Airgram A-353, Joint Weeka No. 45 from U.S. Embassy Jakarta to State, Secret.
National Security Archive
The November 30, 1965 Airgram captures the U.S. embassy’s on‑the‑ground view of Indonesia’s army‑led purge and the swift marginalisation of President Sukarno.
Source: Airgram A-353, Joint Weeka No. 45 from U.S. Embassy Jakarta to State, Secret. Date: Nov 30, 1965 Archive: RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 10, Folder 12-POL 2-1 Joint Weeks Sept. 1-December 31, 1965 Collection: U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder 1965 Oct 17, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A Turbulent Week in the Aftermath of the 30 September Movement
The November 30, 1965 Airgram A‑353 is a terse, secret‑level dispatch from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta to Washington, summarising what embassy officials observed during the second half of November. It was produced at a moment when the Indonesian army, under General Suharto, was turning the chaotic aftermath of the failed 30 September coup into a nationwide purge of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). The memo captures the raw, on‑the‑ground sense that Washington’s analysts had: a semi‑overt power struggle between President Sukarno and the army, a rapidly expanding campaign of mass executions, and the early signs of a new military‑dominated political order.
The document belongs to the broader episode of the 1965‑66 Indonesian mass killings, a watershed that reshaped Southeast Asian geopolitics. Within weeks of the alleged coup, the army seized the initiative, framing the PKI as the existential threat to the nation. By the end of 1965, an estimated half‑million people had been killed, and Suharto emerged as the de‑facto ruler, eventually eclipsing Sukarno. The Airgram is a snapshot of the transition from a chaotic, faction‑filled crisis to a more coordinated, army‑led repression.
Key Actors and Their Calculated Moves
The memo mentions several Indonesian figures whose actions reveal the shifting balance of power. General Nasution, the army’s senior elder, is portrayed as cautious: he publicly re‑asserts the campaign against the PKI but balks at any overt move against Sukarno, fearing accusations of a “generals’ coup.” His hint at a four‑to‑six‑month timetable for neutralising Sukarno suggests that the army was already planning a systematic sidelining of the president, not merely a reactionary purge.
General Suharto, on the other hand, is depicted as the operative force. The Airgram records his orchestration of a “new‑style” KOTI (Supreme Operations Command) staff that excises Sukarno loyalists such as Subandrio, Achmadi, and Jusuf Muda Dalam. By reshaping the command structure, Suharto not only consolidates military control over policy implementation but also symbolically removes the president’s inner circle from the decision‑making core.
President Sukarno himself is characterised in stark terms—“petulant, megalomaniac”—reflecting the embassy’s perception of his diminishing authority. His speech at Bogor Palace, meant to rally the nation, instead reinforced his isolation: he threatened journalists, lectured commanders on revolutionary theory, and failed to deliver any substantive policy shift. The memo notes that 387 military officers present deemed the meeting “useless,” a tacit acknowledgement that the army no longer needed Sukarno’s endorsement to act.
What the Airgram Reveals Between the Lines
Beyond the explicit description of meetings and executions, the document hints at deeper dynamics. The repeated reference to “Moslem youth groups” assisting in the killing of PKI prisoners indicates that the anti‑communist purge was not solely a military operation but a broader societal mobilisation, co‑opted by religious elements that the army could harness to legitise its actions.
The memo’s estimate of 5,000‑10,000 PKI leaders executed in “recent weeks,” while likely inflated, underscores the embassy’s awareness of the scale of violence and its difficulty in obtaining reliable figures. The mention of rumors about high‑ranking communists such as Njoto and Lukman being in army hands signals that the embassy was monitoring the potential for a leadership vacuum that could either destabilise the purge or be used by the army to claim a decisive victory.
Finally, the Airgram’s focus on press control—Sukarno’s accusations against newspapers and the army’s directive that student political activity be funneled through the anti‑communist KAMI—shows a parallel battle for narrative dominance. The United States, already wary of Sukarno’s left‑leaning foreign policy, would interpret these developments as a window for increased influence under a more reliably anti‑communist regime.
Legacy of the Document
Airgram A‑353 is valuable not because it offers new facts, but because it crystallises the U.S. diplomatic community’s real‑time assessment of a regime in flux. The language conveys the embassy’s mixture of alarm (mass killings) and strategic optimism (army’s willingness to marginalise Sukarno). Scholars have used such cables to trace how Washington calibrated its support for Suharto, eventually providing political cover and aid that facilitated Indonesia’s turn toward the West. The memo thus helps explain why the 1965‑66 purge, once a regional tragedy, became a cornerstone of Cold War realignment in Southeast Asia.
POL 2-1 This document consists of 4 pages. Copy 2 of 40 copies. Series A Secret SECRET A-353 FILE SEC STATE WASHINGTON GROUP 2 - EXEMPT INFO: BANGKOK, CANBERRA, COLOMBO, KARACHI, KUALA LUMPUR, MANILA, MEDAN, NEW DELHI, RANGOON, SAIGON, SINGAPORE, SURABAYA, TAIPEI, TOKYO, CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, COMTD, COMSEVENTHFLT, COMMAFIL, CINCPACAF, 13th AF Manila; Cdr. US Nav. Forces Marianas; Cdr. 5th AS, Fuchu AS, Japan; Co. 500th Intc. Grp. November 30, 1965 Amembassy DJAKARTA JOINT WEEKA NO. 45 DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 67289 This Weeka covers the period November 15 - 24. POLITICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL-MILITARY
- Army-Sukarno Tug-of-War and its Ramifications A. The semi-overt struggle between Sukarno and military leaders for ultimate political power in Indonesia remained in the center of the stage during the reporting period, although it became increasingly apparent that under cover of this dispute, changes were occurring pointing toward the growth of more freedom to criticize and operate politically for moderate elements long submerged by the Sukarno- PKI forces. B. In a series of meetings with youth leaders from several parties, General Nasution expressed his determination early last week to continue the campaign to repress the PKI, which has reached the stage of mass executions in several Indonesian provinces, apparently at the behest of General Suharto in Central Java at least. Nasution rejected the youth's demands for the Army to move directly against Sukarno, however, indicating that this would open the military to charges that a Generals' Coup had been planned for October 5, as the 30th September Movement had claimed. He indicated that the military had a plan of action, although he did not explain further, and from other reports it appears the Army may have a time schedule of from four to six months for toppling or at least totally neutralizing Sukarno. C. Part of this plan may have been embodied in several military victories during the week which demonstrated the Army's SECRET POL:RCRowland/ac 11/26/65 POL:EHMasters Secret
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strength and Sukarno's weakness. On November 15, Sukarno met with Nasution and the four service chiefs. Following the meeting, General Suharto announced that all regional and unit armed forces commanders were being called to Bogor Palace the following Saturday for an address by Sukarno. Suharto also announced that the proposed reorganization of the Supreme Operations Command (KOTI) had been prepared, and would be announced during the week at a "special occasion," giving rise to belief that Saturday would provide the occasion. On Friday, West Java Army Commander Adjie with a tortuously-worded statement effectively banned the PKI and Baperki in his district, thus giving rise to speculation that Sukarno had finally agreed to do the same for all Indonesia, since Adjie's close relationship to Sukarno is widely known. However, there were rumors during the week that Sukarno had attempted (with unknown success) to bribe some of the Moslem party leaders to drop the attack on the PKI. It was also reported that he had threatened to ban two other parties, IP-KI and the PSII, instead if they did not stop "arousing emotions," a Sukarno euphemism for attacking Subandrio and the PKI.
D. But on the appointed day, Sukarno did no more than deliver a petulant, megalomaniac speech in which he threatened to arrest reporters if they continued "arousing emotions," lectured the military commanders on the nature of the Indonesian revolution, and attempted to restore and gild his image as the sole spokesman of the Indonesian people. The military officers present - 387 in number - generally believed the meeting to be useless, although it did provide them an opportunity to consult each other. Some commanders reportedly expressed the opinion that Sukarno was batty. And two days later General Suharto "inaugurated" a "new-style" KOTI staff in which the names of Sukarnoites Subandrio, Achmadi and Jusuf Muda Dalam, formerly chairmen of staff groups, did not appear. Although a leading anti-communist general was also excluded, the symbolic importance of this exercise lay in the Army's success in removing their adversaries from a key policy-implementation body.
E. There were a number of other areas where the Army displayed strength at Sukarno's expense. Although at Sukarno's order Djakarta Military Commander Umar had relinquished his War Administrator (Peperda) status the preceding week, [illegible] he announced that the regulations and tasks to be implemented in his normal status as "Dwikora Executive" would remain the same as during the State of War. This appeared to be the case, as the Army continued to round up and arrest communists, demonstrate its partial control of the information media, and, at one point, provide protection to a vocal anti-Subandrio agent who had been arrested at the Palace's orders. Umar also reportedly prevented the occurrence of several pro-Subandrio demonstrations planned by Achmadi, and issued an order that all political activities of university students would henceforth be conducted under the aegis of the anti-communist association "KAMI," rather than by other leftist-infiltrated organizations.
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F. Meanwhile, both in the provinces and Djakarta, repression of the PKI continued, with the main problem that of what to feed and where to house the prisoners. Many provinces appear to be successfully meeting this problem by executing their PKI prisoners, or by killing them before they are captured, a task in which Moslem youth groups are providing assistance. There were several rumors that Njoto, Oei Tjoe Tat, Lukman, Armunanto, and other high-ranking communists or sympathizers are now in Army hands, and this may be true in some cases. There were no indications that PKI resistance has been significant in any provinces where major purges are being pursued, although indications of trouble in some parts of Sumatra have been registered. If all figures received are added up, a total of anywhere from 5,000-10,000 PKI leaders and activists have been reported executed in recent weeks, although this is probably grossly exaggerated.
G. One of the key fields in which the struggle between Sukarno and the Army-moderate-Moslem side broke through to the surface is that of the Djakarta press. At his speech on Saturday, the President devoted a majority of his time to the press, accusing inter alia General Sukendro's Api and General Sugandhi's Djakarta Daily Mail of having attacked "Nefo comrades" North Vietnam and Cambodia. Api immediately carried a denial of the President's words in the Saturday afternoon edition of its "weekly" and that night, at a "friendly gathering" hosted by the President for reporters at Bogor, offered to lock itself up if his words were true. According to Antara, the President back-tracked, and corrected himself, thus performing like Subandrio who several weeks earlier had accused several newspapers of being financed by the CIA, then retracted his remark under pressure. Api's confronting Sukarno, Sukarno's retracting his words, and Antara's printing the item are all examples of the phenomenal changes that have recently taken place in Indonesia. A day later, however, Api admitted it had attacked North Vietnam, and retracted its denial.
H. Another key aspect of the press hassle has been Information Minister Achmadi's confused behavior after issuing a series of press regulations at Sukarno's orders in an attempt to dampen the efforts of the anti-communist forces. Faced with mounting protests by political parties, Achmadi has wavered back and forth in such a confusing manner that his authority to supervise the press field seems grievously weakened. In conjunction with the increasing tendency of the press to raise its sights toward Sukarno, here was another admission of political weakness for the Palace forces. The final touch was added when Api carried a long editorial praising the Sultan of Jogjakarta, whose status as a possible Sukarno replacement and even rival is a matter of wide though never publicly stated knowledge in Indonesia. According to reports, Api, if it is not banned by Saturday, intends to carry in its weekly an article recommending a return to the true provisions of the 1945 Constitution, which limits the President to a five-year term and provides for a Vice-President.
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I. Among other events of significance during the week were the banning of the PKI in the province of Maluku, the "retooling" of pro-communist Governor Sitepu of North Sumatra, the transfer of "Dwikora Executive" authority in Bali from the Governor (a crypto-communist) to the Military Commander (a leftist) and the growing strength of the expelled right-wing leaders of the PNI, who are now publishing their own newspaper and apparently garnering support among PNI branches disaffected with the pro-communist Ali Sastroamidjojo leadership. An anti-Chinese riot in Makassar reportedly caused the destruction, without looting, of 90 percent of the Chinese homes and shops in that city, and resulted in two more Ghicom protests and the imposition of a strict curfew by the military commander of that region. Relations with the Chinese Communists continued very chilly during the reporting period, despite efforts by Subandrio and Sukarno to gloss things over. All Chinese technicians have been withdrawn from the Conefo project, and both trade and aid are at a standstill.
J. Underlying the events of the week has been the growth of a new atmosphere in Djakarta, which though barely perceptible at this time, gives promise of taking hold. The apparent readiness of the Army, Moslems, and other moderates to disobey Sukarno in overt as well as subtle ways has helped to dissipate the pall of fear and suspicion which has shrouded this city for so long, and with the PKI in disarray, groups which in the past would have been too paralyzed to operate politically are emerging into the open. Evidences of these significant developments show up in various ways. A campaign is just beginning which, if it succeeds, may lead to the showing of American movies in Indonesia; even such a pro-Sukarno organ as the Indonesian Herald has editorialized that both anti-imperialist and pro-imperialist books should be available so that readers may formulate opinions based on "philosophical truth." The thrust of the Indonesian revolution toward totalitarian controls on expression and behavior has clearly stalled; as time passes, it will be increasingly difficult for Sukarno to start it rolling again.
For the Ambassador:
Edward E. Masters Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs
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