Airgram A-373, Joint Weeka No. 46 from U.S. Embassy Jakarta to State, Secret.
National Security Archive
A secret Jakarta dispatch reveals how the U.S. watched the army quietly seize power, catalogued the death of PKI leaders, and noted the rupture with China during Indonesia’s 1965‑66 purge.
Source: Airgram A-373, Joint Weeka No. 46 from U.S. Embassy Jakarta to State, Secret. Date: Dec 7, 1965 Archive: RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 10, Folder 12-POL 2-1 Joint Weeks Sept. 1-December 31, 1965 Collection: U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder 1965 Oct 17, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
Jakarta’s Secret Dispatch, December 7 1965
The airgram labeled A‑373 is a routine “Joint Weeka” summary sent from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta to the State Department’s Group 3 desk. Its purpose was to give Washington a rapid, classified snapshot of the rapidly shifting political, military and psychological landscape in Indonesia during the first week of December 1965 – a period when the country was still reeling from the September 30 “coup attempt” and the ensuing anti‑communist purge. The document is not a diplomatic cable in the traditional sense; it is a compiled intelligence brief that aggregates reports from embassy staff, military attachés, and a network of “well‑placed sources” that the embassy considered reliable. The very format—six pages, split into political, psychological and military sections, each marked with a classification level—reveals how the United States treated Indonesia as a theater of urgent strategic concern.
The wider episode: the 1965‑66 Indonesian purge
The airgram sits squarely in the middle of the most violent political transformation in post‑colonial Southeast Asia. After the alleged “coup” of 30 September 1965, which the army blamed on the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), General Suharto’s forces launched a campaign that killed an estimated 500,000 to one million suspected communists, ethnic Chinese and left‑leaning civilians. The United States, fearing a pro‑Chinese communist foothold in the archipelago, covertly supported the army’s anti‑PKI drive through intelligence sharing, propaganda, and limited logistical aid. The airgram’s content reflects the moment when the army, under General Abdul Haris Nasution and his deputy Suharto, was consolidating power while President Sukarno’s authority was eroding.
What the brief tells us—and what it conceals
1. The army’s quiet advance. The report notes that the “struggle for power between Sukarno and Military leaders entered a quiet phase,” yet it emphasizes the army’s focus on the Supreme Operations Command (KOTI) and its encroachment into economic spheres. This language masks a deliberate strategy: the military was moving from a purely security role into a de‑facto governing body, preparing the institutional infrastructure that would later become the New Order regime.
2. The fate of PKI leadership. The document is one of the few contemporaneous U.S. sources that explicitly states Aidit’s death and lists the presumed status of each Politburo member. The phrasing—“captured… and killed after ‘resisting interrogation’ or ‘attempting to escape’”—mirrors the army’s justification for extrajudicial killings. The airgram also hints at disinformation: it suggests the army may have fabricated reports of Aidit’s location to mislead Sukarno. This reveals that even within U.S. intelligence circles there was awareness of the army’s manipulation of facts to control the narrative.
3. Sukarno’s diminishing leverage. The brief records that several “pro‑Communist” ministers were placed under city arrest and that the president called a session of the MPRS (the highest policy‑making body) but would not present his “political solution” to the September 30 affair. The omission of any substantive political agenda indicates that the embassy saw Sukarno’s remaining institutional tools as largely ceremonial.
4. Sino‑Indonesian rupture. The section on China details the confiscation of Chinese‑origin assets, the takeover of rice mills and textile firms, and China’s retaliatory suspension of trade. By labeling the ambassador’s protests as “patently not the case,” the embassy signals that Washington viewed the breakdown as a decisive shift away from any possible Indonesian alignment with Beijing, reinforcing the view that Indonesia was moving into the American sphere.
5. Psychological and military assessments. Both are marked “Negative,” a terse way of saying that morale and combat readiness were deteriorating for the army, or perhaps that the embassy perceived no immediate threat to U.S. interests. The brief does not elaborate, which suggests either a lack of reliable information or an intentional downplaying of internal instability to avoid alarming Washington.
Actors and their subtext
- General Nasution and General Suharto are never named directly, yet the report’s focus on KOTI and the army’s arrests signals their dominance. The mention of Nasution’s anger at the Air Force reshuffle hints at intra‑military rivalries that would later shape the New Order’s power balance.
- President Sukarno appears as a figure whose formal powers are being sidelined; his call for an MPRS session is noted but not treated as a genuine policy pivot.
- D.N. Aidit, Lukman, Njoto, and other PKI leaders are catalogued almost like a roll‑call of casualties, underscoring the systematic dismantling of the party.
- Minister of Agriculture Sudjarwo and Deputy Foreign Minister Suwito are cited as sources of official statements, indicating that the embassy relied on ministerial briefings to gauge the regime’s direction.
Legacy
Airgram A‑373 is a microcosm of how the United States documented and interpreted the Indonesian purge in real time. Its mixture of hard intelligence (the list of PKI arrests) and soft assessment (psychological negativity) illustrates the dual track of U.S. policy: support for anti‑communist forces while maintaining a veneer of diplomatic caution. The document’s emphasis on economic takeover by the army foreshadows Suharto’s later “Pancasila‑guided development” model, in which the military became a central economic actor. For scholars, the airgram provides a contemporaneous checkpoint to verify later oral histories and to trace the timeline of the army’s consolidation of power. Its candid acknowledgment of possible army‑fabricated misinformation also reminds us that even U.S. intelligence was aware of the murky, often brutal, information environment that surrounded the 1965‑66 purge. The legacy of that period—Indonesia’s decades‑long authoritarian rule, the marginalization of leftist politics, and lingering trauma among survivors—continues to shape Indonesia’s democratic transition today.
C.F POL 2-1 Secret A-373 SECRET This document consists of 6 pages. Copy 2 of 40 copies. Series A FILE DEPARTMENT OF STATE GROUP 3 - EXEMPT INFO : BANGKOK, CANBERRA, COLOMBO, KARACHI, KUALA LUMPUR, MANILA, MEDAN, NEW DELHI, RANGOON, SAIGON, SINGAPORE, SURABAYA, TAIPEI, TOKYO, CINCPAC, CINCSAERPAC, COMTDC, COMSEVENTHFLT, COMMAPHIL, CINCPACAF, 13th AF Manila; Cdr. US Nav. Forces Marianas; Cdr. 5th AS, Fuchu, AS, Japan; Co. 500th Intc. Grp. Amembassy DJAKARTA December 7, 1965 JOINT WEEKA NO. 46 This Weeka Covers the Period November 25 to December 3, 1965
POLITICAL
- Army-Sukarno Struggle
- Death of Aidit and Arrests of Communists
- Relations with China
- Confrontation in the News
- Rhodesian Declaration of Independence Condemned
- U.S. Relations
PSYCHOLOGICAL Negative
MILITARY Negative
SECRET POL: MVTrent/RJMartens/RGRichJr/ ECRowland/ds POL: RJMartens Secret
SECRET Page 2; A-373 From Djakarta
POLITICAL
- Army-Sukarno Struggle (SECRET)
The struggle for power between Sukarno and Military leaders entered a quiet phase this week, with little political maneuvering evident at the surface. The Army concentrated on strengthening its position in the Supreme Operations Command (KOTI) which began to extend its authority in the field of the economy. The situation in the press was relatively quiet, as Minister of Information Achmadi's new press regulations went into effect and were observed by all papers except the split PNI journals. Omar Dani was finally replaced as head of the Air Force by his pro-Communist deputy Sri Muljono Heriambang, a move taken without the concurrence of the Army which is said to have angered Nasution. Several ministerial pro-Communists were reportedly placed under city arrest during the week. By the end of the week, Sukarno had called a session of the MPRS, theoretically Indonesia's highest ranking policy-making body, for December 6; however, it was indicated that he would not deliver his "political solution" to the September 30 Affair at this meeting.
- Death of Aidit and Arrests of Communists (CONFIDENTIAL)
a. Information received from a number of high-ranking and well- placed sources indicate that PKI leader D.N. Aidit was captured in Central Java on November 21 and killed after "resisting interrogation" or "attempting to escape." The Indonesian press has also subsequently carried reports to this effect. There is some evidence that Aidit may have been captured as early as mid-October and been under secret interrogation in Bandung and that Army reports of his subsequent presence in Central Java were intended to mislead Sukarno. In any event the recent reports indicate that Aidit is almost certainly dead now, whenever he may have been captured.
b. The Embassy has also received several reports from well-placed sources that PKI First Deputy Chairman Lukman and the pro-Communist Governor of North Sumatra, Sitepu, have been arrested and are in prison. After a flurry of rumors that Njoto, the PKI Second Deputy Chairman and a Sukarno protege, had been arrested, more recent reports indicate that he was not and that he may still be under Presidential protection. (On the other hand, the later reports may be Army-inspired fabrications designed to prevent Sukarno from acting effectively to secure Njoto's release if the latter is imprisoned). There are also reports from well-placed and reliable sources that a number of prominent crypto-Communists have been placed under house arrest including the (left-wing) PNI Secretary General, Surachman, and the
SECRET
SECRET Page 3; A-373 From Djakarta
Minister of Central Bank Affairs, Jusuf Muda Dalam.
c. The Army's willingness to arrest PKI leaders under Sukarno's personal protection and to restrict to house arrest crypto-Communist cabinet ministers weakens Sukarno further and shows an Army determination to challenge him more directly than heretofore. Reports from various sources indicate that most of the PKI Politburo have been captured by now although the solidity of our information varies from case to case and no information has been heard at all concerning one Politburo member (Rewang). The countdown now reads: Aidit - believed dead, Lukman - believed to be in prison; Njoto - status unclear but may be arrested, Sudisman - believed in prison, Sakirman - believed in prison, Adjitorop - in Peking since July, 1964, Njono - definitely in prison, Rewang - unknown. The whereabouts of two Politburo candidate members and most Central Committee members are not known but it is likely that most were arrested and/or killed by the Army. A few are known to be in hiding.
d. As for lower level repression of the PKI, Deputy Foreign Minister Suwito told the DCM that there are now 34,000 PKI prisoners in Java alone. The slow extension of provincial bans continued as the PKI was dissolved in West Kalimantan, the Karo Batak area of North Sumatra and in the Jogjakarta Special Area.
- Relations with China (CONFIDENTIAL)
The recently uncertain course of Sino-Indonesian relations took a turn for the worse again this week. Liquid assets of Chinese-origin residents of Indonesia were confiscated in several provinces, and Minister of Agriculture Sudjarwo announced that regional military commanders would take over all rice mills and textile enterprises owned by members of the Chinese community association Baperki. Perhaps in retaliation for these and other acts of economic repression, NCNA announced December 4 that Communist China was suspending trade relations with Indonesia. The Chinese Ambassador presented several more protests to Dr. Subandrio, who maintained that Sino-Indonesian relations were in the process of "normalizing." This is patently not the case.
- Confrontation in the News (CONFIDENTIAL)
a. After several weeks in which Indonesia's confrontation against Malaysia has been mostly notable from its absence from public attention,
SECRET
SECRET Page 4; A-373 From Djakarta
the Foreign Ministry-controlled Indonesian Herald this week single handedly campaigned to condemn alleged British atrocities against guerrilla fighters in North Borneo. For three days the Herald printed atrocity pictures and stories, but the vernacular press continued its preoccupation with domestic events and has not picked up the theme.
b. In what may be a further effort to stimulate attention on foreign affairs, several claims of Indonesian victories along the border have also appeared in the press. Subandrio once more hinted at "negotiations" on December 1 when he commented to the press that Indonesia would not reject an opportunity to exchange ideas with the British concerning Malaysia. Subandrio also claimed that with the elimination of the PKI Indonesia was now free to pursue confrontation more vigorously.
c. COMMENT (CONFIDENTIAL): The atrocity stories seem mostly designed to make the continuing atrocities committed against rival political factions within Indonesia following the abortive September 30 coup seem less reprehensible, by pointing the finger at alleged barbarity elsewhere. The slightly increased press attention in general may also be partly related to the December 6 anniversary of the declaration of independence in 1961 by the Indonesian puppet government of the "Unitary State of North Kalimantan." No significant increase in physical confrontation appears in the cards, however, and, except for the Palace and Subandrio, most Indonesian leaders now seem inclined to work toward the eventual dismantlement of confrontation.
- Rhodesian Declaration of Independence Condemned (UNCLASSIFIED)
a. On November 26, the Indonesian rubber-stamp Parliament (DPGR) "unanimously" issued a statement condemning Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence and accusing the British of having manipulated this result. Accepting the resolution on behalf of the Government, Foreign Minister Subandrio said that it was the Government's conclusion that Britain had plotted with Smith to achieve the independence of the racist Rhodesian regime and announced that Indonesia would extend no recognition to Smith but would extend recognition to "Zimbabwe" if African political leaders declared independence.
b. COMMENT (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE): Editorial and other comment on Rhodesian developments has been relatively sparse, reflecting the major preoccupation of both the press and the politicians at present with domestic Indonesian political developments. Such statements as have been
SECRET
SECRET Page 5; A-373 From Djakarta
issued, however, have made an effort to blame Britain for the situation, consonant with the Indonesian stereotype of the British as, at best, "neo-colonialists". Unlike many AA countries, Indonesia has announced no sanctions or trade restrictions with Rhodesia and it seems likely that for the time being Indonesian involvement in this African issue will be minimal. Should internal Indonesian politics stabilize while Rhodesia still survives under a minority white government, however, Indonesia may yet attempt to assume a position of demogogic leadership over this issue in line with her self-image.
U.S. Relations (SECRET)
a. Appearance of Sukarno's autobiography.
i. During the week US-Indonesian relations seemed to find their most conspicuous expression through the publication and attendant publicity of the autobiography of Sukarno as told to the American writer, Mrs. Cindy Adams. Especially conspicuous and flamboyant was the treatment given the subject by the Foreign Department's *Indonesian Herald* which lauded the book and felt that here at least was an American who understood Sukarno and Indonesia. The paper printed accounts of cocktail parties sponsored by Ambassador Palar to mark the publication of the book and in general established the full approval of Subandrio's Foreign Department for the project. ii. The Indonesian-language press on the other hand paid little heed to the book. It's publication was conservatively noted but without excessive comment. iii. **COMMENT:** We understand directly from Mrs. Gunis Harsono, wife of the Second Deputy Foreign Minister, that not only she and her husband but also both Subandrios have read and were delighted with the book. Sukarno has not been heard from publicly on the subject.b. Official Calls
During the past week both the Ambassador and DCM have had occasion (the latter in the course of making farewells) to call on several cabinet ministers. This marks what may be the opening of a possibility of dialogue between responsible officials of the two governments, - a possibility which did not exist during the past several weeks in the wake of Gestapu.
SECRET
SECRET Page 6; A-378 From Djakarta
c. Indonesian Approaches
From an increasing number of Indonesians we are receiving approaches, not yet worked out in detail and often quite vague in expression, for economic assistance. Both civilian and military elements foresee coming crises in January-February before the new rice harvest will be reaped and the Lebaran holiday will increase demand. The US posture is to listen while keeping the door open for possible future consideration when circumstances warrant.
PSYCHOLOGICAL
Negative.
MILITARY
Negative.
For the Ambassador:
[Signature] Robert J. Martens First Secretary of Embassy
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE
National Security Archive, Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University, 2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037, Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu