Telegram A-673 from American Embassy to Department of State, Confidential. 'Example of Anti-Chinese Propaganda'

Source: Telegram A-673 from American Embassy to Department of State, Confidential. 'Example of Anti-Chinese Propaganda' Date: Mar 4, 1966 Archive: RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 27, Folder 14 Pol 23-9 rebellions and coups 1966 Collection: U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder 1965 Oct 17, 2017

Editorial Analysis

Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.

Propaganda, Scapegoats, and the Cold War Lens

The telegram dated 4 May 1966 is a routine‑looking cable from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta to the State Department, but its content opens a window onto the frenetic battle for narrative control that followed Indonesia’s 1965‑66 anti‑communist purge. The document records the embassy’s assessment of an Indonesian newspaper article that linked the Chinese Communist Party to the September 30 Movement (G30S). By flagging the piece as “anti‑Chinese propaganda,” the cable signals that Washington was closely monitoring how Jakarta’s new military‑dominated regime was framing its own legitimacy and, crucially, how it was casting China as a foreign conspirator.

The immediate circumstance was the consolidation of power by General Suharto’s forces after the alleged coup attempt on 30 September 1965. Within weeks, the army unleashed a campaign that killed an estimated 500,000 to one million suspected communists, many of them ethnic Chinese. The United States, fearing a left‑leaning, Soviet‑aligned Indonesia, covertly supported the army’s anti‑communist drive. In this context, every public statement from Jakarta mattered to Washington’s strategic calculus, prompting diplomats to catalog and evaluate local propaganda.

The Narrative Engine of the New Regime

The telegram’s internal analysis outlines two explicit propaganda goals: first, to shield President Sukarno from blame for the G30S, and second, to redirect culpability toward the PKI’s external allies—chiefly the Chinese Communist Party and, by extension, Beijing’s diplomatic cadre in Jakarta. The cable notes that early Indonesian messaging “almost complete overt concentration on the PKI as the villain,” but that over time the discourse broadened to implicate “Subandrio and Peking” as part of a “search for scapegoats.”

What is striking is the candid admission that “truth is often a minimal factor in adopting a given line.” The embassy’s observers recognized that Jakarta’s propaganda was less about factual accuracy than about tactical necessity: by painting China as a conspiratorial mastermind, the army could justify the mass arrests and killings of Chinese Indonesians, while also rallying Western anti‑communist sympathies. The telegram further observes that “the Chinese had advance knowledge” of the coup, a claim the authors deem “vague” and “not 100 percent certain,” yet they note that “the sources for such information were numerous and in some cases good.” This cautious language reflects the diplomatic tightrope—acknowledging Indonesian accusations without endorsing them outright.

Actors, Intentions, and the Limits of Evidence

Key actors emerge from the cable: the Angkatan Persendjata newspaper (the source of the propaganda piece), the Consulate General in Hong Kong (who supplied the embassy with the article), and the Indonesian military‑political elite, especially figures like Subandrio, Sukarno’s foreign minister and a known left‑ist. The embassy’s assessment that Subandrio’s role was “informally informed” but not decisive mirrors broader scholarly consensus that the president’s inner circle was aware of the plot but not the primary driver.

The document also hints at the intelligence community’s reliance on “numerous” informants for claims about Chinese arms smuggled with CONEFO equipment—a reference to the “Conference of the New Emerging Forces,” Sukarno’s attempt to rally non‑aligned nations. By flagging the possibility of “falsified evidence,” the cable reveals the uncertainty that shadowed U.S. analysts, who were trying to separate genuine Chinese involvement from the hyper‑nationalist fervor of Jakarta’s anti‑communist press.

Legacy of the Telegram

Why does a single 1966 cable matter today? First, it illustrates how the United States monitored and, at times, tacitly endorsed the Indonesian regime’s narrative that external communist forces—especially China—were to blame for domestic upheaval. This narrative helped legitimize the army’s brutal purge and the subsequent alignment of Indonesia with the U.S. anti‑communist bloc throughout the Cold War.

Second, the telegram provides a rare, self‑critical glimpse into the diplomatic mindset: U.S. officials were aware that Jakarta’s propaganda was “distorted” and that the “truth of Sukarno’s guilt is widely accepted privately.” The candidness of this assessment challenges simplistic portrayals of American policy as blindly supportive of any anti‑communist regime; instead, it shows a nuanced, if morally compromised, calculation.

Finally, the cable’s focus on Chinese involvement foreshadows the later diplomatic rift between Indonesia and the People’s Republic of China, which would not be normalized until 1990. Understanding the origins of that mistrust helps explain contemporary Indonesian sensitivities toward Chinese investment and diaspora politics.

In sum, Telegram A‑673 is more than a bureaucratic footnote; it is a diagnostic of a pivotal moment when propaganda, geopolitics, and mass violence intersected, and it reveals the degree to which U.S. policymakers were both observers and, indirectly, participants in shaping the story that justified one of the Cold War’s most lethal domestic campaigns.

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