withdrawn: 01-07-2005 by:
RETRIEVAL #: 37770 00299 0 0 20 System DocID: 24096636
TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING AmEmb DJAKARTA
Comm Chron Files Amb Min Pol Econ USIS RF
Charge:
CONFIDENTIAL Classification
POL 15-1 ABDULGANDI POL 15-1 SUHARTO Control: DJAKARTA 6224
CONFIDENTIAL
Date: JUNE 20, 1967 1835 rwb
ACTION: SecState WASHINGTON 2997 INFO: USUN 104
STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW [ ] Retain class'n Change/classify to [X] Declassify with concurrence of after 10/01/2008 EO 12958, 25X 1 G Ruslan Abdulgani 11-10-97 D.Harty 10/28/02
SUBJECT: Shadows Behind Appointment of Ruslan Abdulgani Ref: Djakarta's 6163
- In our talks before he left for New York, Malik commented with some bitterness on Suharto's insistence in naming ex-Sukarno henchman-propagandist Ruslan Abdulgani as Indonesia's permanent delegate to United Nations, a decision Malik had repeatedly opposed and which is unpalatable to FonOff, most of Generals, and to intellectual community. Malik had tried to head this off by suggesting a military man (General Simatupang), but his proposal had been turned down by Suharto who maintained that, having promised Ruslan this job last year, he must follow through and that Ruslan now supported the New Order. Malik commented to me that real reason for Suharto's decision was advice from his Dukun (soothsayer), who in
AmbMGreen:vr June 20, 1967 CONFIDENTIAL Classification
DECLASSIFIED Authority NND37720
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without prmg. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T".
PPRC, Japan
TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING AmEmb DJAKARTA CONFIDENTIAL 2. Charge: Classification Control: Date: turn was in pay of PNI (in which party Ruslan is prominent). This led to a discussion of Suharto's connections with PNI. 2. According to Malik, Suharto sees the PNI as the only political party large enough to serve as a counterpoise to those Moslem groups which Suharto suspects of favoring the creation of an Islamic State. Malik agreed with me that these fears of an Islamic State seem unfounded but he nevertheless insisted that they are a matter of preoccupation for Suharto. This has caused his relations with Nasution to cool off, not only because Suharto sees Nasution as the only military leader who could challenge his own position, but also as the man who might become leader of Islamic state proponents. Malik conceded that Suharto had other reasons as well for supporting the PNI: PNI's strength is principally in Central Java which is Suharto's birth place; desire to win over PNI as far as possible in support of New Order and not let PNI be driven into opposition, etc.
CONFIDENTIAL Classification DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 31770 UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED Address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without going. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T". PPRC, Japan
TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING AmEmb DJAKARTA CONFIDENTIAL Classification Control: 3. Date: Charge: 3. Malik was nevertheless much concerned that such identification of Suharto with PNI (and this would be magnified further by appointment of Ruslan Abdulgani, a former PNI luminary) would antagonize many of those now supporting New Order, such as Action Fronts and Moslem groups. He finds it ironical that Suharto should be giving any support to the political party regarded as most pro-Sukarno and anti-New Order. 4. Malik had these further remarks to make (supplementing Djakarta 6058) about military officers on Suharto's personal staff: Alamsjah (the man whom no one trusts), Sudjono Humardani (honest, not too bright, close to Suharto only in a mystic sense), Slamet (close to General Suwarto and our best hope amongst men on Suharto's staff), Murtopo (smart but corrupt; he should stick to intelligence and stay out of political and economic affairs), Suhardjono (an inefficient bureaucrat), Surjo (utterly corrupt and untrustworthy), Sunarso (influential only in foreign affairs field and helpful to FonOff). [DECLASSIFIED Authority NND37770] CONFIDENTIAL Classification UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED ress messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without ng. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T". PPNC. Japan
TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING AmEmb DJAKARTA CONFIDENTIAL 4. Charge: Classification Control: Date: 5. Comments: Despite his reservations about Suharto, Malik will continue to seek to work with him. He feels, as I do, that Suharto's horizons and contacts must be broadened. He also feels that Suharto must move soon to restructure the political party system in a way that will best ensure mass support for Indonesia's New Order. Even though Malik does not anticipate elections before 1970, he believes this is no excuse for further delays in facing up to basic political issues. 6. As reflected in his comments about Suharto's Dukun, Malik is not above taking special aim at this feature of Javanese traditionalism, even though his subsequent comments indicate a far more realistic reason for Suharto's cosiness towards the PNI. GP-3 [wg] GREEN CONFIDENTIAL Classification UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REP. FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTH. DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 37770 ress messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without ng. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T".
NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
National Security Archive, Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University, 2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037, Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu