Source: Telegram from 212 American Consul in Surabaya to Jakarta, 'Joint Sitrep 22', Confidential Date: Dec 28, 1965 Archive: RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 14, Folder 7 pol 23-9 September 30th Mvt, dec 1-31, 1965 Collection: U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder 1965 Oct 17, 2017

Editorial Analysis

Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.

A Consular Snapshot of the Aftermath

The telegram sent by Consul 212 in Surabaya on 27 December 1965 is a terse but revealing window onto the chaotic weeks that followed Indonesia’s September‑October 1965 upheaval. Within a few lines the American diplomat reports a “security situation” that has shifted from the open, mass‑killings of mid‑September to a more concealed, “discreet” wave of violence across East Java. The document was produced for the Jakarta embassy’s daily intelligence flow (the so‑called Joint Sitrep series) and was intended for senior State Department officials, the Pentagon, and the CIA. Its purpose was to keep Washington apprised of how the anti‑communist purge was evolving on the ground, especially as the United States weighed whether to deepen covert support for General Suharto’s emerging regime.

The telegram arrives at a pivotal moment: by late December the initial frenzy of the anti‑PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) purge had begun to subside, yet the death toll was still soaring and the political landscape was being reshaped. The United States had already signaled its tacit approval of the army’s actions, fearing a leftist takeover that might align Indonesia with the Soviet bloc. The Consul’s notes therefore serve as a reality check on the “softening” of the slaughter that Washington hoped would translate into a stable, pro‑Western order.

From Open Bloodletting to Quiet Elimination

The report’s first paragraph underscores a tactical shift. Earlier eyewitness accounts described bodies dumped in rivers and streets littered with corpses. By December, the consul notes that “victims are taken out of populous areas before being killed and bodies are buried rather than thrown into river.” This change suggests that local commanders were attempting to conceal the scale of the killings, perhaps in response to growing international scrutiny. The mention of a “NU source” (the Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization) claiming a province‑wide campaign to exterminate PKI members indicates that the purge was no longer a spontaneous army‑driven frenzy but had been co‑opted by civilian political forces, especially the Islamists who saw the communists as an existential threat.

The telegram also highlights regional variation. Surabaya, the second‑largest city, appears to be an outlier: while the outskirts witnessed sporadic shootings, the city’s core experienced a “reduced scale” of round‑ups. The consul’s reference to a “knowledgeable PSI source” (the Socialist Party of Indonesia) that still sees PKI leaders in hiding points to a lingering, albeit fragmented, communist presence. This nuance counters the dominant narrative of a monolithic, total annihilation and hints at the army’s difficulty in achieving a complete sweep.

Economic Disarray and the Rise of SARBUMUSI

Beyond the violence, the telegram records the immediate socioeconomic fallout. By 26 December rice was “virtually unobtainable” in Surabaya, with prices soaring to 3,000‑4,000 rupiah per kilo—an inflationary shock that would fuel popular discontent. The military’s seizure of “hoarded” textiles, gold, and small currency in the city’s wholesale district reflects an attempt to impose order on a market spiraling into black‑market chaos.

Perhaps the most telling observation is the emergence of SARBUMUSI, the NU‑affiliated labor federation, as a new gatekeeper in state enterprises. The consul notes that employment now required affiliation with the army or SARBUMUSI, displacing the pre‑purge dominance of SOBSI (the PKI‑linked trade union). This substitution signals a deliberate re‑engineering of Indonesia’s labor landscape: the army and its Islamist allies were consolidating economic power, turning former communist strongholds into instruments of their own patronage networks.

Intrigue Within the New Regime

The telegram also sheds light on internal power struggles among the anti‑communist camp. A brief but pointed remark about Vice‑Admiral Nazir ignoring Subandrio’s orders—apparently at General Nasution’s behest—reveals that the army was already undermining the foreign minister’s authority. Subandrio, a Sukarno loyalist, would soon be dismissed, but the document captures the moment when the military began to assert its supremacy over civilian diplomats.

Why the Telegram Still Matters

For historians, this consular cable is valuable because it captures the transition from mass slaughter to a more systematic, bureaucratic repression. It documents the handover of economic control from leftist unions to Islamist‑army coalitions, and it records the early signs of the military’s political consolidation that would culminate in Suharto’s New Order. The telegram’s understated tone—“it very difficult to stop killings”—betrays the frustration of a local police chief caught between loyalty to President Sukarno and the reality on the ground, illustrating how the purge was both top‑down and locally negotiated.

In the broader historiography of the 1965‑66 Indonesian tragedy, such primary fragments help move the narrative beyond the binary of “army versus communists.” They reveal the multiplicity of actors—Islamist groups, labor federations, regional commanders, and even embattled diplomats—who shaped the outcome. The document’s declassification allows scholars to reassess the United States’ real‑time intelligence assessments and to understand how Washington’s perception of a “controlled” purge may have been overly optimistic, even as it continued to provide covert backing to the army. Ultimately, the telegram underscores that the path from revolutionary chaos to authoritarian stability was paved not only with bullets, but with economic seizures, labor re‑structuring, and intra‑elite rivalry—threads that still echo in Indonesia’s contemporary politics.

TELEGRAM
Foreign Service of the
United States of America
INCOMING
AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification
Control: 947A
PAGE 3, SURABAYA 212, Dec. 27, 1965
Recd:

group, this situation might be changed (Ref B).

5. Undermining Subandrio's Authority. Subandrio
recently ordered Indo Ambassador to Switzerland, Vice
Admiral Nazir to return home, but Nazir ignored order,
according to Nazir's brother who is Surabaya Doctor.
Source also told me his brother and probably other
Ambs have been asked by Nasution to ignore Subandrio's
orders and thus further undermine Subandrio's authority.

GP-3.

HEYMANN

12/28/1530eg

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification
POST ACTION COPY
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION
FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
FORM FS-412
3-1-55
FFSC, Japan