Enclosure 1: A-666, Djakarta',
National Security Archive
A 1966 Jakarta embassy report dramatizes Mao’s alleged hand‑in the Indonesian coup, revealing Cold‑War bias that still echoes in today’s Indo‑Pacific debates.
Source: Enclosure 1: A-666, Djakarta', Date: Apr 27, 1966 Archive: RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 27, Folder 14 Pol 23-9 rebellions and coups 1966 'The History of the Gestapu Abortive Coup, Engineered in Peking' Collection: U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder 1965 Oct 17, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
The Document in Context
The piece identified as “Enclosure 1 A‑666, Djakarta” is a declassified intelligence report dated 27 April 1966, produced by the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta during the height of the Cold War’s Southeast Asian flashpoint. The memorandum is filed under the National Archives’ RG‑84 “Jakarta Embassy Files,” a collection that was assembled to track the Indonesian government’s response to the mass killings of 1965‑66 and the collapse of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The report’s purpose was to brief Washington on the alleged Chinese role in the so‑called “Gestapu” coup attempt of 30 September 1965, a narrative the embassy staff repeatedly received from Indonesian military officials and anti‑communist informants.
A Narrative of Chinese Orchestration
The text presents a highly dramatized story: Mao Zedong himself selecting the coup’s date to coincide with the People’s Republic’s National Day, directing the assassination of seven senior generals, and coaching PKI leader D.N. Aidit through a series of secret telegrams. The report quotes imagined dialogues between Mao and Aidit, complete with moralising anecdotes about a village thief. Such detail betrays the document’s function as propaganda rather than a factual record. It was meant to reinforce the U.S. government’s prevailing view that any communist insurgency in Indonesia was a direct extension of Beijing’s “world revolution” agenda. By attributing the timing of the September‑30 night‑time operation to Mao’s personal calendar, the report amplifies the perception of Chinese omnipotence while simultaneously portraying the Indonesian communists as subservient puppets.
The language also reveals the embassy’s reliance on Indonesian military sources, who were eager to cast the coup as a foreign‑engineered plot to legitimize the subsequent anti‑communist purge that claimed up to a million lives. The report’s emphasis on “secret telegrams” and “eight‑day visits” to Beijing mirrors the militaries’ own post‑mortem explanations, which sought to externalize blame and deflect scrutiny from the army’s own role in the massacres.
Why the Report Matters
The 1965‑66 episode reshaped Indonesia’s political landscape: President Sukarno was sidelined, General Suharto emerged as the de‑facto ruler, and the nation entered a three‑decade‑long anti‑communist regime. The United States, fearing a domino effect after the loss of French Indochina, supplied covert assistance to the Indonesian army, including intelligence, weapons, and diplomatic cover. Documents like Enclosure 1 illustrate how U.S. officials framed the crisis in terms of Chinese expansionism, thereby justifying their support for the army’s brutal crackdown.
The report also provides a rare glimpse into the internal logic of U.S. diplomatic analysis. The embassy’s analysts did not have direct access to Chinese archives; instead they stitched together second‑hand testimonies, intercepted communications, and rumor. The inclusion of a footnote that the “CPR promised to supply arms for 30,000 people” hints at the scale of material support the United States feared Beijing might provide, even though no concrete evidence of such a shipment appears in the record.
Legacy and Contemporary Relevance
Since its declassification, the document has been cited by scholars reassessing the Cold War’s ideological battles in Southeast Asia. Its hyperbolic tone serves as a cautionary example of how intelligence products can be shaped by preconceived narratives. Modern historians, such as those at the National Security Archive, use the file to demonstrate that the Indonesian army’s anti‑communist purge was not merely a spontaneous reaction to a failed coup but a calculated political maneuver, bolstered by U.S. tacit approval.
In today’s geopolitical climate, where China’s influence in the Indo‑Pacific is again under intense scrutiny, the Enclosure 1 report reminds policymakers that narratives of foreign orchestration can be both weaponized and misleading. The document’s vivid, almost theatrical portrayal of Mao as a puppet master underscores the danger of allowing ideological bias to eclipse rigorous evidence—a lesson that remains vital for contemporary intelligence assessments.
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Enclosure 1 A-666, Djakarta
THE HISTORY OF THE GESTAPU ABORTIVE COUP, ENGINEERED IN PEKING.
The Peking Regime Ordered the Murder of the Seven (sic) Generals and All Reactionary Officers. The CPR Promised to Supply Arms and Munitions, etc. for 30,000 People.
Based on facts, it can be told at present that the Gestapu/PKI coup was engineered and arranged in Peking within the framework of the world revolution advocated by Peking, as a project which is given the highest priority by Chairman Mao, in order to create a communist world oriented to Peking.
To consummate the Gestapu/PKI coup as a first step in the realization of Mao's own fine dream, he himself became its active architect and it was he himself who decided September 30, 1965, as the date to launch the adventure, in order that the national day of the would-be Indonesian People's Republic of the Chinese would fall on October 1, the national day of the CPR. It was also he who ordered the massacre of the seven (sic) generals and all reactionary officers of the Armed Forces, in order to strike terror among the people, who finally would parrot and surrender themselves to communism.
How close was the contact between Aidit and his lord in Peking was witnessed by secret telegram reports sent by Aidit during earlier days of the coup, which totally failed, because it was crushed by the Armed Forces and the progressive, revolutionary people.
Aidit visited the CPR for eight days, and during this time, he, among other things, held talks three times with Mao. They discussed profoundly the master-plan for the reconstruction of Indonesia in the future. Aidit suggested that the post of the President should be given to a man outside the party after the coup, even though Sukarno should also be removed, while Aidit himself would hold the real power in his capacity as the Prime Minister.
Mao Tse-tung, shaking his head, said: "This is utterly impossible. Everything in this world should be given an appropriate title, so that it is pleasant to the ears. Things which are not pleasant to the ears cannot succeed. You yourself must become the President. In this way, all orders and decrees can be issued smoothly."
Aidit said: "But I am afraid that the Armed Forces will not obey. This will bring about difficulties."
Mao Tse-tung said: "Don't be afraid. Act according to my views, and eliminate all reactionary senior officers such as Nasution, Yani and
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DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 67289
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Enclosure 1 A-666, Djakarta Page 3
Several days afterwards, Untung suddenly saw Aidit. He said: "It is reported that the generals will likely not be in one place before September 30, 1965. Is it possible to wait until the parade in the Army Day of October 5, 1965? So that nobody will escape."
Aidit said: "The first plan was to wait until Armed Forces Day. But in Peking, I agreed with Comrade Mao with regard to the time, namely the night of September 30, 1965. The next day, October 1, 1965, will be stipulated as the new National Day. Because the CPR's National Day also falls on this day, he regarded the date as absolute. Let me send him a telegram to discuss this matter with him." He then sent a secret telegram to Peking.
Upon the receipt of the telegram at the Secretariat of the Communist Party in the CPR, Teng Hsiao Ping himself immediately took it to Mao Tse-tung, and asked for his reply.
Shaking his head, Mao said: "Send immediately a telegram to Aidit as follows: 'The time must not be altered no matter what cir- cumstance; the action must be taken in the night of September 30.'"
Teng Hsiao Ping said: "We are very far away from the action. Aidit is on the spot, and he sees the situation more clearly. It is better to take his view."
Moving his arms from side to side, Mao Tse-tung said: "This is not a correct thing to utter. In every action, we must act, while the exact atmosphere is under way. Don't waver. If you can alter a date once, you may alter it for the second time. If you alter it for the third time, nothing will happen. Let me tell you. In my boyhood, I met an old man in my village. During his youth, he was a well-known thief in Hsiangtan. He was skilled in digging a hole. He could make a hole. He could make a hole in any kind of wall, whether it was made of bricks or stone, and he could enter a house within the time it takes you to walk one hundred steps."
Being impressed, Teng Hsiao Ping said: "How fast his hands are!" Mao Tse-tung said: "That man taught a great number of his pupils. He said that every pupil must make a hole, but he dared not enter the house. The teacher pushed him in, and in this way he was forced to go in. If a pupil dares not enter for the first time, he will never enter a house through a hole, and he will become an useless individual."
Teng Hsiao Ping laughed and said: "Thus, Chairman is persistent to push Aidit into the hole."
Mao Tse-tung said: "Indeed. I shall push him in vehemently, so that he can enter. After the failure of the PKI rebellion in
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UNCLASSIFIED Enclosure 1 A-666, Djakarta Page 4
Madiun in 1948, Aidit replaced Sjarifuddin, an honorable party leader who was killed. Within these last 15 years, the strength of the Party has increased rapidly. The party has now three million members. Barring our own Party and that of the USSR, the PKI has the greatest number of members. But numbers do not mean real strength. One must have the experience of struggle. For example, the Japanese Communist Party has not many members, but its recent performances surprised the world. The PKI is unable to do that."
Smilingly, Teng Hsiao Ping said: "The struggle of the Japanese Communist Party relies on our "special things." Without the special things we send and sold to finance their operations, the Japanese Communist Party could never do anything."
Mao Tse-tung answered: "Nevertheless, the Japanese Communist Party is also capable. If there is enough money, it must be used appropriately. Well then. Send immediately the telegram to Aidit. In other matters, I may yield to him, but in this matter he must follow me. The time must be the night of September 30, 1965. This cannot be altered in whatever circumstances."
ANGKATAN BERSENDJATA, April 25-26, 1966.
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