Telegram A-503 from American Embassy Jakarta to the Secretary of State in Washington, Secret
National Security Archive
A 1966 Jakarta‑to‑Washington telegram maps the fragmented forces that could still topple Sukarno, revealing how U.S. diplomats read elite unrest, army fissures, and economic decay.
Source: Telegram A-503 from American Embassy Jakarta to the Secretary of State in Washington, Secret Date: Feb 7, 1966 Archive: RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 23, Folder 4 POL INDO 1966 Collection: U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder 1965 Oct 17, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
Prospects for a Coup in Jakarta – A 1966 Diplomatic Assessment
The telegram dated 7 February 1966 is a routine yet strikingly candid dispatch from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta to the State Department. Sent just over a year after the September 30, 1965 “30 September Affair” – the army‑backed purge that eliminated the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and set off a wave of mass killings – the cable attempts to gauge whether the volatile political climate could yet produce a new overthrow of President Sukarno. Its purpose was not to advise a specific U.S. policy move but to inform senior Washington officials about the internal balance of forces that might affect American interests in a region where Cold‑War calculations were paramount.
The broader episode is the collapse of Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy” and the transition to General Suharto’s New Order. By early 1966 Indonesia was already sliding into a de‑facto military regime, but the United States remained uncertain whether Sukarno’s charismatic yet increasingly anachronistic leadership could still rally enough support to survive. The telegram therefore belongs to a series of diplomatic intelligence reports that tracked the shifting loyalties of the Indonesian army, the reaction of civilian elites, and the mood of the masses – all variables that could tip the balance between a continuation of the nascent Suharto‑led administration and a possible resurgence of pro‑Sukarno forces.
The cable’s author, identified only as “POL:PPGardner,” writes with a tone that mixes disdain for Sukarno’s personal style and a measured appraisal of the structural constraints on any coup. The comparison of Sukarno to Louis IV of France underscores a perception that the president was out of touch, a view reinforced by anecdotes of his focus on monuments while rice imports faltered. The mention of the $11 million CONEFO complex – a real project Sukarno pursued to cement his “conference of the peoples of the East” – serves as a concrete illustration of misplaced priorities that Washington believed eroded his legitimacy.
Crucially, the telegram does not present a monolithic picture of the Indonesian army. While acknowledging that senior officers publicly praised Sukarno, it notes a “second‑echelon” willingness to act if backed by weapons. The author argues that the September 30 purge has made a “Colonels’ coup” unattractive because the palace guard is now on high alert. This insight reflects the embassy’s access to Indonesian military gossip and suggests that Washington saw the army as a fragmented institution rather than a unified bloc ready to intervene again.
The document also maps the potential of non‑military actors: political party second‑tier leaders (NU’s Dahlan and Subchan, Catholic Kasimo, Protestant Tambunan), the Student Action Command (KAMI), and regionalist figures such as the Atjeh commander. By cataloguing these groups, the cable signals that any future upheaval would likely be a coalition of disaffected elites and junior officers, not a top‑down palace coup. The embassy’s assessment that “the masses are culturally conditioned to accept adversity passively” reveals a stereotypical, perhaps overly simplistic, view of Indonesian popular politics, yet it aligns with contemporary U.S. intelligence that saw mass mobilization as unlikely without military backing.
The significance of this telegram lies in its snapshot of U.S. diplomatic thinking at a turning point. Within months, Sukarno would be effectively sidelined, and Suharto would consolidate power, ushering in a regime that, while authoritarian, proved amenable to American anti‑communist aims. The cable’s warning that “additional weeks of economic deterioration” could push pressures to a “critical point” proved prescient: Indonesia’s hyperinflation and food shortages accelerated the army’s dominance.
Legacy-wise, the de‑classification of A‑503 offers scholars a rare window into the granular, on‑the‑ground analysis that underpinned U.S. policy formation. It shows that Washington’s calculus was not merely a binary choice between communism and capitalism, but a nuanced appraisal of elite factionalism, economic stress, and cultural assumptions about popular behavior. Understanding this mindset helps explain why the United States later provided tacit support to Suharto’s regime despite its human‑rights record – the embassy had already concluded that a stable, pro‑Western military government was the most viable outcome in a country teetering on the brink of chaos.
P & L
INDO
This document consists of 5 pages.
Copy 3 of 12 copies. Series A.
Secret
A-503
SECRET
Group 3: Downgrade each
12 yrs; not automatically
declassified.
SEC STATE WASHINGTON
INFO : CINCPAC FOR POLAD, CANBERRA, LONDON, MEDAN, SURABAYA
February 7, 1966
Ambassy Djakarta
Prospects for a Putsch in Djakarta
FILE
SUMMARY
President Sukarno and the nation's top leadership appear to
be engaged in little Palace games completely divorced from the
harsh economic and political realities of present day Indonesia.
The Army leadership, by adding its voice to the chorus of praise
to Sukarno and by muting its attack on Palace policies, now seems
to have joined in. In many countries, public disgust at such
irresponsibility would lead to putsch attempts. The traditional
apathy of the Indonesian masses argues against any broadly-based
and spontaneous uprising in Indonesia. More prone to action are
certain elements of the elite including political party activists,
youth groups and exponents of regionalism. These elements have,
however, demonstrated unwillingness to move without some Army guns
behind them. While there are sympathetic and action-prone elements
among the second echelons of the Army, the September 30 Affair has
placed the Palace guard on alert and rendered the prospects of a
"Colonels' coup" unattractive. The chances for unseating Sukarno
thus appear to hinge principally on the ability of the youth,
parties and lower military ranks to exert such pressures within
the moderate camp as eventually to force a change of tactics upon
the top Army leadership. Additional weeks of economic deterioration
and Palace procrastination could bring these pressures to the
critical point. In the meantime, Palace games will continue.
* * * * * * * *
SECRET
POL:PPGardner/sc 2/7/66
POL:EHFusters
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 67289
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- Causes for Revolt
A. President Sukarno seems in many ways to be as divorced from the current economic and political realities of Indonesia as was Louis IV from those of 18th Century France. As students demonstrated in the streets against rising prices, Sukarno discoursed on the importance of national monuments. The observation that women were not frying stones on street corners was presented as proof that there is plenty to eat. Sukarno admitted publicly and with a chuckle that he knows nothing about economics and leaves that sort of thing to his advisors. He has not, however, left them the money. He tours the city weakly seeking sites for new buildings and monuments and recently allocated $11 million for the construction of a grandiose building complex for CONEFO at the moment when his Government's default on foreign loans darkened the prospect for the import of rice and essential consumer goods. Finally, the complete transformation of the Indonesian political scene through the destruction of the communist party has changed Sukarno's tone of voice but not his slogans for Nasakom unity.
B. Sukarno has ensured his isolation from life's grimmer realities by surrounding himself with a cabinet, parliamentarians, and even political party leaders who have long lost touch with the "electorate" and can no longer see past the intrigues and schemes of the Palace. Indicative of this situation is the fact that Nahdlatul Ulama youth leaders felt
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the street and kampung reaction to the President's radio addresses and in the circulation figures of the anti-Palace press that Sukarno's prestige has declined. The magic aura of charisma and authority, which the Indonesians call keutbawan, can be lost through one important mistake. Sukarno demonstrated a clear lack of divine guidance in choosing the side of the PKI and the population has undoubtedly taken note. The Indonesian "masses" are unlikely now to rally in significant number to Sukarno's defense if he is threatened. On the other hand, they are culturally conditioned to accept adversity passively and are equally unlikely to rise up spontaneously against Sukarno's misrule. If disgust at recent Palace games is to evoke any meaningful response, it must come from the intellectual elite, from the students, the political parties, the regionalists, and the second and third echelons of the military.
B. The Political Parties. The top leadership of the major political parties has been firmly snared in the tangle of Palace intrigue but the second echelon contains several influential leaders (the NU's Dahlan and Subchan, the Catholic Party's Kasimo, the Protestant Party's Tambunan) who have the initiative and the following to act on their own. These political forces have been united in Subchan's Action Command, now called the Pantjasila Front. The Pantjasila Front has spoken out boldly in public--Subchan on February 2 warned that a political settlement involving "simplification" of the party structure could evoke "serious consequences." In private conversations, however, Subchan and other moderate political leaders have spoken of the Army's accommodation to the Palace with disheartened resignation rather than defiance.
C. The Youth. The political parties owe most of the militancy they have mustered to their youth. Djakarta students during the past two months have amply demonstrated their disgust for the present regime through the Student Action Command (KAMI). KAMI now unites an overwhelming majority of the youth activists in the capital and probably in the provinces. The NU youth arm, Ansor, in particular, possesses both the numbers and the militancy to constitute an effective paramilitary force. The students, however, probably shot their wad in the January street demonstrations. The limited success they attained in that operation was due to the cooperation they received from the Army. KAMI leadership at that time showed itself highly sensitive to the guidelines laid down by the Army and it is highly unlikely that they would take to the streets (much less besiege the Palace) unless assured by the Army that its guns are behind them.
D. The Regionalists. Worsening economic conditions as well as signs of a political interregnum in Djakarta have undoubtedly enlivened traditional centrifugal tendencies in the provinces. Recent remarks by
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the Atjeh Military Commander drawing attention to his province's self- sufficiency in rice and calling for a more equitable distribution of oil revenues evoke memories of earlier complaints from the outer fringes of the nation. The decisive defeat of the 1958 rebellion, however, looms over the head of every exponent of regionalism and will argue against a repeat of such adventures. More significant, the provinces are now firmly in the hands of the Army and loyalty to Djakarta has figured prominently in the choice of regional commanders. Any anti-regime activity in the provinces would most likely be a reflection of disaffection within the Armed Forces as a whole.
E. The Generals. Prospects for a Palace putsch thus inevitably hinge on the attitude of the military. Not all Generals agree with Nasution's and Suharto's softness towards the Palace. Principal among the dissenters is Minister Attached to the Presidium Sukendro. Sukendro, however, controls no troops and is active only as a political strategist. West Java Commander Adjie's recent ban on a "Sukarno Front" in his province threw a new light on his relation to the regime and roused some hopes among the Palace's opponents. Adjie's crack troops could, of course, play a determining role in any Djakarta power play and Adjie's lead would probably be followed by other regional commanders, by his former subordinate South Sulawesi Commander Solichin in particular and perhaps by Generals Mokoginta and Subiran in Sumatra. The banning of the "Sukarno Front," however, is entirely inadequate proof that Adjie's demonstrated loyalty to Sukarno is fading.
F. The Colonels. To find determined Sukarno opponents among the military it is necessary to move further from the Palace, to the second echelons of the Army. When Djakarta pundits discuss the possibility of a "Colonels' revolt" or a Kong La-type coup, the name first mentioned is that of Colonel Sarwo Edhie, the commander of the Paracommando Regiment (RPKAD) which spearheaded the anti-PKI operations in Central Java and is now present in strength in the capital. Sarwo Edhie gave his enthusiastic approval to student demonstrators at a time when his superiors were observing a discreet distance. Recently his troops have been seen with the militantly anti-communist Moslem student organization HMI, and a street banner publicly proclaimed the alliance between the RPKAD and this previously untouchable "rightist" student group. A coup in the capital would, however, require a strong element of surprise which the September 30 Affair has obviated. Sarwo Edhie is aware that the Palace Guard, the Air Force Special Troops (PGT) and elements of the Marine Corps (KKO), all responsive to the President, are on constant alert against such a move and, if unable to defeat it at the onset, could cause a lethal delay.
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3. Conclusions
A. While isolated assassination attempts by small groups of Ansor youth or discontented military are always a possibility, it now seems unlikely that students, political parties, regionalists or second echelon Army elements will move either individually or collectively to mount a putsch.
B. Assuming Sukarno does not make a mistake and overplay his hand, the sole hope for a change in the Palace leadership seems to hinge on these forces building up such pressures within the moderate camp as to force Nasution and Suharto to reconsider their present tactics. Additional weeks of economic deterioration and Palace procrastination could perhaps bring these pressures to the critical point. In the meantime, the Palace games will continue under the direction of President Sukarno.
FOR THE AMBASSADOR:
Edward E. Masters
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
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