Telegram A-218 American Embassy Jakarta to Department of State, 'The Army Takes Hold in Central Java', Secret
National Security Archive
A 1966 Jakarta telegram shows how the Indonesian army turned security checkpoints into a village‑level governance system, foreshadowing Suharto’s New Order.
Source: Telegram A-218 American Embassy Jakarta to Department of State, 'The Army Takes Hold in Central Java', Secret Date: Nov 5, 1966 Archive: RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 23, Folder 12 - DEF6 Armed forces 1966 Collection: U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder 1965 Oct 17, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
The Army’s Consolidation of Power in Central Java, November 1966
The telegram dated 5 November 1966 is a routine diplomatic dispatch from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta to the State Department, but its content reveals how quickly the Indonesian military moved from a chaotic anti‑communist purge in 1965‑66 to a systematic re‑ordering of civil life in the heart of Java. The writer—identified only as a “reporting officer”—spent a week in Central Java with an Indonesian friend and a New York Times correspondent, gathering observations that the embassy deemed worth reporting as “confidential.” The immediacy of the mission is clear: the United States was still trying to gauge the stability of Suharto’s nascent New Order and to assess whether the army’s heavy‑handed security measures were stabilising or destabilising the region.
The telegram arrives at a pivotal moment in the wider “Indonesian mass killings” episode. After the failed coup of 30 September 1965, the army, under Major General Suharto, launched a nationwide campaign that eliminated an estimated 500,000 to 1 million alleged communists and left‑wing activists. By mid‑1966 the army had effectively seized control of the state, but the regime’s legitimacy still depended on demonstrating that it could restore order and deliver economic recovery. Central Java, with its dense population, historic ties to the nationalist movement, and a strong PKI presence before the purge, was a litmus test for the army’s new governance model.
Key Actors and Their Signals
The telegram mentions several Indonesian officials whose remarks betray the shifting balance of power. Maj. Gen. Surono, the military commander of Central Java, is quoted as ordering the closure of the hermitage of Mbah Suro, a mystic accused of spreading “communist and PNI propaganda.” By framing a religious figure as a security threat, Surono illustrates the army’s strategy of conflating any independent social influence with subversion. The Jakarta military police commander’s explanation of the October 20 roadblocks—intended to “net fugitive PKI figures” and keep “potential troublemakers…off balance”—shows a deliberate use of pervasive surveillance to intimidate the populace.
The dispatch also references higher‑ranking officers such as Gen. Sumitro and the unnamed “Korem” (regional army command) lieutenant who, in the village of Gamping, effectively outranked the civilian district assistant. The lieutenant’s dominance in local meetings signals the army’s intent to embed its officers at the lowest administrative tier, ensuring that civilian officials become subordinate rather than partners. The mention of KOSTRAD and RPKAD battalions arriving under the guise of “normal rotation” hints at the army’s practice of masking force deployment as routine, a tactic that would later become standard in New Order counter‑insurgency.
What the Dispatch Reveals Beyond Its Surface
While the telegram reads like a straightforward security report, its subtext is revealing. The description of “iron‑clad control” coupled with the army’s “first stages of an attempt to direct the area’s political life toward more positive channels” betrays an early ideological project: the New Order’s ambition to replace the PKI’s mass mobilisation with a top‑down, militarily guided civic education. The “BIMAS agricultural program” and the “Bandung Army Seminar” seminars are early examples of the army’s development‑oriented propaganda, foreshadowing the later “Pancasila‑based” political engineering that would define Suharto’s rule.
The telegram’s emphasis on the willingness of villagers to meet Western journalists, and the fact that the army arranged the visit, suggests a calculated public‑relations effort. By allowing limited access to foreign media, the army could showcase a veneer of normalcy and progress while the underlying coercion continued. The document’s silence on any resistance or dissent, despite noting the capture of former PKI leader Sakirman, may reflect either genuine suppression of opposition or the embassy’s reliance on official military statements.
Legacy of the Jakarta Dispatch
A decade after the telegram’s filing, scholars still cite it to illustrate how the New Order’s security apparatus extended into everyday village life. The detailed description of overlapping civilian‑military hierarchies anticipates later reforms that officially merged “dual function” (dwifungsi) roles, granting the armed forces a constitutional seat. Moreover, the focus on agricultural productivity and political seminars prefigures the New Order’s development narrative, which combined rapid economic growth with strict political control.
For contemporary readers, the telegram underscores the importance of diplomatic cables as windows into the early consolidation of authoritarian regimes. It shows how U.S. officials, while monitoring the anti‑communist purge, also observed the army’s broader nation‑building agenda—an agenda that would shape Indonesia’s political landscape for three decades. The document remains a valuable primary source for understanding the mechanics of military‑led statecraft and the ways in which security, ideology, and development were intertwined in the aftermath of 1965.
DEF6
ARMY
CONFIDENTIAL
A-218
CONFIDENTIAL
FILE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFO: MEDAN, SURABAYA
Amembassy DJAKARTA
November 5, 1966
The Army Takes Hold in Central Java
[DECLASSIFIED
Authority NNO 67289]
Summary
Accompanied by an Indonesian friend and the Djakarta correspondent for
the New York Times, the writer recently visited Central Java for four
days and spoke with several military officers, political party officials,
students, educators and others. The Army has imposed an ironclad grip
on the province, but with basic security established it is making an effort
--at least in the Jokjakarta area--to tackle some of the more basic
problems which make the area potentially so troublesome. There seems
to be a surprising degree of familiarity with developments in Djakarta,
but in general the province remains remote from the capital, concen-
trating on its own problems with the resources at hand.
Security
On the night of October 20 the city of Jokjakarta was surrounded by Army
roadblocks at which all travelers were obliged to stop for an inspection
of vehicle registration papers and personal identity cards, and to undergo
a weapons search of the trunk. The military police commander in
Jokjakarta later explained that these checkpoints were part of a security
program designed partly to net fugitive PKI figures and partly to keep
potential troublemakers in Central Java off balance. He explained that
the roadblocks never stayed long in one place; those around Jokjakarta
disappeared two days later.
Group 3
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Djakarta A-218 2 CONFIDENTIAL
During a one-week trip to Central Java October 19-25, 1966, the writer found that in this and other ways the Army has extended iron-clad control over the entire political life of the province. There is a general ban in Jokjakarta and Solo on meetings of more than five people unless permission has been obtained in advance from the local military commander, according to students in both cities. Residents of the Jokjakarta military district have been instructed to keep their identity cards current, and surprise house-to-house searches are made by the military to find and identify those who have not complied. It also was confirmed by the Jokjakarta military police commander that one battalion of KOSTRAD troops and one and one-half battalions of RPKAD troops had recently arrived in his area, although he said that these moves were part of the normal rotation program.
Such security measures had resulted in the capture, just before the reporting officer's visit, of former PKI Central Committeeman Sakirman and lesser fry in Solo. Just after this visit was completed, it was announced in Antara that the hermitage of Mbah Suro, a mystic who disseminates communist and PNI propaganda in the guise of occult teachings, had been closed on order of the Central Java military commander, Maj. Gen. Surono. The spreading of Mbah Suro's teachings has been forbidden and the public now is prohibited from giving any assistance or facilities to any would-be pilgrims so that the spreading of propaganda will be prevented and so that the hermitage will not be used "as a secret meeting place for ... old order and Gestapu elements." The Jokjakarta district commander remarked that in his district it is true to say, as Gen. Sumitro reportedly has said of East Java, "There is no pro- and anti-Bung Karno problem here because I say there is not."
...And What Else?
It is apparent, however, that the Army in the Jokjakarta area is attempting to do much more than simply keep the lid on. Its direct control extends down to the village level, and its activities have broadened from affairs of basic security into the first stages of an attempt to direct the area's political life toward more positive channels than heretofore has been the case. This became apparent when the reporting officer visited the village of Gamping, west of Jokjakarta, with the Djakarta correspondent of the New York Times who was gathering material for an article on Central Java. The visit had been
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A-218 Djakarta CONFIDENTIAL 3 arranged by the district commander (Korem), and occupied the better part of two days during which the local officials and most of the population showed themselves quite willing to meet and speak with Western visitors.
Gamping is one of five villages encompassing some 30,000 people which are grouped under a "district assistant." As is the case elsewhere, this civilian official is assisted by a Lurah, or headman, in each of the five villages in his jurisdiction. This governmental structure is duplicated by a military heirarchy under a lieutenant who also has five village assistants and who reports directly to the Korem in Jokjakarta. In at least one of the neighboring villages to Gamping the Lurah himself was a former military officer, but in the other cases it appeared that the local military representatives, although nominally equal in rank to their civilian counterparts, would be distinctly more "equal" if there ever were a dispute between military and civilian approaches to a problem. In the case at hand it was the Army lieutenant, rather than the elderly district assistant, who did most of the talking, who seemed the more dynamic, and who apparently had established excellent relations with the people whom he in effect governed and among whom he lived.
Aside from routine issues of security and local government, the Army has two special programs in Gamping. One is the BIMAS agricultural program under which a local demonstration project run by students from the agricultural faculty of Jokjakarta's Gadjah Mada University had nearly doubled the local average rice yield. This project, unfortunately, has now been suspended due to a lack of fertilizer. The other program is an effort to spread the results of the Bandung Army Seminar and to encourage cooperation among disparate groups through a series of local seminars conducted by Army-sponsored teams in the villages. These teams were composed of eleven members each, drawn from the various political parties, youth groups, mass organizations, etc., as well as from the Army and the other armed forces. The teams are said to start out once a month on circuits of two or three weeks to predesignated villages, where they deliver speeches and engage in question-and-answer sessions with the local populace on such subjects as the meaning of the "new order," the Army's economic program, etc. These seminars apparently have been conducted for the past few months and thus predate the Bandung Army Seminar itself.
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A Political Truce
The Army's efforts to keep the rival political parties and student groups from each other's throats have taken some novel turns in Jokjakarta city. After last June's serious outbreaks of violence between students in Jokjakarta, the Korem organized a sort of military police auxiliary composed of representatives from KAMI, GMNI, Ansor and the other student organizations now represented in the area. This "detachment" was issued uniforms, helmets, etc.--but no weapons--and given the responsibility for policing their own member organizations and preventing further violence. This tactic, along with the ban on meetings of more than five people, seems to have succeeded in establishing unusual tranquillity among Jokjakarta students: the headquarters of the various organizations and the campus of Gadjah Mada itself are quiet.
A similar approach was used to dampen the partisan passion of Jokja's politicians, and the military police commander remarked that this group had done its job so well that it will soon be disbanded. All through Central Java the degree of political polarization, judged by the number of party signs in the villages, seems to be considerably higher than in West Java. No village or town is without its prominently-marked branch and sub-branch headquarters for PNI, NU and former Masjumi-affiliated organizations--generally in that order of incidence. KAMI, KAPPI and Pantjasila Front signs are almost never seen. NU and Masjumi-oriented signs frequently can be seen in front of the same building, reflecting the scarcity of meeting space in many towns. In spite of the proximity of so many rival groups, however, the writer saw no sign anywhere of party activity: all headquarters looked almost deserted, although it is highly [un] likely that they would remain so without the stern Army control.
Larger Issues
Neither the Army nor the population is reluctant to talk with foreigners about the greatest event of the past year--the sudden removal of the PKI from their midst. In Gamping it is said that Aidit and other leaders passed through the town late in October trying to rally support, and it is true that Gamping was a center of PKI strength in the area. The bulk of the inhabitants, however, are said to have rallied to the Army against the communists. In Kotagede, south of Jokjakarta, it is said that some 500 PKI members or sympathizers were rounded up
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A-218 Djakarta CONFIDENTIAL 5 but that the weapons they previously had possessed were not found. The prisons in Solo and Jokjakarta still hold large numbers of PKI prisoners; 400 remain from an original 1, 200 in one prison on the grounds of the palace in Solo, and 90% of a group of 6, 000 are still held in Jokja. Recent news accounts state that c2, 000 are still under arrest in all of Central Java, and extra investigators have been detailed from Djakarta by the Attorney General to help determine which should be released. To judge by Gamping's experience, those who are released remain social pariahs for a few months, then gradu- ally are accepted again as normal members of society.
It appears that the Army's clampdown has not prevented some change in political outlook from taking place in the province, although it is difficult to perceive any change when measured against the frenetic pace of Djakarta. Several individuals remarked that, where they previously admired President Sukarno personally, they now respect him as President only. The Subandrio trial then in progress was followed and discussed in every village, since the Department of Information has distributed radio receivers; one Muslim remarked that his (Santri) village had been "relieved" when the prosecutor demanded the death sentence. Some of the Muslims contacted, including the Jokjakarta military information officer, guardedly indicated their awareness that there were bigger issues at stake in the Subandrio trial and that "justice" might demand more trials. But in the more secularist abangan Javanese neighborhoods, Subandrio is damned as the evil advisor who misled the President, and the September 30 Affair was referred to offhandedly as "Gestok"-- Sukarno's term--rather than "Gestapu." Some Protestant Christian students were among those who said that they still admire Sukarno, but as the President rather than personally. All apparently agreed, however, that the Ampera cabinet is proceeding too slowly.
COMMENT: In Gamping the Army was, of course, showing off a village which is particularly prosperous and in which its presence has been particularly effective. A large part of this success must be credited to the resident lieutenant and his wife, who obviously enjoyed notable rapport with their neighbors. The Army here is attempting to put into effect a program of political "pacification" and social and economic development, which as yet is only outlined but far from implemented. The political parties have been suppressed, but the Santri Muslim and abangan sub-cultures which they represent are still as separate as before and will demand some sort of organized political expression, with or without Army control. The process of
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educating the villages into participation in the Army's program has just begun, and the writer heard repeated pleas from all quarters, military and civilian, for American magazines and books. One of these pleas came from the Gamping leader of the PNI youth group, who classed himself and his friends as "admirers of American culture" in making his approach.
In summary, it can be said that in Gamping and Jokjakarta a group of particularly effective Army officers and their civilian allies have taken the first steps to work out the Army's new role as political arbiter, economic innovator and local educator. This role will largely determine the local shape of things and will be in a process of further refinement for several years to come.
GREEN
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
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