Airgram A-408, Joint Weeka No. 48 from U.S. Embassy Jakarta to State, Secret.
National Security Archive
A declassified 1965 Jakarta embassy report reveals how Suharto’s army turned a secret command into a ‘super‑cabinet’ while the anti‑communist purge surged past 100,000 deaths.
Source: Airgram A-408, Joint Weeka No. 48 from U.S. Embassy Jakarta to State, Secret. Date: Dec 21, 1965 Archive: RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 10, Folder 12-POL 2-1 Joint Weeks Sept. 1-December 31, 1965 Collection: U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder 1965 Oct 17, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
The Airgram in Context: Jakarta’s Diplomatic Pulse, December 1965
The declassified Airgram A‑408 is a weekly “Joint Weeka” dispatch from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta to the State Department, covering the period 13‑18 December 1965. It was produced by the embassy’s political and military officers as part of a routine intelligence‑sharing routine that the State Department required of its overseas posts during the Cold War. The memo’s secret classification and its distribution list—spanning regional U.S. commands, the Pacific Fleet, and the CIA—show that Washington regarded Indonesia’s turmoil as a matter of strategic importance for the entire Indo‑Pacific.
A Turning Point in the Anti‑Sukarno Coup
The document’s first section, titled “Army Takes Another Round in Anti‑Sukarno Campaign,” records the rapid consolidation of power by General Suharto and his “Supreme Operations Command” (KOTI). Within days Suharto received authority to appoint the Extraordinary Military Tribunal that would try the September 30 Movement (G30S) conspirators, and three “Deputy Great Commanders” were installed to oversee military, economic, and socio‑political affairs. The Airgram notes the sidelining of Foreign Minister Subandrio—once a key Sukarno ally—by omitting him from the new KOTI roster and reporting his imminent departure to the Netherlands.
These details confirm what Indonesian historians have long argued: the army’s strategy was to create a parallel “super‑cabinet” that could eclipse civilian ministries. The Airgram’s mention of the Central Intelligence Bureau (BPI) being transferred from the foreign ministry to the army‑run National Intelligence Command underscores the systematic militarization of intelligence functions. By documenting the dissolution of the Supreme Economic Operations Command (KETOK) and its absorption into a development command under Sultan Hamengkubuwono, the memo reveals the army’s willingness to intervene directly in economic policy—contrary to earlier public statements that the military would stay out of the economy until “the adversaries were blackened.”
The Human Cost of the PKI Purge
The second and third sections shift focus to the repression of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The Airgram estimates roughly 100,000 PKI deaths nationwide and cites a Balinese source reporting 10,000 killings on Bali alone, including relatives of “crypto‑Communist” Governor Sutedja. The memo records President Sukarno’s public outcry—threatening resignation if the “jolts” (violent crackdowns) continued—yet notes that his protests had no measurable effect on the army’s actions. This stark contrast between Sukarno’s rhetoric and the ground reality highlights the erosion of his authority.
The dispatch also tracks intra‑leftist factional fighting, noting the defeat of the Ali Sastroamidjojo‑led PKI faction by the Hardi‑Radisubono wing of the Nationalist Party (PNI). The cancellation of a “Working Body Meeting” in Bandung, allegedly at the behest of Military Commander General Adjie, suggests that the army was already withdrawing its last overt support for Sukarno‑aligned leftists.
Why the Airgram Still Matters
The Airgram is more than a bureaucratic status report; it is a contemporaneous window into how U.S. officials interpreted the rapid militarization of Indonesian politics and the scale of anti‑communist violence. The memo’s language—phrases like “striking Army success” and “panic through the ranks of Ministers”—betrays a perception that the army’s coup was not merely a power grab but a decisive, albeit violent, reorientation of Indonesia’s foreign alignment away from Sukarno’s non‑aligned, pro‑Soviet stance.
For scholars of the 1965‑66 Indonesian mass killings, the Airgram corroborates Indonesian sources that the army deliberately framed the purge as a legal process (the Extraordinary Military Tribunal) while simultaneously reshaping intelligence and economic institutions to cement its dominance. It also illustrates the United States’ real‑time monitoring of the crisis, providing a basis for later debates about American complicity or acquiescence.
In sum, Airgram A‑408 captures a pivotal week when Suharto’s KOTI moved from a shadowy planning body to an overt governing apparatus, and when the PKI’s annihilation accelerated beyond Sukarno’s control. Its declassification allows historians to trace the diplomatic calculus that accompanied the birth of the New Order, reminding us that today’s geopolitical narratives often rest on such hidden, week‑by‑week assessments.
POL2-1 6 A FILE Secret 2 40 A-408 SECRET DEPARTMENT OF STATE GROUP 2 - EXEMPT INFO: BANGKOK, CANBERRA, COLOMBO, KARACHI, KUALA LUMPUR, MANILA, MEDAN, NEW DELHI, RANGOON, SAIGON, SINGAPORE, SURABAYA, TAIPEI, TOKYO, CINCPAC, CINCSURFPAC, COMUSMACV, COMSEVENTHFLT, COMNAVPBIL, CINCPACAF, 13th AF Manila; Cdr. US Naval Forces Marianas; Cdr. 5th AS, Fuchu AS Japan; Co. 500th Inte. Grp. Ambassy DJAKARTA December 21, 1965 JOINT WEEKA NO. 48 48
This WEEKA covers the period December 13 to December 18, 1965
POLITICAL
- Army Takes Another Round in Anti-Sukarno Campaign
- PKI Repression
- Left-Wing PKI Takes More Setbacks
- Economic Measures
PSYCHOLOGICAL 5. US-Indo Relations
MILITARY 6. KOTI takes Over BPI 7. New KOSTRAD Commander 8. Polish Attaches 9. Air Force Purges Begin
DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 67289
SECRET Secret POL:KVFront/KCRowland:ds ARMA-Col. Ethel AIRA-Col. Slade H.V. Trent
SECRET Page 2; A-408 From Djakarta
POLITICAL
- Army Takes Another Round in Anti-Sukarno Campaign (SECRET)
a. The reporting week continued to witness striking Army success in drawing power under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Operations Command, or KOTI, which the Army intends will ultimately become a "super-Cabinet" enabling it to direct national policy. On December 10, a KOTI decree gave General Suharto the authority to appoint the members of the Extraordinary Military Tribunal which will try the leaders of the September 30 Movement, as well as to set court procedures and serve as prosecutor. A few days later, on December 14, General Suharto announced on the Palace steps that President Sukarno had appointed three Deputy Great Commanders of KOTI, namely, General Nasution for Military Affairs, Sultan Hamengkubuwono for Economic and General Affairs, and Ruslan Abdulgani for Social-Political Affairs. Subandrio, who had originally been slated to receive the "General Affairs" portfolio, was nowhere listed, and on the same day an item in Antara announced he would leave on a trip to the Netherlands after the beginning of the new year.
b. The Army thus appeared to have achieved all its objectives. But the real import of the Army's victory did not strike home until a few days later when, again on the Palace steps, Suharto announced that:
(i) The Central Intelligence Bureau (BPI), the Subandrio document-fabricating and general surveillance organization, will be withdrawn from the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and incorporated into the Army-run National Intelligence Command, a sub-division of KOTI.
(ii) The Supreme Economic Operations Command (KETOK) will be dissolved, and along with the "Berdikari Operations Command" (KOTARI) will be incorporated into the Berdikari Development Command under Sultan Hamengkubuwono in KOTI. As well as another indication of the Army's increasing power, this announcement reflected the supersession of an earlier Army decision to keep its hands off the economy until its continuing difficulties had blackened the military's adversaries.
(iii) Certain Ministers suspected of involvement in the September 30 Movement will be tried as "rebels." Suharto's reading of this announcement, according to an eye-witness, sent panic through the ranks of Ministers who habitually turn up at the Palace every morning for Sukarno's daily kaffe-klatsch.
SECRET
SECRET Page 3, A-403 From Djakarta
(iv) The "Drikorn volunteers" said to be 21 million strong but actually more in the vicinity of 40,000 to 50,000, will henceforth be supervised by a special JKTI section. Although this is not too clear, it appears to take the responsibility for these volunteers---an important percentage of whom were controlled by the PKI---away from the National Front, an organization which appears to be on its last legs anyway.
- PKI Repression (CONFIDENTIAL)
a. Although Sukarno went to his most vitriolic and angry lengths to demonstrate his disagreement with the present campaign of repression against the PKI---even threatening again to resign if the "jolts" were not stopped---it didn't do a bit of good. The "jolts", which have now resulted in an estimated 100,000 PKI deaths, continued, as did the issuance of more statements by politicians and youth groups denouncing the idea of any resurgent Marxist-Leninist Party, as well as reports that all members of the PKI politburo are now dead or in custody except for one said to be out of the country, and one who disappeared in August. Not surprisingly, reliable reports indicate that the PKI---what is left of it---is rapidly losing confidence in Sukarno's ability to protect it, and may resort to active defense if the situation does not improve by December 24. It is not likely to improve, but what capability the PKI will have to begin "active defense" by that date is quite problematical.
b. A reliable Balinese source informed the Embassy that PKI deaths on the island of Bali now total about 10,000, and include the parents and even distant relatives of crypto-Communist Governor Sutedja, who fled with his wife to Djakarta after his house was burned down by demonstrators. Killing is continuing on the island, which had a strong PKI and a right-wing PNI which opposed it.
- Left-Wing PKI Takes More Setbacks (CONFIDENTIAL)
The Sukarno-supported, left-wing PKI led by Ali Sastroamidjojo and Ir. Surachman appears to have suffered sharp defeats this week in its duel with the ousted Hardi-Radisubono faction to control the PNI. According to the Hardi faction's newspaper Berita Republik, John Luminkawas, Deputy Secretary General of the PNI and a chief Surachman hatchet-man, was arrested along with four other suspected Communist infiltrators of the PNI. Moreover, although this is not completely confirmed, it appears that West Java Military
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Commander General Adjie withdrew his permission for the left-wing PNI to hold a "Working Body Meeting" in Bandung December 18-20 which was ordered by Sukarno to conclusively oust the Hardi-Hardisubeno faction from the party. It is true the meeting was not held, but the cause is not yet known; if it is true that Adjie has deserted Sukarno, the President has lost the only real military ally he had left.
- Economic Measures (CONFIDENTIAL)
a. Long-awaited measures to improve the state of the Indonesian economy began to appear during the reporting week. The preceding week, President Sukarno had confined 24 economic Ministers to a villa in the resort area of Tjipanas with instructions not to emerge without an economic program. The Army, at that time, was cool toward these proceedings, and was said to have taken a decision to keep its hands off the economy in order to allow its growing slide toward chaos/blacken the image of its adversaries.
b. The first concrete results of the Tjipanas meetings came on December 13, when Third Deputy Prime Minister General Saleh announced that all currency in circulation will be replaced by new currency at a rate of 1,000 rupiah of old money to 1 rupiah of the new. The announcement sent a jolt through the markets for a day or two, but following some stern exhortations against price-raising and store-closing, things seemed to have calmed down by December 17, with prices only slightly above the previous normal.
c. The Army, which had first opposed this step, is now said to be behind it; Sultan Hamengkubuwono himself, the new Deputy Great Commander for Economic Affairs of KOTI, is even said to favor devaluation, as well as other new regulations believed to be ready for announcement.
PSYCHOLOGICAL
- US-Indo Relations (CONFIDENTIAL)
a. Relations continue to hinge specifically on the position of the American oil companies and on Indonesian feelers for American aid (USIA No. 47). In more general terms of course the overall political developments, now accelerating at such a speed that some significant early resolution seems inevitable, remain of dominating importance.
SECRET
SECRET Page 5; A-400 From Djakarta
b. The change of atmosphere in relations between Indonesians and Americans has been conspicuous and increasingly warm cordiality has been evident in social gatherings as well as in more quiet contacts during the week. Indonesians not seen for months now freely greet American friends on public occasions. The passing of old posters and signs directed viciously against the US, sometimes along with other "Nekolim" powers, continues to strike us as evidence of the new day. Although the removal of such signs of the old regime is not complete, the former eyesores are greatly reduced. At Senajan sports hall when Sukarno, appearing in that large arena for the first time since Gestapu, addressed the 20th anniversary meeting of the women's Perwari organization on December 17, there was no sign of such former garish propaganda as caricatures of Uncle Sam and similar tasteless and hostile presentations which used to accompany the Bung's appearances. His attempt to rekindle his old oratory and to evoke the former ovations failed dismally in the new atmosphere.
c. There are signs everywhere of re-awakened intellectual curiosity as to what is going on in the outside world and especially is there an insatiable interest in what others think about Indonesian developments. People are hungry for US newspapers, magazines, books and contacts. In the fantastic switch which has occurred over ten short weeks the Embassy is busily doing what it can to meet the need and to take advantage of new opportunities which a short time ago would have seemed impossible. While the press in general remains centered, not surprisingly, on internal developments, it has given good play to the extraordinary Gemini achievements of the past week, and the Foreign Department's Herald of December 20 front-pages story under the head "Record Breaking Gemini 7 Returns." Editorials in the same issue nevertheless regret that the United States, so advanced scientifically, is behind the times in its policy on Vietnam. But Antara, long one of our most articulate and harmful enemies, now under new Army-controlled management, has taken the occasion to emphasize what it has seen as hopeful signs for improved US-Indonesian relations, based on Ambassador Green's call on Suwito last week. On the whole, a fresh breeze is blowing.
ARMY
- KOTI Takes Over BPI (UNCLASSIFIED)
a. General Suharto, Army Commander and Chief of Staff of KOTI announced December 18 that the Central Intelligence Body (BPI) will be
SECRET
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merged into the National Intelligence Command (KIN) which is subordinate to KOTI.
b. COMMENT (CONFIDENTIAL): The KPI had been, in fact, Foreign Minister Subandrio's private intelligence organization.
- New KOSTRAD Commander (UNCLASSIFIED):
Major General Umar Wirahadikusumah, the former Military Commander of KODAM V (Greater Djakarta), was installed as the Commander of the Strategic Army Command (KOSTRAD) on December 7.
- Polish Attaches (UNCLASSIFIED):
a Polish military attaches are accredited to Indonesia for the first time. Colonel Waclaw Kruglaski, Armor, and Major Yan Bietajec, Signal, recently made their first public appearances. Both officers are accompanied by their families, and are on three year tours.
b. COMMENT (CONFIDENTIAL): Bietajec has not participated in official calls and may remain in the background. Both officers seem to be attempting to cultivate U.S. Attaches. They look on their tours in Indonesia with foreboding.
AIR FORCE
- Air Force Purges Begin (CONFIDENTIAL):
As his first official act after being sworn in as new Air Force Minister, Sri Muljono Herlambang announced the retooling of Deputy Minister for Operations and Intelligence Devanto, who may go to Moscow as Air Attache after a brief, face-saving period in the status of "attached to the Minister." The two Deputy Minister slots he held will now be occupied by the former Air Attaches to Canberra and Moscow.
For the Ambassador:
[illegible signature]
Mary Vance Trent First Secretary of Embassy
SECRET
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