Telegram A-386 From American Embassy Jakarta to Secretary of State, 'The PKI Hunt in Central Java', Confidential.
National Security Archive
A December 1965 Jakarta telegram maps how army commandos, religious parties, and a Chinese‑Indonesian informant coordinated the anti‑PKI purge in Central Java.
Source: Telegram A-386 From American Embassy Jakarta to Secretary of State, 'The PKI Hunt in Central Java', Confidential. Date: Dec 10, 1965 Archive: RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 14, Folder 7 pol 23-9 September 30th Mvt, dec 1-31, 1965 Collection: U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder 1965 Oct 17, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
The Telegram in Context
On December 10, 1965 the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta sent a confidential telegram to the State Department titled “The PKI Hunt in Central Java.” It arrived at a moment when the Indonesian army, under General Suharto, was consolidating a brutal anti‑communist purge that had begun after the failed September 30 Movement. The telegram is a routine intelligence dispatch, but its content reveals how American officials tried to map the chaotic, locally driven violence that was reshaping the archipelago.
The document is anchored in a single informant – a man identified only as Suhandjo, a “Coordinator” of Catholic Party activity in the Pati residency. Suhandjo, described as “of Chinese extraction,” supplied a snapshot of how the army’s elite Paracommando (RPKAD) units coordinated with religious and political groups – the Catholic Party, the Indonesian Islamic Union Party (IP‑KI), and especially Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) – to root out members of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). The telegram notes that the NU youth wing, Ansor, often blurred the line between anti‑communist action and personal vendetta, attacking non‑PKI villagers caught up in local feuds. This detail signals the indiscriminate nature of the violence and the way communal tensions were weaponized by the anti‑communist coalition.
Mapping the Local Mechanics of the Purge
The telegram’s most striking passage is Suhandjo’s list of Baperki (Indonesian Chinese association) members. He presented the embassy officer with a “who’s who” of over 200 businessmen, plus a separate list of twenty Baperki leaders slated for “intensive grilling.” The language – “interrogated,” “detained indefinitely,” “disappeared” – mirrors the broader pattern of extrajudicial detentions that defined the 1965‑66 massacres. By highlighting that the army relied on a local political operative to compile ethnic‑based target lists, the telegram exposes the intersection of anti‑communist zeal, anti‑Chinese sentiment, and opportunistic profiteering.
The report also offers a rare glimpse of the army’s self‑perception. The Paracommando troops are described as having “generally good rapport with the local population” because they were “most were Central Javanese.” Yet the same paragraph concedes they were “very tough on the communist sympathizers.” This ambivalence underscores how the U.S. diplomatic corps tried to reconcile reports of disciplined counter‑insurgency with the reality of mass killings, suggesting a tacit acceptance of harsh methods as long as they were directed against the PKI.
Why the Telegram Matters Today
First, it documents the collaborative framework that turned a national anti‑communist campaign into a patchwork of local militias, religious groups, and elite army units. The involvement of the Catholic Party and NU – both traditionally anti‑communist but otherwise politically distinct – demonstrates how the purge became a unifying cause for disparate factions, eroding any pre‑existing political pluralism.
Second, the focus on Chinese‑Indonesian targets anticipates later scholarship on the ethnic dimension of the 1965‑66 killings. While the PKI was the official enemy, the telegram makes clear that anti‑Chinese sentiment was institutionalized through lists supplied by community insiders. This foreshadows the long‑term marginalization of Chinese Indonesians, a legacy still felt in contemporary debates over citizenship and cultural rights.
Finally, the telegram illustrates the limits of U.S. situational awareness. The State Department received granular, on‑the‑ground intel, yet the dispatch is framed as a neutral report rather than a policy recommendation. The absence of any directive to intervene or to pressure Jakarta suggests that Washington, while monitoring the bloodletting, was content to let the Indonesian military resolve its internal crisis – a stance that would shape U.S.–Indonesian relations for the next three decades.
In sum, Telegram A‑386 is more than a bureaucratic note; it is a window onto the mechanics of Indonesia’s 1965‑66 anti‑communist purge, the ethnic undercurrents that amplified the violence, and the diplomatic posture of a Cold War superpower watching a strategic ally cleanse itself of leftist influence.
[POL23-9] CONFIDENTIAL A-386 CONFIDENTIAL SEC STATE WASHINGTON INFO : MEDAN, SURABAYA [FILED] GROUP 3 Downgrade each 12 yrs; no automatically declassifie Amembassy DJAKARTA December 10, 1965 The PKI Hunt in Central Java
The "Coordinator" of Catholic Party activities in the Pati residency of Central Java, Suhandjo (of Chinese extraction), provided the reporting officer with the following description of anti-PKI operations in that region which may be typical of activities through- out the province.
Paracommando (RPKAD) troops on arrival in Kudus solicited the assistance of the Catholic, IP-KI and Nahdlatul Ulama party organizations in rooting out PKI elements. All cooperated and the Nahdlatul Ulama as the region's principal anti-communist party provided the bulk of the support. The NU youth arm Ansor, however, has caused problems as its brutal attacks on PKI elements in villages surrounding Kudus have been extended to non-PKI victims involved in personal feuds with Ansor members.
Suhandjo was responsible for singling out members of the Chinese association Baperki for the military. He showed the report- ing officer a list of over 200 Baperki members which he had furnished the Army and which constituted a "Who's Who" of the Kudus business community. Suhandjo noted that all on the list would eventually be interrogated and those who had clearly been Baperki activists would be detained indefinitely. A separate list of 20 names included Baperki leaders who were due for more intensive grilling but many of whom had disappeared.
The Paracommando units, Suhandjo added, had a generally good rapport with the local population as most were Central Javanese. They were very tough on the communist sympathizers, however.
CONFIDENTIAL POL:PFGardner/ac 12/9/65 POL:BJMartens [DECLASSIFIED Authority NNO 67289] CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Page 2, A-386
From Djakarta
5. Suhandjo said Kudus was now free of PKI elements but the country-
side was as yet not safe.
FOR THE AMBASSADOR:
Robert J. Martens
First Secretary of Embassy
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
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