Telegram 1290 from American Embassy Jakarta to Department of State, Confidential
National Security Archive
A 1965 Jakarta telegram shows U.S. diplomats watching the army’s crackdown on communists turn into a scramble to protect oil refineries and American families.
Source: Telegram 1290 from American Embassy Jakarta to Department of State, Confidential Date: Nov 1, 1965 Archive: RG 84, Entry P 339, Jakarta Embassy Files, Box 14, Folder 4 pol 23-9 September 30th Mvt November 1-9, 1965 Collection: U.S. Embassy Tracked Indonesia Mass Murder 1965 Oct 17, 2017
Editorial Analysis
Original analysis by the DriftSeas editorial desk. The complete primary-source document, transcribed from the National Security Archive scan, appears in full below.
Jakarta in the Eye of the 1965 Crisis
The telegram dated 1 November 1965 is a routine‑style security briefing sent from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta to the State Department, yet its contents illuminate the chaotic aftermath of the September‑October coup attempt that toppled President Sukarno and unleashed a wave of anti‑communist violence across Indonesia. Written just weeks after the army’s “purge” of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), the dispatch focuses on the oil sector in Central Sumatra—a strategic linchpin for both the Indonesian economy and U.S. interests. It reports that roughly 600 suspected communists have already been detained, that senior officials of the state‑linked oil workers’ union (PERBUM) are in custody, and that the military is bolstering guard forces at the Shell and Stanvac refineries to prevent sabotage. The tone oscillates between factual observation and urgent warning, revealing how quickly the U.S. diplomatic corps moved from watching a political crisis to managing the security of American‑owned energy assets.
The wider episode: the 1965–66 anti‑communist purge
Indonesia’s 1965 crisis was not a single coup but a cascade of events that reshaped Southeast Asia. After an alleged PKI‑backed kidnapping of army generals on 30 September, General Suharto seized the initiative, positioning the army as the nation’s saviour against a “Red” threat. Over the next six months an estimated 500,000 to 1 million people were killed in a campaign of extrajudicial killings, mass arrests, and forced relocations. The purge eliminated the PKI as a political force, ushered in Suharto’s “New Order” regime, and realigned Indonesia firmly with the West during the Cold War. The telegram captures a micro‑cosm of that larger transformation: the military’s willingness to intervene directly in industrial production, the targeting of union leaders, and the pre‑emptive steps taken to protect foreign capital.
Actors and what they reveal
The document names several key figures. Maj‑Gen. Ibnu Sutowo, Indonesia’s minister for oil and natural gas, appears as a pragmatic, security‑focused bureaucrat who orders additional army troops to guard refineries and contemplates transferring 1,000 workers to “make‑work” projects to tighten supervision. His actions suggest a convergence of state and military priorities—protecting revenue streams while demonstrating loyalty to the anti‑communist agenda. The American managers—Stanvac’s Tong (??) and Shell’s Dutch officers—provide a contrasting perspective. While Stanvac’s American staff are visibly anxious, planning evacuations and urging the reduction of dependents, Shell’s Dutch management downplays sabotage risks and refuses to send families home. This divergence hints at differing corporate risk assessments and perhaps varying degrees of entanglement with local political factions.
The telegram also notes that “lists” of individuals slated for execution were compiled by the army, including both Indonesians and foreign staff. Although the message does not confirm any foreign deaths, the very existence of such lists underscores the lawlessness of the period and the thin line between anti‑communist zeal and indiscriminate violence. The U.S. embassy’s awareness of these lists indicates that Washington was receiving granular intelligence on ground‑level reprisals, not merely high‑level political analysis.
Reading between the lines
Beyond the explicit facts, the telegram hints at several deeper dynamics. First, the emphasis on “voluntary” indoor lockdowns by refinery workers suggests that fear, not just orders, was dictating behavior—an early sign of a climate of terror that would later spread to villages and towns nationwide. Second, the reference to “third‑state nationals” (German, Swiss, etc.) contemplating departure reflects the broader exodus of foreign expertise, a brain‑drain that would complicate Indonesia’s post‑purge reconstruction. Third, the embassy’s mention that “Indo military forces friendly, especially Air Force and Navy” implies that the United States still expected cooperation from the Indonesian armed forces despite the chaotic power shift, a confidence that would later be tested as Suharto consolidated power.
Finally, the document’s classification as “Confidential” rather than “Secret” suggests that, at the time, Washington did not yet view the situation as a direct threat to national security, but rather as a regional stability issue with commercial implications. The focus on safeguarding oil output—vital for U.S. military logistics in the Pacific—reveals the pragmatic calculus that often underpinned Cold‑War diplomacy.
Legacy
The telegram is a snapshot of a pivotal moment when Indonesia’s internal upheaval intersected with global strategic interests. It shows how U.S. diplomatic reporting moved from political observation to operational concern for American corporate assets, foreshadowing later U.S. involvement in Indonesia’s economic development under Suharto. The document also provides concrete evidence of the military’s willingness to intertwine security operations with economic control—a pattern that would become a hallmark of the New Order’s authoritarian rule. For historians, the telegram enriches the evidentiary base on how foreign embassies perceived and reacted to the 1965‑66 purges, adding nuance to the narrative that often reduces the period to a monolithic “anti‑communist massacre.” Its declassification allows us to trace the early stages of a partnership that would shape Indonesia’s trajectory for three decades.
TELEGRAM
Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA [P 2-6]
FILES COMM CHRON AMB MIN RF POL POL LAB/POL ECON
Charge: Embassy CONFIDENTIAL Classification CONFIDENTIAL Control: 25A Date: Nov 1, 1965 8 PM
ACTION TO: SECSTATE WASHINGTON 1290 INFO : AMEMBASSY MANILA 367 MANILA FOR FELG
- General.
a. In contrast relaxed situation Central Sumatra (Embtel 1272) LabAtt visiting Palembang, S. Sumatra Oct 28-29 found atmosphere tense. Reportedly 600 communists already jailed and arrests continuing. Top SOBSI officials at both Shell and Stanvac refineries and at PUSRI Fertilizer Plant among those picked up. Some domestic ser- vants of foreign staff at both refineries also arrested. Local staff both companies voluntarily remaining indoors at night. Stanvac foreign staff forbidden to visit Palembang City as Army and police contacts say skirmishes occurring among communist and anti-communist elements.
b. Maj Gen Ibnu Sutowo, Minister of State for Oil and Natural Gas Affairs, inspecting
CONFIDENTIAL Classification FORM FS-413 9-1-55 "Single address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "P" UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 67257
TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA CONFIDENTIAL Charge: Embassy Classification Control: -2- Date: refineries Oct 27-28 warned both managers if communists turn to violence their installations will be focal points of attack as means denying government foreign currency earnings and gasoline on which military and economy are dependent. Army security guards increased by Ibnu to provide better protection against sabotage. Shell official told by Indo authorities Army found lists both of per- sons communists would "butcher" and those assigned to do the butchering. Former list said to include no foreigners but both military and civilians including some Shell Indo staff. Latter list included two Shell-employed security guards. 2. Stanvac. a. Most Americans in area are Stanvac employees and dependents; 46 families, most at refinery Sungaigerong others at Lirik and Pendopo fields. Sumatra Manager Tongish desirous of reducing number dependents. Plans underway to CONFIDENTIAL Classification UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED FORM FS-413 3-1-55 "Single address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T"." FPRC, Japan
TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the
United States of America
OUTGOING AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
CONFIDENTIAL
Charge: Embassy Classification Control:
-3- Date:
bring all families into refinery camp and employees
"not discouraged" from returning dependents to point
of hire and collecting separation allowance.
b. Tongish reported Gen. Ibnu feels one
type of sabotage could be incidents against foreign
staff which would both discredit Army and disrupt
production. 120 additional Army troops being assigned
as security guards at Ibnu's direction. Six families
(four American two of 3rd state nationals) departing
immediately. German and Swiss employees old enough
to recall WW II and subsequent communist activities
in Europe also appear on verge of leaving. (There
are 11 families of 3rd state nationals at Stanvac.)
c. Army has picked up about 30 Indo
employees including all leaders communist oil workers
union, PERBUM. Some domestic servants and/or their
relatives living in the camp were also arrested.
Indo personnel manager at Stanvac and Dutch Shell
officer both feel enough PERBUM leadership picked
CONFIDENTIAL
Classification
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION
FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
FORM FS-413
8-1-55
"Single-address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without
retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T".
FPBC, Japan
TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA CONFIDENTIAL Charge: Embassy Classification Control: -4- strikes Date: up to prevent launching effective or slow- down, but that not all hard-core communists yet arrested so potential for sabotage remains. Each official independently estimated another 50 to 75 were such individuals/still at work. d. To reduce further opportunities for sabotage Gen. Ibnu considering Stanvac plan whereby excess refinery employees (at least 1000 out of 3500 see Emb A-527 and A-536 Dec '63) should be trans- ferred to make-work projects outside refinery area leaving remaining workers much more easily supervised. e. While Tongish working hard to reduce number total/foreign dependents aboard, thus minimizing problem if total evacuation necessary, he does not intend relying on USG assistance in evacuation since always six to ten ships, at least half non-Indo, loading or waiting to load at refineries. Assuming Indo military forces friendly, especially Air Force and Navy, evacuation would be relatively simple and safe. CONFIDENTIAL Classification UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED FORM FS-413 3-1-55 "Single-address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T". PPRC, Japan
TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA CONFIDENTIAL Charge: Embassy Classification Control: -5- Date: 3. Shell. a. Two American employees in foreign staff of 20; both have wives with them but no other dependents. Fifth American is wife of Dutch employee. Unlike Stanvac neither the management nor Americans were concerned over Indo political situation. Latter not considering send- ing wives home. Shell imposed no restrictions on travel to Palembang. Management now Dutch, most with many years Indo experience, look for favorable trend in future. Thievery not sabotage they claim is main problem. Gen. Ibnu's contention that recent refinery fire was sabotage they categorically deny. (They confirm production not affected by fire since what crude Pladju couldn't handle because of accident Shell refinery in Balikpapan did. By mid-Nov all damage caused by fire will have been repaired.) On Oct 29, 40 additional Army guards had been assigned to Pladju. b. 24 PERBUM members picked up by Army at the Pladju refinery and 35 at Prabumulih oil fields. CONFIDENTIAL Classification UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED FORM FS-413 "Single address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T". FFBC, Japan
TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the
United States of America OUTGOING AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
Charge: Embassy CONFIDENTIAL Classification -6- Control: Date:
In Shell two domestic servants were picked up but here again the Dutch were complacent. Army respect- fully told Dutch official his cook was suspect and would be arrested. "But not till after lunch," said Dutchman, "I've a big party planned." Arrest made after lunch.
- Oil Company Relations with GOI. a. Both companies are hampered in their operations by GOI supervisory teams. Any tendency towards a responsible attitude on problems brought up by the teams was strenuously fought by union members even though PERBUM no longer represented. However teams have not interfered in personnel management or labor relations matters as much as could be expected. Both companies report teams' major preoccupation is securing more prerogatives for their members. b. Stanvac officials in Sumatra believe the coup and subsequent events will have no effect on progress of negotiations with GOI on sale of refinery,
CONFIDENTIAL Classification UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
FORM FS-413 3-1-55 "Single-address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T"." FPRC, Japan
TELEGRAM Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA CONFIDENTIAL Charge: Embassy Classification Control: -7- Date: feeling the Army is sensitive to possible criticism should it attempt to alter or slowdown takeover plans. Shell management more optimistic hoping for return to a "rational approach" recognizing the importance of foreign management in maintaining production levels. 5. PUSRI Fertilizer Plant. Two Americans employed under GOI contract with W. C. Shroeder Co. One employee has wife and daughter at plant. Con- tractor provides no separation plan and employee not considering return of dependents. Indo labor force 1300 of which Army has arrested 15 SOBSI union leaders. 6. Contingency Planning for Evacuation. Stanvac agreeable to serving as focal point thru which Emb can maintain contact with Americans in Palembang area. Choice natural since refinery has continuing voice radio contact with Djakarta office close to Embassy. Company's Sumatra personnel chief accompanied LabAtt CONFIDENTIAL Classification UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED FORM FS-413 3-1-55 "Single address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T". FPRC, Japan
TELEGRAM
Foreign Service of the United States of America OUTGOING AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
Charge: Embassy Classification CONFIDENTIAL Control: Date:
-8-
on visits to American employees in Shell and PUSRI.
If evacuation necessary, Stanvac could not only pass word promptly thru community but help all Americans to find transportation aboard tankers.
GP-3.
POL:EEMasters [PMM]
GREEN [465]
[scribble]
Clearance: [Initial] ECON/P. McCusker (in draft)
LAB/POL:HGFhrig:jr:efr [Initial] 11/1/65 [Initial]
CONFIDENTIAL Classification
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS NOT AUTHORIZED
FORM FS-413 3-1-55
"Single address messages to the Department can be diverted to pouch (appropriate to the classification of the message) without retyping. Type "By Pouch" after the address, omit the serial number, and pouch in envelope marked "For DC/T".
FPRC, Japan
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