Telegram 1025 A from American Embassy Jakarta to Secretary of State, Confidential
National Security Archive
A 1965 Jakarta telegram reveals U.S. diplomats puzzling over a secret PKI‑led coup, Chinese and Soviet takes, and the looming anti‑communist purge.
Source: Telegram 1025 A from American Embassy Jakarta to Secretary of State, Confidential Date: Nov 30, 1965 Archive: RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 14, Folder 7 pol 23-9 September 30th Mvt, dec 1-31, 1965 Collection: U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder 1965 Oct 17, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
Jakarta’s Inside View of the September‑30 Movement
The telegram dated 30 November 1965 is a terse, classified dispatch from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta to Secretary of State Dean Rusk. It reports a conversation the embassy’s Polish first secretary, Andrzej Grądziuk, had with a senior member of Indonesia’s Communist Party (PKI) on 1 October, the day the army‑backed “September‑30 Movement” seized power in Jakarta. The Polish diplomat’s source, identified only as a “PKI Central Committee member,” claimed the coup was not a spontaneous PKI plot but a limited intra‑government operation orchestrated by a secretive “special group” headed by D.N. Aid‑Aidit, the PKI’s public leader. According to the source, the idea for the move originated outside the party—presumably from President Sukarno—who allegedly allowed the PKI to participate only on the condition that the party would stay out of the press and that the operation’s sole objective was to detain a handful of senior generals, not to kill them.
The dispatch is significant because it captures, in near‑real time, how U.S. diplomats interpreted the bewildering chain of events that would soon spiral into a three‑month wave of anti‑communist violence, killing an estimated 500,000 people. The telegram reveals the embassy’s reliance on informal, personal contacts—here a Polish diplomat with a long‑standing relationship to the PKI—to make sense of a rapidly deteriorating situation. It also shows the diplomatic habit of filtering raw intelligence through the lens of Cold‑War rivalries: the report repeatedly compares Chinese and Soviet assessments, noting that Chinese communists saw the crisis in “black‑and‑white” terms while the Soviets were “disturbed” by the army’s broader targeting of progressive groups.
The Broader Crisis: From Coup to Mass Murder
The September‑30 Movement was a brief, poorly understood seizure of power that claimed to thwart an alleged “Generals’ Council” plot against Sukarno. Within days, General Suharto’s forces moved to crush the insurgents, and the army launched a nationwide purge of suspected communists. The telegram’s mention of a “special group” and the insistence that the PKI was merely a participant, not a mastermind, reflects the confusion that even seasoned diplomats felt. It also hints at the narrative the Indonesian military would later promote: that the PKI had acted independently, justifying the subsequent genocide as a necessary defense against a communist takeover.
The document also illuminates the international dimension of the crisis. The Polish officer’s speculation that the Chinese “Chicoms” regarded Sukarno as an unreliable ally and that the Soviets were uneasy about the army’s expansion of targets beyond the PKI aligns with declassified Soviet archives, which show Moscow’s alarm at Jakarta’s anti‑communist swing. The telegram’s request for the ambassador’s opinion on the feasibility of forming a “new Communist Party” underscores Washington’s concern that, even after the purge, a reconstituted left could re‑emerge, perhaps under Soviet or Chinese patronage.
Why the Telegram Still Matters
First, it provides a rare glimpse of how U.S. officials interpreted Indonesian internal politics before the full scale of the massacre became evident. The emphasis on “press messages” and the desire to keep the PKI’s involvement low‑key reveal Washington’s fear that overt acknowledgment of communist agency might legitimize the army’s brutal response.
Second, the telegram exposes the diplomatic juggling act between allies and rivals. By noting Polish, Chinese, and Soviet viewpoints, the embassy staff were mapping a contested ideological battlefield where Jakarta sat at the crossroads of Sukarno’s “guided democracy,” Chinese revolutionary zeal, and Soviet strategic caution.
Finally, the document’s very existence—classified, then declassified decades later—demonstrates the enduring relevance of the 1965‑66 Indonesian tragedy for U.S. foreign‑policy scholarship. It reminds us that the Cold War’s “local wars” were often understood through fragmented, second‑hand reports, and that those reports helped shape policy decisions that, in turn, affected millions of lives.
In sum, Telegram 1025 A is not just a bureaucratic note; it is a window onto the chaotic moment when a failed coup, Cold‑War anxieties, and Sukarno’s waning authority converged to unleash one of the twentieth century’s deadliest political purges. Its nuanced, sometimes contradictory observations continue to inform historians seeking to untangle myth from reality in the Indonesian mass killings.
TELEGRAM
Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING AMBASSY DJAKARTA [P. 23 1]
FILMS COMM CHRON AMB MIN RF POL POL LCON CAO ATTACHES
Charge: Embassy CONFIDENTIAL Classification Control: 1025A Date: Nov 30, 1965 12:30 PM
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION TO: SECSTATE WASHINGTON 1591 INFO : AMCONSUL HONG KONG 201 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 33 AMEMBASSY WARSAW ONE
Polish First Secretary Andrzej Grądziuk told EmbOff he had talked to PKI Central Committee member at 8:00 A.M. on October 1. PKI source was elated, knowing that Sept 30 Movement then underway. PKI source told Grądziuk, "This is what we've been waiting for." He said not all of PKI Central Com- mittee knew about plot, only "special group" headed by Aidit.
According this source, idea originated outside PKI (presumably Sukarno although this not stated) and Aidit presented proposal to group from Central Committee (presumably Politburo, possibly supplemented by other key CC members). PKI leaders agreed to participate on condition that PKI as CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Classification
DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 67289
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
press messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without ing. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T". PPRC Japan
TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING AMBASSY DJAKARTA CONFIDENTIAL Charge: Embassy Classification Control: -2- Date: organization would not be involved and that only objective was intra-government operation to seize limited group of top generals. Source claimed there was no intention to kill generals. PKI source added that Sukarno was supposed to come out with statement on October 1 alleging suppression of Generals' Council plot. 3. Gradziuk said he believes PKI had become so dependent on taking orders from Sukarno that it was subsequently paralyzed when Sukarno failed to act. On other hand, he thought Sukarno was gradually reasserting control and might still win out (This line may have been designed to solicit EmbOff's opinion, however). 4. Source thought Chinese saw present picture in black and white terms and really did not have clear idea of what happened or forces at work. He said Chicoms believe it is simple matter of reactionary Army on one side and temporarily defeated PKI on other with CONFIDENTIAL Classification UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED FORM FS-413 3-1-55 "Single-address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T"." PFRC, Japan
TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the
United States of America
OUTGOING AMBASSY DJAKARTA
CONFIDENTIAL
Charge: Embassy Classification Control:
-3- Date:
Sukarno no longer important factor. Chicoms
see no importance in cultivating middle forces. They
feel Sukarno was untrustworthy ally who let PKI
down (Although not explicitly stated, corollary
of this analysis would be that Chinese felt PKI
internal strategy wrong all along and are assuming I
told you so attitude).
5. Gradziuk felt Soviets saw more complex
situation but he was unwilling or unable to express
himself so clearly on Soviet attitudes. He did
say that Soviets were disturbed that Army targets
extended beyond PKI itself to "other progressive
groups," attitude implicitly shared by source.
Gradziuk was particularly interested in soliciting
EmbOff opinion on feasibility of forming new Communist
Party. This question also posed by Soviet counselor
in separate conversation with EmbOff and may indicate
that it is at center of Soviet attention. In reply
to question, Gradziuk said he did not think Soviets
CONFIDENTIAL
Classification
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION
FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
FORM FS-413
8-1-55
"Single address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without
retyping Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T".
FPRC, Japan
TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING AMBASSY DJAKARTA
Charge: Embassy CONFIDENTIAL Classification Control: -4- Date:
knew where Indo Army going politically and did not feel they were in position to talk seriously to Army on political matters at this time in view of confused situation.
In brief separate conversation, Soviet Political Counselor [illegible] said he could not understand why PKI did not act in face of repression by Army. "Why, why, why?" he repeated. EmbOff answered with Polish argument that PKI may be immobilized by long habit of obeying counselor Sukarno. Soviet [illegible] responded that PKI may think Sukarno is with them but it is obvious he is only trying to save himself and no longer cares what happens to PKI, [illegible]
Comment: It is possible that Polish EmbOff's story was doctored to protect PKI or to appear coopera- tive. Source is long-time acquaintance, however, and appears highly Western-oriented and sympathetic to progressive non-Communism. On other hand, he is
CONFIDENTIAL Classification UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
FORM FS-413 9-1-55 "Single address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T". PFRC, Japan
TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING AMBASSARY DJAKARTA Charge: Embassy CONFIDENTIAL Classification -5- Control: Date: believed to be intelligence officer and is undoubtedly a good one. GP-4. GREEN [signature] POL:MMasters [signature] [initials] POL:RJMartens:efr 11/30/65 CONFIDENTIAL Classification UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED FORM FS-413 3-1-55 "Single-address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T". FPRC, Japan
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