Telegram 1626 from American Embassy in Jakarta to Secretary of State in Washington, Secret
National Security Archive
A 1967 Jakarta embassy cable maps the army’s internal timetable to legally dismantle Sukarno, revealing U.S. eyes on the hawks’ push for a swift, constitutional coup.
Source: Telegram 1626 from American Embassy in Jakarta to Secretary of State in Washington, Secret Date: Jan 20, 1967 Archive: RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 38 (Dummy Box), Folder 5 Collection: U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder 1965 Oct 17, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
Jakarta’s Inside Track on the Sukarno‑Suharto Power Shift
The January 9, 1967 telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta is a rare glimpse of how Washington’s diplomatic corps tried to map the clandestine negotiations that were reshaping Indonesia’s political landscape after the 1965‑66 anti‑communist purge. Sent by the embassy’s political counselor to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the message records a conversation with Major‑General Sjarif Thajeb, a senior army officer aligned with the “hawks” who were pressing General Suharto to accelerate the removal of President Sukarno. The telegram does not merely recount gossip; it outlines a concrete timetable—parliamentary sessions in late January, a special MPRS (People’s Consultative Assembly) meeting in February‑March, and a coordinated public‑opinion campaign—to force Sukarno’s “suspension” and pave the way for a formal, constitutional transition.
The document was drafted at a moment when the United States was still calibrating its response to the Indonesian crisis. By early 1967, the CIA’s covert backing of anti‑PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) forces had largely receded, but Washington remained deeply invested in ensuring that the anti‑communist outcome produced a stable, pro‑Western regime. The telegram’s focus on “hawks” within the army, their desire to create a situation that would compel Suharto to act, and the reference to a forthcoming Sukarno statement that would blame the “Nekolim” (the so‑called “Nekolim” conspiracy linking the army’s local friends to the PKI) all reveal how the U.S. Embassy was trying to anticipate the internal logic of the Indonesian military elite.
The Broader Context: From the 1965 Coup Attempt to the 1967 Transition
The telegram belongs to the larger narrative of Indonesia’s violent break with Sukarno’s guided‑democracy. The failed 30 September 1965 “Gestapu” coup—blamed on the PKI—triggered a nationwide purge that killed an estimated half‑million people and crippled the communist movement. In the aftermath, General Suharto, then commander of the army’s strategic reserve, emerged as the de‑facto power broker. By late 1966 he had already begun to sideline Sukarno, but he was wary of appearing to seize power outright, fearing both domestic backlash and international censure.
The telegram shows that by January 1967 the “hawks” were no longer satisfied with a slow, behind‑the‑scenes erosion of Sukarno’s authority. They wanted a visible, legally framed removal—hence the emphasis on parliamentary and MPRS actions that could be presented as constitutional. The U.S. Embassy’s report that Suharto “insists on doing things his slow and deliberate own way” underscores his calculated restraint, while simultaneously noting that “bloodshed likely before problem solved,” a stark reminder that the transition was still fraught with the potential for renewed violence.
What the Telegram Reveals About Decision‑Making Inside Jakarta
Several points stand out:
- Internal Army Factionalism – The term “hawks” identifies a subset of senior officers pushing for a rapid showdown, contrasted with Suharto’s more cautious approach. This internal pressure explains why Suharto eventually moved against Sukarno in March 1967, after the parliamentary and MPRS sessions had built a veneer of legitimacy.
- Manipulation of Public Opinion – The telegram notes a coordinated effort to mobilize public sentiment against Sukarno, already underway in Jakarta (code 3120). This suggests that the army, with tacit U.S. awareness, was using propaganda to erode Sukarno’s popular base before any legal maneuver.
- Strategic Use of Legal Institutions – By targeting the DPR (House of Representatives) and MPRS, the hawks aimed to “make this body…more manageable.” The plan to have the parliament act as a “prosecutor” indicates a deliberate attempt to cloak a coup in procedural normalcy.
- Sukarno’s Vulnerability – The telegram records that Sukarno’s planned report to the MPES (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?) would blame the PKI but also the army’s “local friends,” a move that could alienate his remaining military allies and accelerate his downfall.
Legacy and Contemporary Relevance
The declassification of this telegram, though delayed until 2017, adds nuance to the long‑standing debate over the extent of U.S. involvement in Indonesia’s 1965‑67 power shift. While the document does not prove direct American orchestration of the hawks’ timetable, it confirms that U.S. diplomats were closely monitoring, and arguably tacitly endorsing, the army’s internal machinations. The language of “slow and deliberate” versus “forced acceleration” mirrors today’s diplomatic dilemmas in authoritarian transitions, where external powers must balance strategic interests against the moral hazards of supporting internal factions.
For scholars of Cold War Southeast Asia, the telegram underscores how the Indonesian military’s own factional calculations, rather than a monolithic “Suharto‑CIA” axis, drove the final ouster of Sukarno. It also illustrates the importance of diplomatic cables as primary sources: they capture the real‑time uncertainty, the jargon of “hawks,” and the anticipatory framing of events that official histories often smooth over. Understanding these dynamics helps explain why Indonesia emerged from the crisis with a militarized, anti‑communist regime that remained a key U.S. ally throughout the Cold War—and why the shadows of those decisions still influence Jakarta’s political culture today.
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
RG: 84 - Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State Box: 00299 Withhold Box: 0 Withhold Folder: 0 Document: 18 HMS REID: Entry: Series: State Department Lot Files Total Pages: 4
ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
Document Date: 01-10-1967 Document Type: Telegram Special Media: File Number:
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. This document is being withheld under Section 3.3b of EO 13526 and/or NARA's discretionary withholdings outlined in 36 CFR 1256.
NND: 37770 Withdrawn: 01-07-2005 by:
RETRIEVAL #: 37770 00299 0 0 18 System DocID: 24096634
[NO STATE OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION BY illegible DATE 08/16/17]
TELEGRAM
Foreign Service of the United States of America
OUTGOING AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
SECRET Classification
POL 15-1 SUKARNO Control: DJAKARTA 3143 Date: Jan 9, 1967 1725 cns
AMB A/DCM POL ECON USIS COMM CHRON RF FILES
Charge: ACTION: SecState WASHINGTON DC 1626 INFO: Amconsul MEDAN 450 Amconsul SURABAYA 434 Amembassy SINGAPORE 180 Amembassy Kuala Lumpur 198 Amembassy MANILA 292 Amembassy CANBERRA 141 CINCPAC 344
- In talk with Political Counselor January 7 Maj. Gen.
Sjarif Thajeb said Suharto is definitely committed to ousting
Sukarno but will not be pushed and insists on doing things his
slow and deliberate
own way. Since attempts to persuade Suharto to move
haxxmore rapidly have failed, Sjarif and other "hawks" are attempting to create situation which will force Suharto to act and thereby precipitate final showdown. They believe this can be done by March.
[Next]
NEXT/major event, according to Sjarif, will be Sukarno's report to MPES which other sources say now due tomorrow. Sjarif said statement will criticize PKI role in Gestapu but will place real blame on Nekolim and "its local Army friends" who "deceived PKI" and induced it to act as it did. Statement will by implication
ADCM:EMasters:py 1/9/67 SECRET Classification
DECLASSIFIED Authority NND377720
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
All messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For BG/T".
TELEGRAM
OUTGOING
Foreign Service of the
United States of America
SECRET
2.
Charge:
Classification
Control:
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also place blame for events of October 1, 1965, on Nasution.
Sjarif said statement will not mention CIA by name, but
"implication will be clear" that this is what is meant by
m
use of term Nekolim.
3. Sjarif said statement will please no one and will certainly
not rpt not be acceptable to Army. It will in fact be useful
to "hawks" to heighten anti-Sukarno feeling and pave way for
two major actions planned during next several weeks. First
effort will be coordinated move to mobilize public opinion
against Sukarno. (This apparently already underway - Djakarta 3120.)
Second will be expansion in membership of Parliament (DPR) in order
to make this body, and also MPRS which includes all DPR members,
more manageable.
3 4. Parliament will convene January 23, Sjarif said, and will
serve as "prosecutor" in move against Sukarno. Sjarif indicated
he himself would spearhead attack. After airing Sukarno's
misdeeds, Parliament will call for MPRS session to deal coup
de grace.
5. MPRS is expected to meet in late February or early March
SECRET
Classification
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION
FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND37770
messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without
... "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T".
TELEGRAM OUTGOING Foreign Service of the United States of America
SECRET Charge: Classification Control: 3. Date:
at which time it will "suspend Sukarno" pending a full investigation of his regime. Sjarif was vague on what would follow suspension decree but he and "hawks" apparently hope this action by MPRS will suffice and will either induce Sukarno to retire gracefully or precipitate military showdown which will forcefully remove him from office. Sjarif seemed to think latter was more likely possibility and said bloodshed likely before problem solved. Sjarif, and also Abu Bakar Lubis in subsequent talk, said trip abroad by Sukarno "definitely out." Sukarno refuses to go voluntarily and Suharto and others prefer to deal with him within Indonesia rather than taking what they regard as undesirable step from standpoint of world public opinion of forcibly exiling president.
- Timetable similar to that given by Sjarif Thajeb has been outlined to us by other knowledgeable sources. There no question but that this is what "hawks" hope to achieve but exact way scenario will unfold cannot be predicted at this time with any degree of certainty. Suharto is still calling shots and has not tipped his hand. Additional uncertainty is fact MPRS may prove difficult to control unless Suharto permits Army to exert
DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 37770 SECRET Classification UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED Changes to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DS/T".
TELEGRAM
OUTGOING Foreign Service of the United States of America
SECRET Classification Control: 4. Date:
Charge:
real pressure on members.
Our guess is that Suharto definitely wants to remove or neutralize Sukarno but is committed to no firm timetable or exact method beyond fact he wants to stick to constitutional means and avoid bloodshed if possible. As a result he is resisting efforts to force him into what he regards as premature action but is taking no steps to prevent situation from ripening to point where more direct move against Sukarno may be feasible or in fact inevitable. When and if that happens Suharto will act as forcefully as he did in March 1966.
Following Lebaran holidays (Jan. 12 and 13) we will again be entering period of tension which likely to build for month or
moremore. Net effect will probably be to reduce Sukarno's position further but there no certainty now that this tense period any more likely to result in Sukarno's final ouster then those which preceded it.
GP-3.
LYDMAN
[Signature]
SECRET Classification
DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 31770
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
message to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For BG/T".
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