Telegram 1425 from American Embassy Jakarta to Secretary of State, Secret
National Security Archive
The November 12, 1965 Jakarta telegram captures U.S. diplomats racing to decode Sukarno’s defiant speech, army maneuvers, and the early sparks of Indonesia’s deadly anti‑communist purge.
Source: Telegram 1425 from American Embassy Jakarta to Secretary of State, Secret Date: Nov 12, 1965 Archive: RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 14, Folder 5 pol 23-9 Sept 30th Mvt Nov 10-19 1965 Collection: U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder 1965 Oct 17, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
A Crisis in the Making: Jakarta’s Telegram 1425
The November 12, 1965 dispatch from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta is a snapshot of the chaotic power struggle that erupted after the failed coup of 30 September 1965. Within hours of President Sukarno’s defiant speech on November 10, American diplomats were scrambling to interpret a rapidly shifting battlefield where the army, the president, and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) vied for dominance. The telegram, marked “SECRET” and circulated to the State Department, CIA, CINCPAC, the Pentagon and the White House, was not a routine political report; it was a high‑priority intelligence product intended to inform policy makers about the immediate risks to U.S. interests in a country that was, until weeks earlier, a cornerstone of Jakarta’s non‑aligned foreign policy.
The document’s opening paragraph captures the essence of the moment: Sukarno’s speech displayed “authority and determination,” unsettling the so‑called moderates who feared a resurgence of presidential power. The telegram notes that the army’s “information sources reported no signs of fighting” yet acknowledges a “lack of order” in the media sphere. This juxtaposition reveals how U.S. observers sensed a veneer of calm over a deeper instability. The mention of “anti‑communist drive” and a “destructive anti‑Chinese riot in Makassar” hints at the burgeoning violence that would soon become the mass killings of 1965‑66, a campaign that eliminated an estimated half‑million suspected communists and reshaped Indonesia’s political landscape.
The Players and Their Signals
The telegram names three Indonesian actors whose statements the embassy deemed worth tracking: General Abdul Haris Nasution, Minister of Defense and former army chief; Deputy Foreign Minister Ganis Harsono, who relayed palace optimism; and General Suharto, who was already exercising de‑facto authority as commander of the army’s strategic reserve. Nasution’s terse press comments—refusing to elaborate on the president’s health or the “five recommendations” the army had submitted—signal a cautious, perhaps calculated, silence. By contrast, Harsono’s upbeat assessment that Sukarno would “re‑establish his hold” and that Subandrio (the foreign minister and a left‑leaning figure) would remain in office reflects a palace narrative aimed at projecting continuity, even as the army was quietly consolidating power. The telegram’s annotation that Harsono’s confidence “undoubtedly forced to some extent to impress us” betrays the diplomats’ skepticism and suggests they sensed a performative element in the official discourse.
General Umar’s declaration that his wartime orders would stay in effect despite the formal lifting of martial law, and the transfer of Radio Indonesia’s control from the army to a civilian appointee, illustrate how the military was both loosening and retaining influence over key levers of information. The embassy’s observation that the army’s information chief, General Ibnu Subroto, emphasized the move was not meant to diminish the army’s authority underscores the delicate balancing act the armed forces were performing: projecting a return to civilian governance while preserving strategic control.
What the Telegram Reveals Beyond the Headlines
Because the telegram is a raw diplomatic cable, it does not spell out the scale of the violence that would follow, but its language is telling. The phrase “anti‑communist drive continues in provinces” and the reference to a “destructive anti‑Chinese riot” are thin descriptors for what historians now know were coordinated pogroms that targeted ethnic Chinese and alleged PKI supporters. The cable’s focus on “moderates’ concern” indicates that even within the U.S. diplomatic corps there were divergent expectations about whether the army would seize power outright or allow Sukarno to retain a façade of authority. The mention of “speculation as to what Army and political parties might do to head him off” shows that Washington was already weighing scenarios ranging from a negotiated power‑share to a full‑blown coup.
The document’s distribution list—CIA, CINCPAC, the Pentagon, the White House—highlights how the U.S. treated Indonesia as a theater of Cold War competition. The telegram’s classification as “CIA PRIORITY” and “CINCPAC PRIORITY” signals that the intelligence community was preparing contingency plans, a point corroborated by later declassified memos that discuss potential support for anti‑communist elements.
Legacy of the Jakarta Telegram
Telegram 1425 is a pivotal primary source for understanding the moment when Indonesia teetered between Sukarno’s guided democracy and the army’s emerging authoritarianism under Suharto. It captures the ambiguity of U.S. perception: a mixture of alarm, speculation, and an attempt to read between the official pronouncements of Indonesian leaders. The cable foreshadows the United States’ tacit acceptance of the army’s purge of the PKI, a stance that would shape bilateral relations for the next three decades of Suharto’s New Order.
For scholars, the telegram offers a window into how diplomatic cables functioned as both intelligence products and policy‑shaping tools. Its terse, often contradictory observations remind us that even the most secretive documents are filtered through the biases and limited access of their authors. As historians continue to reassess the 1965‑66 killings, Telegram 1425 stands as a reminder that the United States was not a passive observer; it was an active, if covert, participant in the political calculus that enabled one of the 20th century’s most brutal regime changes.
TELEGRAM
Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING AMBASSY DJAKARTA SECRET FILES COMM CHRON AID MIN RF POL POL ECON CAO ATTACHES SURABAJA (P) Charge: Classification Control: 455A This document consists of 8 pages. Date: Nov. 12, 1965 6:10 pm Copy 1 of 11 copies. Series A. ACTION TO: SECSTATE WASHINGTON IMMEDIATE 1425 CIA PRIORITY CINCPAC PRIORITY DOD PRIORITY WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY INFO : AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 132 AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 168 AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 243 AMEMBASSY LONDON 179 AMEMBASSY MANILA 389 AMCONSUL MEDAN 313 AMEMBASSY PARIS TOPOL TWO AMCONSUL SINGAPORE 225 AMCONSUL SURABAJA (POUCH) AMEMBASSY TOKYO 178 AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 98 CINCPAC FOR POLAD MANILA FOR FELG/RSO PARIS FOR USRO JOINT SITREP No. 51 SECRET SECRET Classification FORM FS-413 8-1-55 "Single-address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked UNLESS FROM DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 67289
TELEGRAM
Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING AMBASSY DJAKARTA
Charge: EMBASSY SECRET Classification -2- Control: Date:
General Situation as of 1800 November 12. Authority, determination and defiance displayed by President in his November 10 speech has caused concern among moderates that President will regain former power position and has aroused speculation as to what Army and political parties might do to head him off. Events of past two days have produced incomplete answers to these questions but indicate that some pessimism in relinquished control of Indonesian radio and showed no order. Army
information sources reported nosigns of fighting for other info media.AndMilitary leaders have generally adhered to firm line in public statements; we only permitted to guess as to private words Nasution had with Sukarno yesterday. Among political party leaders, previously vacillating NU Chairman advocated banning of PKI despite President's expressed distaste for such shoving, while PSII leader backed down from his party's attacks on First DepPriMin Subandrio. Although continuing to hit PKI, press has let up on Subandrio attacks which had cost some casualties. Anti-communist drive continues in provinces and destructive anti-Chinese riot occurred in Makassar.Moderates' Concern. Several Embassy sources who had previously displayed optimism over Army's chances of boxing in Sukarno state that there now widespread concern that Sukarno's display of authority and determination in November 10 speech
SECRET Classification
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
FORM FS-413 3-1-55
"Single-address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T".
PFRC, Japan
TELEGRAM
Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING AMBASSY DJAKARTA
Charge: SECRET Classification -3- Control: Date: presages renaissance of Presidential power. (Embtels 1406 and 1408 are representative of several views we have received.) 3. Palace Optimism. In conversation with DCM, DepFonMin Ganis Harsono stated Sukarno well on way to reestablishing his hold, that Subandrio will stay on and that Palace will dictate direction of Revolution while Army concentrated on difficult but menial tasks of restoring security and economy. Harsono indicated Army leaders had manufactured evidence against Subandrio and others and that President would investigate and determine invalidity of these charges. COMMENT: Harsono's confidence undoubtedly forced to some extent to impress us. 4. Army Stance. A. Nasution spent hour and half with President yesterday in their second meeting since September 30 affair. Embassy has as yet no information on this crucial conversation other than Nasution's own terse and tantalizing answers to press queries. Na- sution stated that he had reported to President on state of his health and had noted he now working as usual. (Nasution's health was excuse given for his absence from cabinet meetings.) Nasution added that "his work" also discussed but declared he could say nothing further on that subject. Nasution said he wished to make
SECRET Classification UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED FORM FS-413 3-1-55 "Single address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T". PPRC, Japan
TELEGRAM
Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING EMBASSY DJAKARTA
SECRET Charge: Embassy Classification Control:
-4- Date:
clear that President and Armed Forces were united in accomplish- ing their tasks. Asked whether he had brought up Army's five recommendations to President (Sitrep 36), Nasution replied that he could not "go so far as to discuss this question." Some newspapers also reported that Nasution asked reporters to see Subandrio when queried on purge of intelligence bodies. Others stated question applied to purge of security organs and Nasution referred reporters to General Suharto.
B. Djakarta Commander General Umar announced that his orders issued as War Administrator would remain in effect until rescinded despite lifting of martial law. COMMENT: Umar did not mention what authority could rescind these orders, but his instructions concerning press have already been bypassed by MinInfo Achmadi.
C. Supervision of Radio Indonesia transferred today from Army caretaker to new civilian chief appointed by MinInfo Achmadi. Speaking at transfer ceremony Army Information Chief General Ibnu Subroto noted Army was responsible for radio broad- casts under General Suharto's October 1 order/that this situation but was not intended to decrease authority of Achmadi. COMMENT: Transfer indicates Achmadi's authority has in fact been increased in accordance with President's wish to return information media
SECRET Classification UNLESS ENCLASSIFIED REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
FORM FS-413 8-1-55 "Single address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch appropriate to the classification of the message; without retyping Type By Pouch after the address, mail the serial number and pouch of envelope marked "For DC 1"" PPBC Japan
TELEGRAM
Foreign Service of the United States of America
OUTGOING AMBASSY DJAKARTA
Charge: Embassy SECRET Classification Control: -5- Date:
to Palace control.
- Political Party Reaction.
A. NU General Chairman Idham Chalid, who old Sukarno sycophant and whose determination to stand up to President had been questioned by his cadres, finally gave forth with anti-PKI statement. Chalid said Indonesians must reject myths that Revolution without PKI would be rightist, that people could not be mobilized without help of PKI and that production would drop without PKI unions and peasant affiliates. (Although these remarks published in today's newspapers, they may have been made before President's November 10 speech.) NU Third Chairman Sjaichu made post-November 10 statement warning that as long as PKI allowed to exist more rebellions would occur.
B. PSII Chairman Arudji Kartawinata issued statement denying that he had written President not to send Subandrio to Algiers Conference and somewhat circuitously disclaiming responsibility for his party's attacks on Subandrio. Statement which has as yet appeared only in FonDept controlled English language Indonesian [illegible] Herald was apparently signed on Subandrio's request.
SECRET Classification
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
FORM FS-413 9-1-55
"Single address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T"."
PPRC, Japan
TELEGRAM
Foreign Service of the
United States of America
OUTGOING
AMBASSY DJAKARTA
Charge: Embassy
SECRET
Classification
-6-
Control:
Date:
6. Press Attitude.
A. One of two banned PSII dailies reappeared today with
quotations from the Koran in columns previously devoted to anti-
Subandrio copy. If Api, which we understand will publish Saturday
as weekly, has been similarly chastened, Subandrio has bested his
most outspoken opponents.
B. One notable spark of defiance to Palace, however,
appeared in editorial of Moslem daily Duta Revolusi, which in
polite but challenging tones asked President to name and punish
recipient of alleged foreign bribe of 150 million rupiah
(Sitrep 50 ). Noting that spy who used signed receipt was either
green or stupid, editorial said that if charges false, person
who made them should be punished. COMMENT: Duta Revolusi
probably making most of last days left it by new press regulations.
C. In rapid response to President's warning (Sitrep 50 ),
Indonesian Journalists Association issued instructions to all
newspapers to eschew editorials, corner columns, and caricatures,
which arouse emotions. While disclaiming intention to dampen
press' ardor in assisting Armed Forces, instruction asked journalists
to aim pens at Nekolim.
7. Security Situation.
A. South Sulawesi. Sulawesi Protestant leader arriving
SECRET
Classification
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION
FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
FORM FS-413
"Single address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without
retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/I"".
PPRC, Japan
TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the United States of America
OUTGOING AMBASSY DJAKARTA
Charge: Embassy SECRET Classification Control: -7- Date:
Djakarta today reported 90% of Chinese shops in Makassar raided and contents destroyed during November 10 riot which reportedly involved virtually entire population. Riot apparently carefully managed to exclude looting and was in response both to discovery of PKI arms cache and to Chinese merchants' failure to lower prices. Crowds were reportedly prevented by military from entering Chicom Consulate.
B. Southeast Sulawesi. Indonesian Protestant leader also reported extensive anti-PKI violence in Buginese area of Sulawesi. Moslems in Bone reportedly broke into detention camp and killed 200 PKI prisoners.
C. Central Java. Band of 50 communists killed five civilians in Kudus area of Central Java on November 7, according Army release. American journalist just returned from Central Java states Army seems have situation well in hand although PKI has potential capability of greater sabotage and terrorist activity than so far experienced. Army claims that villagers on Merapi slopes now volunteering intelligence. Military spokesmen continue report that Aidit holed up in Merapi area with Djakarta PKI chief Njono (who previously reported under arrest here), September 30 Movement leader Colonel Suherman and several other military officers. Embassy has received conflicting story
SECRET Classification UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
FORM FS-413 3-1-55 "Single-address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T"." PPRC, Japan
TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the United States of America
OUTGOING AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
Charge: Embassy SECRET Classification -8- Control: Date:
that Aidit imprisoned in Bandung and that Army reports to contrary simply designed hide his arrest (Embtel 1408). Army announced that Central Java Deputy Governor placed under house arrest for alleged complicity in September 30 Movement.
D. East Java. Western correspondent has received report which we unable confirm that Indonesian warships sent to investigate report of Bloc vessels cruising off Patjitan.
E. Djakarta. Djakarta police claim to have XXXXXX arrested total of 872 persons implicated in September 30 Movement. Joint Army-Civil Defense-youth operation in Tanggerang area near Djakarta nabbed 346 PKI elements, according press report.
GP-3.
GREEN [signature]
POL:MVTrent______ [efr] POL:PFGardner:efr 11/12/65
SECRET Classification UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED "Single address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T". FORM FS-613 8-1-66 PPRC, Japan
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