Telegram 203 from American Consul in Surabaya to Jakarta, Confidential
National Security Archive
A December 1965 consular dispatch reveals the U.S. knew Indonesia’s anti‑communist purge was quietly continuing under the guise of ‘stopping excesses.’
Source: Telegram 203 from American Consul in Surabaya to Jakarta, Confidential Date: Dec 22, 1965 Archive: RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 14, Folder 7 pol 23-9 September 30th Mvt, dec 1-31, 1965 Collection: U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder 1965 Oct 17, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A Consular Dispatch from the Frontlines of the 1965 Indonesian Crisis
The telegram dated 22 December 1965 is a routine‑looking situation report from the U.S. Consul in Surabaya, but its terse lines open a window onto the chaotic final weeks of Indonesia’s anti‑communist purge. Written by a “reliable source” in Nasuruan and echoed by a separate informant in Asembagus, the note confirms that the army’s mass killings of suspected PKI members had officially been halted, yet a covert pattern of nightly prisoner releases for Muslim death squads persisted. The wording—"gives appearance that Army pleas ‘to stop excesses’ are being obeyed while still allowing… to carry out their determination to wipe out PKI"—betrays a diplomatic calculus: Washington was being told the overt violence was ending, but the underlying terror machinery remained active.
The Broader Turmoil: From Coup Attempt to Genocide
The telegram arrives three months after the alleged “Gestapu” (Gerakan 30 September) coup on 30 September 1965, an event that sparked a nationwide campaign that killed an estimated 500,000 to one million people, predominantly alleged communists and ethnic Chinese. The U.S. government, fearing a left‑leaning Indonesia aligned with the Soviet bloc, quietly supported the Indonesian Army’s anti‑communist offensive. This document is part of a larger corpus of diplomatic cables that tracked the purge in real time, revealing how American officials balanced public condemnation of indiscriminate killings with tacit acceptance of a “clean‑up” that eliminated the PKI as a political force.
Who Is Speaking, and What Their Words Reveal
The consular officer cites a “reliable source” from Nasuruan, a village near Surabaya, and cross‑references a similar report from Asembagus. The duplication suggests an intelligence network that filtered local rumors into the embassy. The mention of “Moslems” as executioners reflects the army’s strategy of delegating the most brutal tasks to Islamic militias, a tactic that allowed the regular forces to maintain a veneer of restraint. The telegram also records observations on economic fallout: a sudden rice shortage, price spikes, and state‑owned firms hoarding supplies. These details show that the consul was monitoring not only security but also the humanitarian impact of the purge, which the U.S. would later cite when assessing the stability of Suharto’s emerging regime.
The Document’s Subtext: A Warning Wrapped in Neutrality
Beyond the explicit facts, the telegram’s commentary hints at a diplomatic warning. By noting that the army’s “pleas to stop excesses” are “being obeyed while still allowing… to carry out their determination,” the consul signals to Jakarta that Washington is aware of the deception. The inclusion of economic data—rice scarcity, inflated prices, and state‑company price hikes—serves a dual purpose: it informs policymakers of potential civil unrest and subtly pressures the Indonesian authorities to restore market order, lest the chaos undermine the anti‑communist coalition that the U.S. was backing.
Legacy: Why This Dispatch Still Matters
Telegram 203 is a microcosm of the larger U.S. diplomatic posture during the 1965‑66 Indonesian upheaval. It illustrates how American officials gathered granular intelligence on a rapidly evolving massacre while publicly maintaining a stance of “confidential” discretion. The file’s declassification, now housed at the National Security Archive, provides scholars with concrete evidence that the United States possessed detailed, contemporaneous knowledge of the army’s covert killings and the ethnic targeting of Chinese communities. It also underscores the paradox of U.S. policy: a declared commitment to human rights coexisting with strategic support for a regime that employed mass murder to achieve its geopolitical aims. Contemporary debates over U.S. involvement in foreign atrocities draw directly on such primary sources, reminding us that the language of “excesses” often masks tacit endorsement of state‑sanctioned violence.
The Human Dimension Behind the Numbers
Finally, the telegram’s brief mention of Bali’s Chinese community—one shop burned “by error”—humanizes the broader statistics. It shows that even as the army orchestrated large‑scale purges, everyday interactions—mistaken attacks, protection of foreign nationals—were part of the chaotic tapestry. The consul’s observation that American and Japanese expatriates were “well protected” hints at a selective application of security, further illuminating the hierarchy of lives valued by both Indonesian and foreign actors during the crisis.
# TELEGRAM
Foreign Service of the
United States of America
INCOMING AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
POL 23-9
CONFIDENTIAL
Classification
Control: 762A
Recd: December 22, 1965
0700
ACTION:
FROM: SURABAYA
ACTION NO: 203, December 21.
INFO:
CIERON
AME
MIN
FF
ECON
CAO
ATTACHE
POL
PRIORITY
ACTION DJAKARTA PRIORITY 203 INFO DEPT 53
Joint SITREP 21.
1. Security Situation. Reliable source from NASURUAN told me indiscriminate killings have ceased there. At same time, source said, Army is quietly releasing nightly 10 to 15 prisoners to Moslems for execution. (Comment: This is similar to situation provided by source from ASEMBAGUS (SITREP 20) and may be widespread. It gives appearance that Army pleas "to stop excesses" are being obeyed while still allowing for Moslems, although on reduced scale, to carry out their determination to wipe out PKI here.)
2. Effect of Devaluation. (As of 1700 hours December 20) beginning December 19 rice has not been available in Surabaya markets. However, rice sellers are entering city with 100 or so kilos and selling whole lot to buyers with sufficient funds at 2,000 rupiah per kilo which has been price since December 15. Outside of Surabaya rice reportedly also difficult to get. Reference other commodities, larger stores in Surabaya have been forced to maintain December 13 prices and owners reportedly expect to be cleaned out of merchandise within week if not resupplied. At same time press reports state companies and wholesalers are reluctant to sell to retailers. Further according press, state companies are raising prices 10 percent on purchases involving old currency and have vastly raised prices of certain items.
3. Reports on Bali. Japanese Consul, who returned from Bali December 16, said burning of Chinese stores and shooting at night continues. Also reported that American and Japanese communities well protected by authorities. Unofficial head of Nationalist Chinese community here told me only one shop belonging to "non-Red" Chinese was burned and this by error.
EEM
MVT
RJM
HLH
RG
PFG
PCH
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
UN
Action Taken
[Handwritten: Si 12/22]
FORM FS-412
3-1-55
CONFIDENTIAL
Classification
POST ACTION COPY
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION
FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 67289
TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the United States of America -INCOMING
PAGE TWO SURABAYA 208 CONFIDENTIAL Classification Control: 762A Recd:
; According PSI source, reason Governor SUTEDJA did not return to Bali from Djakarta is Army Chief Staff SUHARTO and Bali Commander Brig. Gen. SJAIFUDIN told him Army could not protect him if he went back. Also, according source, 40 of SUTEDJA's aides in Bali Government were killed.
Bali Chinese Request Evacuation. According reliable Chinese source, Bali Chinese communists sent delegation to CPR. Embassy in Djakarta which requested evacuation to mainland China. Embassy representative replied that Indonesians for years had been trying unsuccessfully to deprive local Chinese of livelihood and said this not time to give up and that they should hang on here.
East Java NU Conference. East Java Nu is evidently ignoring SUKARNO's advice not to pressure him. In recent conference at DJOMBANG as reported in press December 17 it passed resolution calling for replacing term "leftist revolution" with "Pantjasila revolution." In addition, it called for purge of Gestapu from Cabinet and ban on PKI before end of year. It also took firm anti-Chinese line and called for "revision" of diplomatic relations with Communist China, "reviewing" of sending students to countries sympathizing with Gestapu and revival of ban on trading activities by aliens in rural areas. (Comment: Hard line adopted by Nu evidently aroused PNI suspicions that PSI had master- minded conference. PSI source said PNI official had accused him of assisting with resolutions. Source also said accusation was baseless.)
Surabaya GMNI statement. (Consulate A-19). Surabaya GMNI (PNI university students affiliate) in statement carried in press Dec. 16 sniped at and carefully disassociated itself from local chapter of Moslem dominated anti-PKI Indonesian students action committee (KAMI). Stated it could not join KAMI and reminded KAMI of need to prevent rightist counter-revolutionaries from using crushing of Gestapu to divert leftist revolution to right." It added that it approves all KAMI's actions provided they do not deviate from BUNG KARNO's policy to restore peace and order."
Brawidjaja Anniversary Celebration. On December 17 I attended Brawidjaja Division's 17th anniversary celebration at which Acting Commander Brig. Gen SOENARJADI spoke and Army Chief of Staff SUHARTO
CONFIDENTIAL Classification UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED POST ACTION COPY FORM FS-412 3-1-55 PPRC, Japan
TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the United States of America INCOMING
ACE TEL SURABAYA 705 Classification Control: 735A Recd:
sent written message. both called for crushing of estapu, but warned against excesses. MUSLIM mentioned only once and this by SUKARNO. At reception following ceremony SUKARNO walked over and sat next to me, which was certainly not missed by East Java officials.
- Another battalion in East Java. Brawijaja's 510 ? trooper 14 returned from Sulawesi to Surabaya. At ceremony Fri. on SUKARNO said it now has duty of crushing estapu.
CY-3.
ja/22/1045
CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Classification POST ACTION COPY FORM FS-412 3-1-55 PPRK Japan
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